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The Common Good in a Plural Society: 
Muslims, Christians and the Public Arena in Britain 
Abstract 
This thesis develops an idea of how the common good might be pursued in a plural society, 
beginning from Jonathan Sacks' vision of such a society as a'community of communities'. It 
does so principally by developing Alasdair Maclnytre's concept of 'tradition'. Chapter 1 
begins by assembling conceptual tools for the task, drawing on the work of scholars from a 
variety of disciplines. These include understandings of morality, plurality, community 
relations, the common good, the public arena, and modernity. 
Chapter 2 begins to refine these tools through a case study of The Satanic Verses 
controversy. The analysis is achieved principally by viewing the controversy in terms of a 
conflict between two communities of interpretation, a'literary community' and 'the British 
Muslim community'. While it is recognised that these constructs are over-simplistic, it is 
argued that the conflict can most fairly be viewed by seeing participants in the controversy as 
members of communities of interpretation, each with their own history, practices and 
identities at stake. In the course of the chapter, the 'literary community' is identified as 
broadly 'liberal' in outlook. Liberalism is then the topic of Chapter 3, in particular recent 
theoretical formulations of liberalism in the work of Rawls, Kymlicka and Galston, and their 
application of liberal theory to minority cultures in plural secularised societies. 
Chapter 4 provides an account of the failure of such liberal approaches according to 
Maclntyre, developing his concept of tradition as an alternative way to safeguard the integrity 
of individuals and communities, and to pursue the common good in a plural society. Chapters 
5 and 6 seek to understand aspects of British Muslim and Christian communities respectively 
in the light of this analysis, in particular their inter-relationship with British society, and their 
contribution to the common good. Chapter 7 then problematises and refines the concept of 
tradition through an examination of the work of John Milbank, suggesting an understanding 
of tradition which combines teleological orientation, emphasis on concrete cultural practices 
and recognition of difference. Finally, Chapter 8 applies this refined concept of tradition to 
two contested fields; the international debate on Islam and human rights, and multicultural, 
citizenship and religious education in schools in England and Wales. 
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Chapter 1: 
Plural Societies and the Common Good 
1.1 The 'Common Good': Introduction 
The primary question for any cultural institution anywhere, now that nobody is leaving 
anyone else alone and isn't ever again going to, is not whether everything is going to come 
seamlessly together, or whether, contrariwise, we are all going to persist in our separate 
prejudices. It is whether human beings are going to be able, in Java or Connecticut, through 
law, anthropology, or anything else, to imagine principled lives they can practically lead 
[together]. (Geertz 1983 p. 234) 
We have run up against the limits of a certain view of human society: one that believed that 
progress was open-ended, that there was no limit to economic growth, that conflict always 
had a political solution, and that all solutions always lay with either the individual or the 
state. We will search, as we have already begun to, for an ethical vocabulary of duties as well 
as rights; for a new language of environmental restraint; for communities of shared 
responsibility and support; for relationships more enduring than those of temporary 
compatibility; and for that sense that lies at the heart of the religious experience, that human 
life has a meaning beyond itself. (Sacks 1991 p. 10) 
In the first quotation, the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz frames the problem of the 
common good in modem plural societies. Today, through the multiple processes of 
globalization, I there is a heightened awareness of cultural diversity at national and global levels, 
and, at the same time, of an intertwining of all our destinies in this global context. Yet, as the 
second quotation illustrates, there is a simultaneous loss of confidence in many aspects of the 
Enlightenment dream of a global civilization. 2 
In his 1990-1 Reith lectures, Jonathan Sacks suggested that the decline of the influence of 
religious traditions in liberal societies means that we are running down our'moral reserves'. The 
consequent threat of nihilism and societal disintegration is now such that a re-evaluation of the 
relationship between liberalism and religious traditions is required. Liberal societies need to come 
to recognise the vital role of traditions and seek to sustain and nurture them. In response, Sacks 
offers a model of society as a "community of communities" (1991 p. 8), in which the life and 
interactions of communities, including religious communities, together provide some moral 
substance to sustain the public arena. Sacks sees liberal society as having driven itself to the 
limits of negative freedom, to a nihilist abyss, whose gaping blackness may lead society to turn 
again to the religious traditions which have always, in fact, been necessary to sustain public 
morality, but whose contribution remained unrecognised until the stock of moral capital ran 
dangerously low. 
'Perhaps most significantly, globalization of markets, media, migration, tourism and information 
technology (Featherstone ed. 1990). 
2For a similar diagnosis form a different perspective, see Gray 1995a. 
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Unfortunately, Sacks fails to perceive the fundamental relation between economic and ethical 
forms of exchange (Maclntyre 1985, Polanyi 1971, Habermas 1989). In his desire to reject the 
dominance of the economic in the understanding of society's problems he ends up separating the 
economic and ethical in precisely the liberal manner he condemns, a separation indicated in 
passages such as: 
... the problem 
[with our "social fabric"] lies not with our economic and political systems, but 
in a certain emptiness in our common life. (15 Nov. 1990 p. 4) 
Rather, the problem lies in the relationships between all three. However, given this qualification 
of Sacks' analysis, this thesis can read as an attempt to build an idea of the common good in a 
plural society based on Sacks' vision of a community of communities, principally by developing 
Alasdair Maclnytre's concept of 'tradition' (Maclnytre 1977,1985,1988,1991). Chapter 1 
begins by gathering and attempting to hone some conceptual tools for the task: understandings of 
plurality, community relations, the common good, the public arena, and modernity will all be 
discussed. Chapter 2 begins to refine these tools on a case study: The Satanic Verses controversy. 
Chapter 3 turns to theoretical formulations of liberalism, and their application to minority 
cultures in plural secularised societies. Chapter 4 provides an account of the failure of liberal 
approaches according to Maclntyre, developing his concept of tradition as an alternative. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then seek to understand aspects of British Muslim and Christian communities 
respectively, in the light of Chapter 4's analysis of Maclntyre. Chapter 7 problematises and 
refines this concept through the work of John Milbank. Finally, Chapter 8 seeks to apply the 
refined concept of tradition to two fields: the international debate on Islam and human rights, and 
the development of multicultural, citizenship and religious education in schools in England and 
Wales. 
But what does it mean to seek the common good in a plural society, in a society secularised and 
politically, economically, socially, culturally and religiously differentiated? The fortunes of the 
Anglican church suggest something of the problem in the British context. Until two hundred years 
ago the cultural hegemony of the established Anglican church could be assumed, guaranteed by a 
series of legal, economic and political privileges. Then, during the nineteenth century, the barriers 
against the public participation of non-conformists and Catholics were largely removed, leaving 
only the vestiges of privilege and establishment. 3 Mid-century, the 1851 census led to a 
questioning of the role of a national church which could no longer rely on the active participation 
of three quarters of the populace, and less of the working classes (Mann in Golby 1986 pp. 39- 
3For an account of these transformations see Best 1971 pp. 190-218; in a wider European context 
McLeod 1981 pp. 22-53. 
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44). In the century and a half since, attendance has largely continued to decline (Wolffe 1994 p. 
85). Meanwhile, since 1950, the numbers of non-Christian faith communities in the UK has risen 
rapidly (Weller ed. 1993 pp. 39-40). In short, at first sight, the Anglican church no longer 
appears a plausible religious institutional embodiment of the common good, although its 
representative status may, paradoxically, benefit other faith communities (Lewis 1994a). But 
first, to return to a broader canvas, what concept, practice or institution might plausibly make 
such a claim? Let us begin with a brief definition and historical sketch of the use of the term. 
The term 'the common good' can be used in its broadest sense to refer to anything jointly valued 
by a given community or communities. How this is perceived depends upon one's understanding 
of the relationship between the individual, society, and the cosmic order. Thus for the founding 
utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, as for other individualists, the interest of a community is no more 
than the aggregate of the interests of the individuals which comprise it, whereas for a Catholic 
thinker like Aquinas, human life is teleologically oriented towards fulfilment in Christ. Indeed, 
Langan (in Childress and Macquarrie eds. 1986 p. 102) goes so far as to describe the doctrine in 
Catholic teaching as the antithesis of the Benthamite position, because of the Catholic insistence 
on the necessity of appropriate institutions and social relations for human flourishing. For 
example, Dignitatis Humanae offers a definition of the common good as: 
the sum of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach 
their fulfilment more fully and more easily. (In Hannon 1992 p. 95) 
Since Aquinas, the common good has played a significant role in Catholic thought as the basis of 
political and legal legitimacy (De Gruchy 1995 p. 66; Abbott ed. 1967 p. 284). As a thread in 
Catholic social teaching, the common good can be traced back through Aquinas to Augustine, 
both of whom drew on classical sources, and forward to Maritain, Pope John XXIII and the 
conciliar documents of Vatican II (Langan in Childress and Macquarrie eds. 1986 p. 102). 
Maritain drew on the tradition of natural rights to balance the Thomist stress on the collective, an 
emphasis continued by John XXIII, and reflected at Vatican II, as the cited extract shows (Abbott 
ed. 1967 pp. 284-5). 
The strong collective component of the concept, even in its post-Maritain form, appears difficult 
to defend in an age which has seen the collapse of state socialism and the global penetration of 
market institutions based on individual consumer choice. Similarly problematic is the intellectual 
context of 'postmodern' thought, which threatens to unmask pretensions of common interest as 
diverse manifestations of the will to power. The concept is also beset by at least two further 
problems. Either it says too little - specifying only what is obviously recognised as necessary for 
everyone, such as food, warmth and shelter, or it specifies too much, such as a comprehensive 
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public welfare system, and becomes controversial, thus ceasing to be common. Further, even an 
expression which avoided banality or over-inclusion could be accused of being simply 
descriptive, and if devoid of critical or analytic teeth, then pointless and not worth stating. 
However, I have chosen to pursue the concept because in societies which are characterised by 
diversity, which have an economic system founded on individual preference, and in which 
intellectual endeavour is prone to increasing specialisation, the question of what is or could be 
held in common remains both pressing and perplexing. It is perplexing because growing diversity 
makes a synoptic view increasingly difficult, and it is pressing because in a world which is 
increasingly inter-connected, as Geertz points out (p. 1 above), it is difficult to do anything in the 
public arena without some implicit appeal to a concept of the common good. Without such a 
basis, all public action becomes either ultimately arbitrary, or, in a democracy, at best 
majoritarian tyranny. 
In an attempt to make the thesis manageable it focuses on a particular set of questions concerned 
with the interaction between religious groups and the wider society in modern, secularised 
contexts. These questions are: 
(i) To what extent can the aspirations of religious minorities be realised within modem 
secularised societies? 
(ii) Do such minorities present challenges which should lead members of modem secularised 
societies to reassess their own fundamental beliefs, and the way their societies are organised? 
In the UK a number of issues which have attracted media attention during the last decade pose 
these kinds of question. Often the assertion of religious rights by minorities has surprised and led 
to conflict with the post-Christian secular majority. For example, the popularity amongst British 
Hindus of the ISKCON4 temple 'Bhaktivedanta Manor' in London's green belt has led to conflict 
with local residents. But the strongest concentration of claims and conflicts has surrounded 
British Muslims, and Bence cases involving them provide the focus for reflection in this thesis. 
Many of the issues raised concern education: the style and content of Religious Education in 
schools, the arguments for and against state-funded Muslim schools (demands paralleled in the 
Hindu community, Kanitkar 1979), the demand for single sex education after puberty, for the 
4International Society for Society for Krishna Consciousness, better known as the Hare Krishna 
Movement. The dispute over congestion and 'inconvenience' caused by large numbers of Hindu pilgrims 
descending on the small village at festival times was the subject of a BBC Everyman documentary in 
Sept. 1994. 
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provision of halal ('permitted') meat in school meals, and for facilities for prayer in schools. But 
Muslims have also sought broader recognition: some have challenged the defining of anti- 
discrimination legislation around categories of 'race' and ethnicity, urging reform to include 
religious identity and thus protect Muslims from discrimination in housing and employment, and 
from incitement to hatred. In both cases Muslims have used the Western philosophical and legal 
discourse of human rights to express their claims. In the public arena, flashpoints in recent years 
have included the'Honeyford affair', The Satanic Verses controversy, and the Gulf war. In each 
case the definition and recognition of British Muslim identity has, in some sense, been at issue. 
This process can be viewed as involving negotiation and conflict both within Muslim 
communities, as well as with the rest of society. 
'Plural societies' will be understood as those in which: 
there are several large ethnic groupings involved in the same economic and political order 
but otherwise largely distinct from one another. (Giddens 1989 p. 244) 
"Ethnic groupings" will be understood as to groups which can be distinguished by their "cultural 
practices and outlooks" (Giddens 1989 p. 243), and "culture" as the "values... norms... and 
material goods" of a given group (Giddens 1989 p. 31), which can be used interchangeably with 
the phrase 'ways of life'. Beyond these definitions, I understand modem liberal secularised 
societies to incorporate democratic institutions, which allow for the expression of dissent, and to 
have available in the public arena a political vocabulary, predominantly of rights. This shapes the 
way in which individuals and communities express their demands, 5 in particular leading to 
demands by cultural minorities being expressed in the form of a demand for'recognition'. 6 
At the centre of many disputes is disagreement over the terms of political equality between 
citizens (Taylor with Gutmann 1994). Where historically in western societies political equality 
has been understood to entail assimilation to a presumed to be superior liberal democratic form, 
the homogenising process presupposed is increasingly challenged by demands for the recognition 
of cultural difference, with 'culture' no longer confined to the marginal role to which it has 
historically be assigned. Hence in plural societies varieties of the 'politics of difference' stand 
head to head with 'difference-blind politics of equality'. It is therefore appropriate that arguments 
developed in American, Canadian and German contexts will also contribute to the development of 
the thesis. While much attention will be given to theoretical issues, the thesis is ultimately 
oriented towards the practicalities of everyday life in plural societies. 
5As will be illustrated in the case of British Muslims, e. g. at 5.4 below. 6Charles Taylor's (1994) account of the genesis of demands for 'recognition' will be discussed at 3.5 
below. 
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The thesis is informed by my experience of inter-faith relations in West Yorkshire, and by 
conversations with educators and community leaders there. While this fieldwork was necessarily 
local, it may be suggested that parallel challenges of pluralism to can be found in various local 
guises across the globe (Geertz 1983; see above p. 1). In particular, many of the issues facing 
British society as a plural society are paralleled in plural societies in North America, Europe 
and other 'western style' democratic states. Given these conditions, the kind of controversies 
which arise will vary with the history and culture of the minorities present, and the history and 
culture of the society concerned. 
For example, in the United States, the presence of a written constitution and its history of use in 
the struggle for civil rights, is likely to affect the shape in which minority claims are made. Critics 
have expressed concern over the extent to which legal hermeneutics may come to substitute for 
democratic participation, and over the difficulties for a "critical legal discourse" in recognising 
the legitimacy of any form of authority (Fraser 1984 p. 52). The presence of indigenous peoples, 
a broad ethnic mix, and a fairly recent history of conquest and settlement are further significant 
factors. Important, too, is the presence of a large and vocal minority of fundamentalist Christians, 
who have used the language of rights and the instrument of law to exert influence in the public 
arena, for example over abortion legislation and the teaching of biological and cosmic origins in 
schools. 
In the UK, the South Asian origin of many religious minorities, and the ancestry of most of 
Britain's ethnic minorities as subjects of the British empire, are salient factors. In Canada the 
situation is different again, the presence of a strong French minority and the very real possibility 
of Quebec becoming independent, highlighting the issue of minority rights, while much reflection 
has also focused on the search for appropriate ways of protecting the lifestyle of indigenous 
groups. 
On mainland Europe, as in the UK, the presence of long-established majority historic cultures is 
significant, but more than in the UK the legal status of religious and ethnic minorities as 
guestworkers heightens their insecurity. The tightening of German entry controls after 
reunification and the Cold War means that the federal republic is no longer the haven it once was 
for asylum seekers The rise of racism across Europe, including the election of fascists as part of a 
ruling coalition in Italy, (the first in Europe since World War II), represent causes for concern, 
and together with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia indicate the resurgence of 
nationalism in tension with economic and political moves to further European integration. Greater 
European integration, combined with population pressure from East and South driven by 
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economic factors, may lead to the construction of a 'Fortress Europe', whose border habits may 
rebound on minorities within. To Muslim minorities, for example, such fears can seem well 
founded in France, where the cultural and religious symbol of girls' headscarves have been 
outlawed and condemned as 'ostentatious' by the French authorities (Q News 16-23 Sept. 1994). 
One common factor amidst a diversity if issues here is the existence of secular institutions for the 
organisation of public life (e. g. constitution and/or legislative apparatus, mechanisms of 
democratic participation), supported by a secular ideology among at least the political and 
intellectual elite, and diffused to varying degrees through the majority population, which conflict 
with the views of religious minorities, who are frequently also ethnic minorities. This is not to 
suggest the secular-religious clashes lie at the root of all racism or inter-communal conflicts, but 
rather to highlight a somewhat neglected part of the total situation, and to suggest a perspective 
which may provide new insights on the problems of co-existence in plural societies. 
This chapter in particular attempts to characterise plural societies more fully from this 
perspective, and more broadly this is a central aim of the whole thesis; to shed new light on 
familiar issues by challenging conventional ways of thinking about plurality. But beyond re- 
description, the thesis also seeks to ask 'what common good is possible in plural societies? ' In 
particular, how can differences between groups be resolved in such a way that, negatively, the 
identity and self-esteem of groups is not damaged or corroded, and, positively, that their different 
aspirations might be fulfilled? To begin to address these questions, four critics of the modem 
context within which these inter-group relations occur will now be considered. 
1.2 Introducing Four Critics of Modernity: Maclntyre, Bauman, Habermas and Milbank 
Modernity, the economic-political-social-cultural complex which has grown out of Europe in the 
last three to four hundred years, significantly shapes the encounter between secular and religious 
outlooks in contemporary plural societies. Further precision has been given to the broad term 
'modern' by adding the various prefixes 'late' (e. g. Surin 1990 and other post/neo Marxists) 'high' 
(Giddens 1990), 'advanced' ('industrial' rather than'modem', Beckford 1984) and post- (e. g. 
Bauman 1992 and much continental social theory). These serve to distinguish the current stage of 
modernity in the West from its earlier phases. The terms post- and neo-colonial are also 
important in drawing attention to the global location of these societies. 
Although a range of resources will be drawn on, four critics of modernity have probably been 
most influential in shaping the analysis: Alasdair MacIntyre, Zygmunt Bauman, Jürgen 
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Habermas and John Milbank. Each of the first three are senior international figures in their 
respective, though overlapping, fields: Maclntyre (moral philosophy), Bauman (sociology) and 
Habernas (moral philosophy/sociology). In fact their fields of interest cannot be clearly 
separated; Maclntyre insists that morality, society and history are inseparable, Bauman has 
recently written a full length book on ethics (1993), while the two disciplines mentioned (and a 
great deal else - e. g. moral development, linguistic pragmatics) are intertwined in Habermas' 
work.? 
Each of these has a somewhat ambivalent relation to religion. Maclntyre is the most clearly 
related to Christianity, supporting his earliest work in the 1950s with reference to Matthew 25, 
distancing himself from what he saw as the secularising influences on Christianity in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and returning to an explicit commitment to Augustinian-Thomist Christianity in the 
1980s. Yet he rarely refers to modem theology, the modem intellectual articulation of Christian 
tradition, and his references to living religious communities are brief. Habermas has recognised 
the role of theology in providing important sources of both hope and critique in the post-war 
federal republic; yet in spite of this and his willingness to engage with so many dialogue partners, 
he expresses a preference not to engage with theology (in Schüssler-Fiorenza and Tracy 1990). 
Bauman has admitted the Jewish roots of Levinas' concept of faciality which has become central 
to his critique of modernity; yet in spite of this and sharp criticism of sociology's exclusion of 
morality (1989) he insists that sociology cannot speak of religion, or at least of theology. 8 
Furthermore, religion is conspicuously absent from Bauman's narratives of modernity. 
Underlying the reluctance of both to engage with religion's self-articulation may be a desire to 
avoid metaphysics; an acceptance that in spite of modernity's faults it is not possible to reach 
behind modernity to reconstruct metaphysics; postmodern thought must also be postmetaphysical. 
This lack of engagement with religious self-understanding is symptomatic of the public arena we 
are addressing: sociologists and philosophers write for a public arena which is largely presumed 
to be secular, in which religion is understood as a private matter with no place in public affairs. 
This is precisely the kind of critique given by Milbank, an academic at an earlier stage in his 
career than the other three, but who has nonetheless provided a wide ranging critique of 
modernity by composing a theological counter-narrative to the secular story of modernity 
(Chapter 7 below). 
7Given these overlapping interests, it is not surprising that each has addressed at least one of the other's 
argunmetnts, e. g. Bauman on Habermas (1993 p. 21) and Maclntyre (1993 pp. 39,50), Habermas on 
Maclntyre (1993 pp. 97-104) and Maclntyre on Habermas (1991 p. 46). Milbank has also addressed 
aspects of Habermas' work (1990a pp. 11,238,240,268,274,318), and his treatment of Milbank is the 
subject of 7.5 below. 
8Pcrsonal communication, during a series of public lectures given at the University of Leeds in 1993. 
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Maclntyre has been accused of "nostalgia" (Poole 1991 pp. 146-151), because his criticisms of 
modernity draw heavily on pre-modern sources, an accusation which could equally be levelled at 
Milbank. Certainly, there is at least a prima facie case that in their emphasis on criticism they 
neglect the achievements of modernity: a discourse of universal human rights, longer life and 
better health for many, for example. Furthermore, they run the risk of appearing absurd in a 
context in which modern forms are highly pervasive. Yet it will be argued that their critiques of 
modern forms of life and thought are important, and that their positions can fruitfully engaged 
with without necessarily endorsing all their conclusions. One significant sense in which their work 
is based on more than 'nostalgia' can be seen in their critical attitude towards pre-modem forms 
of life. An example of this is their reconceptualisation of hierarchy as of value rather than of 
individuals or social groups, a rethinking they owe to the Christian socialist tradition. 9 
1.3 Communities, Minorities and Majorities. 
Interpreted in different ways, the challenges of plural societies have become a central concern 
across the range of humanities and social science disciplines, and in other forums of debate. The 
thesis will focus on three communities and their interaction in one context: that is on Muslims, 
Christians and 'liberals' in the British public arena. The use of the term 'community' to designate a 
religious group may seem strange in modem contexts in which individuals tend to be defined by 
multiple affiliations, of which religion may be rarely the most prominent. Yet this mode of 
description may have some analytic value because Muslims, Christians, and arguably liberals, 
can all be seen as members 'interpreting communities' - communities defined by sharing common 
interpretations of life, by making sense of life using certain shared narratives (Alexander 1985). 
This term has affinities with Berger's (1969) term'cognitive minority', meaning a group 
distinguished from the majority by distinctive patterns of belief. However, using the term 
'community' is intended to indicate that majorities as well as minorities rely on such social 
support to maintain their beliefs. 
Use of the term 'interpreting' in place of 'cognitive' emphasises the hermeneutical character of 
social life, although'epistemic' would also be appropriate; 'epistemic' indicates that fundamental 
differences may be present at the level of the foundations of knowledge rather than in superficial 
matters of style. Neither term necessarily indicates isolation or mutual exclusivity; it is possible 
that individuals could belong to several different interpreting communities in different contexts, 
9e. g. Milbank on Ruskin 1990a p. 200, pursued at 7.2 below. 
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and dissonance may only be experienced occasionally. For example, Jackson and Nesbitt's study 
of Hindu children in Coventry found that many exhibited "multiple cultural competence" (1993 
pp. 174-8), 10 switching smoothly from English speaking secular school settings to predominantly 
Hindi domestic and religious settings. Such results contrast with earlier findings such as Anwar's 
Between Two Cultures (1978). However, if there are fundamental differences at the level of the 
foundations of knowledge and social life, membership of multiple interpreting communities may 
be difficult to sustain, 11 and we shall also consider examples of this kind. 
Much use will be made of the term 'minority' in the thesis. An account of the usage adopted here 
can serve to introduce discussion of relationships between groups in plural societies. Tajfel's 
(1981) model of majority-minority relations uses relative power rather than numerical 
preponderance to define majority-minority status - defining 'majority' as the most powerful group, 
which may or may not be a numerical majority. For example, prior to the 1994 general election, 
blacks in South Africa could be spoken of as political minority in Tajfel's sense because of their 
subordinate political status, even though they constituted a numerical majority. 
However, although it is sensitive to power relations this binary structure still oversimplifies the 
complexity of relations in plural societies. First, it does not account for the variety of types of 
minority group - this will be addressed by considering Parekh's typology of minorities at 1.5 
below. Second, it presumes a monolithic, unidirectional concept of power, neglecting the 
resistance of minorities to majorities. Certain uses of the discourse of 'race' provide exemplify the 
difficulties which can arise from this. In spite of decisive refutations of its biological basis, 'race' 
probably remains an important analytic category in the social scientific study of interactions 
between groups in society. But analysis of 'race' tends to consist of the study of what majorities 
do to minorities - in labelling, politically subordinating and prejudicially discriminating. In the 
process, the resistance of minorities, and subsequent interaction, tend to be neglected. A case 
study of this is presented at 1.5. Third, a majority-minority power analysis may neglect the 
variety of political discourses active in the field of community relations. Thus, to account for the 
complexity of power relations, 'race' has sometimes recently been reconceived in more complex 
and dynamic terms: 
there has been a relative neglect of the general institutional and discursive form of the liberal- 
democratic, capitalist nation-state and its effects in the contradictory discourses around 'race'. 
That is, racist, ethnocentric and nationalist ideas, which attempt to create strict symbolic and 
institutional barriers between collectivities, have also to coexist and continually articulate 
with a variety of discourses and practices around meritocracy, equal opportunities and 
citizenship rights. (Rattansi in Donald and Rattansi 1992 p. 37) 
10This phrase originated from S. Vertovec (Jackson and Nesbitt 1993 p. 183 note 3). 11 For a further discussion of issues of personal integrity and multiple belonging, see 7.5 below. 
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The struggle over the terms in which 'race' relations are conceived can be seen as part of a 
struggle between the 'difference-blind politics of equality' and a 'politics of difference'. This 
means that the principle of equality for all individuals may be challenged questions such as, 'on 
whose terms is such equality defined? ', and 'are some groups disadvantaged by the terms in which 
equality is being defined? '. Such a clash is illustrated in the following case study, a controversy 
pursued in the pages of a British community relations journal. 
1.4 Case Study: Conflicting Conceptions of'Race', Ethnicity and Religion 
The academic study of 'race' relations draws on the disciplines of sociology, psychology, 
economics and politics in an attempt to understand the dynamics of intergroup relations in 
societies, normally with a view to rectifying inequalities between groups. In British 'race' relations 
this task of striving for equality has begun to be problematised by the question 'equality on whose 
terms? ' One illustration of a debate along universalist-contextualist lines occurred between Roger 
Ballard and John Goering in the pages of New Community (Ballard 1992, Goering 1993). 
Ballard's thesis is that approaches which emphasise the construction of categories of'race' and 
processes of racial discrimination by dominant groups neglect the cultural resources for 
resistance possessed and mobilised by minorities. 
He accuses conventional race relations of being dominated by an ethnocentric 'deprivationist' 
paradigm, in which it is assumed that cultural difference will, for all significant purposes, be 
subsumed to an urban proletarian identity determined by national class structures. By contrast, he 
argues that: 
... the moment one abandons 
deprivationism, and replaces it with a perspective which assumes 
firstly that racism is always and everywhere resisted, and secondly that all strategies of 
resistance - no less those than those of hegemony - are culturally grounded, one's whole 
understanding of social inequality in general, and racial and ethnic inequality in particular, is 
radically transformed. (1992 p. 486) 
The main benefit of this radical transformation of understanding seems to be an ability to 
appreciate the culturally rooted strategies of resistance employed by minorities of which Ballard 
emphasises "morally and socially supportive community networks" (1992 p. 488). He argues for 
the creative interaction between intellectual, social and economic life, suggesting that 
improvements in "educational achievements, property ownership, success in business enterprise, 
levels of income and savings" (1992 p. 488) need to be understood in the context of the beliefs 
and community life of minority groups: 
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it is mental, spiritual and cultural resistance - the construction of an alternative moral and 
conceptual vision with which to transcend the hegemonic ideologies in which dominators 
invariably seek to ensnare the excluded - which is an essential prerequisite for successful 
physical resistance. (1992 p. 485) 
Goering counters by arguing that Ballard dangerously relativises real inequalities in arguing that 
"there arc no 'objective' measures of success" (Ballard 1992 pp. 486-7), and in reply emphasises 
the importance of agreed standards in the quest for equality. Goering's US location is significant 
because of the powerful influence of the American experience of race relations on the current 
shape of 'race' and ethnic studies in Western democracies, in particular the emphasis on 
difference blind equality and individualism rooted in the US constitution, which shaped the 
progress of the civil rights movement, and the conceptualisation of 'race' relations in terms of a 
black/whitc division. 
Goering's concern about the relativism implicit in Ballard's argument is one we shall find repeated 
throughout the thesis in universalist objections to contextualist arguments. Goering is concerned 
that, to borrow Bauman's terms (1991), poverty and inequality will become accepted as part of 
legitimate postmodern difference. He sees Ballard's thesis that exclusion produces creativity as 
serving "to rationalise and legitimate exclusionism since it would result in bigger and better gilded 
ghettos" (1993 p. 339). At the same time Ballard ignores the negative consequences of exclusion 
("withdrawal, anger, violence ... apathy, self-hate and criminal alternatives", and neglects 
the 
extent to which minorities share interests with the majority population: 
what of the thousands of minorities who, in polls, want nothing different, value the same 
things, aspire to the same media culturally-driven images of success which white people 
hold? (1993 p. 340) 
Ballard's article is also seen as economically naive: 
Within what sort of post-industrial economic system do these separate, plural economic 
enclaves develop, thrive and remain inviolate? What are the natural limits of peripheral 
economies operating, presumably parallel, to the dominant world wide economy? (1993 
p. 340) 
What are we to make of this conflict of opinions? Goering's response shows some polemical 
perversity. The idea that adversity sometimes brings out the best in people is surely a widely 
accepted paradox, and doesn't need to be brought to Goering's reductio. Similarly, Ballard's call 
for the recognition of the economic significance of community networks is surely not intended as 
an advocacy of withdrawal from wider economic relations. 
13 
But some serious questions remain. On the whole, minorities both wish to retain their own 
cultural identities, to make use of community resources, and also to prosper in the terms to which 
the majority population aspires. They aim for "multiple cultural competence", (Vertovec in 
Jackson and Nesbitt 1993 p. 183 note 3), in order to achieve what might be termed 'multiple 
cultural success'. But what does this mean? What are the terms of integration in plural societies 
to be? How are they to be negotiated? Western culture and capitalist economics, while arguably 
supportive of certain kinds of individual freedom and equality, are also often seen as powerfully 
corrosive of alternative cultural and economic forms. Ghettoization neglects the degree of 
integration to which minorities may aspire, but the assimilationism which underlies 
'deprivationism' neglects the significance of cultural difference. Together, they conspire to avoid 
confronting this central problem of the interrelationship between cultural and economic forms. 
Ballard's argument for considering cultural as well as 'racial' factors in analysing community 
relations receives support from the work of Modood (1992). In particular Modood draws 
attention to concept of the 'etluiicity paradox', first proposed by American sociologists Parks and 
Thomas based on their observations of US cities such as Chicago in the first quarter of this 
century. The paradox: 
refers to their conviction that allowing ethnic minorities to take root and flourish in the 
new soil was the most satisfactory way of promoting long term integration and 
participation in the institutions of the wider American society. (1992 p. 57) 
The similarity of this perspective to that of Sacks (above, p. 1) is striking: both hold'a 
conununity of communities' to be the firmest base for public culture and societal stability. 
Ballard's view that minority cultures are subordinated in deprivationist understandings of 'race' 
relations also finds a parallel in the educational field in Hulmes' (1989) argument that 
multicultural education policies subordinate minority cultural understandings of education to "the 
practical judgement of an established educational philosophy assumed to be logically prior to all 
others" (1989 p. 13). 
However, the problem with such views remains that either no alternative terms for the integration 
of plural societies are specified, or else that they remain vague. Should 'taking root and 
flourishing in new soil' include freedom for South Asian Muslims to contract for their daughters 
to marry at puberty, or for Hindus to perpetuate caste practices? Should multicultural education 
extend to permission for state-funded separate schooling by religion or ethnicity? In order that the 
terms of integration in plural societies can be discussed with more precision, a classification of 
different kinds of minority groups will now be presented, using the work of the British secular 
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Hindu political philosopher, Bhikhu Parekh. This will provide the concept of minority developed 
so far with a firmer location in the politics of modern states. 
1.5 Parekh's Typology of Minorities 
Parekh (1994b) has devised a four-fold typology minority groups, which are to be regarded as 
points on a continuum. This typology is valuable in distinguishing between different conditions 
within plural societies. Type I he identifies as indigenous peoples who seek to preserve pre- 
modern lifestyles within nation-states: the various American Indian groupings, New Zealand's 
Maoris and Australia's Aborigines are examples. This type is an ideal rather than a precise 
categorisation, since each of these groups embraces aspects of modem life. Type 2 are regionally 
concentrated groups who embrace modem life, but seek greater autonomy within and often 
independence from larger collectivities in which their interests are perceived to be marginalised. 
'Independence' may include alignment with another nation-state. Republicans in Northern Ireland, 
French Canadians and Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza are examples. Type 3 are 
"territorially dispersed minorities" (p. 2), groups who seek to preserve aspects of their way of life 
but not political autonomy, such as many South Asian people in Britain, Hispanics or Jews in the 
United States. Parekh identifies type 4 as "self-chosen lifestyles" although perhaps 'subcultures' 
or'counter-cultural movements' would serve as well; gays and lesbians or New Age travellers 
might be examples. For type 4 groups, respect for alternative ways of life is demanded, but they 
retain a fluidity of boundaries not available to ethnic (types 1-3) minorities. 
It is the third group with which this thesis is primarily concerned, for this is how I perceive the 
majority 'of British Muslims, 70% of whom are of South Asian origin. It is significant that for 
type 3 groups the political authority of the nation-state is not a major point of contestation, even 
if the legitimacy of some of its practices are occasionally challenged. This characteristic is also 
shared by types 1 and 4; for each an established nation-state can be accepted as a common 
backdrop. This feature sharply differentiates the situation of Muslims in Britain (type 3) from 
that of Republicans in Northern Ireland (type 2), for example. However, it should be recalled that 
the model involves a continuum; for example it is possible for type 3 situations to boil over into 
type 2 situations if political authorities become sufficiently discredited; both a high regional 
concentration and a certain intensity of cultural identity would also appear to be necessary for 
this to happen. 
The presence of type 3 minorities from non-western backgrounds within secularised Christian or 
post-Christian societies presents certain challenges to their social and political frameworks, 
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calling for a re-examination of existing social structures and political forms, and especially the 
modes of legitimation of their practices and institutions. Tracing the genesis and decline of the 
public sphere (1.12) will provide a critical perspective on these arrangements. The political 
institutions of modern democracies incorporate rights of representation and participation in 
political processes, and individual rights; in other words, they are broadly liberal institutions. 12 
The term 'liberal' here can be initially defined in Gray's sense of a political philosophy 
characterised as individualist (asserting the primacy of the claims of the individual over the 
group), egalitarian (equality before the law, in political theory), universalist (unity of human 
species exceeds historic and cultural differences) and meliorist (social and political arrangements 
can be changed and improved) (1986 p. x). 13 To be heard in such a context, minority groups 
often express themselves using the discourses of liberalism - the invocation of equal rights to run 
state-funded religious schools for example - but the motivations internal to the community may 
spring from quite different wells, 14 
Of course, in Britain there are exceptions to liberal arrangements in crucial areas: compulsory 
daily acts of "wholly or mainly" Christian worship in state schools hardly fits a classic liberal 
church-state divide; nor do blasphemy laws or the establishment of the Church of England. But 
liberal ideas have been immensely influential in shaping British political life and thought, are 
embedded in political institutions and supported by many individuals, especially from the political 
elite. This socio-political view of minorities can be developed using Alasdair MacIntyre's concept 
of tradition. 
1.6 Maclntyre's Concept of'Tradition': An Introduction 15 
British Muslims and other cultural minorities may be described as 'traditional religious 
minorities'. Use of this term is intended to combine the general use of 'tradition' as "something 
handed down" (Shils 1981) with MacIntyre's more specialised use of the term (1985,1988). It is 
not used to suggest that members of these groups invariably follow inherited religious custom, 
but rather to recognise diverse histories of communities, with their varying mixtures of cultural 
competencies and affiliations. 'Traditional' also indicates that some members of these groups self- 
consciously legitimate certain practices by reference to inherited materials (particularly religious 
12For a fuller discussion of liberalism, see 3.1 below. 13The definition of liberalism will also be discussed further at 3.1 below. 14A point we shall return to in the international context of Islam and human rights at 8.1 below. 15Maclntyre's ideas receive more sustained attention in Chapter 4 below. 
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traditions). As such, these groups transmit non-western religious and cultural resources which are 
relevant to the shaping of their communities' destinies. 
This account pins contrary to the peripheral role assigned to religion in many 'race relations' 
analyses, as we saw in the Ballard-Goering dispute at 1.4 above. There we saw that analysis in 
terms of 'race relations' tends to emphasise the agency of majorities. Such analysis is essential, 
but one-sided. In part, at least, this one-sidedness is due to an assumption, embedded in social 
scientific discourse and wider Western society, that cultural minorities possess neither resources 
nor reason to resist assimilation. This in turn is part of an assumption that post-Enlightenment 
Western culture, the culture of modernity, had no serious rivals materially or intellectually. The 
same assumption supports the secularisation hypothesis (see 6.3 below), which predicts the 
gradual withering of religion. But as even a liberal political theorist admits: 
the assumption that the importance of cultural membership would decline under modernising 
conditions, a common assumption a few decades ago, has proved breathtakingly false. 
(Kymlicka 1989 p. 177) 
Rather, religious and cultural traditions persist, and in certain contexts provide resources for 
resisting the impact of racism. South Asian extended families, for example by biraderi ('kinship 
group') for Muslims andlati ('caste') for Hindus, have provided structures for economic 
mobilisation (Werbner 1991). Islam, through The Satanic Verses controversy, has proved a focus 
for political resistance. Intellectual resources may also be significant, as we shall see at 5.6 
below. 
To understand the role of cultural traditions in resistance against prejudice requires attention to 
the internal dynamics of minority communities, to the interaction of their distinctive cultural 
forms with majority structures, as well as the study of majority structures which dominates 
conventional 'race relations' analysis. Furthermore, culture can not only become active in 
resistance, but may also be a dynamic resource, capable of innovation and response to change. 
Religious traditions possess their own resources for creative adaptation, as well as for 
maintaining continuity in changed circumstances. Maclntyre's concept of tradition provides a way 
to view the material, moral and intellectual aspects of cultures in dynamic interaction. A fuller 
account will be given in Chapter 4, but a brief introduction is presented here. 
The main traditions on which Maclntyre has worked are "traditions of meta-ethical reasoning 
which take as their subject ... the practical moral tradition of particular societies" (Turner 1990 p. 
178). This emphasis on practical moral tradition is significant in challenging the distinction 
between facts and values embedded in much social scientific analysis. Thus the 'facts' of minority 
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cultures, including social organisation (e. g. biraderi, 'ah) or material products (e. g. saris, halal 
food) arc not neatly separable from 'values' or moral traditions; rather, practices enact 
convictions. For Maclntyre, the scope of tradition is not confined to practical moral discourse; 
instead, tradition is a holistic term which embraces all aspects of cultural production, from 
agriculture to music to metaphysics. 
Thus Maclntyre challenges the Enlightenment division of reason and tradition MacIntyre, 
developing instead a conception of'traditioned reason'. He writes: 
all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, transcending 
through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that 
tradition; this is as true of modern physics as medieval logic. Moreover when a tradition is in 
good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of 
which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose. (1985 pp. 221-2) 
The creative resources which minority cultures possess, if viewed as traditions in Maclntyre's 
sense, are not merely to be thought of as social or symbolic, but also intellectual: they are 
alternative ways of thinking developed in dynamic relation to alternative ways of life. An 
illustration of this from the field of justice in the public sphere is the contrast Islamic and secular 
understandings of 'freedom of religion'. Again, this subject will receive further treatment below 
(5.8), but the following case study can serve to introduce some of the issues involved, drawing on 
the work of the Muslim feminist sociologist, Fatima Memissi. 
1.7 Case Study: 'Freedom of Religion' in Islam and Secularism 
In the UK, in the absence of a Bill of Rights, it is to international treaties such as the'Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR) and its European equivalent (Poulter 1987) to which 
Britain is a signatory, that British judges must look for guidance on issues involving human 
rights. 
Article 18 of the UDHR concerns freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the right 
to change religion. Mernissi (1993 p. 87) points out that the translation of this article into Arabic 
posed considerable difficulties, and was only achieved by means of a complex circumlocution. 
This is because of the association of civic peace and religious conformity embedded in Islamic 
origins, and the centrality of Islam for the development of Arabic. In seventh century Arabia the 
chaotic pagan world 'ahili a in which each worshipped their own god, was displaced by 
submission ('Islam') to one God, Allah. Thus the civic peace which Islam brought is intimately 
linked to submission to one God. In this context, the most obvious translation of 'freedom to 
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choose one's religion' was therefore shirk, ('idolatry'), which is not only an insult to Allah, but 
also the disruption of civic peace, a return to the anarchic violence of iahi) "liyy . 
Likewise al-hurriya, freedom, "remains tied to the jahiliyya" (Mernissi 1993 p. 92), while in 
Islam virtues such as rahm a, which means 'mercy' and carries connotations of tenderness and 
forgiveness, are linked with uniformity and equality in submission to Allah. The power of rahma 
as a resource for political mobilisation for minority groups has been seen among Black Muslim 
groups in the US, brought home to British audiences recently by the film Malcolm X. Indeed, 
across the Islamic world, as Mernissi writes: 
The clamor of the fundamentalist youth of today is, among other things, an appeal to that 
Islam of rahma, where the wealthy of the cities are sensitive to the anguish of the poor.... 
Reducing the outcry of the young to a declaration of war against the wealthy of the planet - 
that is, against the West - is to make a serious error in understanding their anguish. Peace in 
the world, and especially strategies for realising peace, depend in part on analyzing that 
anguish. (1993, p. 88) 
Both Islamic anxiety concerning secular understandings of freedom of religion and secular 
insistence on the subordination of religion in the public arena spring from a deep-rooted concern 
for civic peace. But whereas in Islamic mythology peace came to Mecca through surrender to the 
justice of the one God, in liberal mythology the European wars of religion were resolved through 
the subordination of religious differences to a secular public sphere (see 3.2 below). To begin to 
make sense of these differences I suggest that something like Maclntyre's concept of 'tradition', 
which thinks together the religious, moral, intellectual, social and political, is necessary. 
1.8 Sociology, Modernity and the Nation State 
In this section concerns about the coherence of contemporary plural societies will be considered 
in the context of long-standing problems of legitimation inherent in the modern nation state. The 
social, cultural and religious diversity of plural societies raises questions of how such societies 
can peaceably cohere. This is not a new problem, although it will be argued that it takes a 
particular form in modem societies. Certainly, within modem societies it has been a major focus 
of sociological study since the birth of the discipline; even if the quest for a glue to bind society 
together has not always been the expressed intention of sociology's practitioners. 
In a sociological sense, the term 'modem' indicates the economic, social and intellectual forms of 
life which grew from seventeenth and eighteenth century European roots to the present state of 
near global penetration. Earlier roots can be traced to the Renaissance, and beyond to antiquity. 
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As has been stated (1.1), the global impact of modernity has meant that different cultural and 
ethnic groups now interact on an unprecedented scale, through trade, communication and 
migration. In socio-economic terms postmodernity does not represent a decisive break with 
modernity, although moves to a post-industrial society and the explosion in global communication 
correlate with the emergence of self-consciously postmodern thought. Rather, the difference 
between modern and postmodern is principally one of outlook or orientation, in particular the 
contrast between the modern belief in progress, and the postmodern loss of that faith. 16 
Both sympathetic and antagonistic critics of sociology have recently stressed the close 
relationship between sociology and modernity. For example, Bauman writes: 
The nature and style of sociology has been attuned to the self-same modem society it 
theorised and investigated; sociology has been engaged since its birth in a mimetic 
relationship with its object, or rather with the imagery of that object which it constructed and 
accepted as the frame for its own discourse. (Bauman 1989 p. 29) 
The theologian John Milbank points out an important implication of this insight: 
Secular social theory only applies to secular society, which it helps to sustain. (Milbank 
1990a p. 3) 
This leads Milbank to stress the role of the imagination and retrieval of an alternative social order 
(see Chapter 7 below). However, whatever may be imagined, modern, plural, secularised society 
remains the public arena within which Muslims, Christians and liberals interact. In this context 
sociology remains enormously important, because it provides the normative framework for 
studies of community relations and many projects in religious studies; 'objectivity' is usually 
taken to correspond to a standpoint within this discourse. Yet, as these critics point out, sociology 
is a tradition with a particular history rather than a universal standpoint. Thus, while it provides 
suggestive analyses of events and relationships, it cannot do so from a neutral perspective, but 
only from a vantage point within modernity. 
What is this vantage point? The founders of modern 'human sciences' (Foucault 1970) lived in 
uncertain times; traditional modes of authority were becoming increasingly untenable, and as 
privileged members of society they sought new means to legitimate social order. Keith Tester sees 
the institution of "civil society" as the product of this search. In modem societies "civil society" 
provides a space between the isolated individual and the intrusive modem state. In present day 
use the term: 
16For a full discussion of these issues see Rengger 1995. 
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can be applied to all those social relationships which involve the voluntary association and 
participation of individuals in their private capacities. ... 
It involves all those relationships 
which go beyond the purely familial, and yet are clearly not of the state. Civil society is about 
what happens to us when we leave our homes and go about our lives. It is about the 
relationships I have with my colleagues and the person who crashed into my car. (1992 p. 8) 
In origin and continued function, civil society served both the ideological role of giving order to a 
public space disrupted by the effects of modem economic and social forms on traditional 
conceptions of order, and as a forum for participation in public affairs for the newly (in 
eighteenth century terms) emancipated citizen. Thus Tester sees its genesis as a response to the 
crisis of legitimacy in political authority which attended the birth of the nation state. Tester traces 
the history of sociology's search for order back from the birth of sociology in the nineteenth 
century to the founding fathers of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 
They were all trying to understand how safe society was at a time when it seemed as if 
individuals were becoming increasingly disdainful and disrespectful of external authority. As 
such, they did not see themselves as engaged in idle speculation. The men who wrote about 
civil society were actually very worried. The philosophers and sociologists were offering 
different ways of avoiding a pit which, to them, promised to be a collapse of civilization into 
chaos and a complete barbarization of social existence. (1992 p. 7) 
Here, once again, a parallel may be noted to Sacks' (1990-1) diagnosis of the condition of 
contemporary society (see p. 1 above). Civil society was a space constructed to "explain how 
society was possible and why individuals lived in societies which in many ways stopped them (us) 
doing things that they (we) might have liked to do" (Tester 1992 p. 7). The concern with the 
coherence of society which Tester finds among seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers 
and nineteenth century sociologists has been remained central to the sociological tradition. As 
Giddens argues, sociology has been largely concerned with the "problem of order" within nation 
states. Hence he comments: 
Even where they do not explicitly say so, authors who regard sociology as the study of 
societies have in mind the societies associated with modernity. In conceptualising them, they 
think of quite clearly delimited systems which have their own inner unity. Now understood in 
this way, societies are plainly nation states. (1990 p. 13) 
Roland Robertson confirms this view in the context of the difficulties which the sociological 
tradition faces in coming to terms with globalization: 
I consider it to be of the utmost importance for us to realise fully that much of the 
conventional sociology which has developed since the first quarter of this century has been 
held in thrall by the virtually global institutionalisation of the culturally cohesive and 
sequestered national society during the main phase of 'classical' sociology. (In Featherstone 
1990 p. 16) 
The association of religion with the disruption of civic peace in the emerging European nation 
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states has had serious consequences for the role of religion in secular theory. Milbank describes 
the common origin of the categories of 'the social' and 'the political' with the creation of the 
modem state, part of which involved the 'fencing' of religion as discrete field, for inspection and 
analysis by a superior secular 'gaze' (Foucault 1973). Thus he writes that: 
the emergence of the concept to the social must be located within the history of 'the secular', 
its attempt to legitimate itself, and to 'cope' with the phenomenon of religion. ... the 
emergence of a critical, non-theological metadiscourse about certain aspects of religion ... 
was of one birth with the concept of political sovereignty. It sprang up alongside 'the state' 
which was a new perspective upon things. ... 
From 'the new science of politics' onwards, ... 
there persists a double element in the practical and intellectual approach to religion: its 
particular, historical manifestations must fall under the superior glance (the'higher 
perspective') which is that of the state, the whole body, and so of 'humanity', which often 
identifies itself with a universal religion. (1990a p. 102) 
In its claim to totality, secular theory can brook no rivals; religion can only persist in a private, 
irrational sphere. By sealing the transcendent off as inaccessible (a movement completed by Kant 
- see 7.4 below), secular theory becomes the only publicly available mode of understanding. But 
Milbank argues that such a claim is based on circular reasoning: 
Secular reason claims there is a 'social' vantage point from which it can locate and survey 
various 'religious' phenomena. But ... assumptions about the nature of religion themselves help to define the perspective of this social vantage. 
From a deconstructive angle, therefore, the priority of society over religion can always be 
inverted, and every secular positivism is revealed to be also a positivist theology. Given this 
insight sociology could still continue, but it would have to define itself as a 'faith'. (1990a p. 
139) 
The strength of Milbank's argument will be assessed more fully in Chapter 7 below. For now it is 
sufficient to note that the grounds from which he proceeds are shared with contemporary 
sociologists like Bauman, Robertson and Tester. All recognise the contingent foundation of their 
discipline on particular historical, political and cultural formations, and the role of that discipline 
in maintaining those formations. Each accepts that modernity grew out of a religiously construed 
universe, and bears the imprint of it origins. The Enlightenment replaced God with the national 
sovereign state, the king and aristocracy were replaced by the cabinet and bureaucracy, but: 
What remained was and is the essence, the structural relation between state and citizen 
patterned on the relation between God and the Christian. 17 (Galtung 1994 p. 6) 
Thus the new secular totality was hewn not just from a religious rock, but from a Christian one. 
The character of modernity as post-Christian must be remembered when analysing secular- 
17Though a heterodox, Scotist God, according to Milbank: see 7.2 below. 
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Islamic encounters. It may be argued that in its encounter with Islam, modernity fears both the 
ghost of its own past as repressive medieval Christendom, and the historic enemy of Islam 
battering at the gates of Vienna, an image which may still haunt 'fortress Europe'. 
Yet Enlightened European civilization did not succeed in ending barbarism within its borders. 
Bauman in particular has pointed out that the close relationship between sociology and the 
preservation of the nation state is disturbing because of the nation state's capacity for human 
destruction in the interests of self preservation. The price for this has largely been paid by 
minorities. Tlius, Leo Kuper, in his study Genocide: its Political Use in the Twentieth Century 
(198 1) writes: 
the sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit 
genocide, or engage in genocidal massacres, against people under its rule, and ... the 
UN, for 
all practical purposes, defends this right. (in Bauman 1989 p. 11-12) 
Further, Bauman contends that: 
none of the societal conditions that made Auschwitz possible has truly disappeared, and no 
effective measures have been undertaken to prevent such possibilities and principles from 
generating Auschwitz-like catastrophes. (Bauman 1989 p. 12) 
In his study Modernity and the Holocaust Bauman inverts the civilising myth of modernity. 
Through its social order modernity creates conditions which make unprecedented destruction 
possible. This argument will be examined more thoroughly at 1.13, but it will be useful to 
introduce it here. Following Levinas, Bauman argues that moral sense arises from intimacy - 
exposure to 'the face' of 'the other'. Like gravity, this sense is sustained by proximity and 
weakened by distance. Thus it is precisely the instrumental reason which extended the productive 
and technological grasp of modernity which has wounded its conscience. The more complex the 
network of causal connections in which one is enmeshed, the dimmer moral sense becomes. The 
specialisation and diversification of modernity neutralises moral sense, and absolves one of 
responsibility for the distant consequences of one's actions. 
The impact of such critiques of modernity has been to weaken faith in its totalising ambitions. 
Such loss of faith is characteristically postmodern. However, the postmodern dissolving of'grand 
narratives' into so many little stories does nothing to alleviate the anxieties about order which 
fuelled modern ambitions. Further, postmodern thought perhaps only accentuates the self-critical 
tendencies always inherent in modernity: the reflexivity through which modernity deconstructed 
God's ordered universe is now turned on modernity's own mythology of totality, as we saw with 
the sociologists discussed alongside Milbank earlier in this section.. Thus modernity may be seen 
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as inherently unstable, but now that its myth of universality is threatened the problem of order re- 
emerges in contemporary Western societies in particularly acute form. Thus Tester writes: 
If individuals do not live in homogenous societies which make universal demands through 
universal regulations, then it becomes very difficult to see why and how they should live 
together.... by the late twentieth century the possibility of society was again being popularly 
seen as difficult problem rather than as a self-evident proposition. (Tester 1992 p. 169) 
1.9 The Question of Legitimate Commonality 
Stephen White asks in the context of his study of Habennas: 
What [does] it mean to create some legitimate commonality among different forms of life, 
with 'legitimate' here carrying the sense of reciprocity and mutual respect [? ] (White 1989 p. 
154) 
How might this question be addressed, in the context of Muslim struggles for recognition and 
justice in British society, liberal responses to these struggles, and Christian struggles to come to 
terms with both religious plurality and secularisation? 18 While White describes his question as 
"one of the key questions of contemporary philosophy", the context proposed here suggests that it 
is of more than philosophical interest. Especially when one substitutes 'how is it possible? ' for 
'what does it mean? ', his question becomes a pressing practical, political and social one. It is a 
also a religious question, in so far as 'different forms of life' may represent different religious 
traditions. 
The question does not simply define a 'problem', in the sense of an anomaly within a larger field 
of settled meaning. Rather, it will be argued that in modem societies the question of 'legitimate 
commonality' challenges the legitimacy of all discourses and 'forms of life'. Why should this be? 
After all, the co-existence of different forms of life within the same political space has not always 
precipitated a legitimation crisis (Habermas 1976) within those forms of life, for example in the 
religiously plural cities of medieval Islam or Ashoka's India. Rather, a breakdown of hierarchical 
relationships is necessary to precipitate such crises. Under modern conditions, differences can no 
longer be stably resolved as social stratification. New, more reflexive, forms of legitimation are 
required. Increased social mobility is one consequence of such a breakdown; under these 
conditions, independent forms of life can no longer be so easily protected by isolation. Other, 
more tangible, forms of mobility are also promoted by modern economic and social conditions; 
developments in transport and communication, and mass migration, are examples of this. In such 
18For further discussion of secularization see 4.1 and 6.3 below. 
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an interconnected world the question of 'legitimate commonality' puts everything in question. 
To illustrate the significance of this hypothesis, consider its implications for Christian responses 
to religious plurality. 19 In Christian missiology, possible differences between first century 
Mediterranean and twentieth century global religious plurality are significant, because any such 
differences raise hermeneutical questions for of the use of New Testament texts as a basis for 
contemporary practice. For example, CJ Arthur (1984) has argued that a central difference is 
that first century Palestinians were ignorant of the teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism. In 
general terms, his point is that the breadth of knowledge available was limited. However, if 
knowledge is closely related to social forms, then changes in social structure may be as relevant 
as the breadth of knowledge available. In particular, the question raised by Milbank and 
Maclntyre is whether a teleologically ordered hierarchy of value could replace social hierarchy as 
a basis for legitimate commonality which can survive modem reflexivity. 
White's posing of the question already indicates a certain understanding of "legitimate" as 
implying "reciprocity and mutual respect", suggesting that such qualities provide the necessary 
background conditions for negotiation between participants in plural societies. However, it is an 
answer which may be problematic in a multi-faith, or multi-traditional situation. The liberal 
assumption that free and equal dialogue between autonomous individuals is the best way to 
resolve differences is deeply problematic for people who, for example, take a religious authority 
as their ultimate standard. Here, a concept of tradition as a hierarchically ordered system of 
values/knowledge may provide a framework within which both liberals and traditioned minorities 
can recognise their contrasting positions, and one another's. However, such a proposal faces 
likely opposition from both sides, who already have their own mechanisms for coping with 
difference. Thus traditional societies have resolved difference through social stratification, while 
liberalism has formulated a public/private distinction, requiring certain minimal conditions for 
access to the public arena, containing most forms of difference within the private sphere. This 
kind of arrangement is exemplified in the work of John Rawls. 
1.10 A Liberal Formulation of Legitimate Commonality: Rawls' Political Liberalism 
According to Rawls, a basic premise of liberalism is the exclusion of 'comprehensive doctrines' - 
beliefs which legislate for how the whole of life ought to be conducted - from the public or 
political realm (Rawls 1993). A key question for this position is, why should groups who hold a 
19This is considered in more detail at 6.4 below. 
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comprehensive doctrine of the good accept a political order in whose public realm their 
comprehensive doctrine will be subordinated to a limited political conception of the good? 
This question can be taken either as a question about the basis of morality or, by contrast, about 
pragmatics. The former asks if there are any reasons beyond particular traditions - that is 
universal reasons - by which people should be persuaded to subordinate their particular interests 
to a political conception of the good. The latter asks only if one should do this for reasons of 
interest. The former interpretation considers the possibility of a universal account of morality, 
while the latter takes a contextualist line, assuming morality to be defined wholly in relation to 
context. 
The labels 'universalist' and 'contextualist' can thus be used to describe the forms of 'legitimate 
commonality' which different parties hold to be possible. It is also possible for some parties to 
hold positions which seem to share some features of each position, as we shall see; provisionally 
therefore, contextualist and universalist can be seem as poles at two extremes, with a continuum 
of possible positions between them. For the contextualist there is no common basis in morality to 
which to appeal; indeed, both rationality and morality are defined wholly in relation to context. If 
minorities are to be persuaded to accept self-limitation and a political conception of the good, it 
must be on pragmatic grounds, or by force. However, a more positive interpretation may be given 
to 'pragmatic' reasons than may at first seem possible: persuasion might occur because of the 
attractiveness of a political conception of the good in terms of minority comprehensive doctrines. 
As will be argued in more depth at 4.6 below, Maclntyre's view of the interaction between 
traditions provides a model for considering this possibility. 
Maclntyre argues that through a process of "translation"20 -a process which involves entering 
into the complex web of inter-relations between forms of thought and social life which constitute 
a tradition - it is possible for members of one tradition to come to understand the internal 
dynamics of another tradition. From this vantage point it is possible that members of one tradition 
may come to recognise developments in an alien tradition which are better solutions to problems 
recognised but unsolved within their own tradition than their tradition has been able to produce. 
Thus MacIntyre writes: 
When they have understood the beliefs of the alien tradition they may find themselves 
compelled to recognize that from within this other tradition it is possible to construct from the 
concepts and theories peculiar to it what they were unable to provide from within their own 
conceptual and theoretical resources, [that is] a cogent and illuminating explanation - cogent 
and illuminating, that is, by their own standards - of why their own intellectual tradition had 
been unable to solve its problems or restore its coherence. (1988 p. 364) 
20MacIntyre's understanding of translation is discussed at 7.5 below. 
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In our situation, this account of the interaction of traditions suggests the possibility of a model 
within which Muslim, Christian and secular traditions could learn from one another without 
compromising their integrity. In the particular case being considered, it may be that a limited, 
liberal conception of political good could be recognised by minorities who hold a comprehensive 
doctrine of the good as providing a solution to some of the problems posed by living in plural 
societies for their traditions, problems and solutions compatible with the survival of their 
traditions. Interpreted in this way, contextualism appears capable of providing a foundation for a 
politics of the common good, on grounds other than coercion, and without appeal to a universal 
morality. 
However, the above extract from Maclntyre suggests that for learning to take place across 
traditions members of a tradition must first come to recognise that their own tradition cannot 
provide resources from within itself, at least as it stands at that point in time, to solve the 
problems which it faces. Maclntyre refers to this condition as an "epistemological crisis". 21 But 
doesn't this imply that a tradition must have its back to the wall before it is forced to listen to 
another, and hence we are back with a reduction of contextualism to coercion? Not necessarily: 
rather, Maclntyre requires a dynamic conception of tradition - one which entails some openness 
to recognition of the imperfections of existing formulations of tradition - but which does not 
require viewing tradition as entirely bankrupt. On the contrary, such a negative view of one's 
tradition is disabling. 
Some consideration of the examples of epistemological crisis used by Maclntyre may be useful 
here. For Maclntyre, "an epistemological crisis is always a crisis in human relationships" (1977 
p. 455), and the dramatic narratives through which he tells his histories of traditions tend to focus 
on conflicts in the lives of individuals who have stood at the confluence of traditions. Such figures 
perceive ahead of their time when a particular tradition is no longer capable of meeting the 
challenges which it faces in its present form. Thus Aquinas saw the inadequacy of Augustinian 
theology before his contemporaries, Galileo the inadequacy of Ptolemaic astronomy, and so on. 
However, Aquinas did not see his tradition as entirely bankrupt; rather it was the value he placed 
on it which led him to re-work it with reference to Aristotelian philosophy. By contrast Hume's 
attack on his own tradition becomes disabling, and Maclntyre sees Hume's dilemma as typical of 
liberalism's self-destructive approach to tradition. Maclntyre cites evidence of Hume's own 
anguish at the consequences of his radical scepticism: 
21For further discussion of this concept see 4.5 below. 
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the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely 
subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in 
philosophy or in common life ... 
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and 
imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am 
ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion as more provable than 
any other. (Hume in Maclntyre 1977 p. 462, quoting from Treatise of Human Nature ed. 
Selby-Bigge P 1941 pp. 267-9) 
Maclntyre argues that a foundation in tradition is a necessary basis for launching any kind of 
enquiry; radical scepticism becomes unintelligible even to its protagonists. In more familiar 
terms, this suggests that confidence in the value of one's own tradition is important for minorities 
to make creative responses to the challenges of liberal societies. This argument will be important 
when we come to consider the liberal prizing of autonomy (3.3-3.4), especially in arguments 
concerning education. But for now it is important to stress that in order to become willing to 
learn from another tradition it is not necessary to regard one's own as entirely bankrupt. This 
applies both to liberals and traditioned minorities: modern conditions may provoke 
epistemological crises for traditioned minorities, but also the presence of traditioned minorities 
may provoke such crises for liberals, who find the tradition-location of their own position 
exposed, when it had been supposed to have been surpassed. 
Further features of the universalist-contextualist debate also warrant consideration. For the 
contextualist, as we have seen, commonality is possible as something created, or as a 
coincidence of particular interests, not something which can be known prior to encounter. For the 
universalist, by contrast, commonality is rooted in some universal feature of human life such as 
reason, nature or morality, or some transcendent referent. Each position implies a critique of the 
other: for the contextualist the universalist violates difference in the name of a universal which is 
always, in fact, reducible to the contingent. This position has its own ironies, for the contextualist 
here appears to be making a universal claim: all universal theories are reducible to the 
particular. Perhaps all the contextualist can argue without self-contradiction is that every 
universalist position developed so far can be shown to be reducible to particular conditions, a 
claim reinforced by the moral argument that the repressive consequences of universal theories 
justify a general suspicion of them. 
Yet the universalist can reply with some force that contextualism is inadequate as a foundation 
for moral protest, because the contextualist has no means of effectively criticising existing 
practices, no non-arbitrary court of appeal, and hence becomes a prisoner of existing norms. This 
point can be illustrated by referring to accounts of morality in contemporary sociology. Zygmunt 
Bauman argues that sociology, in conformity to scientific culture: 
promoted, as binding rules of its own discourse, the inadmissibility of ethical problematics 
28 
in any other form but that of a communally sustained ideology and thus heterogeneous to 
sociological (scientific, rational), discourse. (1989 p. 29) 
Two examples of this can be termed 'atomistic' and 'structural' sociological accounts of human 
behaviour. The first is exemplified by Irving Goffinan's view that people can be understood as 
actors performing a variety of roles in specific social situations (Goffinan 1957,1959). Here 
there is not one self but many; to discern individual integrity in the midst of this polyphony is to 
conjure an illusion. Goffinan's individual is nothing but a collection of scripts, and hence has 
nothing with which to offer resistance to social conformity. By contrast, moral responsibility 
requires some notion of the individual as a whole, some capacity to draw together the multiple 
"lifestyle sectors" (Giddens 1990) of a contemporary life, so that one script may criticise another, 
may strive towards integrity. 
The second, 'structural' type of account is similar in its reduction of the individual to sub-personal 
forces, although at first it may appear the opposite of atomism. This is the attempt to account for 
human behaviour in terms of social organisation on a large scale. The difference between this and 
Goffinan's account is only one of scale, atomism focusing on small scale, transient situations, and 
aspects of individual behaviour in relation to those contexts, while structural accounts focus on 
more enduring settings, and hence more enduring behaviours. But the continuity of behaviour is a 
still a product of situation rather than personal integrity. Morality is conceived as wholly socially 
determined, a matter of convention, with no room for individual responsibility. 
Yet an account which holds morality to be purely socially determined can only narrate moral 
nonconformity as a failure of socialisation; it leaves no room for the possibility that the minority 
might be right and the majority wrong. Jean-Paul Sartre has dramatised the implications of this 
position: 
someday the fascists may triumph, ... and when that time comes, 
if it comes, "fascism will be 
the truth of man. " (In Stout 1988, p. 257) 
Yet the possibility that a minority might be right and a majority wrong is a pre-requisite for 
ethical resistance. It also implies some notion of 'moral fact', a notion which contradicts probably 
the dominant theory in Anglo-American moral philosophy this century, "emotivism". This theory 
holds that moral values are essentially affective, the product of emotions, and hence not capable 
of rational discussion. However, emotivism is not confined to the academy, rather, according to 
Maclntyre (1985) and Midgely (1989), it has become the dominant tacit moral theory in Western 
societies. 
In defence, the contextualist may argue that memory of past practice and diversity in existing 
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practices can provide grounds for criticism of present practices in particular locales. But is this 
sufficient to escape from majoritarian tyranny? Why should the majority pay any heed to past or 
dissenting practices? Maclntyre's answer seems to rely on appeal to resources within dominant 
traditions which could be used as levers to prize open debate - either an internal tradition of self- 
criticism or the recognition of inadequacies within the tradition. Maclntyre's locates moral fact in 
living debate within and between traditions; yet for others this approach relies too much on the 
capacity of traditions for self-regeneration, and ignores the possibility of more radical criticism, 
which is interpreted as a positive feature of the Enlightenment. 
Habermas has sought to rescue positive elements from the Enlightenment project, and to develop 
the possibility of radical critique which avoids the solipsistic self-destruction which Maclntyre 
sees as the blighted root of all Enlightenment thought. For Habermas modernity has gone awry, 
laying waste to the constructive aspects of human community embodied in his concept of the 
'lifeworld', because of the overgrowth of one form of rationality - instrumental rationality - and 
the stunting of 'cormnunicative rationality', rationality enacted in human communication. For 
Habermas, claims to rationality cannot ultimately be sustained without appeal to human 
community -a point on which he agrees with Maclntyre. For MacIntyre, communities sustain 
rationality because of their rootedness in a historic tradition, and lose their rational coherence 
when disembedded from that context. But for Habermas the communicative aspects of 
community can be successfully abstracted from their historical contexts, and their features 
analysed to reveal a universal structure of normative expectations which can provide a universal 
basis for morality. 22 
We began this section with the question of why groups who hold comprehensive doctrines of the 
good should submit to a limited political conception of the good in the public realm. Unlike 
Maclntyre, Habermas does not appeal to the interactions of historic communities to answer this 
question, but rather to a communicative model of rationality. Habermas' position combines 
elements of universalism and contextualism, for he espouses a minimal universal conception of 
morality rooted in the immanent realm. It is derived from context, and requires no appeal to a 
transcendent realm, and hence is contextualist. Nonetheless, he holds that certain features of 
context, those to do with communication, are universal, and hence his position can also be 
described as universalist. 
For Habermas, notions of rationality as reducible to strategy (which merely expresses interest) or 
to context (understood as sheer contingency) are inadequate, because they provide no means to 
22Habermas' "discourse ethics" is discussed further at 3.6 below. 
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formulate reasons for interests, or for criticising existing norms. According to Habermas a further 
conception of rationality is necessary "[i]f we do not want to settle questions concerning the 
normative regulation of our everyday existence by open or covert force" (1993 p. 151). This is 
provided by a communicative model of rationality which entails "a co-operative process of 
interpretation aimed at attaining intersubjectively recognised definitions of situations" (1981 pp. 
69-70). Furthermore, he argues that such communicative rationality is implicit in every speech 
act (the "speech-act immanent obligation"), thus providing the basis for a universal minimum 
ethics, and an argument that all utterances which are not oriented to this goal of understanding 
are self-contradictory. 
While Habermas' model of communicative action is certainly worthy of further investigation (as 
will be provided at 3.6), at this stage several problems must be noted. The first is the horizon of 
understanding sought; some utterances would seem to be oriented to create only local 
understanding, defined by the boundaries of what might be called a'speech community'. Such a 
model would seem to respond adequately to Habermas' criticisms of strategic and contextual 
accounts of rationality, without requiring a universal horizon. Secondly, Habermas' account 
draws heavily on Kohlberg's account of moral development. This has been criticised by feminists 
such as Gilligan for emphasising abstract, universalistic conceptions of morality over contextual 
ones, without providing any adequate reason for this preference (White 1988 p. 68 and pp. 83-5). 
A parallel argument could also be made by other groups whose reflections on norms may be more 
contextually than abstractly oriented. Thus Rosen (1987) argues that Islamic conceptions of law 
are just as rational as Western conceptions, but proceed more by 'downwards' reference to local 
context than 'upwards' reference to artificial reason (5.6-5.7 below). 
A further question is how Habermas' model might attempt to encourage communication between 
groups when each group is convinced that communication is so systematically distorted that other 
groups mishear, or deliberately distort, every word they say. Such a situation might be thought to 
exist between some elements of the British Muslim community and the British press. This 
suggests a general problem with Habermas' model; while he locates the source of hope in 
communicative rationality, he does not provide the means by which such rationality may 
successfully assert itself against the instrumental reason serving vested interests. 
Habermas' response to Gilligan has been to emphasise the complementarity of his approach with 
hers, arguing that communicative action provides an orientation within which ethical issues can 
be discussed rather than substantive solutions; these must be sought in particular contexts using 
context-sensitive methods such as Gilligan's. However, at 3.6 it will be argued that this 
distinction cannot be sustained. The full argument must wait until then, but as already indicated, 
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doubts exist as to whether Habermas' model can either withstand contextualist criticisms or 
persuade those who hold comprehensive doctrines of the good to support a limited political 
conception. From a contextualist standpoint Habermas' response to Gilligan does not answer the 
question of why forms of morality which favour autonomy and universality should be considered 
more 'developed' than those which favour heteronomy or context determination. Habermas' 
account is in fact embedded in a sophisticated theory of modernity, which is both critique and 
defence. It is sufficient to note at this stage that his concept of the speech-act immanent obligation 
as a foundation for a minimal ethics is not clearly separable form his advocacy of the modern 
virtue of autonomy. This being the case, it seems unlikely to persuade those who favour 
heteronomy, or who hold a comprehensive conception of the good. 
Initially, therefore, a basis for developing legitimate commonality will be sought not in linguistic 
pragmatics, but in historical argument. For this, Habermas' earlier work will be used (1.12). But 
first liberal and postmodern approaches to the common good will be examined. 
1.11 Liberal and Postmodern Approaches to the Common Good 
Kymlicka describes the difference between conceptions of the common good held by the rival 
'liberal' and 'communitarian' factions in American political philosophy as follows: 
in a liberal society the common good is adjusted to fit the pattern of preferences and 
conceptions of the good held by individuals. 
In a communitarian society, on the other had, the common good is conceived of as a 
substantive conception which defines the community's 'way of life' (1989 p. 77). 
In the first definition there is apparently nothing shared to constrain bargaining between 
competing groups. Yet liberals such as Rawls (1971) have adopted a concept of'primary goods' 
which it is presupposed everyone will want; these focus on individual choice rather than shared 
ways of life, but, as will be argued at 3.2, such a focus in fact presupposes a certain liberal way 
of life. For communitarians, some shared way of life constrains bargaining between competing 
interests in a plural society. A model based on Maclntyrean traditions recognises such 
constraints, and seeks to understand shared ways of life in terms of the interactions between 
traditions. 
Postmodern thinkers, taking their cue from Nietzsche, have attacked any conception of the 
common good as inevitably a mask for imposing one's interests on others: 
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'Good' is no longer good when your neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there 
be a 'common good'? The expression is a self-contradiction: what can be common has but 
little value. (Nietzsche in Poole 1991 p. 115) 
A similar attack is made by Marxists; the dominant ideology is expressed as the common good 
but masks its real class interests. A tradition based model can respond to these criticisms by 
arguing that both embody a model of emancipation as negative freedom which is ultimately self- 
destructive, a point which will be developed through the thesis, especially in Chapters 4 and 7. 
The historicism (in a weak sense) of a tradition-based approach alerts one to the context of power 
relations between traditions, and is compatible without an account of social class, while arguing 
that other commonalities and differences are also important. 
Furthermore, in spite of postmodern critiques, at a popular level the idea of the common good 
persists; at 8.2 some examples in education will be considered (Halstead 1988). Sacks expresses 
a widespread sense of unease when he writes of his concern that the common good may be 
undermined by a naive notion of pluralism, a pluralism of indifference, which is inadequate to 
deal with the consequences of inevitable encounters between different groups in the public arena: 
The irony of pluralism is that it leads us to expect a growth of tolerance, while in fact it lays 
the ground for new forms of intolerance. By dismantling and privatising the concept of the 
common good no one position is forced to come to terms with the reality of any other. (Sacks 
1991 p. 2) 
But how might the public arena in which groups encounter one another be properly 
conceptualised? The historical orientation of a model of traditions suggests that a historical 
account of the development of the public arena is needed. For this we turn to Habermas' (1989; 
original 1962) account of the transformation of the "bourgeois public sphere" (Bürgerlich 
Öffentlichkeit). 
1.12 The Public Sphere: Concept and History 
Habermas' Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere stimulated broad public debate on 
public participation in politics in West Germany in the 1960s (Holub 1991), and its translation 
into English (1989) has again stimulated such discussion, albeit in more limited academic circles, 
in the United States some thirty years later (Calhoun ed. 1993). This section will use Habermas' 
account of the transformation of the public sphere as a framework for locating a range of 
changes of perception of self, others and interaction between groups which have been part of the 
transition from premodern to modem societies. The heart of these changes was the emergence of. 
i' 
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a far-reaching network of horizontal dependencies ... that 
in principle could no longer be 
accommodated by the vertical relationships of dependence characterising the organization of 
domination in an estate system based upon a self-contained household economy. (1989 p. 15) 
An insight into this shift can be gained by tracing changes in word üse between medieval and 
modem periods. In medieval society 'representation' signified 'display' in both aesthetic and 
political contexts. Thus the knight was represented by his heraldry while his feudal dependants 
were represented by the knight in much the same way. Representation was understood as given, 
not socially produced through negotiation, as Habermas writes: 
publicness ... of representation was not constituted as a social realm ... rather, 
it was 
something like a status attribute. (1989 p. 7) 
In modernity, representation retains its aesthetic sense, but this becomes distinct from its political 
meaning, which comes to imply democratic process. 'Opinion' has undergone a parallel 
transformation, from the public display of honour, something which can be lost or gained, to 
something interior and privately constituted. Even'public opinion' today means an aggregate of 
private opinions. 
Habermas' argument does not reduce intellectual and social change to economic causes, but 
rather is holistic or interactionist, proposing causal pathways in both directions between 
intellectual and material forms. 23 Capitalism undermined traditional power bases as economic 
power shifted from land to capital, and the mobility required by markets increased social 
interaction. Feudal stability was both undermined from within by an erosion of its power base, 
and invaded from without by an influx of strangers. Over the course of several centuries identity, 
which had been anchored in the divinely ordained hierarchy, came to be seen as a problem. As 
Charles Taylor writes: 
What has come about in the modem age is not the need for recognition, but the conditions in 
which the attempt to be recognised can fail. That is why the need is now acknowledged for 
the first time. In premodern times people didn't speak of 'identity' and 'recognition' not 
because people didn't have (what we call) identities, but rather because these were too 
unproblematic to be thematised as such. (1994 p. 35) 
This problematization comes both from the replacement of the estate-rooted power base which 
underpinned feudalism, and because populations were becoming increasingly mobile and 
23An illustration apposite for the Islam-West locus of our discussion is the contention that capitalist 
enterprise developed in Europe rather than the more culturally sophisticated Islamic territories partly 
because of the presence of the concept of abstract legal personalities in Western (based on Roman) law, 
but not Islamic law (Shari'ah (Rosen 1987 p. 49; Ruthven 1991 pp. 174-6). It has been argued that this 
abstract concept of law facilitated the development of the abstract systems of exchange of finance and 
commodities which form the heart of the capitalist system. 
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displaced. Under these conditions, as Tester writes: 
With ever-increasing urbanisation and the improvement of cosmopolitan communications, the 
existence of the stranger could no longer be explained in terms of a temporary figure from 
wild places. (1992 p. 75) 
Two consequences may be noted as following from the new permanence of 'strangers on the 
doorstep'. Firstly, argues Tester, it becomes more difficult to project "wildness", disorder and 
chaos, 'out there'; instead the forces of disorder come to be seen as inhering within societies. 
Secondly, new strategies for dealing with social interaction become necessary; ways of dealing 
with people with whom one may come into close contact, yet about whom one has very little 
knowledge. Richard Sennett describes this process, and how it influenced early eighteenth-century 
Paris and London: 
in the population formation of both cities, a special sort of stranger played a critical role. He 
or she was alone, cut off form past associations, come to the city form a significant distance. 
Indeed in describing the population of the cities, Londoners and Parisians in a decade like the 
1720s resort to images of these outsiders as "motley", "amorphous", "questionable", 
"unformed". (1974 p. 62) 
Unlike later waves of immigrants, these groups could not be clearly differentiated by colour or 
culture. They were mostly young (late teens, early twenties), largely unmarked by their former 
lives. How were these new, amorphous people to be understood? As Sennett asks: "... to what 
knowledge, to what past experience does one appeal when dealing with such a motley mass? " 
(1974 p. 62). It is perhaps no accident that it was in this context that the development of human 
beings as abstract entities endowed with rights regardless of their role in society began to 
develop. Maclntyre, in particular, makes this connection between a world of strangers and the 
emergence of rights discourse: 
the modem world in everything that makes it peculiarly modem is a society of strangers, that 
is a society where bonds of mutual utility and of appeals to rights have replaced older 
conceptions of friendship which presuppose an appeal to the virtues. (In McMylor 1994 pp. 
102-3) 
At the same time as the stranger disrupted intimacy in local social interaction higher expectations 
of intimacy were placed on the nuclear family, which came to be seen as an intimate sphere free 
from external constraints. Evidence for this can found in the new forms of letter-writing 
developed in the eighteenth century. As Habermas comments: 
In the intimate sphere of the conjugal family privatised individuals viewed themselves as 
independent even from the private sphere of economic activity - as persons capable of 
entering into "purely human" relations with one another. The literary form of these at this 
time was the letter. (1989 p. 48) 
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New forms of legitimation were needed as conceptions based on hierarchy were undermined. 
Habermas sees the creation of the bourgeois public sphere as a key response to this need. 
The institutional bases for this development were the London coffee houses, Parisian salons, and 
German Tischgesellschaften (table societies), linked through international trade in goods and 
especially information (although the latter was initially contingent on the former). These three 
forums for bourgeois socialising and commerce shared three features which gave birth to the ideal 
of the public sphere as a forum for negotiation. These were: 
1. A form of social interaction which in principle suspended power and economic relations. 
Although not realised in practice, "as an idea it had become institutionalised ... 
If not realised, it 
was at least consequential" (1989. p. 36) 
2. They sustained public discussion of matters of interpretation previously the preserve of church 
and state (e. g. art, literature, philosophy). 
3. They "established the public as in principle inclusive" (1989. p. 37) 
Concern with identity, democratic representation, and the importance of an intimate sphere of 
purely human relations centred on the family; these features, together with an ideal of public 
participation based on suspension of power and privilege, open to all - characterise modem 
liberal political and moral consciousness. By providing a tradition location for these features we 
provide a basis, using Maclntyre's model, through which liberals can become self-critical, and 
from which they can advocate their understanding to traditioned minorities without the arrogance 
of universal assertion. 
Within modernity, however, the capacity of these ideas to sustain morality has been questioned; 
the generality of the thesis also invites criticism. Zygmunt Bauman's work both criticises 
modernity for its corrosion of morality and relies on a very similar version of the modern story to 
that outlined above; as such his work can be used to introduce both kinds of criticism. 
1.13 Bauman on the Moral Consequences of Modernity 
Bauman argues that moral consciousness was transformed by the increasing complexity of social 
relations. Conditions in which "physical and moral proximity overlapped" (1990 p. 23), as in the 
village based society, or in pre-modem urban situations where rigid social barriers performed the 
distancing function, were no longer sustainable. The new norm of interaction became one with 
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strangers 'on the doorstep', "morally distant yet physically close" (1990 pp. 24-5). Bauman's 
work is supported by Tester (1992, and above) and Sennett's (1974 and above) analyses of the 
role of strangers in modernity. 
The effect on moral sense is described by Bauman as "adiaphorization", adiaphoron being a thing 
declared neutral by the church; moral sense is neutralised by immersion in complex social 
situations. This complexity is not just the product of modem movements of population caused by 
the movement of labour in the market, but the result of modem technology increasing 
communication, and modem modes of production involving people in complex causal networks in 
which their actions may have consequences which are difficult or impossible to envisage. 
Bauman presents one possible conceptualisation of innate moral sense by placing the ideas of the 
moral philosopher and rabbinical scholar Emmanuel Levinas in a historical narrative which 
traces the fate of "innate morality" from pre- to postmodern societies (1990a). 
Bauman sees morality as operating at face-to-face level, a pre-social response to the 'face' of the 
'Other'. This "natural ethical impulse" can be described as a predisposition to feel responsibility 
for another person. It precedes encounter and therefore reciprocity or interest; it is 
unconditionally for the sake of the 'Other' (1990a pp. 12-13). Further, it is not only pre-social but 
pre-conscious, not a matter of choice, but an involuntary response to the presence of another 
person: 
The neighbour concerns me before all assumption, all contract consented to or refused... It is 
not because the neighbour would be recognised as belonging to the same genus as me that he 
concerns me. He is precisely other. The community with him begins in my obligation to him. 
(Levinas 1982 p. 87) 
Levinas' theory turns both philosophical attempts to find a rational basis for ethics, and 
sociological theories which view society as restraining innate 'uncivilised' behaviour, on their 
heads: 
Morality is the secret of sociality, and yet neither existence nor knowledge give birth to 
morality. Both come after.... Sociality is before being. Sociality is before knowing that being 
is. (Bauman 1990a p. 16) 
But why should this conception be remotely plausible, when precisely the reverse assumption is 
culturally dominant? As Bauman indicates, there is a widespread assumption that sociality, 
understood by social science as a realm of 'facts', precedes morality. But Bauman, here 
coinciding with Maclntyre, sees this a contingent construction, an example of the Enlightenment 
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divide between 'facts' and 'values': 
The etiological myth entrenched in the self-consciousness of our Western society is the 
morally elevating story of humanity emerging from pre-social barbarity. ... 
By and large lay 
opinion resents all challenge to the myth. Its resistance is backed ... 
by a broad coalition of 
respectable learned opinions which contains such powerful authorities as the 'Whig view' of 
history as the victorious struggle between reason and superstition; Weber's version of 
rationalisation as a movement toward achieving more for less effort; psychoanalytical 
promise to debunk, prise off and tame the animal in man; Marx's grand prophecy of life and 
history coming under the full control of the human species once it is freed from the presently 
debilitating parochialities. (Bauman 1989 p. 12) 
To this list one might add Adam Smith's invisible hand of capitalism, ensuring that the market 
distributes goods effectively and fairly. What can be said against this impressive consensus of 
modernity? First of all, as Bauman argues: 
non-social man is not to be found anywhere in time or space. For this reason, the hypothesis 
of inborn moral instinct cannot be investigated empirically. (1990a p. 10) 
The absence or presence of moral instinct is therefore a matter of interpretation, one of a number 
of possibilities. What an interpretation must do is to present the evidence relevant to the field of 
enquiry and demonstrate the coherence and consistency of the explanation proposed. The innate 
depravity of humanity needing social control claims to be more than this, but it is only as "false 
pretence" that it can "deny its interpretative status and claim that of a scientific theory" (1990a, p. 
11). 
But Bauman must still show his narrative to be more plausible than the alternative. His story is 
one of the demise of proximity. For this is moral reaction's sole precondition. It is a local 
response; it doesn't travel well. In premodern societies, where moral boundaries coincided with 
physical boundaries, it worked well enough, because, by definition, those encountered regularly 
were neighbours. But in modem societies we constantly meet people we don't (and because of 
their numbers couldn't) know. Therefore a need develops for mechanisms to deal with the 
presence of strangers. Maclntyre has suggested that the development of rights discourse may be 
an intellectual response to this situation (in McMylor 1994 pp. 102-3; above 1.12). As Maclntyre 
stresses, the downside of this is of loss of virtue-based concepts from our moral vocabularies 
(Maclntyre 1982, below 4.1,4.3). Bauman characterises the strategy of'mismeeting' as the 
foremost practical response. This refers to ways of ignoring other people while being physically 
close, a common examples of which would be keeping our gaze fixed on neutral space in a 
crowded lift or tube. 
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But the effects of adiaphorization are felt not only where large numbers of individuals are forced 
into close proximity, but also where individuals are involved in complex causal networks, where a 
sense of individual agency may be overwhelmed. In this context, the growth of financial 
institutions may be seen as an adiaphorising process. To enable exchange of unlike goods and 
services across familial, communal, cultural and national boundaries, a common denominator, 
money, is required. But an effect of the system created is to distance the individual from the 
consequences of his or her actions in production and consumption; to sunder production from 
value leading to alienation, in Marxist terms. It should be noted that the destruction of individual 
agency, and hence moral responsibility, is the result even for the most affluent consumers. 
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Furthermore, such systems work most effectively when individuals are severed from local 
attachments which might provide substantive interruptions to 'free' exchange. Thus Bauman cites 
Simmel's classic sociological analysis of monetary transactions: 
The significance of the stranger for the nature of money seems to me to be epitomised in 
miniature by the advice I once overheard: never have financial dealings with two kinds of 
people - friends or enemies. In the first case the indifferent objectivity of money is in ... 
conflict with the personal character of the relationship; in the other, the same condition 
provides a wide scope for hostile intentions ... . 
The desirable party for financial transactions 
- in which it is said quite correctly that business is business - is the person completely 
indifferent to us. (Simmel in Bauman 1990a p. 28) 
There is a further, linguistic, level at which this adiaphorising effect may be reinforced. The 
penetration of public discourse by the discourses of market exchange -especially an 
understanding of the citizen as consumer - and the privatisation of morality, may be transforming 
for the worse our capacity for conceptualising moral responsibility, both collectively and 
individually. Rorty, following Davidson, suggests the metaphors we use may have a profound 
impact on our self-understanding (1989 p. 16). 25 
Bauman interprets the Holocaust in the light of his adiaphorization thesis. His view is that the 
Holocaust was made possible not principally by local anti-Semitism, the peculiar character of the 
German nation, or the pathology of individuals. Rather, it was made possible by the division of 
labour, the diffusion of responsibility, and the adoption of a thorough-going problem-solving 
approach. As Richard Rubenstein writes: 
24Thus Poole argues: "Capitalism provides for the gratification of consumer needs, but denies the 
individual the capacity to choose what these might be. Capitalist production depends upon itself being 
able to call into existence wants which it can then satisfy. For the individual, the source, not just of his 
gratification, but of that which is to be gratified, is located elsewhere. He is subject to forces which exist 
beyond himself, and the act of consumption is not the expression of his individuality, but the denial of it. 
(Poole 1991, p. 33). 
2SThis argument is pursued further at 5.5 and 7.3 below. 
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no horror perpetrated by the German medical profession or German technocrats was 
inconsistent with the view that values are inherently subjective and that science is intrinsically 
instrumental and value-free. (In Bauman 1989 p. 10) 
Bauman's startling conclusion is that: 
All social organization consists ... 
in neutralising the disruptive and deregulating impact of 
moral behaviour. (1989 p. 215) 
The arrangements of modernity are particularly effective in this respect. Bauman continues by 
summarising the mechanisms involved: 
This effect is achieved through a number of complementary arrangements: (1) stretching the 
distance between action and its consequences beyond the reach of moral impulse; (2) 
exempting some 'others' from the class of potential objects of moral conduct, of potential 
'faces'; (3) dissembling other human objects of action into aggregates of functionally specific 
traits, held separate so that the cause for re-assembling does not arise, and the task set for 
each action can be free from moral evaluation. (1989 p. 215) 
An example of (3) is found in the language used by engineers responsible for the design of the gas 
vans used in the initial stages of the "Final Solution" (another example), where the people in the 
vans are described as "cargo", the vomit and excreta they produce in their dying moments as "thin 
fluids" and "thick fluids" (Browning in Bauman 1989 p. 197). As Bauman comments: 
The fact that the load consisted of people about to be murdered and losing control over their 
bodies, did not detract from the technical challenge of the problem. This fact had anyway to 
be translated into the neutral language of car-production technology before it could be turned 
into a'problem' to be'resolved'. (1989 p. 197) 
It is important to note that Bauman does not suggest that such social arrangements in themselves 
promote immoral behaviour, rather moral indifference. As we have said, they render social action 
'adiaphoric', not immoral. 
The power of Bauman's thesis lies in the way it enables us to see the moral greatness and 
depravity of modernity as two sides of the same coin. For the same impulse to universalise and 
abstract can be seen to underlie both the development and global penetration of the concept of 
universal human rights (perhaps the epitome of modern moral achievement) and the gas 
chambers. Thus, like Maclntyre, Bauman laments the moral consequences of modernity. 
However, a criticism can be made of appeal of both to 'simple' pre-modern forms of society, both 
in the sense that they over-simplify such societies, and in the more fundamental sense that the 
appeal is flawed because it neglects the moral achievements of modernity and offers no 
constructive alternative; traditions or face-to-face communities simply cannot be reassembled 
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under modem conditions. Concerning the first criticism, it is true that Bauman uses the isolated 
village as his model of premodern societies, whereas current anthropology has tended to challenge 
this model: 
instead of assuming the autonomy of the primeval community we need to examine how it was 
formed out of the interconnected space that already existed in the first place. (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1991 p. 8) 
However, it has already been argued both that hierarchy may be reconceived in terms of values 
rather than social order, while the contention that traditional societies resolved differences as 
social stratification may be applied here to suggest that in traditional societies social stratification 
maintained social distance even where physical distance was not maintained. Thus this model can 
apply to complex urban cultures, such as the cities of pre-modern India where social distance was 
maintained by jati. Here, although large numbers may interact, these interactions are regulated by 
strict rules. But what about conditions in which hierarchical relations were profoundly disrupted, 
such as times of conquest or migration, for example? After all, it is the containment of the 
consequences of encounter, of the disruptive force of faciality, rather its frequency which has 
been understood as crucial. 
Seen in this light, it may be plausible to explain the modem paradox of concurrent heightened 
individuality and depersonalisation as the consequence of sustained social displacement, which 
has been experienced to a lesser degree throughout history. This argument is supported by the 
anticipation of characteristically modem forms of thought at periods or points of displacement in 
premodern societies. Examples include the prefigurement of certain aspects of modem democracy 
in ancient Athens (Gray 1986 p. 5), and Augustine's reflexive thought against a background of 
displacement from late Roman paganism and the threat to Roman hegemony from pagan 
incursions (Chadwick 1988). 
Conversely, characteristically modem forms of thought are not universal in modem societies: 
Bellah et al's (1985) sample of middle Americans didn't display much reflexivity in their morality 
(below, 3.4). The extent to which morality in the West remains determined by context rather than 
by the reflective, autonomous subjects of postconventional moral theory is often underestimated 
in liberal arguments against the ethics of traditioned minorities. It is an argument which will be 
brought into sharp focus by our case study in the next chapter, where we shall consider The 
Satanic Verses controversy in Britain. 
Chapter 2: 
The Satanic Verses Controversy and the Common Good 
2.1 Introduction: Rival Interpreting Communities and the Common Good. 
At 1.1 we considered the definition of the common good offered in the Vatican II document 
Dignitatis Humanae: 
the sum of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach 
their fulfilment more fully and more easily. (In Hannon 1992 p. 95) 
This chapter seeks to examine the problems involved in maintaining a sense of common good in 
one particular context where people's understanding of what that "fulfilment" might entail differs 
substantially: The Satanic Verses controversy in Britain. 
The basic approach in this chapter will be to consider two broad communities of interpretation of 
the book, and to ask what the common good might mean in the context of their conflicting 
understandings. These communities are the broadly liberal readership of the book, and Britain's 
Muslims. Both communities are diverse, but for the purposes of this argument certain 
commonalities can be highlighted. In terms of the above definition of the common good the 
question which will be addressed is, what social conditions, in particular those governing the 
production and dissemination of this book, would enable both groups to reach their 'fulfilment' 
most fully and easily? 
Putting the question in this way already raises problems for certain liberal understandings of the 
regulation of society, which attempt to specify the conditions of justice without reference to 
particular conceptions of the good (above 1.10, below 3.2). Such justice is to be founded instead 
on universally and rationally justifiable principles. It is claimed that on the basis of such 
principles the state can provide neutral structures within which differing conceptions of the good 
may co-habit. Indeed to act justly on such a theory one must inhabit a space circumscribed by 
these neutral structures, which exist precisely to govern justly between competing convictions. To 
threaten these structures is, by definition, to act unjustly. Such, it has been widely assumed, is 
the case for free speech in this controversy; the upholding of this has been taken as by itself 
guaranteeing justice, and is therefore protected by this powerful form of argument. Yet the 
possibility of such neutrality is highly questionable (3.2). 
Chapter 3 will consider in more depth the problems of liberal claims to neutrality, but in this 
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chapter some problems for this claim will emerge through consideration of the clash of 
interpretations between two audiences of The Satanic Verses, that is the intended or assumed 
sophisticated liberal audience, who might be termed 'consumers of high-brow fiction', and the 
British Muslim community. Initially it had been intended to start this chapter with a section 
entitled "The Book", in which an account would be given of the various themes presented in the 
novel. An attempt would have been made to allow the book to 'speak for itself, before the voices 
of controversy engulfed it (Rushdie 1989). 
However, on reflection this seemed to be a flawed approach, because any reading of a text 
assumes an interpreting community; no book reads itself. In one sense, a book has no meaning 
without someone to read it. This is not to say that people can get out of a book only what they 
bring to it, for such a theory would make learning impossible. But the meaning of a text is the 
product of the complex interaction of signifiers in the text itself and their significance to different 
interpreting communities. The importance of the interpreting community can be seen in the 
following extract from Gautam Sen, a Marxist from a Hindu background. Sen's initial reaction to 
the book's publication was positive, but the media response to Muslim protests prompted a 
striking reappraisal: 
When the crisis ... first 
broke ... I found myself cursing the 
bigots and signing a newspaper 
advertisement in Rushdie's support. ... But the past few months 
have drawn me inexorably 
closer to the protesters against The Satanic Verses. All sorts of racists were crawling out of 
the woodwork to clarify a more important prior distinction between white societies and 
blacks, transcending any differences within white society itself. ... I was not 
born a Muslim, 
but I have to say we are all Muslims now. (1989 p. 6) 
Sen's change of heart is perhaps extreme; his 'reading' seems entirely driven by the context 
without regard to the content of the book. We shall consider below (2.4) the more subtle 
transition of Bhikhu Parekh, for whom contact with Muslims has also led to a different reading of 
the work. This consideration means that an attempt at a literary-critical appreciation of the work 
will appear in a section which seeks to contextualise such readings, i. e. by asking who makes this 
kind of reading, and why (2.3). 
Thus the strategy of focusing on interpreting communities has been chosen in an attempt to avoid 
making any particular audience normative for understanding the text, something which can 
happen simply by omitting to mention or locate an audience. When a thing is so obvious that it 
doesn't get mentioned, it may silently attain normativity. Here, it is hoped to avoid fixing the 'real' 
meaning of the book to the understandings of any particular community, and thus to avoid 
alternative interpretations tacitly being ruled eccentric, or worse. 
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'Alternative' interpretations to those of the literary community include those of South Asian 
Muslims offended by the book's portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed, his family and followers. 
Yet it should be pointed out that use of this 'hermeneutical community' way of understanding 
textual interpretation to legitimise a wider range of readings is something of a double-edged 
sword. For de-normalising one hermeneutical community opens the interpretation of the text to 
all-comers, rendering the notion of writers having some responsibility for their works more 
problematic. Authorial intention may be unfashionable in literary theory, a fashion prompted 
largely by the honourable motivation of modesty in the face of a plurality of readings. Here, the 
meaning of a text floats in intersubjective space; normativity comes seen as arbitrary imposition, 
a forced intervention in an open-ended hermeneutical spiral in which text, and successive 
interpreting communities, continually interact. 
Yet while this may generate creative textual interpretation, the intrinsic absence of adjudication 
between competing interpretations poses problems in some contexts. Where one interpretation of 
a text requires it to be banned, while another promotes its circulation, a judgement must be made; 
doing nothing, in this field of action, is implicitly to favour one particular point of view. While we 
may be able to suspend judgement between competing interpretations artificially in order to study 
them, the requirements of practical judgement may not allow us to do so indefinitely. 
This tension, between artistic and scholarly suspension of judgement and the requirements of 
practical judgement, is paralleled by that between theology and literature. For example, Terry 
Wright comments: 
Much theology ... tends towards unity and coherence, a systematic exploration of the content 
of faith which attempts to impose limits on the meaning of words, while literature ... 
is often 
dangerous, subversive and chaotic, an anarchic celebration of the creative possibilities of 
language. (1988 p. 1) 
Wright is referring here to the Christian tradition, but this tension is, at present at least, probably 
more acutely felt in the Islamic tradition, where faith remains, in the understanding of many, 
closer to the legislature, and hence to the necessity of decision. Some forms of artistic expression, 
notably the figurative and performing arts, have traditionally been prohibited by orthodox Islam 
(Kabbani 1989 pp. 62-5); although when it comes to the spoken and written word it is probably 
Christianity which has the stronger record on censorship (Webster 1989 pp. 19-44). It may be 
worth noting here that if Christianity's relationship to literature has mellowed, this may be 
because, as Asad (1990) argues, Western religious sensibility has largely been assimilated to the 
realm of private, aesthetic experience. 
In part, then, the freedom to continue to embrace a plurality of interpretations may be afforded by 
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an absence of practical responsibilities, something religion or literature can achieve only by 
retreating form the public realm of competing convictions. But The Satanic Verses controversy 
presents incompatible interpretations of a book fed by incompatible value systems, and yet 
demands practical judgement. The problem here is one, as Nagel puts it, "created by a disparity 
of value and the singleness of decision" (1986 p. 128). If both literary and Muslim communities 
sustain traditions of 'the good', and the requirements of one tradition conflict with those of the 
other, how is one to arbitrate between them? Can any sense of the common good be rescued? 
The frequent lament of those who found themselves in a mediating role in the controversy is the 
lack of mutual understanding present on both sides. The media is also seen to have played a key 
role in the controversy in sustaining mutual incomprehension. I will therefore begin with some 
comments about two incidents which stand entangled at the heart of popular perceptions of The 
Satanic Verses controversy, and attempt to disentangle them. 
2.2 The Satanic Verses Controversy: Book-Burning and Fatwa 
As a media event, or in the popular imagination, The Satanic Verses controversy began with two 
incidents: the book-burning in Bradford on 16 January 1989, and Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa on 
14 February 1989. A month apart, these events have fused in public perception, symbolised on 
the envelope of a letter received by Shabbir Akhtar, a leading figure in the Bradford campaign 
against the book, addressed simply "The Ayatollah's Bradford Acolyte, Dr Shabbir Akhtar" 
(Akhtar 1989, p. 50). In particular, public perceptions of the controversy have been almost 
entirely filtered through the prism of the fatwa, with murderous intent read back into the Bradford 
conflagration. However, under scrutiny, each of these incidents appears somewhat differently to 
the image suggested by their media fusion. 
Rather than a sudden violent explosion signalling the eruption of an Islamic Third Reich in West 
Yorkshire, the Bradford book-burning followed five months of peaceful lobbying which had 
failed to catch the media's attention. Since the book's publication on 26 September 1988, Muslim 
organisations, first the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, then the Bradford Council for Mosques 
and the Union of Muslim Organisations, had been lobbying Viking-Penguin (the publishers) and 
the Government. As Samad writes: 
At this early stage many Muslim leaders were not asking for the book to be banned but for 
the insertion of a statement reasserting that it was a piece of fiction. (1992 p. 514) 
Their protests met with no response which indicated to them that their grievances were being 
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taken seriously. Penguin wrote to say that they were "truly sorry for the distress the book had 
caused", but insisted that this "reaction is based on a misreading of the book", calling on the 
support of "the critics" to endorse their claim (Ruthven 1990 pp. 102-3). In an attempt to bring 
their grievances to public attention, a book burning was held in Bolton in December 1988, but it 
was not widely reported (Akhtar 1990 p. 43). Therefore Bradford Muslims deliberately informed 
the press prior to the Bradford book-burning (Ruthven 1990 p. 103); and attention they certainly 
got, though not quite the kind they were after: 
All the newspapers commented ... Times, Daily Telegraph, 
Guardian, Yorkshire Post. They 
compared us to Hitler. (Liaqat Hussein of the Jamiaat Tabligh ul Islam, in Ruthven 1990 p. 
99) 
It is worth pointing out that while in Bradford WH Smith had been forced to withdraw the book 
due to threats prior to Khomeini's fatwa (Samad 1992 p. 515), the only place in the UK where 
this was so, no threats had been made to Rushdie or his family: 
Although Muslims were intensely frustrated and angry, and although isolated individuals 
spoke of violence, no Muslims to my knowledge, threatened Rushdie or his wife's life, or even 
threw a stone at him or his house, at a time when he was unguarded and vulnerable. (Parekh 
1991 p. 62)1 
While most media attention focused on Muslim outrage, both the media presentations and liberal 
spokespersons expressed considerable anger themselves. This anger needs to be understood, in 
particular the anger aroused through the juxtaposition of book-burning with Khomeini's fatwa, as 
driven by a sense that where books are destroyed the destruction of people is not far behind. Why 
such a powerful connection? It is worth reflecting on responses to the book-burning in the context 
of European history. Asad evokes a sense of the power of cultural memory by the following 
comparison: 
When characters in a novel are burned to death (or vilified), we are reminded that it is, after 
all, "only a story". And yet a literalist response doesn't seem equally convincing to us when 
we are told that the book burned is, after all, "only paper and ink". The liberal expressions of 
outrage at this symbolic act - no less then the anger of South Asian Muslims at the 
publication of the book - deserve to be more fully explored than they have been, so that we 
can understand the sacred geography of secular culture better than we now do. (1990 p. 258) 
In his comparison Asad exposes a liberal sacred space opaque to a crude positivist distinction 
between metaphor (artifice) and literalism (reality). Liberal reactions to book burning, especially 
by a religious group, need to be understood in the context of events such as the Inquisition, the 
emergence of the modern nation-state from the religious strife of post-reformation Europe, and in 
living memory the burning of books under Nazism. They also need to be understood in the 
l Webster 1989 p. 126 also supports this contention. 
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context of the turbulent history of the West's relations with Islam; medieval conflict in Palestine, 
the Turks at the gates of Vienna at the birth of modem Europe, orientalist caricatures which 
legitimated colonial practices and which continue to legitimate neo-colonial practices (Said 
1978). 
Thus liberal responses need to be understood in terms of the history of liberalism, and the stories 
that liberal communities have told about themselves in response to, and in shaping, this history. 2 
Yet if it is necessary to have some grasp of such stories, and the goods testified to in them, to 
arrive at liberal conceptions of justice, this runs contrary to liberal self-understanding as able to 
generate conceptions of justice independent of particular conceptions of the good. We shall return 
to the philosophical form of such claims in Chapter 3, but for now the point can be illustrated by 
example. D'Costa has described the field of knowledge in Western societies such as Britain as 
dominated by the discourses of "secular fundamentalism" (1990b p. 419). He describes his 
admittedly provocative use of the term as follows: 
fundamentalism can be said to represent an unquestioned authority given to a particular 
revelation of the way things are; in this case, a secular metaphysics with its attendant 
political and social baggage. (1990b p. 419) 
He admits that there are varieties of secular fundamentalisms, but goes on to illustrate certain 
core characteristics using a letter printed in The Independent on Sunday near the anniversary of 
the fatwa, and Rushdie's repudiation of the term in Is Nothing Sacred? (1990b). D'Costa believes 
Rushdie's views to be widely shared (1990 p. 419). The text of the letter which he cites runs: 
The events following the publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses highlight the 
fundamental obstruction to the further development of society. Belief, that is the dogmatic 
rejection of reason and the acceptance of ideas on the basis of 'faith' alone, provides man with 
a box to hide from the realities of life. Belief, be it religious or political, has been the major 
cause of war, conflict and disunity ... 
To build a better society and a better world we must be 
prepared to question and to reason; belief obstructs the path towards achievement of this 
ultimate aim. (in D'Costa 1990b pp. 425-6) 
Despite this polemic against beliefs, D'Costa highlights a number of beliefs indicated in the letter. 
First, the belief that it is possible to have no beliefs is itself a belief; second, that context-free 
reason is possible; third, "the Cartesian presumption that doubt leads to truth" (1990b p. 426), 
and fourth, the conviction that "no mode of discourse other than itself can facilitate the conditions 
where other discourses can survive" (1990b p, 426). D'Costa finds this pattern repeated in 
Rushdie, in spite of Rushdie's rejection of the label 'secular fundamentalist'. Thus he comments: 
[Rushdie] writes'I have never in my adult life affirmed any belief (1990, p. 19), yet he 
2See above (1.12) on the bourgeois public sphere, and below (3.2) on the modern secular state as a device to enable religious toleration, for aspects of such stories. 
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provides us with a manifesto replete with metaphysical, ethical and epistemological beliefs ... 
Rushdie has found and preaches the truth as he sees it: a godless universe which is self- 
created and socially constructed, in which all rules, duties and obligations are human made 
and open to change, in which the individual has Promethean rights to question and write, and 
a universe nevertheless in which love is worth striving for. (1990b p. 427) 
D'Costa is "certainly not against a person holding such a view", but is concerned that the view is 
not recognised by its proponents as a "'sacred' discourse" (1990b p. 427). Without such 
recognition, disagreements with people holding alternative views of the sacred are likely to appear 
as unprovoked attacks. 
Now, it may be objected that it is unfair to extract a letter from a paper and use it to represent an 
entire tradition. However, whether or not the position explored represents the best that the liberal 
tradition has to offer, if such views are widely shared then they must be understood in order to 
understand more fully The Satanic Verses controversy. The wide distribution of such views will 
be attested in this chapter in many ways; through considering the writings of literary critics, the 
methods of social scientific investigators of 'race', the small amount of empirical work that has 
been done on specifically anti-Muslim prejudice, and Muslim allegations of a'Liberal 
Inquisition'. In Chapter 3 we shall then have the opportunity to consider just how different at 
crucial points the quality of argument in this letter is from that of more eloquent liberal 
spokespeople. Both, it will be argued, carry a strong conviction in the superiority of liberal 
society which is justified, if at all, by a kind of social Darwinism: traditional cultures retard 
economic and social development; one way or another they must perish. 
But first, in the light of some recognition of the liberalism's history and sacred space, it is 
appropriate to re-assess the acts of book-burning. It is possible to view the Bradford book- 
burning as less the calculated action of an organised and dangerous Islamic fifth column, and 
more as an ill-advised though graphic and non-violent expression of the frustration of a relatively 
powerless minority. There is certainly no evidence of any direct foreign connection with the 
demonstrations (Modood 1990 pp. 127-8, Ruthven 1990 pp. 97-8). Which brings us to the 
infamous fatwa. 
Ironically, whether in ignorance or contempt of the rhythms of the secular season, it was on 
Valentine's Day 14 February 1989 that Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, or "learned legal 
opinion" (Modood 1990 p. 129), which condemned Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic 
Verses, to death. The crime for which Rushdie was condemned was not blasphemy, which has no 
strict equivalent in Islam (Ally 1990 p. 23), but rather riddah, literally 'turning back' from the 
path of Islam, usually translated 'apostasy' (ibid. p. 25). According to Ally, two kinds of riddah 
can be distinguished in Shari'ah ('Islamic law'). On the one hand, the Qur'an declares that "There 
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is no compulsion in religion" (2: 256), and indicates punishment in the afterlife rather than the 
present life for those who turn back from faith (2: 217,16: 106). On the other hand, a series of 
severe penalties, including death, are prescribed where apostasy is accompanied by fighting 
against the Islamic community (5: 36-7). Thus Ally concludes: 
a quiet desertion of personal Islamic duties is not a sufficient reason for inflicting death on a 
person. Only when the individual's desertion of Islam is used as a political tool for instigating 
a state disorder, or revolting against the law of Islam, can the individual apostate then be put 
to death as a just punishment for his act of treason and betrayal of the Muslim community. 
(1990, pp. 25-6) 
But in what sense could Rushdie be considered to be guilty of apostasy in this second sense? How 
can the act of writing and publishing a novel be construed as an act of war against the Islamic 
community? On 12 February 1989 six people were killed in riots protesting against the book in 
Islamabad, Pakistan, and the next day another person was killed and more than a hundred injured 
in another riot in Kashmir, India (Appignanesi and Maitland 1989 p. ix). Since the fatwa 
followed the next day it seems plausible that Khomeini saw Rushdie's rejection of Islam 
evidenced in the book, and the international means of its dissemination, as deliberately designed 
to provoke the Islamic community on a large scale, and therefore held him and his publishers 
responsible for these civil disturbances and consequent Muslim deaths. Certainly the national day 
of mourning called in Iran for the victims of the riots on 15 February supports this view. In this 
light the judgement of what might be termed 'aggravated apostasy' begins to become intelligible. 
Political factors are also likely to have been significant. As political leader of Iran, the vying for 
political leadership of the Muslim world between Iran and Saudi Arabia cannot be ignored. 
Ironically, it was for this reason that while the fatwa led the British media to suspect a world 
Muslim conspiracy, in most of the Muslim world "the fatwa was the deathblow to the 
internationalisation of the campaign because the pro-Saudi Organisation of Islamic Conference 
refused to endorse the Khomeini's diktat" (Samad 1992 p. 511). 
A significant cause of consternation in the West has been the view that the fatwa showed flagrant 
disregard of national sovereignty and international law by passing judgement on a British citizen 
for a 'crime' committed outside Iranian jurisdiction. However, in view of previous relationships 
with the West, concern over interference with the internal workings of other sovereign states is 
unlikely to have detained Khomeini; Iran had more than enough reason to feel its own sovereignty 
had been violated, not just in the colonial past, but in Western support for the Shah and then for 
Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. 
Seen in the light of both Shari'ah and international politics, the reasons behind Khomeini's fatwa 
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become comprehensible. But how widespread was support for it in the Islamic community? 
Firstly, as Ally points out: 
Khomeini does not represent the constellation of views of all Muslims, nor is he the head of 
the Islamic Ummah. (Ally 1990 p. 24) 
Two related issues require consideration here. First, the strength of the case upon which his 
verdict rests, given other factors which may be relevant, and second, the authority of his verdict 
because of his standing. Shari'ah requires Muslims in a minority situation to follow the law of the 
land, provided this is not contrary to fundamental Islamic beliefs and practices, and also requires 
proper legal procedure (Ally 1990 pp. 26-7). Both these factors give grounds for challenging 
Khomeini's call for the Muslim faithful to act on his verdict. 
But Khomeini's authority also needs to be considered; Ally's comment, as a Sunni Muslim, that 
"Ayatullah (sic) Khomeini is subject to the procedures of shari'ah like anyone else" (1990 p. 27) 
neglects Khomeini's special role in Shi'i Islam. Firstly, Khomeini was a faaih (expert in Islamic 
jurisprudence), and since the mid-nineteenth century Shi'ite faaihs have had powers to exercise 
their independent judgement far in excess of their Sunni peers; indeed Momen states that from 
this period "they could issue edicts on virtually any subject" (1985 p. 187). Secondly, Khomeini 
had himself developed the role of the faaih, particularly in the realm of politics. 
Shi'ite Muslims hold that the full spiritual and political power of the Prophet was passed on to 
Mohammed's male blood descendants, who hold the title of 'Imam'. However, for the majority 
'Twelver' Shi'ites the twelfth Imam went into 'the Greater Occultation' (a hidden and inaccessible 
state) in 941 CE (Momen 1985 pp. 161-17 1), leaving the community without a spiritual or 
political leader. In the absence of the Imam the ulama gradually adopted his religious, legal and 
finally, with Khomeini, political powers: 
Khumayni (sic) has taken the Nai'ib al 'Amm ['general representative'] concept to its 
logical conclusion by asserting the right of the faaih as the deputy of the Imam to 
superintend all religious, social and political affairs - the Vilayat-i Fagih ['government of 
the legal expert']. (Momen 1985 p. 196) 
This position gave Khomeini vast power and prestige in Iran, but this does not extend to the rest 
of the Muslim world, and particularly not to the majority Sunni community. As we have seen, the 
pro-Saudi Organization of Islamic Conference refused to endorse the fatwa (Samad 1992 p. 511). 
Most importantly, however, although the fatwa was not indicative of Muslim unity on the issue, it 
"spoke to the hearts of many Muslims who felt despised, powerless and without recourse in law" 
(Modood 1990 pp. 129-130). While it damaged the campaign against the book internationally 
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(Samad 1992 p. 511), in Britain, in concert with the press vilification of Muslims, it led British 
Muslims to raise the stakes, calling for an outright ban on the book, and in some cases for 
reprisals against publisher and author. 
2.3 The Intended Readership: The Literary Community. 
Most people define themselves by their work, or where they come from, or suchlike; we have 
lived too far inside our heads. It makes actuality damn hard to handle. ('Mirza Saeed' in 
Rushdie 1988 p. 490) 
This section focuses on the kind of audience Rushdie might expect to read his fiction in the 
normal course of events, i. e. consumers of sophisticated contemporary fiction in English, and the 
readings of the book which this audience might generate. 
The audiences of novels are not often the subject of critical, or even descriptive investigation. 3 Of 
course, anyone in a country where a book is published can buy or read it, and hence the contours 
of this group are difficult to determine. There are basic methodological obstacles; purchase or 
borrowing of a book is no guarantee of reading, and interpretation is not easily quantifiable, 
although qualitative methods are available. The absence of study in this area may also reflect the 
tendency of social scientists to focus on the policing the boundaries of the normal, and the 
function of social scientific discourse in defining social norms. Harmless readers of novels fall 
well within accepted social boundaries, and hence do not require the regulative scrutiny of the 
social scientist. 
Yet the practice of reading sophisticated fiction, both in terms of the private use of texts and the 
particular form of 'the novel', is quite culturally specific. The 'sophisticated' tag here denotes the 
elite constitution of the readership of a novel of the complexity and length of The Satanic Verses. 
This readership is an international community, but one which is likely to be comparatively small 
in any one country. Sales are not necessarily a reliable guide to readership, as it may be that a 
high proportion of novels bought are not read. However, in caricature, this audience is likely to 
consist mostly of middle class professionals; including the kind of people who study other people 
(i. e. social scientists), which may be another reason for the dearth of investigation of 'the social 
practice of the reading of complex fiction'! More likely, as suggested above, the practice of 
reading is perceived as private and therefore not relevant (specifically not threatening) to the 
public arena. What, then, can be learned about this audience in the absence of direct studies of it? 
3For example, neither British Social Attitudes or Social Trends investigate this matter. 
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In the study of religion it is usual to be confronted with a historic text of whose first interpreting 
community we know little. In this situation, it is usual practice to attempt to imaginatively 
reconstruct the audience from clues in the text itself, supplemented by archaeological evidence, or 
evidence from other texts. 4 Something of that method will be used here by asking the question: 
what hints to the identity of its intended audience does The Satanic Verses provide? 
The cultural anthropologist Talal Asad suggests that: 
The book's stories ... powerfully connect with ... the 
highly ambivalent emotions generated by 
an anglicised Indian's gaze at the ruling class of Imperial Britain. (1990 p. 257) 
Certainly the central characters of the book, Saladin and Gibreel, are privileged, cosmopolitan, 
anglicised Indians. Here it is alleged that Rushdie does not, whatever the claims of his 
comfortable appreciators, write of a universal experience of migration; rather, if he writes of 
migration as metaphor of postmodern life, the life alluded to is that of the high-flying 
cosmopolitan. Yet in critics' reviews of this and other works by Rushdie universalising statements 
abound. With breath-taking ethnocentricity difficult to attribute entirely to literary flourish, The 
New York Times' reviewer of Midnight's Children describes it as "a continent finding its voice", a 
comment which the publisher's saw fit to repeat on the paperback's cover (Rushdie 1981, cover; 
Ahmed in Asad 1990, p. 249). Nisha Puri of The Indian Post, having confessed that "The Satanic 
Verses is not an easy read", nonetheless goes on to proclaim: 
Rushdie remains buoyantly accessible to anyone who responds to all that is good and living 
in the supreme fictions offered by literary genius. (In Appignanesi and Maitland 1989 p. 13) 
Clearly, Rushdie is an example of a writer in English from an ethnic minority who has assumed 
the status of representative; but the question remains, representative of whom? Rushdie's text, 
argues Asad: 
is constructed from the start within a field of modem reading-and-writing that extends beyond 
the activities of literary figures to include the scope of modem politics; the text acquires its 
representative status by tapping the network of images and power made available in that field 
and not another. (1990 p. 249) 
In this field are included "the self-fashioning narratives of militantly atheist readers who 
remember a repressive religious upbringing" (1990 p. 249), and the post-enlightenment meta- 
narrative of secular European civilisation's hard won and relatively recent victory over 
ecclesiastical authority. It has also been suggested that in this secular order literature occupies 
something of the sacred space once held by religion, and not only in the very literal sense 
4This procedure is fundamental to 'redaction criticism', a method which predominates in current New 
Testament scholarship (Tuckett in Coggins and Houlden 1990 pp. 580-2). 
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proposed by IA Richards and the New Critics of the 1930s: Rushdie's own comments certainly 
point in this direction. Thus in 1989 he wrote that he possessed "the same God-shaped hole" as 
Dr Adam Aziz, the patriarch of Midnight's Children, and that "Unable to accept the unarguable 
absolutes of religion I have filled up that hole with literature" (1990a p. 26). Is Nothing Sacred? 
(1990b) is constructed around an opposition between his love of literature ("I grew up kissing 
books and bread" 1990b p. 2), a love which "need not be blind" (1990b p. 3), and faith, which, he 
contends "must, ultimately, be a leap in the dark" (1990b p. 3). The climax of the essay is a 
parable in which literature is represented as the special, set aside room in the crowded, run-down, 
dangerous house which is the world: 
Literature is the one place in any society where, within the secrecy of our own heads, we can 
hear voices talking about everything in every possible way. (1990b p. 16) 
But if literary forms are culturally specific, how can they really aspire to universal representation, 
except by assimilation of all other cultural forms? Yet Rushdie remains oblivious to the 
imperialism of his discourse. The doctrine of salvation through literature reaches its partly self- 
mocking extremity in Fay Weldon's notorious defence of Rushdie: 
... as a piece of revelatory writing 
The Satanic Verses reads pretty much to me like the works 
of St. John the Divine at the end of our own Bible... St Salman the Divine. Too far? 
Probably. But if into the weevily meal and the brackish water of our awful, awful society, 
this good yeast is dropped ... all may yet 
be well and our brave new God of individual 
conscience may yet arise. (1990, p. 42) 
If one is tempted to defend Weldon and Rushdie's highly reflexive writing by arguing that their 
sacred space of literature is only a metaphor, not a literal space to guard with one's life, then 
Asad's comments on liberal responses to the book-burning give pause for thought. A retreat into 
literalism cannot explain Western revulsion at the burning of books; only memories of the 
Inquisition and the Third Reich can do that. For while literalism can happily accept that burning 
or insulting people in a novel is "only a story", when the book itself is burned, not even a story 
but the mere pen and ink, tempers and hackles rise. This community has a history and its 
memories demand respect; it has a sacred space opaque to a crude positivist distinction between 
metaphor (artifice) and literalism (reality). 
Thus Rushdie takes his bearings largely from the expectations of this audience, and through this 
prism explores in the novel the contradictions of life in a plural society. We now turn to consider 
the light which this kind of perspective throws on the theme of a 'common good' in a plural 
society, using some passages from The Satanic Verses itself. 
Ij 
I 
i 
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2.4. Rushdie and the Common Good: Plurality and Co-existence in The Satanic Verses 
'The modem city, ' Otto Cone on his hobbyhorse had lectured his bored family at table, 'is the 
locus classicus of incompatible realities. Lives that have no business mingling with one 
another sit side by side upon the omnibus. One universe, on a zebra crossing is caught for an 
instant, blinking like a rabbit, in the headlamps of a motor-vehicle in which an entirely alien 
and contradictory continuum is to be found. And as long as that's all, they pass in the night, 
jostling on Tube stations, raising their hats in some hotel corridor, it's not so bad. But if they 
meet! It's uranium and plutonium, each makes the other decompose, boom. ' (Rushdie 1988 p. 
314) 
In this passage the prognosis for the common good seems bleak. Furthermore, Otto Cone's 
pessimistic picture would seem justified by the explosion the novel has itself precipitated. Yet 
other voices in the book speak more brightly. The description of Zeenat Vakil's art-criticism, in 
her Bombay context, seems suggestive of a way of living with different cultures beyond 
communalist strife or homogenising secular modernity: 
She was an art critic whose book on the confining myth of authenticity, that folkloristic 
straitjacket which she sought to replace by an ethic of historically validated eclecticism, for 
was not the entire national culture based on the principle of borrowing whatever clothes seem 
to fit, Aryan, Mughal, British, take-the-best-and-leave-the-rest? - had created a predictable 
stink, especially because of its title. She had called it The Only Good Indian. 'Meaning, is a 
dead, ' she told Chamcha when she gave him a copy. (Rushdie 1988 p. 52) 
Perhaps this passage also anticipates the opposition to The Satanic Verses, another provocatively 
entitled work. Certainly, there are strong parallels between 'the book' and 'the book within the 
book'. Both challenge a belief in purity. In The Satanic Verses the purity challenged is the 
possibility of a sacred text revealed without human interpolation, without accommodation to 
context, while in The Good Indian the purity challenged is that of aspects of Indian cultural 
tradition. One is targeted at what the author sees as Islamic fundamentalism, the other at Hindu 
fundamentalism. Both titles seek to turn an old vice into a new kind of virtue; the colonialist 
insult and the orientalist taunt into ironic celebrations of eclecticism. 
These excerpts from The Satanic Verses give glimpses of Rushdie probing the incongruous 
juxtapositions of life in multicultural urban settings. While he refers to Bombay, ancient Mecca 
and, briefly, Teheran, the dominant city in his narrative landscape is "Ellowen Deeowen", spelt- 
out 'London'. Thus Rushdie raises the very issues and describes the very situations on which this 
thesis reflects. Seen from this perspective, The Satanic Verses is not a simple slander on the 
Prophet of Islam, but a form of diagnosis, and even a hint of cure, for the disease of conflict 
threatening plural, rapidly changing societies; a disease which its publication has both tragically 
and ironically highlighted and exacerbated. 
This kind of reading correlates broadly with the critical reception for the book by secularised 
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audiences, and with Rushdie's expressed intentions. Thus before publication Rushdie commented: 
There are things that seem not to belong together, except that it is part of the metropolitan 
experience that such things do not belong together and do live side by side - that you can live 
upstairs from Khomeini. What I've tried to do is set alongside each other in odd, sometimes 
raw juxtapositions all sorts of different bodies of experience to show what frictions and 
sparks they make. (In Appignanesi and Maitland 1989 p. 9) 
In her review, (also pre-publication), Angela Carter too interprets Zeeny Vakil's art criticism as a 
key to the novel: "The Satanic Verses, as if in tribute to Zeeny's ethic, is eclectic as hell" (The 
Guardian 23 Sept 1988). She describes it as "an epic into which holes have been punched to let in 
visions, an epic hung about with ragbag scraps of many different cultures". These "holes ... 
punched to let in visions" identify the genre as 'magical realism', a style of fiction in which 
realistic narrative is interspersed with fantastic events, and dreamscapes mingle with political 
allusion. 
Characteristic features of this genre have been outlined by Brennan (1989), using the example of 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude, which he compares with Rushdie's 
Shame (1984). The comparison also holds for the more recent The Satanic Verses. Thus both 
One Hundred Years of Solitude and The Satanic Verses feature miraculous defiance of gravity 
(the gypsies' flying carpet in the former, Gibreel and Saladin's safe fall from the exploding jumbo 
in the latter), young girls haunted by swarms of butterflies, and the frequent appearance of 
ghosts. 5 While fantasy in many forms can be seen as influencing Rushdie's work, including the 
pre-Islamic Arabic tradition of storytelling represented in The Satanic Verses by the figure of the 
poet Baal, the debt to Marquez's magical realism goes further. As Brennan comments: 
What Rushdie borrows from Marquez is 
... unique 
in one respect: he theorises his own use of 
fantasy, and does so by referring to colonialism. (1989 p. 66). 
Magical realism, according to Brennan, "is a genre that serves an ideological role ... as the 
imaginative expression of freedom" (1989 p. 65). He means political freedom; the idea is that by 
subverting the realist conventions of modem fiction the hegemony of dominant political ideologies 
are challenged. 6 Marquez deliberately apes the fantastical style of early white explorers of the 
continent, ironically adopting a discourse developed to subjugate a continent as a means of 
challenging present dominant modes of representation; once again, as we saw in The Satanic 
5Rushdie's links with Marquez and Latin American magical realism may be mediated through his 
experiences of travelling in Latin America, recorded in The Jaguar's Smile: A Nicaraguan Journey 
(1987). 
There are perhaps some comparisons to be made between magical realism and apocalyptic: both use 
fantastical imagery to subvert repressive political regimes, although earnest eschatological expectation is 
replaced with irony. 
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Verses, an old insult is transformed into an ironic celebration. 
However, while Rushdie's earlier novels, especially Midnight's Children and Shame, have been 
welcomed as positively contributing to post-colonial literature, some critics have discerned in 
The Satanic Verses a slide from hopeful engagement in post-colonial struggle to nihilistic and 
cynical acquiescence in Western postmodernism (Brennan 1989). The salient features identified 
as postmodern here are an abandonment of left-wing struggles, replacing political commitment 
with heightened aestheticism (most leading intellectual postmodernists have a Marxist 
background), in which the dominant metaphor is that of the text or work of art, to be shaped and 
fashioned at will. Ironic juxtaposition becomes an end in itself, mischievous playfulness replaces 
politics. For example, Talal Asad forcefully describes objections to this approach: 
But everyday life is not so easily invented, abandoned, reinhabited as this notion of culture, 
modelled on the postmodern idea of an imaginative work of art, suggests. Nor does everyone 
in the modem world have an equal power to invent, or resist the imposition of someone else's 
invention. To say this is not merely to remind ourselves of the enormous inequalities of class, 
race, and gender that still exist. It is also to note that although the strictly privatised role of 
religion in the modem Western state makes it easy for English believers and non-believers to 
assimilate it to the category of Literature, most Muslim immigrants in Britain find it difficult 
to assimilate their practical religious traditions to this category. (1990 p. 251) 
Bhikhu Parekh's successive interpretations of The Satanic Verses, while not expressed in the 
language of postmodern/postcolonial, nonetheless illustrate the differences between political 
approaches underlying the two. Parekh, 7 a secularised Hindu, professor of political philosophy at 
Hull University and deputy chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, shifts from a 
reading oriented by a secularised Western context and emphasising the aesthetic merits of the 
text, to one more sensitive to non-western forms of life. Initially Parekh welcomed the book, both 
for its brilliant use of English and "because its treatment of religion seemed to advertise the 
loyalty of a secular Muslim to a secular non-progressive India" (Asad 1990 p. 245). Following 
discussions with "Muslim friends" however, he began to revise his opinion, concluding that the 
book embodies a number of contradictions: 
An immensely daring and persistently probing exploration of the human condition, ... 
lies ill 
at ease with timid obeisance to the latest literary and political fashions; profound seriousness 
lapses suddenly and without warning into pointless playfulness. ... 
Intensely delicate 
explorations of human relationships and emotions are overshadowed by an almost childlike 
urge to shock, hurt and offend. (1989 p. 31) 
Parekh's re-reading is occasioned by exposure to Muslim sensibilities, yet his understanding of 
the validity of Muslim offence is not Islamic, but draws instead on liberal understandings of 
"fairness". 8 Yet even from this perspective, he begins to interpret passages in the book 
7Parekh's typology of minorities was discussed at 1.5 above. gElsewhere he appears to participate fully in a patronising quasi-psychological interpretation of 
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disapprovingly as motivated by "an almost childlike urge to shock, hurt and offend" (1989 p. 3 1). 
Parekh's shifting views pose sharply the difficulty in taking account both the interest of the 
literary community in exploring complex issues of identity in a plural society, the reading on 
which we have so far focused, and that of the Muslim community, offended by the book's insults 
of the Prophet, his family and friends. This latter community, and the context of Islam in Britain, 
will now be examined. 
2.5 Another Interpreting Community: British Muslims 
In the preceding section we considered how The Satanic Verses has been interpreted by some of 
the literary community, moving from sympathetic readings of the work as postcolonial literature 
to criticisms of it as out of touch with and insensitive to the experience of many migrants, 
colluding in rather than challenging the dominant discourses of Western societies. Critics who 
take this line contrast Rushdie's relatively privileged background with that of most British 
Muslims. Thus Asad writes: 
The remarkable thing about The Satanic Verses, considering what's been said about it, is that 
it isn't about the predicament of most immigrants at all. ... 
Most Muslims in Britain are 
proletarian, large numbers of whom have settled in the mill towns of northern England.... 
The book's stories do not connect with the political-economic and cultural experiences of this 
population. (1990 p. 257) 
Asad's point is backed up by the available demographic portrait of Britain's Muslim communities. 
Several prefatory remarks are necessary to introduce this material. 
Most population figures for Muslims in Britain are based on place of birth and place of birth of 
the head of household, and are therefore premised on the assumption "that anyone who comes 
from a Muslim cultural background and is not explicitly Christian, or of some other non-Muslim 
religion, is Muslim. " (Nielsen, 1992a pp. 39-43,167-8). This means that caution is needed in 
comparing Christian or Jewish denominational figures based on church or synagogue membership 
or attendance with census derived data for Asian religions, since like is not being compared with 
like. 9 
religious faith, as when he writes: "the first generation of Muslims who turned to religion to give some 
meaning to their empty lives" (Parekh 1989 p. 31). 
9National figures for mosque attendance are not available, but comparison between traditions of 
attendance at regular acts of worship is of limited validity anyway, since such acts signify different 
things in different faiths, and are influenced by different constraints. For example, salat, unlike 
communion, is not necessarily a communal activity, while Friday worship probably constrains mosque 
attendance in the West, as since Friday falls during the usual working week it may be difficult to get 
time off work to attend. 
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Studies of economic status are also generally conducted by ethnicity rather than religion, so the 
same inferences are at work. Muslims are often keen to point out that Islam is a matter of 
conviction not colour, and there are Muslim believers of all ethnicities. While this is true, it is 
nonetheless also the case that the majority of Muslims in Britain are from South Asian 
backgrounds (c. 70-80%, from Nielsen 1992 p. 41), with most of the rest from the Middle East 
and Africa, and probably not more than five thousand white converts (1992 p. 43). Thus ethnicity 
figures, especially where a very high proportion of people from a minority ethnic background are 
Muslim (e. g. Pakistan, Bangladesh) are a fairly reliable indicator for the religious community. It 
should also be observed, a point which will bear re-emphasis, that any population generalisations 
conceal considerable variation within groups. 
Given these provisos, we can now turn to consider the evidence for Asad's remarks. This will be 
drawn from the Policy Studies Institute's survey Britain's Ethnic Minorities (1993), which itself 
drew on a range of studies conducted during the last decade. Asad's comment concerning 
geographical distribution is supported for the Pakistani population in relation to other ethnic 
minorities. Thus while: 
For each individual group within the ethnic minority population, the biggest single 
concentration is in Greater London. ... 
[it is also the case that] ... the 
Pakistani population is 
less concentrated in Greater London and more evenly distributed between three other areas: 
19 per cent of people of Pakistani origin live in Greater London, 19 per cent in the Yorkshire 
and Humberside region, 16 per cent in the West Midlands Metropolitan County and 12 per 
cent in the Greater Manchester area. (1993 p. 15) 
The other main groupings constituting the South Asian Muslim population, namely Bangladeshis, 
East African Asians, Indians and Malaysians, are more typical of ethnic minority distribution, 
with approximately half of the population concentrated in Greater London. 
The PSI study focused on the economic and social welfare of ethnic minority communities, and 
their findings are of relevance to Asad's description of Muslim immigrants as "proletarian". Most 
immigration from Britain's former colonies, or New Commonwealth immigration, came in the 
post-war years in response to shortages in the British labour market in manual and low skilled 
occupations, (with Asian immigration peaking some ten to fifteen years after Caribbean 
immigration). In the post-war years citizens of these countries could freely enter the UK to live 
and work and easily obtain full British citizenship; but as the post war boom declined and 
immigrant numbers rose, immigration was progressively restricted through the late sixties and 
early seventies. Thus most immigrants joined the bottom rung of Britain's economic ladder. The 
PSI report suggests that in the last twenty years the economic fortunes of different groups have 
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varied. Thus: 
The essential diversity of the different ethnic groups is perhaps overcoming the common role 
in which immigrants were cast by British society. (1993 p. 151) 
So how have the groups which make up the British Muslim population fared? The report 
concludes: 
The findings suggest that the South Asian population contains both the most and least 
successful of the ethnic minority groups that we have studied. At one extreme we have the 
African Asian and Indian populations. These groups have higher proportions of well qualified 
people, have attained comparable (or better) job levels to whites, and have unemployment 
levels closest to those found amongst the white population. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum are the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. They retain the largest proportion, even 
among young people, with no formal qualifications of any ethnic groups. They have 
substantially lower job levels than people of other origins, and consistently suffer the highest 
rates of unemployment. ... 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis stand out as the two groups in 
consistently poorer circumstances than all others. ... these two groups retain 
high proportions 
of employees in the semi-skilled and unskilled categories. (pp. 151-4) 
This pattern is confirmed by Modood (1990 p. 127), working from Labour Force Survey figures. 
Together, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis make up the largest grouping of British Muslims - over 
50% in figures derived from the 1981 census (Nielsen 1992a, p. 41). The jet-setting 
cosmopolitans of The Satanic Verses stand a long way from the economic fortunes of these 
groups. Parekh illustrates the resentment caused by inequalities in social status within the Muslim 
community by referring to recorded discussions between his colleague and a group of Muslims of 
mixed educational backgrounds, who had been active in opposition to the book. When asked why 
they had not involved Muslim intellectuals in "the struggle" against the book, "the reaction was 
immediate and fierce ... 
'All these scoundrels are useless. They were never ours, they never will 
be"', was the response of one teacher, while a graduate worker in a textile mill commented: 
They are all stooges of the whites. They talk a lot about struggle, but when have they been 
beaten up, lost their jobs or suffered a reduction in their salary? They think highly of 
themselves and hate us. It even seems they are ashamed of us. (1991 p. 71) 
Such conditions and attitudes form the background to this group's reading of The Satanic Verses. 
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2.6 Compound Deprivation 
This diversity of economic fortunes among ethnic groups, and the economic deprivation of certain 
Muslim groups in particular, calls for further comment. The causes of the relative deprivation of 
British Muslims were controversially explored in a BBC Panorama documentary early in 1993, 
entitled A New Underclass? This programme drew on the PSI report and focused on Muslim 
groups, particularly in Bradford. Links were made between characteristics of South Asian 
Islamic culture and economic failure, notably seclusion of women and insularity leading to failure 
of English language acquisition. The growth of drug dealing and prostitution was also reported. 
The programme drew furious protests from Bradford Muslims. The portrayal of Muslims as an 
underclass conceals the economic success of many Muslim individuals, leading to further 
stereotyping. The pictures of Pakistani youths dealing in drugs clashed fiercely with Muslim 
views of their faith as a bastion against Western immorality. But probably most offensive was the 
implication that Muslim poverty, and hence its alleged social consequences, including illicit drugs 
and prostitution, was at least partly due to a failure to assimilate to mainstream British culture, 
for example in the form of liberalising attitudes to women and hence altering working practices, 
and learning English. 
In fact, the programme went considerably beyond the PSI report in speculating on the cultural 
and religious origins of Pakistani and Bangladeshi poverty. The report does note that: 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women, who are nearly all Muslims, have very low rates of 
economic activity; very high proportions do not work outside the home. Also high 
proportions have no formal qualifications: many have never had any schooling at all. (1993 
p. 158) 
However, there is no claim to have established a causal relationship between this and the poverty 
of these groups. Indeed the report is cautious about the explanations which it does offer, stating 
the need for further research "to explain this continued relative disadvantage" (1993 p. 156). Yet 
certain features of the report embody the logic worked out in the Panorama programme. For the 
report concludes that discrimination against relatively deprived groups cannot explain this 
relative deprivation, since discrimination is held to apply equally against all ethnic minorities 
(1993 pp. 155-6). It is this position which drove the Panorama team to look to the internal 
working of Muslim communities to explain relative deprivation. For if such a position is 
accepted, explanations can only be made either in terms of non-discriminatory factors in British 
society, or in terms of the internal characteristics of minority groups, and it was to the these that 
the Panorama team turned. 
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The PSI report itself suggests that the characteristics of the sending communities are probably 
significant: 
The Bangladeshis tended to come to Britain to escape the poverty in their home countries, 
bringing with them very little in terms of capital and educational qualifications. African 
Asians, on the other hand, came to Britain to flee political persecution in East Africa. Prior to 
this, they had formed a highly successful business community, and many were able to bring 
with them skills, qualifications and even capital to help them in their new country. It is hardly 
surprising therefore, that a group like African Asians appears to be defeating the constraints 
imposed by discrimination and disadvantage more quickly than other ethnic minorities. (1993 
p. 156) 
What is said of Bangladeshis here could also be said of most Pakistanis, who also came from 
poor, rural backgrounds (Saifullah Khan 1977). The quoted passage perhaps underplays the 
difference in the skills required by predominantly rural communities, and those of an urban 
middle class, the respective positions occupied by Pakistani and Bangladeshis on the one hand, 
and East African Asians in Uganda and Kenya on the other. As well as formal educational 
qualifications and better opportunities to learn English, the urban, trade and bureaucracy 
background of African Asians equipped them far better for British economic conditions than rural 
life in Pakistan or Bangladesh. It should also be noted that African Asians include significant 
numbers of Muslims - as many as a hundred thousand according to a private survey conducted in 
1986 (Nielsen 1992a p. 41). 
As far as non-discriminatory factors in British society goes, it is important to consider the British 
economic context. Migrants to northern mill towns joined a textile industry already in decline, and 
recessions before the early 1990s have tended to hit the North, with its traditional manufacturing 
base, harder than the south; we have already seen how Pakistanis are highly represented in the 
West Midlands and the North. It is likely that such factors which disproportionately affect 
Muslim conununities, but which do not relate to Islamic faith, and external factors, are important 
in influencing economic fortunes. But what about the position that triggered the search for such 
factors, the assumption of the uniformity of prejudice against ethnic minorities? Is it correct to 
dismiss group specific discrimination so easily? The PSI report states baldly that: 
Previous research found that racial discrimination was experienced equally by all ethnic 
minority groups. (Donaldson ed. 1993 p. 155) 
It continues by asserting that it is "highly unlikely" that the situation would have changed. The 
only evidence offered in support of this assumption of stasis is "the fact that both the most and 
least successful of the groups in the ethnic minority population have a similar skin colour" (1993 
p. 166, emphasis added). But is skin colour the only criteria on which people discriminate? Are 
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the clean-shaven Asian professional in a smart Western suit and the mullah with traditional dress 
and full beard discriminated against solely in the same way, on the grounds of colour? Does 
history, even immediate context, not influence perceptions? Are media reactions to Muslims in 
Iran, to The Satanic Verses, to the Gulf War, irrelevant to discrimination in this country? 
As was argued at 1.4, community relations in Britain tends to be conceptualised in terms of 
'race', with the result that nearly all analytic emphasis is placed on factors producing blanket 
discrimination against minority groups by the majority community (Ballard 1992). Factors 
internal to minority groups are only considered when 'external' explanations fail, as here; but the 
assumption of blanket discrimination across minorities is retained. However, even in social- 
scientific studies of discrimination and prejudice, which rarely control carefully for cultural let 
alone religious factors, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that prejudice against ethnic 
minorities is not uniformly experienced. 
Thus Davey (1983) found differences between white schoolchildren's attitudes to West Indian and 
Asian children, in addition to the well known 'pecking-order effect' between minorities, where the 
children of another minority are least favoured compared with white children and one's own 
group. Bagley and Verma (1978) found that "specific racism", that it is racism against particular 
minority characteristics, was found in high contact areas in their study of adolescents. Kawwa 
(1968) found that prejudice against Cypriot immigrants in London was stronger than against 
West Indians, a difference he attributed to greater cultural differences. Significant among such 
differences is language, highly salient in the case of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Indeed, Giles et 
al. (in Giles ed. 1977), considered language to be the single most salient symbol of ethnicity. It 
has also been suggested that similarity of beliefs and attitudes are important in racial 
discrimination. While the weight attached to this by Rokeach (1960) has been challenged, (e. g. by 
Moss and Adrasik 1973), it seems clear similarities and differences in belief and attitude do play 
a role in discrimination against ethnic groups. 
All this evidence suggests that while discrimination by skin colour may form a basis for 
prejudice, other distinctions, on the basis of culture, religion or belief, are also likely to play a 
role. It is worth noting in this context that people with higher levels of prejudice have been found 
to be more skilled at discerning ethnic differences (e. g. Allport and Kraemer 1946). The specific 
recent history of economic and military conflict between the West and countries with largely 
Muslim populations, 10 and of controversy in this country, is likely to have exacerbated such 
prejudice. Two recent pieces of empirical work support this hypothesis. A MORI poll 
commissioned by the Muslim IQRA trust in 1991 found high levels of specifically anti-Muslim 
10e. g. the oil crisis in the early 1970s, the Gulf War (1990). 
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prejudice; 17% said they would not like to have a Muslim family living next door, and two-thirds 
of those who expressed a view stated a negative perception of Islam. Modood (1990 p. 127) cites 
a European Commission survey cited in Today newspaper (14 March 1990), which found that 
"while Muslimophobia had not yet reached French proportions, Asians are the single most 
disliked minority in this country". 11 
It is hoped that at least the possibility that discrimination unequally affecting Muslim 
communities needs to be considered alongside the other possible explanations of relative 
deprivation. Consideration of the socio-economic status of Muslims has drawn us into discussion 
of prejudice against Islam. This is not a digression; the attitudes of British non-Muslims toward 
Islam are central to hopes for the common good in Britain. Such hopes must be nurtured in an 
environment already fraught with suspicion and mistrust. In the next section examines the 
importance of specifically South Asian forms of Islam for The Satanic Verses controversy. 
2.7. South Asian Islam and The Satanic Verses Controversy 
Some commentators on The Satanic Verses controversy have pointed out that the strongest 
protests against the book came predominantly from South Asian Muslims (Modood 1990, Samad 
1992). Samad argues that, with the exception of Iran, the countries most affected by the 
controversy have been those with substantial populations of South Asian Muslims: India, 
Pakistan, South Africa and Britain (Samad 1992 p. 510). Modood offers the following 
explanation of the particular offence caused to South Asian Muslims by the book: 
If Rushdie had successfully attacked fundamentalism, as I believe he intended, many 
Muslims would have cheered and certainly there would not be the present lines of 
confrontation. It was not the exploration of religious doubt but the lampooning of the Prophet 
that provoked the anger. This sensitivity has nothing to do with Qur'anic fundamentalism but 
with South Asian reverence for Mohammed (deemed by many Muslims, including 
fundamentalists, to be excessive) and cultural insecurity as experienced in Britain and even 
more profoundly in India. (1990 p. 129) 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the offending passages circulated in the Muslim 
communities were those which were seen as using "'obscene' and 'foul' language ... 
in the 
discussion of Mohammed and his family and companions", and not those which criticised Islam 
as an organised religion. (Parekh 1991 p. 71) The pir, sheikh, or holy man, plays an important 
role in South Asian Islam, and this tradition of reverence for holy men reaches its height in the 
person of the Prophet. This is particularly evident in the case of the Brelwi movement, one of the 
11See Halliday 1996 chapters 4 and 6 for further discussion of anti-Muslim prejudice. 
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largest Muslim movements in Britain. 12 Such is the Brelwi reverence for Mohammed that "the 
Brelwi movement is accused by its opponents of treating Mohammed like a deity" (Nielsen 1992a 
p. 133). In this context insult to Mohammed is acutely felt. 
There is also the matter of izzat, or honour, often associated with the biraderi, or extended family, 
but which can also be associated with a wider community. Standing up to insult against 
Mohammed came to be seen as a matter of pride by a community already bruised by the 
controversies of the 1980s, economic deprivation and racism. However, this emphasis on the 
South Asian dimension sits uncomfortably with the commonly expressed view that the 
controversy served to unite the British Muslim community. Thus Pnina Werbner has written: 
... the protest against 
The Satanic Verses was a genuinely populist response which caught up 
almost everyone in the Muslim community. (1991 p. 344) 
The perceived violation of central Islamic values has mobilised the normally fragmented 
Muslim religious community in a broad unified alliance. (1992 p. 20) 
Another contrary view is that of Samad, who makes the focus of the protest even narrower than 
South Asian Muslims, arguing that events in the previous decade in Bradford made protest there 
far more significant and sustained than elsewhere in Britain. In support of this claim he argues: 
There are sixty thousand Bangladeshis in Greater London whose involvement was relatively 
low key in comparison. ... 
Their large scale participation in the campaign was limited to two 
demonstrations at Hyde Park. The involvement of Muslims from India, Turkey, Cyprus and 
the Arab world was on an even lower level and mainly limited to orthodox Muslims. (1992, 
p. 511) 
Perhaps these disparate views can be reconciled by saying that local variations in Britain affected 
the intensity of the campaign, and its main impulse came from South Asian Muslims, especially 
Pakistanis, but that nonetheless the campaign drew widespread support in Muslim communities. 
Nielsen, who also explores the South Asian dimension, writes: 
As many Muslims of all kinds of backgrounds said and wrote at the time, there was a deep 
revulsion at the insult to Islam, and especially to the person of the prophet, contained in the 
book. (1992a p. 158) 
This support increased as the British press turned what they widely perceived as a witch hunt 
against Rushdie and freedom of speech, into what Muslims, and as we have seen with Sen, 
increasingly other ethnic minorities, saw as a witch hunt against Muslims. Such a perception 
I2Lewis (1994a pp. 36-48) describes five traditions of South Asian Islam, all marked by colonial 
encounter, and influential in Britain (in particular, in Bradford). These are characterised as: "the 
reformist Deobandis, the quietist and revivalist Tablighi Jamaat, the conservative and populist Barelwis 
[sic], the Islamist Jama'ati Islami and the modernists" (1994a p. 36). 
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developed in a decade in which British Muslims had already been engaged in several public 
controversies. We now turn to consider these, with specific reference to Bradford. 
2.8 The Politicisation of British Muslims: The Example of Bradford 
In the previous sections we have at different points come across the thesis that Bradford played a 
leading role in the campaign against the book (e. g. Samad 1992). Reasons for this include the 
high proportion of South Asian Muslims in the city; fifty thousand Muslims compared with nine 
thousand Hindus and eight thousand Sikhs, in a Metropolitan district of about four hundred and 
fifty thousand (Lewis 1993b p. 119). Most of these live within a half dozen or so inner-city 
wards. There are a high proportion of Brelwis, who as we have seen hold Mohammed in 
particular esteem; ten of the twenty-six mosques located in Bradford by Ruthven were Brewli 
(1990 p. 81). In addition to these reasons, the involvement of Bradford Muslims in campaigning 
on several local issues (some of which have had national ramifications) during the last two 
decades, may have prepared the community, organised through the Council for Mosques in 
particular, for a campaigning role. 
(i) Bussing. The first of these issues was opposition to the council policy of 'bussing', a policy 
which lasted from 1964 to 1979 (Halstead 1988 p. 37). This involved taking children from areas 
with high concentrations of ethnic minorities to predominantly white areas, and theoretically, 
though rarely in practice, vice-verse. Many Muslim parents objected to this inequality, as well as 
to the inconvenience caused, for example in attending parents' evenings and other extra-curricular 
events, especially when fewer Muslim parents in the inner city had access to cars than suburban 
parents. There was also the suspicion, well-founded in economic terms, that the policy persisted 
after it had been abandoned elsewhere in the country because it saved money - the rapid growth 
of the ethnic minority population called for a large building programme in the inner city if all 
were to be schooled there. Probably the main issue, however, was one of the right of children of 
minorities to education in their own area, and the notion of 'community schooling'. Halstead tells 
us that: 
Councillors Ajeeb and Hameed called the policy racist and considered it an affront to the 
freedom and dignity of ethnic minority parents. (1988 p. 39) 
Parents, teachers and others organised to present a thousand-signature petition to the Council in 
1979, which together with pressure from the Commission for Racial Equality led to the policy 
being dropped. 
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(ii) Halal Meat. Halal ('permitted') meat, has been slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law, 
and is only kind of meat which Muslims are allowed to eat. Although the 1974 Slaughterhouse 
Act gives local authorities licence to permit halal and kosher (Jewish) methods of slaughter, 
public institutions did not serve any halal meat until 1983 (Halstead 1988 pp. 45-6). In Bradford 
schools then, Muslim children had to opt for vegetarian meals; and as numbers grew through the 
seventies, so pressure from Muslim parents to provide halal meat mounted. In 1983 the local 
education authority piloted a scheme which extended to cover sixty schools within a year; 
however opposition followed from an unlikely alliance of animal rights activists and the National 
Front. Muslims organised in reaction, presenting a petition with seven thousand signatures to 
support provision. In March 1984 the council voted by a large majority to continue the service 
(Halstead 1988 pp. 45-6). 
(iii) Honeyford. The Ray Honeyford affair saw the Muslim community take a leading role in 
organising the campaign for the removal of Honeyford, head teacher of Drummond Middle 
School between 1980 and 1985. Between 1982 and 1984 Honeyford published several articles in 
the right-wing journal The Salisbury Review and The Times Educational Supplement. In these he 
made offensive remarks about Asian and Afro-Caribbean cultures, accusing Asians of importing 
"the hysterical political temperament of the Indian subcontinent", and describing Pakistan as "a 
country which cannot cope with democracy ... the 
heroin capital of the world", and which, he 
added, is a "fact which is now reflected in the drug problems of English cities with Asian 
populations". In the same article, Afro-Caribbean homes are portrayed as places "where 
educational ambition and the values to support it are conspicuously absent" (1984 p. 31). 
Honeyford also provided a New Right justification for monocultural education policies. He 
argued that in the "pretty ruthless meritocracy" of early eighties Britain children need an 
education which equips them to compete in terms of mainstream culture; it is therefore a mistake 
to attempt to "enhance the self-respect of settler children by teaching the culture of their parents' 
mother land and a critical view of British imperialism" (in Halstead 1988 p. 57). 
A variety of parents, Asian and Muslim groups campaigned for Honeyford's removal, rivalry 
developing for leadership between the secular and left-wing Asian Youth movement and the 
Council for Mosques (Samad 1992 p. 513). Bradford council, while split cross-party over the 
issue, were at odds with Honeyford over his highly public criticisms of their 'multi-racial' 
education policies. Support for Honeyford was considerable; the 'Friends of Drummond Middle 
School' collected some ten thousand signatures in his support, and his union, the National 
Association of Head Teachers gave him full support throughout (Samad 1992 p. 514). Eventually 
a controversial settlement was reached whereby Honeyford agreed to early retirement in exchange 
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for a substantial payoff. 13 
The extent of the support for Honeyford suggests that the affair resulted in, or exposed, 
considerable ill-feeling toward Bradford's Muslims. As for internal organisation, Samad 
comments that: 
No organisation involved in the Honeyford affair emerged as undisputed leader of the 
Mirpuri community. But it had opened new vistas of agitational politics to the Bradford 
council of Mosques and given them credibility in the eyes of the politicised Mirpuri youth. 
(Samad 1992 p. 514) 
Education has been a common theme in these 'politicising' events for Bradford's Muslim, 
predominantly Mirpuri community. Two further issues of relevance are also concerned with 
education. 
(iv) 1988 Education Act. 14 The first of these issues is the 1988 Education Act, specifically the 
provisions relating to religious education and the conduct of assemblies. The Act requires that 
education should be "mainly" and "broadly Christian", worship "mainly or wholly" so; schools 
wishing to have a lower proportion of Christian assemblies must apply for a special licence 
renewable every five years, a position which has considerably antagonised some Muslims, 
(Akhtar 1993). The provisions for religious education appear to run contrary to the direction of 
developments during the last thirty years to 'pluralise' religious education in schools, which have 
involved a shift from confessional, religious nurture approaches towards methods which seek to 
impart an understanding and appreciation of the variety of religious traditions without 
commitment to any of them. 
Muslim views of these approaches vary; more orthodox Muslims are likely to be suspicious of 
the non-confessional approaches, seeing here the tacit inculcation of secular humanism, in terms 
ranging from disdain for a 'wishy-washy' approach to the full-blown conspiracy theory of Kalim 
Siddiqui: 
The western civilization is fundamentally an immoral civilization ... such moral values as 
survived the Christian experience were systematically eradicated. ... those parts of our 
societies that the West has succeeded in disintegrating from the highly integrated Islamic 
social order all display the same symptoms of corporate selfishness and a shift away from 
moral behaviour. (In Nielsen 1991 p. 469) 
Siddiqui draws attention to the moral implications of 'western civilization', refusing the western 
13Apparently a £70 900 lump sum plus £6 500 p. a. index linked, as against the £161 000 rumoured 
(Halstead 1988 p. 110, Samad 1992 p. 514). 14This is considered in more depth in Chapter 8 below. 
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self-image of neutrality. His style may be confrontational, but Siddiqui is not alone in making the 
latter point. Some educational theorists have also challenged this perception of neutrality, seeing 
approaches which attempt to combat prejudice as prejudiced and ethnocentric themselves: 
The comprehensiveness of constituent cultures is subordinated at critical points to the 
practical judgement of an established educational philosophy which is assumed to be 
logically prior to all others. (Hulmes 1989 p. 13) 
In these circumstances, Muslims may prefer a Christian orientation to religious education to 
secular approaches, the former being seen as closer to an Islamic value system. But the implied 
normativity of Christianity in the Act is likely to be resisted, often in the form of the demand for 
separate schools. 
(v) 'Separate' Schools. As yet, there are no voluntary-aided Muslim schools, enjoying the same 
combination of state funding status and religious foundation as Anglican, Catholic and Jewish 
schools. 15 There are a number of independent Muslim schools, including the Muslim Girl's High 
School in Bradford (now Feversham College), 16 which has up to one hundred and twenty pupils 
between eleven and eighteen years of age. Repeated applications for voluntary-aided schools with 
religious foundations outside the Jewish and Christian traditions have consistently been refused 
by councils in various parts of the country (Halstead 1988). 
The Muslim community appears to be divided in its attitude to such schools; for example in 1983 
the Bradford Council for Mosques voted 13-8 against a proposal to convert Belle Vue Girl's 
school into one. The latter is one of the few surviving single sex state schools in the area, and has 
predominantly Muslim pupils. Local authorities have tended to avoid making a decision in 
principle on the issue, giving instead a variety of reasons for their decisions, including the 
grounds that sufficient provision is already available in existing schools, which may have to close 
if a new school opened, or, in the case of Belle Vue, that insufficient Muslims were in favour, and 
that financial and administrative resources were inadequate to support the project. The advent of 
government encouragement of schools to opt-out of local education control is likely to pose the 
issue afresh; it may be noted that Honeyford has "expressed provisional support" for such 
schools, and that the Labour party has dropped its opposition to them (Halstead 1988 p. 45). 
The field of education is a central one for the common good: in schools, children receive their 
preparation for participation in society; hence this theme will be developed at 8.2-8.5. Each of the 
cases considered here - opposition to bussing and Honeyford, support for halal meat provision, 
and support for Muslim schools (albeit divided) - indicate opposition to an assimilationist attitude 
15This is considered in more depth in Chapter 8 below. 
16In British Muslims Monthly Survey for March 1996, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 14. 
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in which: 
Virtually all the cultural adaptations and transformations were expected from the side of 
minority groups. (Halstead 1990 p. 49) 
The Bradford example shows the Muslim community increasingly willing to contend actively for 
the maintenance of their religious tradition. 
2.9 Bradford in the British Context 
In her work with Manchester Muslims Pnina Werbner provides evidence of a parallel 
development to that we have traced in Bradford. She sees the timing of The Satanic Verses 
controversy as significant, coinciding with a growth in the self-confidence of the community. She 
quotes a speech from the Pakistani Ambassador to an Asian Business Seminar held in 
Manchester Town Hall on 16 January 1989, the day of the Bradford book-burning. He highlights 
the changes that he has observed during the previous decade: 
I have come back to Britain after ten years, twelve years, and I find a total change. A total 
change in the environment. A change much for the better. The basic trauma, the basic 
tensions, the basic contradictions have been overcome. People have begun not only to settle 
and adjust, but are now poised to participate and contribute. ... 
The community now has 
businesses, the community has houses, it knows that its families are coming ... 
if someone 
gets married, it may take a little time. But they know their rights. They know how to go 
about things. (in Werbner 1991 p. 336, emphasis added. ) 
Werbner's premise in the article is that this kind of statement would not have been possible even a 
few weeks later (i. e. after the Bradford book-burning). Yet the public rhetoric did refer to a 
reality: 
Thus, it needs to be recognised that it was the growing prosperity and self-confidence of the 
community, its numerical strength, its establishment of a vast array of economic, cultural and 
especially religious institutions in Britain, its 'success' in other words, which enabled the 
powerful rise of the movement [against The Satanic Verses]. ... 
Even as it disguises hidden 
truths, an event's facade constitutes a currently 'real' public truth. (Werbner 1991 pp. 344-5) 
Such a view contrasts sharply with the picture presented by the PSI survey (above, 2.6), and 
which seems to have widespread support. For example Modood, who rejects the homogenising 
'racial' approach, accepts the relative economic deprivation of British Muslims considered above 
to be indisputable. Thus he writes: 
That South Asian Muslims form a virtual underclass in Britain there cannot be much doubt. 
Throughout the 1980s, of the nine non-white groups identified in the Labour Force survey, 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have suffered the highest rates of unemployment, have the 
lowest number of educational qualifications and the highest profile in manual work; and this 
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is true not just for women, but also men, and not just of the middle-aged (the fist generation), 
but also of the young. They have had the most adverse impact from immigration laws and 
rules, they have the worst housing and suffer from the highest levels of attack on person and 
property. (Modood 1990 p. 127) 
What sense can be made of these contrasting pictures? Werbner is reluctant to dismiss the 
Ambassador's remarks as out-of-touch rhetoric: the Asian Business Seminar witnesses to the 
economic success of many Muslims, as the political activity in Bradford witnesses to their 
growing participation in civic life. 
The pictures can perhaps be reconciled if the reality of both widespread deprivation and the 
substantial prosperity of certain groups is recognised behind the gloomy overall statistics. 
Success carries with it an expectation of further recognition and respect by the wider society, as 
well as added frustration in both economic and cultural spheres, when success or recognition are 
slow to come. Arguably, it was this expectation of wider recognition which received a severe 
rebuttal by the majority response to The Satanic Verses controversy. The effect of the struggles 
which have been outlined, and especially of The Satanic Verses controversy, has been to greatly 
increase both the determination and capacity, in the form of political organisation, of Muslim 
communities to maintain and promote Islamic values and traditions. Nonetheless an overall 
representative body, like the British Board Jewish Deputies, remains lacking (see 5.4 below). The 
next section considers these struggles in the broader context of the ummah, the world-wide 
community of Muslims, and of the relationship between Islam and the West. 
2.10 British Muslims in a Global Context: Modernity and Postmodernity 
The historic antagonisms between Islam and the West can be seen in new light using the 
perspective of sociological theories of modernity and postmodernity, as the Muslim sociologist 
Akbar Ahmed's Postmodernism and Islam (1992) illustrates. Ahmed provides a reading of the 
present global situation of Islam, which uses the western critique of western modernity collected 
under the umbrella of 'postmodernism', 17 particularly social theory, drawing on the work of 
sociologists such as Giddens, Harvey, Lash and Bauman. In this context, British Muslims' 
protests against The Satanic Verses controversy can be seen as an example of the struggle of 
religious and cultural minorities world-wide to assert their local identities in response to the 
global spread of western culture. It is worth emphasising here that I am following Henri Tajfel's 
(1978) definition of a minority as a subordinate segment within a political unit (usually a state 
17Ahmed uses 'postmodernism' where Giddens uses 'postmodernity', for the whole set of conditions 
which follow modernity. Giddens uses 'postmodernism' for "aesthetic reflection on modernity" (1990 
p. 45). I shall follow Giddens' usage. 
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society), that is, as a term denoting power relations, rather than as a numerical term (1.3 above). 
Western culture, expressed through technology and socio-political order, brings new powers of 
integration and differentiation, both unprecedented connection and threat. British Muslim protest 
against The Satanic Verses in Bradford can be viewed in terms of this global context, described 
by Charles Bright and Michael Geyer as "a struggle over the terms of [global] integration" (1987 
p. 69). They write: 
This struggle for autonomy - the assertion of local and particular claims over global and 
general ones - does not involve opting out of the world or resorting to autarchy, it is rather an 
effort to establish the terms of self-determining and self-controlled participation in the 
processes of global integration and the struggle for planetary order. (1987 p. 69) 
The world domination of the West is both questioned from within by the Western characteristic of 
reflexivity (the tendency to critically examine the sources of one's own power and knowledge), 
and challenged from the periphery by subordinate groups who have learned to use this feature of 
Western culture to question its hegemony. Aluned draws attention to central features of 
'postmodernism' described by sociologists, emphasising features relevant to his analysis of Islam's 
role in the contemporary world. He starts with: 
a questioning of, a loss of faith in, the project of modernity; a spirit of pluralism; a 
heightened scepticism of traditional orthodoxies; and finally a rejection of the world as a 
universal totality, of the expectation of final solutions and complete answers. (1992 p. 10) 
He also notes the importance of the media (1992 p. 11), and the related "juxtaposition of 
discourses 
... mixing of 
diverse images" (1992 p. 25), and the rapid urbanisation of the global 
population (1992 p. 18), associated with the breakdown of traditional social relationships. In this 
context he draws attention to the inadequately explored "connection between postmodernism and 
ethno-religious revivalism" (1992 p. 13), and to the Muslim hope that: 
If modern meant the pursuit of Western education, technology and industrialisation in the 
first flush of the post-colonial period, postmodern would mean a reversion to traditional 
Muslim values and a rejection of modernism ... . 
In Muslim society postmodernism means a 
shift to ethnic or Islamic identity (not necessarily the same thing and at times opposed to one 
another) as against an imported foreign or Western one. (Ahmed 1992 p. 32) 
Ahmed also emphasises the continuity between modernity and postmodernity: 
We [Muslims] emphasise its [modernity's] European context and origin; and we point out 
that many of its features are continued, in altered form, in postmodernism. (Ahmed 1992 p. 
32) 
The loss of confidence in modernity is driven both by the reflexivity inherent in the Western 
tradition, and by the assertion of local identities in the post/neo-colonial period. But, 
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paradoxically, the assertion of local identities is itself contingent on modernity, drawing on 
Western culture to assert local autonomy. This can be illustrated particularly powerfully in the 
case of the media. 
The Western-dominated media links Muslims in Palestine, Bosnia, Iraq and Britain, connecting 
the global ummah and hence creating unprecedented possibilities for solidarity. But, at the same 
time, many Muslims feel: 
a numbing awareness of the power and pervasive nature of the Western media which are 
perceived as hostile. (Ahmed 1992 p. 32) 
The news that the media often bring is that of the suffering inflicted on Muslims in many different 
parts of the world (Palestine, Iraq, Ayodhya, Bosnia), frequently transmitted through caricatures 
of Muslim cultures. For example, Ahmed describes the dominant portrayal of Saddam Hussein 
"and, by extension, all Arabs" during the Gulf crisis as "one dimensional", and comments: 
It therefore dehumanised Arab civilization, reducing it to a nonsense. Arabs were shown as 
either playboys squandering money in European casinos, or bully-boys terrorising smaller 
neighbours. (1992 p. 229) 
Ahmed continues by describing the consequences for the attitude of American troops in the Gulf: 
For the American GI on the Arabian peninsula there was little difference between the Arabs 
he was defending and those he was to attack. Both were 'desert niggers'; and he had 
contributed a racist neologism. When the GI on television said "I'm here to kick ass", it was 
difficult to predict which posterior - friend or foe - was destined to receive the imprint of his 
undoubtedly large boot. (Ahmed 1992 p. 229) 
I am not trying to argue that Western media presentation of Muslims is entirely "one 
dimensional", nor that the Western media have complete global hegemony; nonetheless, as the 
recent Channel 4 series Channels of Resistance (1993) pointed out, most of the largest 
international news networks are indeed US based multinationals, driven primarily by competition 
for exposure to a domestic American audience. In the free market of the airwaves, Americans still 
have the biggest buying power, although maybe not for long. 
Yet, as the Channels of Resistance series also illustrated, film and video, from amateur video 
smuggled out to break the Israeli imposed silence on the occupied territories, through 
consciousness raising for Bolivian shoe-shiners, to a full-length professional documentary of 
Noam Chomsky denouncing the seduction of the media, media technologies can be used to assert 
local identities and resist dominant images. Thus Giddens' argument seems correct, at least for 
the example of the media: 
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modernity is not just one civilization among others .... 
The declining grip of the West over 
the rest of the world is not a result of the diminishing impact of the institutions which first 
arose there but, on the contrary, a result of their global spread. (1990 pp. 51-2) 
On this broad canvas Muslims globally, and especially minorities in the West, feel their culture 
threatened. The West has brought changes which appear irreversible; whether it is Western 
nations which continue to exert global power (the Gulf war shows how powerful these nations 
remain), or the power of the products of Western culture, from the motorcar and weaponry to 
mass communication and the international capitalist trading system; such challenges seem set to 
persist. In this environment, what stake can British Muslims feel that they have in the common 
good? The next section considers the case that Muslims were unfairly treated by the British press 
in its coverage of the Satanic Verses controversy. 
2.11 British Muslims and the Media 
I do not want to see Salman die, that is immoral and wrong, and anyway not what the 
majority Muslim population here want. I don't even think the book should be banned. But 
right from the beginning, I have felt that everyone was treating the Muslim protest as if it 
was completely crazy. This freedom of expression - why do we have pornography and libel 
laws, and a law of blasphemy which applies only to Christianity? How can that be fair? 
(cited in Alibhai 1989b p. 12) 
These words from a young Muslim teacher in Bradford shortly after the fatwa contain the kernel 
of the Muslim case against liberalism as manifested in the widespread media response to Muslim 
protests. Even in its own terms, the liberal response to Muslim calls for action over the book of 
arguing for unrestricted speech can be seen as unjust, or at least in need of further justification. 
For speech is already restricted in the UK in the interests of private individuals (libel), national 
security (e. g. Spycatcher), 'racial' minorities (incitement to racial hatred), public morality 
(restrictions on pornography) and even Christianity (blasphemy): so why not protect Muslims 
against similar verbal assaults? 18 
Shabbir Akhtar describes the dominant media response as "The Liberal Inquisition", a title which 
places Akhtar's approach in the growing tradition of scholarship which argues that stereotypes of 
Islam from long dead battles persist in Western popular imagination, and that secular tolerance is 
both a recent acquisition and perhaps even a misdescription (Said 1978, Kabbani 1986). Akhtar 
describes the coverage of the affair in the following terms: 
Western commentary can safely be seen, even by non-Muslims in retrospect, as shallow and 
extravagant. To be sure, some newspaper and television coverage was investigative and 
balanced. But overwhelmingly it was accusatory in its very format, inviting hasty and 
18This question will be addressed further at 2.12 below. 
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unoriginal judgement against Muslims. ... 
Oddly enough, the quality papers differed from 
such papers as The Sun and The News of the World mainly in their choice of more 
sophisticated language, since the content was substantially identical. (1989, p. 40) 
Richard Webster supports Akhtar's case with reference to the coverage of The Independent and 
The Independent on Sunday, papers which perhaps devoted the most space to the controversy. 
Yet even in the "huge coverage" during the fortnight leading up the first anniversary of the fatwa, 
central issues of free speech, blasphemy and the law "were treated by the paper's own editorial 
staff as though they had been resolved in advance" (1989 pp. 115-6). Webster even concurs with 
Akhtar's rhetoric, using the phrase "Liberalism's Holy War". 
The deeper issue here is whether liberalism's self-perception of neutrality is ever justified. At 3.2 
we shall pursue this question further. But at this stage it is worth re-emphasising that the kind of 
Muslim case which we have considered in this section is one which is itself constructed from 
liberal premises - essentially a matter of seeking equal treatment (i. e. freedom form abuse) for 
people from a minority religious tradition. This being the case, we might expect that the Muslim 
position would find some support in the legal system of a liberal state. The next section considers 
the possibility of a legal solution to the controversy. 
2.12 A Legal Solution? 
The influence of the free speech defence of The Satanic Verses is illustrated in the fact that the 
British government justified its non-interference with the book on the grounds of free speech 
within the law (3.2 below). It was argued that both this advocacy of free speech, and acceptance 
of certain reasons for its curtailment, must be viewed in the context of certain core values in 
Western democratic societies, in particular a notion of individual autonomy within the constraints 
of the modern nation state (Patten 1989 in CRE 1990a p. 86). 
In response to this position, it may be been suggested that in a society where the development of 
autonomous individuals is valued, since the development of autonomy depends on some prior 
learning, or 'embedding' in a cultural tradition, the right to publish material which is offensive to 
traditional minorities should not be taken as automatic, but considered in the context of the other 
goods involved. 19 As shown at 2.11, other sources of verbal offence are already forbidden under 
English law. Some of these may seem a good deal more trivial than insult of the central figure of 
a major religious tradition; for example in 1993 Elton John was awarded three hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds damages for libellous allegations about his eating habits (The Guardian 5 Nov 
19This argument is developed by Fitzmaurice (1993); see 3.4 below. 
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1993). 
In this context, the final section of the chapter poses the question: since existing law gives 
Muslims no means to pursue their grievances against the book, should the law be changed in 
order to allow them to do so? Sebastian Poulter, Reader in Law at Southampton University, has 
written both about ethnic minorities and British law (1987,1988) and specifically about The 
Satanic Verses controversy (in CRE 1990a), while Simon Lee, Professor of Law at Queen's 
College Belfast brings his experience of inter-communal strife in Northern Ireland and a broad 
perspective on the relation between free speech and the law to bear on his considerations of The 
Satanic Verses controversy (1990,1992 in Bowen ed. ). 
Poulter observes that English law has been quite flexible in its accommodation of ethnic 
minorities in a number of ways. Jews are exempt from Sunday trading laws under the Shops Act 
(1950), provided their shops are shut on Saturday (in CRE 1990a p. 15). Both Jews and Muslims 
are exempt from the usual slaughter regulations to enable slaughter to follow traditional (kosher, 
halal) methods, while Sikh motorcyclists are exempt form the requirement to wear crash helmets 
if they wear turbans. Following the laws against racial discrimination, rulings mean that Asian 
women can wear trousers at work where white women cannot, and Rastafarians cannot be 
refused work on the grounds of refusal to cut off their dreadlocks (CRE 1990a pp. 13-14). 
This flexibility goes beyond the letter to the interpretation of the law. Parekh (in CRE 1990a) 
gives several examples of cases where judgements have taken account of people's cultural or 
religious background. Thus in 1980 the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence of a Muslim 
woman found guilty of importing cannabis on the grounds that "she was totally dependent on her 
brother-in-law and was socialised by her religion into subservience to the male members of her 
household" (1990a pp. 72-3). In 1974 a Nigerian mother was convicted for inflicting wounds on 
her sons' faces in accordance with tribal custom, but was granted an absolute discharge (Parekh 
in CRE 1990a p. 78). 
Two points need to be made here. First of all, these examples illustrate how equality before the 
law is taken to mean equality which takes account of context, rather than crude uniformity. Thus 
Poulter writes: 
while the hallowed principle of 'equality before the law' (which has been cherished as part of 
'the rule of law' since Dicey first wrote about it in 1885) generally requires English law to be 
colour blind, it does not require it to ignore important religious and cultural differences. (In 
CRE 1990a p. 21) 
This is an important point, which should be born in mind when considering The Satanic Verses 
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controversy. But secondly, each of the cases involves the permission of particular minority 
practices, rather than the prohibition of practices offensive to a minority. Minority practices may 
be tolerated, but should minority sensibilities be embodied in law? To answer this question 
Poulter turns from English to international law, and in particular to human rights. Britain is a 
contracting party to both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in the absence of a written 
British constitution or bill of rights, it is in this direction that British judges must look for advice 
on such matters (in CRE 1990a p. 16). 
Poulter first affirms Rushdie's right to life under these treaties. The question of legality in terms 
of shari'ah has already been considered (2.2), where it was found that it is disputed whether 
Rushdie had committed the kind of apostasy (riddah) which merits a death sentence20 (Ally 
1990a), and that Khomeini's pre-eminent status as afä (expert in Islamic jurisprudence) 
extends only to the minority Shi'ite community. Yet, as Ruthven comments, such arguments: 
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that if Rushdie had published his book in Egypt or 
Pakistan, he could quite legitimately have been condemned to death according to the laws of 
Islam. Would public opinion in the West, unanimously outraged by the fatwa have 
acknowledged the right of an Islamic tribunal to try Rushdie? (1990 p. 153)21 
Ruthven is guilty here of obscuring the distinction between shari'ah and its partial implementation 
in countries with hybrid (incorporating post-colonial, local and Islamic influences) legal systems, 
and of over-simplifying Rushdie's case. Nonetheless, his statement indicates that, for whatever 
political or other reasons, a substantial body of opinion in some Muslim countries would 
condemn Rushdie to death, and in some countries would have the legal and political influence to 
enforce this penalty. Thus The Satanic Verses controversy is not simply a matter of the minority 
accommodation in a plural liberal society, but illustrative of a clash of values at a global level, 
seen here in the conflict between international law and shari'ah, or, at least, some of its 
interpreters. 
The second right considered by Poulter is freedom of expression. He notes the invocation of this 
by Rushdie, his publishers, the press and the Government, but comments that such citations 
rarely mention the duties and responsibilities associated with freedom of expression in 
international treaties, or that it may be curtailed if the rights of others are threatened (in CRE 
1990a p. 17). However, the European Court of Human Rights seems to consider freedom of 
expression to be a particularly important right, stating in a verdict on a case in 1976, (reiterated 
in 1978), that freedom of expression is: 
20For further discussion of shari'ah pertinent to this point see 5.6-5.7 below. 21The plight of Egyptian writers who have had a fatwa for riddah issued against them was recently the 
subject of a BBC Everyman documentary (4 Dec. 1994). 
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... one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society, indeed one of the basic 
foundations for its progress and for the self-fulfilment of the individual. 
This even includes ideas which: 
... offend, shock or 
disturb the state or any section of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society" 
(in CRE 1990a p. 18)22 
And yet, when Gay News went to the European Commission of Human Rights to protest against 
Mary Whitehouse's successful private prosecution of them under the English blasphemy law over 
a homoerotic portrayal of Christ, their application was rejected as "manifestly unfounded" 
(Poulter in CRE 1990a p. 18). Hence international law does not appear to accord freedom of 
expression automatic precedence over other rights, and in this case expressly restricted it in 
deference to religious sensibilities. 
The third right discussed by Poulter is freedom of religion. Does this include freedom from insult, 
or just freedom to practise religion? English law seems undecided. According to Lord Scarman's 
verdict on the Gay News case (Whitehouse vs. Lemon 1979), freedom of religion "by necessary 
implication, imposed a duty upon all to refrain from insulting or outraging the religious feelings 
of others" (in CRE 1990a p. 18). However, his conclusion has been questioned by the Law 
Commission (in CRE 1990a p. 27). 
Taking these cases together, it seems fair to conclude that no unambiguous priority of freedom of 
expression over freedom of religion, including freedom from gross insult to one's religion, can be 
determined from English or international law, but rather that it is a matter of judgement in 
particular cases. 
The fourth and final right considered by Poulter is that of freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of religion. In the ECHR this principle is connected with the list of rights guaranteed in 
the treaty (in CRE 1990a p. 19); this implies that the rights of all groups should be equally 
protected. The present blasphemy law, which protects only Christianity, appears to contravene 
this principle. Given its contravention of the ECHR, the options for this law would appear to be 
extension to other faiths or abolition. If Scarman's interpretation of freedom of religion including 
freedom from vilification is correct, then the blasphemy law is one means of enforcing this 
principle. If, however, Scarman is wrong, then any blasphemy law goes beyond the requirements 
22Judgement of 7 Dec. 1976 par. 49 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 (CRE 1990a notes). 
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of the treaty. 
A number of objections are commonly raised to extension of the blasphemy law. Notably, the 
government has argued that it would be too difficult to define the charge, given different faith 
perspectives, and that it might lead to a flurry of litigation which would damage relations between 
faiths (Patten in CRE 1990a pp. 84-7). In response to the first point Poulter argues that no 
international treaty defines religion, but this has not precluded its protection in the past; 
blasphemy in particular has been legislatively prohibited by British authorities in religiously 
plural contexts such as India and other former territories in the colonial period (in CRE 1990a p. 
19). Answering the second point, Poulter points out that since blasphemy here is being defined as 
"scurrilous abuse" rather than denial of truth, such fears may be unfounded. 
Certainly, there appears to be widespread discontent with the blasphemy law in its present form. 
A seminar hosted jointly by the CRE and the Interfaith Network in 1989 in response to The 
Satanic Verses controversy, which was attended by more than forty delegates including 
representatives of different faiths, legal experts, publishers and community relations 
organisations, collectively endorsed the Rt. Rev Jim Thompson's verdict as chair that "the 
existing law of blasphemy was very unsatisfactory because it had an inaccurate target, many 
difficulties in its implementation. and was too limited in its application" (CRE 1990 a p. 56). 
However, extending this law, with its distinctively Christian history and terms which do not really 
fit the categories of other faiths, also seems fraught with difficulties. In response to this Prof. 
Simon Lee has suggested the modifications of more modem laws to cover offences against 
religious groups. One such possibility is the extension of the law against incitement to racial 
hatred to cover religious hatred. At present this provision exists in Northern Ireland but not in 
England and Wales, while the racial hatred provision applies in England and Wales, but not in 
Northern Ireland. 
Lee contends that while consistency and fidelity to international law would suggest that both 
kinds of incitement should be outlawed on both sides of the Irish Sea, in practice the law has not 
worked in Northern Ireland - no successful prosecutions from its introduction until at least 1990 
(1990 p. 86), although recent attempts to strengthen it since the peace process began may change 
the situation. The racial hatred law had the requirement to prove subjective intent removed in 
1986 to make prosecution easier, but this has not yet extended to religious hatred in Northern 
Ireland (1990 p. 87). Yet, even with this modification, securing conviction would be likely to 
prove difficult. 
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Lee argues that the blasphemy law directed public attention in a fruitless and contentious 
direction, but that the amount of attention focused on it testifies to the power of law, even an 
archaic and rarely invoked one, to shape public debate (1990 p. 92). He therefore suggests that 
even a law against incitement to religious hatred on which it is difficult to secure convictions 
could serve a useful symbolic function, and could help shape public debate down more 
constructive channels: 
A shift in focus of the law [away from blasphemy] might have diminished conflict and 
dissatisfaction. 
... 
A law against incitement to religious hatred might well have contributed 
something positive in this direction. (Lee 1990 p. 87) 
Another alternative would be some form of group libel offence. The New South Wales Anti- 
Discrimination (Racial Vilification) Amendment Act 1989 comes close to this (Lee 1990 p. 90, 
CRE 1990a pp. 90-9). Moderation in application is promoted by several measures. First, the 
requirement for prosecutions to gain the consent of the Attorney General, second by the Attorney 
General's power to order an apology, and third by a public interest defence. The latter protects 
form prosecution: 
a public act, done reasonably in good faith, for academic, artistic or research purposes in the 
public interest, including discussion or debate about and expositions of any act or matter. 
(Cited in Lee 1990, p. 90) 
Here we see a legislative embodiment of the need for an autonomy promoting society to weigh the 
educative value of controversial material against any offence caused to minority groups. The 
inclusion of "artistic... purposes" here is particularly important. Horton points to the tendency of 
"many liberals" to "attach too much importance to a rather specific and narrow conception of 
argumentation and to neglect the value of other forms of expression" (1993 p. 14). This tendency 
can also found among Muslim commentators, partly because of the orthodox prohibition of 
dramatic and visual representation, and perhaps partly because of the role of fich ('jurisprudence') 
as the central intellectual discipline in Islam. 
Thus the character of the debate can be distorted when emphasis falls on literal meaning and 
verbal precision, while creative arts, or humour, the ability to shock or draw attention by 
exaggeration and mockery, are neglected as means of communication. It is not yet clear how the 
New South Wales legislation is working out in practice, but in principle at least it represents an 
attempt in law to move toward an engagement with the diversity of values that are at play in a 
culturally complex society. 
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2.13 Conclusion 
In this chapter the competing claims of two interpreting communities have been described, and in 
this final section examined at the point where the free play of interpretation ends - in the need for 
practical judgement in law, a law which mediates between diverse and divided communities. On 
reflection, it may be argued that even in earnest efforts to seek justice for Muslims under the law 
in Britain the liberal conviction that traditional minorities will internally liberalise in the course of 
time is evident. Thus, even Lee, who supports Muslim demands for legal recognition, does so 
because of his perception of their vulnerability in British society, a situation which he envisages 
will change over time, rather than because of any engagement with the principles which Muslims 
may be upholding (1990 p. 127). This may be justified both as an inevitable consequence of the 
impact of Western social and economic forms of life, and as a moral imperative; often the two are 
not clearly distinguished. But what is the basis of this liberal insistence on internal liberalisation? 
Is 'when in Rome do as the Romans do' (except at the peripheries of culture -in sarees, samosas 
and steel bands) an adequate principle of justice in a plural society? In the next chapter we shall 
scrutinise liberal principles more closely. 
Chapter 3: 
Liberalism, Cultural Diversity and the Public Arena 
3.1 What is Liberalism? 
[T]he problem of political liberalism is: how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines? (Rawls 1993 p. xxv) 
Liberalism is an account of the manner in which diverse moral communities can co-exist 
within a single legal community (Galston 1991 p. 45) 
These understandings of liberalism, the promises they hold and the problems they face, are the 
main topic of this chapter. The discussion will take place primarily at the level of political theory, 
neglecting for reasons of space a historical account of liberalism, although this will play a larger 
role when assessing Maclntyre's critique of it (Chapter 4). A point at issue among liberals is 
whether the "single legal community" referred to by Galston must itself be a moral community, 
which assumes some conception of the common good. As we saw in Chapter 1, advocates of 
liberalism have often wished to disassociate liberalism from any substantive conception of the 
good. However, before pursuing this question further it will be helpful to consider something of 
the range of current meanings given to the term 'liberalism'. 
The term 'liberalism' is currently used in a variety of ways to indicate anything from a particular 
kind of political philosophy to a pervasive set of social attitudes co-extensive with modernity. 
These are not necessarily incompatible, since liberalism can be viewed as a political philosophy 
which has become embedded in the particular forms of culture, society and economic and 
political relations which constitute modernity. There has been an interactive relationship between 
liberalism and modernity, such that liberal thought can be seen as formative of modern societies, 
and modern economic and social developments have been formative of liberal thought. But 
liberalism is not co-extensive with modernity, a point highlighted by the example of Marxism, a 
modern rejection of liberal theory and practice. Yet the impact of its economic correlates of the 
free market and capitalism are felt almost everywhere. So far in the thesis its characteristics have 
been introduced ad hoc; in this section views of liberalism will be considered in a more 
systematic way, as a preliminary to exploring liberal responses to cultural and religious plurality. 
In his book Liberalism (1986) John Gray argues that: 
Whereas liberalism has no single unchanging nature or essence, its origins lie in a definite 
cultural and political circumstance and its background in the context of European 
individualism in the early modem period. (p. ix) 
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Gray finds a common, modem conception of humanity and society in all variants of liberal 
tradition, a conception which he describes as (i) individualist, (ii) egalitarian, (iii) universalist and 
(iv) meliorist (1986 p. x). Gray sees these as moral claims, (i) asserting the moral right of the 
individual against the collective, (ii) conferring equal moral status on all people, at least in the 
negative form of denying the relevance of moral worth to legal and political order, (iii) asserting 
the moral unity of the human species and the secondary significance of sources of difference, and 
(iv) insisting on the possibility of change and improvement in society's arrangements. 
A tension is evident between Gray's location of liberalism in a specific historical setting and 
liberalism's universal claims. It is also significant that Gray sees these claims as primarily moral, 
while the development of liberal theory and statecraft in line with (ii) has been to emphasise 
liberalism's moral neutrality. These tensions are important in considering liberalism's response to 
forms of plurality which challenge its understandings of neutrality and universality. 
Others have emphasised the contractual nature of liberalism, contracts being seen as the best way 
to reconcile the competing interests of individuals (McFadyen 1990 p. 303). Indeed, Barry goes 
so far as to see the minimalist account of human relations implied if a contract view predominates 
as the defining essence of liberalism: 
The essence of liberalism as I am defining it here is the vision of society as made up of 
independent autonomous units who co-operate only when the terms of co-operation are such 
as to ... 
further the ends of each of the parties. Market relations are the paradigm of such co- 
operation. (Barry 1973 p. 166) 
Under these conditions, the area of common good is inevitably eroded (McMylor 1994 p. 128). 
This has led to the accusation that liberalism, the philosophy of capitalism, in fact is parasitic 
upon the 'moral capital' accumulated by previous generations, which it does nothing to replenish. 
Thus Habermas argues: 
Capitalist societies were always dependent on cultural boundary conditions that they could 
not themselves reproduce; they feed parasitically on the remains of tradition. (Habermas 
1976 p. 76). 
However, classical liberal theories presupposed a foundation of moral consensus, and were 
prepared to take steps to safeguard it when it appeared to be threatened (e. g. Locke in Galston 
1991 pp. 259-263). Gray sees JS Mill as the turning point between classical and modern or 
revisionist liberalism. In a context in which the viability, universality and neutrality of liberalism 
have all come under threat, some liberal thinkers have dug back into liberal tradition and 
discovered a more realistic if less ambitious liberal project in liberalism's classical phase (e. g. 
Gray 1986, Galston 1991). But if religion is allowed a greater role here, in an inter-faith context 
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we should note that it is Christianity, or perhaps Deism, which was envisaged by these founding 
fathers. It is also striking that the rights bestowed upon humanity by the founding fathers were 
specifically bestowed upon men - even Gray speaks of "man and society" - and that a particular 
patriarchal household pattern was presumed alongside particular forms of religion. Furthermore, 
as Dorrien argues, in classical liberalism property rights are given priority over rights to 
democratic self-government (1990 p. 3). Thus a return to classical liberalism is by no means an 
unproblematic solution to problems of cultural diversity of for the liberal tradition. 
Mention of Dorrien, a theologian, raises the issue of the use of the terms 'liberal' and 'liberalism' 
in theology. Dorrien in fact uses the terms in a similar sense to political theoristsl, but elsewhere 
in theology other usages prevail. 'Liberal' is often used by opponents to denote anything which 
attempts to accommodate revelation or tradition to contemporary modes of thought. Proponents 
may adopt a similar meaning with positive connotations, stressing the importance of 
communication in contemporary idioms. Liberalism indicates an open attitude to the spirit of the 
age, and since its present form was shaped in the late nineteenth century, this includes an 
optimistic account of human culture and progress, and an espousal of historical and scientific 
methods (Reardon in Coggins and Houlden eds. 1990 pp. 395-6). All this received a sharp 
rebuttal from Barth, whose faith in autonomous human culture was shattered by World War I, 
and whose designation of 'liberal' as naive accommodation sharply counterpoised to the 
judgement of the Word of God remains influential. 
However, in this chapter 'liberal' is used to indicate a political philosophy rather than a 
theological position, although the latter will become relevant in Chapter 6. We now turn to 
consider the issue of liberal neutrality. 
3.2 The Myth of Liberal Neutrality 
The same freedom which has enabled Muslims to meet, march and protest against the book 
also preserves any author's right to freedom of expression for so long as no law is broken. To 
rule otherwise would be to chip away at the fundamental freedom on which our democracy is 
built. (Patten 1989 in CRE 1990a p. 86) 
This extract comes from a letter from the then Minister of State at the Home Office, John Patten, 
to leading British Muslims on 4 July 1989. Underlying it is the liberal view that the ideal state 
places the minimum of restrictions on the political and economic choices of its citizens. For such 
a system to work, there must be confidence in the ability of the law to defend rights against 
1Dorrien identifies post Millian liberalism, with its prioritising of democratic rights over property 
rights as modern liberalism or 'postliberalism'; pre-Millian liberalism he calls 'classical liberalism'. In 
general it is the former sense which he denotes by the term 'liberal' (1990 p. 3). 
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interests, a confidence in turn dependent on some measure of agreement concerning the difference 
between the two. However, as we saw in the preceding chapter, such consensus cannot be taken 
for granted in the case of liberal and Muslim protagonists in The Satanic Verses controversy. 
Nonetheless, Patten expresses here both the liberal self-assurance that liberalism is the best 
guarantor of freedom and toleration, and the liberal confidence in the ability of the liberal state to 
act as neutral arbiter between conflicting parties. Such a self-image plays a significant role in 
liberal self-understanding. However, the argument in this chapter will be that liberalism is not 
neutral, and would be better defended by offering a positive account of qualities and abilities 
prized by liberalism. Furthermore, liberalism's claim to be the best guarantor of freedom and 
toleration requires explanation and justification in a plural public arena, both because liberal 
values of freedom and tolerance are culturally specific constructs, and because liberal societies 
have far from unblemished records, even judged by their own criteria. 
The view Patten reflects here has a long pedigree. As Stephen Lukes writes, the European nation 
state which in many ways became the political embodiment of liberalism, was created as a 
solution to religious conflict: 
... 
liberalism was born out of religious conflict and the attempt to tame it by accommodating it 
within the nation state. The case for religious toleration was central to its development. 
(Lukes 1991 p. 17) 
This founding myth is often repeated, and surely constitutes a major feature of the sacred 
landscape of liberalism. Mary Midgely tells the story: 
For a long time, Catholics and Protestants shared the view that only one of their creeds could 
survive. This meant that one had to destroy the other, and they differed only on which one it 
should be.... Certain people, however, such as Montaigne and Locke, saw a possibility of 
approaching the problem differently, so that this kind of question would not arise. They 
proposed finding a way to view this disagreement as a normal one, containable within the 
scope of a decent human life. Their work made it possible for toleration to be developed 
without the fearful sense of betrayal which it had seemed at first to involve. (Midgley 1989 p. 
242) 
Jeffrey Stout expands on this narrative by contrasting theological vocabularies with the new 
secular ones in terms of their ability to handle disputes concerning the common good: 
Might it be that theology got into trouble with the intellectuals largely because it was unable 
to provide a vocabulary for debating and deciding matters pertaining to the common good 
without resort to violence? Could it be that the distinctive vocabularies of modem politics and 
ethics - the languages of human rights, of Benthamite utility, of respect for persons, and so 
on - owe their existence in part to a complicated history of attempts to minimise the unhappy 
consequences of religious conflict? (Stout 1988 p. 222) 
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These new secular vocabularies sought to overcome the divisiveness of religious vocabularies 
through the means of the universal human subject, the management of human interests through 
the mechanism of the market, and the discipline of the sovereign nation-state. However, for 
classical liberalism this did not imply the exclusion of religion from public life. Rather, at least in 
the British and American as opposed to French contexts, religion was seen as the foundation of 
personal morality, so that it is appropriate for the state to ensure that this foundation is 
maintained in good order. John Locke provides an example of this position. 
In examining Locke's arguments for religious toleration, Galston finds that Locke was opposed to 
coercion in religion, but not to persuasive public discourse on religious matters, and certainly not 
on moral matters. Locke believed that while religious knowledge could only be verified 
eschatologically - no human court could decide - rational knowledge of morality was possible. 
For Locke toleration did not mean the inviolability of the individual conscience; civic peace was 
of paramount importance. On this Galston argues that: 
conceptions of civic education and the social role of religion can be defined which are at once 
faithful to liberal principles and far more hospitable to moral and religious traditionalism 
than is the understanding that dominates contemporary liberal theory. (Galston 1991 p. 241) 
We shall return to Galston's views on civic education at 8.2, and to his concept of liberalism as a 
tradition later in this chapter. But for now, it will be evident that the development of strictly 
secular discourses as a panacea for the ills of religious divisiveness is not without its critics, even 
within liberalism. Other criticisms include the argument that the extent to which "the distinctive 
vocabularies of modem politics and ethics" (Stout 1988 p. 222) have in fact enabled decisions on 
matters of the common good to be made without violence is highly questionable; violence may 
have been expelled from the bourgeois public sphere only to re-emerge at the colonial periphery 
and in the disciplinary activities of the state in restraining the lower classes (Giddens 1987 pp. 
166-182). In a global context in which the vast majority of armed conflicts are now civil wars, 
the efficacy of the nation-state as a solution to religious and ethnic difference must also be called 
into question, although it must be admitted that the relationship between liberalism and the 
nation-state is not a straightforward one. 
Criticisms of liberalism's universal subject have also been made: because this universal subject is 
anyone in general rather than someone in particular, two effects tend to follow. The first is that in 
theory it is not possible to accord particular features a primary place: this has meant that 
liberalism has traditionally neglected the role of cultural membership in developing its 
conceptions of the identity of the citizen, equality and justice. A more concrete reason for this 
could also be that cultural diversity has simply not been acknowledged. The second effect of a 
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supposed universal subject is that particular features favoured by dominant groups may be 
deliberately or unconsciously imported under the guise of universals, and because their partiality 
is not recognised, they become very difficult to challenge. 
The relationship between the development of modem political and moral vocabularies and 
colonialism requires further consideration. The emergence of the language of universal human 
rights would seem at first sight to militate against the subordination of whole nations and groups 
of people. Yet, as Bhikhu Parekh argues, an underlying reason for the quest for universality may 
have been the development of liberal political theory as a legitimation for colonial practices. 
Where colonial expansion could no longer be legitimated on the grounds of converting the natives 
to Christianity, the view that European culture was the bearer of universal civilising values was 
substituted. 
In support of his case, Parekh (1994a) has pointed to JS Mill's importance to the liberal tradition, 
and his employment with the East India company. Mill was so opposed to the colonial 
bureaucracy being made accountable to elected representatives, either in England or India, that he 
retired early rather than co-operate with the new system when the British government took over 
direct rule of India in 1858 (Parekh 1994a p. 11). Furthermore, Parekh argues that revisions of 
liberalism by Raz, Barry, Rawls and Dworkin substantially retain Millian form, and concludes: 
Millian liberalism represents the British and European self-consciousness during the heyday 
of imperialism, and bears the deep imprint of an age in which the liberal way of thought 
exercised unchallenged political hegemony over its defeated rivals. Since the victims of 
history are now feeling confident enough to assert their cultural identity in a decolonised 
world, and since we now appreciate better than before that no way of life, including the 
liberal, represents the last word in human wisdom, liberalism cannot afford to remain trapped 
within the arrogant colonial mode of thought. (1994a p. 13) 
However, Parekh's criticism rests on some overgeneralisation about liberalism's relation to the 
rights of cultural communities. Kymlicka (1989) has pointed out that recognition of such rights 
remained a feature of liberal theory up until World War II, when it was discredited by association 
with Nazi invocation of such rights as a pretext for the annexation of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. In Mill's own case, his argument for liberty recognises the necessity of cultural 
communities as a context for the exercise of liberty. 
Nonetheless, the presence of the descendants of the colonised within former colonial powers 
urges both a reassessment of the adequacy of supposedly universal values embodied in political 
and legal institutions and a reassessment of the history of those institutions and values. Indeed, 
cultural plurality is increasingly persuading liberal theorists to re-think their position, in relation 
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to minorities as diverse as North American indigenous peoples (Kymlicka 1989; Galston 1991) 
and British Muslims (Fitzmaurice 1993; Newey 1993). 
3.3 Reassessing Liberalism: from Foundations to Autonomy. 
Two possible factors may have led to this reassessment. The first is an open recognition that 
liberal positions, rather than being founded on universal principles, are in fact embedded in 
particular cultural traditions. But reassessment may also be driven by the fact that construed 
apart from European and American political interests, liberal arguments may be used against 
their historic advocates - as when Muslims invoke the right of freedom of religion against the 
right to free speech (Chapter 2). Alternative grounds may therefore become attractive to defend 
European and American political interests. Both of these factors may have contributed to an 
erosion of confidence in liberal neutrality. 
Neutrality has been closely connected with liberalism's claim to provide the most tolerant political 
arrangements. In the introduction to his paper "How much cultural and religious pluralism can 
liberalism tolerate? " Jonathan Chaplin describes the liberal perception that liberalism will 
produce the most tolerant political arrangements: 
Liberal pronouncements lead us to expect that liberalism will generally be more tolerant than 
any other theory. (Chaplin 1993 p. 32) 
However, not surprisingly in view of the history and structural dangers of supposedly universal 
values, he suggests that contrary to this self-image: 
certain important manifestations of cultural and religious pluralism would be undermined by 
the consistent application of a liberal policy. (Chaplin 1993 p. 32) 
Thus Muslims and those provoked by racist responses to Muslim protests against The Satanic 
Verses are not the only people to question liberalism's self-image as the supreme guarantor of 
toleration. The collection in which Chaplin's paper appears (in Horton ed. 1993) contains several 
philosophically oriented contributions which question the relationship between liberalism and 
toleration. These papers, some of which reflect on The Satanic Verses controversy, some on 
education, while others are of a more general nature, indicate a growing awareness among 
academics of fault-lines within liberalism's self-understanding, particularly a scepticism of the 
view that intellectual or moral beliefs can be universally and rationally justified. In the absence of 
the discovery of such 'foundations', there has been a search for alternative means of securing and 
justifying claims about knowledge and morality (e. g. Stout 1988; Rorty 1989). 
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However, we shall retain our focus on liberalism's claim to be the best guarantor of tolerance, and 
the closely related claim to be able to provide a neutral space within which different conceptions 
of 'the good' can co-exist. 
Tolerance can be initially defined as disapproval of something combined with restraint from 
attempts to stop it. Peter Gardner has suggested a more positive concept, pointing out a curious 
implication of the above kind of definition: the more things one dislikes and the more intensely 
one disapproves, the greater one's toleration! Instead, Gardner proposes separating the 
disapproving agent from the tolerating agent, so that it would only be necessary for something to 
be disapproved of by some members of a society, (and hence, I suggest, for disapproval to be 
publicly comprehensible or'available'), for others in society to tolerate it (in Horton ed. 1993 pp. 
83-103). 
The claim to neutrality is centrally a claim to provide principles of justice independent of any 
particular conception of the good (Fitzmaurice 1993 pp. 55-56). Fitzmaurice describes the 
pressures under which Rawls, a major liberal theorist, has retreated from this claim put forward 
in his A Theory of Justice (1973). In his original argument, Rawls uses the device of a "Veil of 
Ignorance" behind which one is stripped of knowledge both of particular conceptions of the good 
and of one's abilities and social location. From this "Original Position" the arrangements one 
chooses for society are held to be just, because particular interests are excluded. 
Yet far from being neutral, the "Original Position" presupposes a particular kind of individual, 
one who views society instrumentally, as means to whatever ends he or she, as an individual, may 
happen to seek. The reason for not knowing one's social location dissolves if, instead, one has a 
conception of the common good which overrides self-interest, or conceives of self differently to 
the Western individualist sense. For example, one may choose a rigid, hierarchical society 
whatever one's position in it, if one believes that one's place in the world is determined by actions 
in a previous life, and thus represents one's dharma. 2 
This objection, however, imports a feature which Rawls' construct attempts to exclude: particular 
conceptions of the good. One may ask what one is left to decide with when such conceptions are 
excluded. Rawls holds that there are some general or "primary goods" on the basis of which 
choices are to be made. These are: 
goods which it is supposedly rational to want whatever one wants, because they provide the 
instrumentally necessary conditions for the achievement of any determinate conception of the 
good whatsoever, and are equally useful in the pursuit of all. (Fitzmaurice 1993 p. 55) 
2Hindu/Buddhist conception of 'cosmic duty' or 'right path'. 
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In other words, a primary good is something which it can be presupposed that all people will need 
or want. 
Examples of primary goods include freedom of action and equality of opportunity. However, as 
my objection to the "Original Position" and "Veil of Ignorance" suggests, there is no reason to 
suppose that these conditions are universally desirable. As Nagel has argued, such goods are not 
equally useful for the realisation of all particular conceptions of the good (Nagel 1978). In 
particular, traditional, religiously-based societies may find that such 'goods' erode their sense of 
the common good; for example, increased social mobility and economic opportunity may be seen 
to weaken extended family structures. The rationality presupposed by Rawls' theory is manifestly 
that of a particular economic system and culture, a product of the threat of unbridled capitalism 
to public order. 
In the face of these kinds of criticisms Rawls has altered his justification of primary goods. As 
Fitzmaurice argues: 
He now acknowledges that the goodness of the primary goods derives not from their 
constituting the universal means to desire fulfilment, but from the fact that they provide the 
conditions under which the individual may form a conception of the good independently. 
(Fitzmaurice 1993 p. 56) 
In other words for Rawls the ability to choose one's conception of the good is the highest good; 
autonomy is the most highly valued virtue in Rawls' scheme. Conversely, any system in which a 
conception of the good is substantially provided, or revealed, is excluded. Rawls' justification has 
shifted its grounds from a universal conception of the means to desire fulfilment to the value of 
autonomy in modern societies. Rawls accepts that this valuing of autonomy above other goods is 
particular to Western societies (1993), but doesn't consider the difficulties this may present for 
minorities within those societies who do not share this cultural background. Thus these new 
grounds may prove problematic in a multicultural setting. 
Rawls does not consider cultural membership to be a primary good. This denial of the status of 
primary good to cultural membership takes place in spite of his endorsement of Mill's argument 
for liberty, which accepts that we are reliant on cultural structure for personal development 
(Rawls 1973 pp. 208-9). Why then the reluctance to recognise the importance of belonging to a 
particular culture if one is to be able to form any determinate conception of the good? Possibly 
because liberalism, like other guises of modernity, has sought to found public life on universal 
principles, generating a reluctance to recognise anything contingent, including cultural 
membership, as of fundamental importance. But also simply because liberal theory has tended not 
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to recognise significant cultural diversity, particularly that which does not conveniently fall into 
the discrete categories of public and private. Even Rawls' latest theory, which recognises a 
diversity of reasonable but incompatible "comprehensive doctrines" does not consider the 
relationship between such doctrines and economic and social forms of life. 
3.4 Interrogating the Liberal Virtue of Autonomy. 
We have seen that between A Theory of Justice (1973) and Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls 
shifted the foundation for legitimating liberal arrangements from supposedly universal means to 
desire fulfilment (primary goods) to the value of autonomy in Western societies. A similar move 
has been made by other liberal theorists; Chaplin (in Horton ed. 1993 pp. 32-49) considers the 
arguments developed by Nozick, Kymlicka and Raz. 
Nozick (1974) proposes a kind of diverse voluntaristic utopia, in which all kinds of ways of life 
co-exist, including communities in which people are constrained and treated unequally, so long as 
people enter into such communities voluntarily, and communities do not constrain others outside 
the group. Yet questions arise as to the kind of social conditions which are required to produce 
people able to choose voluntarily which communities to enter. Moreover, the exercise of choice in 
society may have less to do with educational virtue than economic relations, and capitalist 
systems may be profoundly corrosive of certain traditional lifestyles. However, Chaplin focuses 
his criticism at the cognitive level, arguing that an education which produces an autonomous 
individual may be inimical to the sustenance of certain kinds of community. Thus Chaplin writes: 
Surrounded by myriad distracting alternatives and operating in a climate thoroughly 
permeated by a spirit of voluntaristic individualism, how could a Muslim or a communist or 
a Gandhian community survive? (in Horton ed. 1993, p. 37) 
There is also an underlying and contestable assumption that some kind of neutral perspective 
from which such a judgement can be made is available. But as Chaplin argues, "voluntaristic 
individualism" is a better name for this perspective than "neutrality"; the market as a model for 
life. Again, the cultural prizing of the kind of autonomy which is a pre-requisite for effective 
market relations is the bottom line of the argument. 
Unlike Nozick, Kymlicka (1989)3 is sensitive to the relationship between social context and the 
kind of choices which people are able to make. Hence he includes cultural membership as a 
primary good (1989, pp. 162-181). However, there is an ambivalence in his valuing of minority 
cultures. On the one hand, his recognition of power imbalances between majority and minority 
3 This chapter does not take account of Kymlicka's revised position presented inMulticultural Citizenship (1995), as this was unavailable at the time of writing. 
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cultures means that special rights are needed for minorities. Thus he moves beyond the crude 
individualism of some liberalism, from a negative neutrality (no particular culture is favoured), to 
a positive neutrality (intervention to ensure that minorities are not subordinated). However, within 
minority cultures the same rules are held to apply; minorities must treat their own members 
according to liberal principles. There is thus an assimilationist assumption in Kymlicka's 
position, an expectation that minorities will, in the course of living in liberal culture, internally 
liberalise themselves. This may be sociologically plausible - though Kymlicka himself rejects a 
crude secularisation thesis - but the question here is whether this assumption should be built into 
a theory of justice. Should minorities be expected to internally liberalise? Chaplin comments: 
Cultural communities may preserve their distinctiveness, but only within the limits 
determined by liberalism. 
... 
He seems to assume (contra Raz) that a community can be 
liberalised without essentially changing its particular character, but he can do so only by 
assuming that liberalism has no particular character of its own. (in Horton 1993 pp. 45-6) 
Thus, according to Chaplin, a form of the fiction of liberal neutrality is retained by Kymlicka. By 
contrast, Joseph Raz (1986) concedes the distinctive character of liberalism, and thus abandons 
any claim to neutrality. However, Raz does not concede that this leaves liberalism in a simple 
stalemate with alternative cultures; instead he advocates the moral superiority of liberalism. The 
locus of this superiority is the value placed in Western societies on autonomy, the ability to 
choose one's conception of the good. Here Raz's argument dovetails with that of Fitzmaurice. For 
both, and as we have seen, also for the later Rawls, autonomy is the defining good of liberal 
theory. Thus Fitzmaurice argues: 
The ideal of autonomy is indeed one of our dominant cultural ideals. But I want to make a 
stronger claim than this on behalf of the value of autonomy, and to argue that it is a condition 
of life's being good that it could be reflectively affirmed by the person leading it. (1993 p. 59) 
Fitzmaurice understands autonomy as the ability to affirm reflectively one's own way of life. 
Autonomy, then, depends not just on choice, but on rational exercise of choice. Rationality and 
choice here need to be clearly distinguished. In many defences of liberalism what is valued about 
autonomy is that it enables the rational exercise of choice. Yet what may be found in the Western 
societies is the presence of choice without the exercise of rational discernment, either because of 
information overload or difficulty in relating the competing demands of different areas of life to 
one another. By contrast in traditional societies choice is more constrained, but its limited 
exercise may be more rationally undertaken, in the sense of being made within a framework of 
reasoning which makes sense of life as a whole. It may be that there is a relationship between the 
increase in choice and the growing inability to make rational or moral sense of that choice; the 
conditions of consumer capitalism which produce relatively unconstrained choice make 
meaningful decisions (rational exercise of choice) increasingly problematic, while a telos 
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embodying tradition constrains choice but preserves meaning, enabling rational choice. 4 
At stake here is the nature of rationality, which is understood quite differently in, say, 
anthropology and most traditions of Western philosophy. 5 Anthropologists see rationality as 
consisting of any mode of thought which enables people to make sense of their context, prompting 
the following response from the sociologist Bryan Turner: 
Ernest Gellner 
... 
has argued that functionalist interpretation of other people's beliefs results 
in contextual charity which 'absolves too many people of the charge of systematically 
illogical or false or self-deceptive thought' .... 
In contemporary anthropology, it is as a result 
difficult to know what would count as prelogical thought. (in Turner ed. 1993 p. 171) 
In philosophy, the ability of the individual to follow and develop a chain of reasoning through 
inference and assessment of evidence is likely to be seen as central. What sense can be made of 
such diverse perspectives? As we shall see below (4.1,4.4), while upholding a universal sense of 
logic, Alasdair Maclntyre distinguishes between diverse forms of rationality. He therefore 
criticises an individualist approach as solipsistic and ultimately irrational, if it is not recognised 
that the exercise of logical powers takes place within some wider context of shared meaning. If 
action is not oriented within some larger purposive framework, some teleology, then it is 
ultimately random and arbitrary. Similarly, Habermas criticises the overgrowth of instrumental 
reason unbounded by communicative reason; without the latter the former is ultimately irrational 
(above 1.10, below, 3.6). Bauman (1989) does not share MacIntyre's faith in tradition or 
Habermas' in communicative reason; instead reason itself is the danger if unrestrained by moral 
instinct (above 1.13). 
For Fitzmaurice, rationality does not depend upon a person actually affirming their way of life 
after critical reflection. Thus, in her understanding of autonomy it is only necessary that, were a 
person to reflect in this way, they would then arrive at such an affirmation: 
She may have become settled quite fortuitously in a way of life which just suits her. I accept 
this is a rationally good life. ... 
However, it is the possession of the capacity, not the fact of 
its exercise that is a necessary condition of a rationally good life. (1993 p. 60) 
So a person must be capable of rational reflection (even if this capacity is not exercised) to 
qualify as autonomous; presumably rational reflection must be evident in some area of their life, 
even if not directed at the whole of it. But what counts as rational reflection? Given the range of 
meanings available, how much is necessary, and indeed, how much is possible? As we saw in 
Maclntyre's critique of Hume (1.10), it is impossible, indeed mentally unbalancing to try, to strip 
4This argument will be further considered in relation to the work of MacIntyre (especially 1985, 
1988) at 4.4 below. 5Rationality and its relation to culture and logic will be discussed further in Chapter 4 below. 
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away every aspect of one's background to arrive at the pure cogito, or reasoning self devoid of 
cultural accretions. We can only build on pre-understanding, not on nothing. Yet this is not to 
deny the necessity for some degree of rational reflection; on Maclntyre's account questioning 
some aspects of life is possible, and, indeed, desirable. Maclntyre's way of holding the needs for 
criticism and continuity together is to see critical questioning as part of the life of traditions, 
indeed germane to their health: 
Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. ... 
A living tradition then is an 
historically extended socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about 
which goods constitute that tradition. (1985 p. 222) 
In fact, Fitzmaurice admits that both her understanding of autonomy, and the concept of 
rationality which underpins it, are culturally specific: 
talk of rationality is never innocent. ... 
What I have been defending as the conditions of 
autonomy are in fact the conditions of modem autonomy, where what it is to rationally reflect 
on the best life for oneself is reflectively to compare a number of different ways of life, ... 
treating custom and tradition as just so much grist to the mill of the reflective individual's 
reasoning. But what counts as reasoning about the good life is culturally variable. (1993 p. 
62) 
Thus both Fitzmaurice and Raz accept the cultural specificity of liberal concepts of rationality, 
and hence the derivative virtue of autonomy, which becomes the justification for liberal claims to 
tolerance. How, then, do they go on to justify their view of the superiority of liberalism, of prizing 
autonomy above heteronomy? For Raz, it seems to be primarily a matter of social Darwinism; 
autonomy best enables individuals to survive in modem societies: 
For those who live in an autonomy supporting environment there is no choice but to be 
autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society. (1986, p. 391) 
There is surely a heavy irony in this statement, which can be paraphrased: 'you have no choice 
but to value choice'. Here, a connection may be made with the earlier suggestion (2.6) that 
Muslim anger at the Panorama documentary "A New Underclass" may be due to the implication 
that Muslim maintenance of traditional values and culture is impeding their economic progress. 
As indicated above, I believe that the evidence is too ambiguous to support this suggestion, and 
that the PSI and Panorama team were led by their presuppositions to dismiss prejudice as a 
possible explanation for Muslim relative deprivation too quickly. Furthermore, there are less 
ambiguous refutations of Raz's assumed connection between the Western concept of autonomy 
and economic success. Japan and other East Asian countries surely provide plenty of counter- 
evidence to the thesis that a high value placed on autonomy is a pre-requisite for success in late 
capitalist systems. In Japan heteronomy and economic prowess combine; technological innovation 
and entrepreneurial flair do not seem to be tied to the prizing of individual choice and inviolability 
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the way that Raz, in his North American context, seems to assume: 
communities whose culture does not support autonomy ... 
immigrant communities, 
indigenous peoples, religious sects [in so far as] they insist on bringing up their children in 
their own way ... are 
harming them. (1986 p. 423) 
Yet in Chapter 1 (1.12) we saw Habermas' argument that the bourgeois public sphere, the 
birthplace of the modem autonomous individual - that is, one who subscribes to the ideal of 
unconstrained dialogue without regard for power or privilege, the outcome of which is decided by 
reason alone - owed these attributes to the historical development of capitalism. The conditions 
under which these ideals came to be articulated was one phase in the development of capitalism, 
which soon passed. Furthermore, it produced an ideal only ever partially embodied in reality, and 
ideal which rested on the ideological obfuscation of the man of means with humanity in general 
(Habermas 1989). 
In contrast to Raz, Fitzmaurice focuses on the cognitive rather than economic consequences of 
cultural diversity. She argues that simple ethical monism, (one unargued version of the good), 
heteronomously sustained (supported by the community rather than individually reasoned out) 
amounts to a refusal to face the reality of pluralism. However, once a member of a 
heteronomously defined group, or traditional minority, begins to understand the questions which 
members of the majority culture ask, and to engage in debate with them, she has already begun to 
satisfy the conditions of autonomy as defined by Fitzmaurice. Autonomy does not necessitate the 
abandoning of traditional forms of life, but only traditional legitimising of them, replaced by 
engagement in new, reflective forms of legitimisation. Hence she writes: 
Once she [a member of a traditional minority] is actually facing an intelligible challenge to 
her way of life from a member of another culture, she already inhabits a world in which, if 
not all gods and demons, at least the minor deities and devils, are at war. If more than one 
mode of life is customary, and many authorities extant, then reference to 'custom' or 
authority' cannot justify a particular mode of life. One has to give reasons for treating these 
customs or this authority as binding, and this is necessarily to engage with the substance of 
what they commend or prescribe. (1993 p. 66) 
She borrows Maclntyre's terminology to describe the challenge with which heteronomous 
traditions are confronted: the "epistemological crisis" (Maclntyre 1977,1988: see below 4.5). 
The conceptual resources of such traditions no longer enable them to make sense of the world 
around them. Ethical "monism" (one version of the good) cannot make sense of cultural diversity 
(1993 p. 65). 
However, there are difficulties with the contrast Raz and Fitzmaurice make between Western and 
traditional cultures; they seem to contrast a rather idealised account of legitimisation in Western 
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societies with the practices of traditional cultures. Both give the impression that in Western 
societies everyone other than members of traditional minorities engage in the kind of reflective 
self-justification which they call autonomy. It is the inability of minorities to do so which 
allegedly prevents them from prospering economically (Raz) or cognitively (Fitzmaurice), and 
which also accounts for their failure to tolerate others. But are most practices in Western 
societies justified, or justifiable, by their practitioners? How widespread is autonomy in the sense 
employed by these philosophers? 
Is it not, as I suggested above, that Westerners may value and exercise choice, but only a small 
minority ever engage in much rational exercise of it in any fundamental sense? It seems that we 
are confronted here with at least some wishful thinking; for reasons already suggested it seems 
unlikely that most people's lives are so rationally or autonomously constructed. Further evidence 
comes from Bellah's study of contemporary American morality. 6 
Bellah et al's (1985) study of the moral reasoning of middle Americans discovered that their 
interviewees were swiftly reduced to silence by the Socratic interrogation of a sociologist, so the 
investigators concluded that their subjects' moral reasoning was shallow. Yet as Stout (1988) 
argues, Bellah's findings may not witness so much the moral incoherence of his subjects as the 
failure of the investigators to grasp the structure of practical moral reasoning. Stout argues that 
such reasoning has more the shape of a web connecting the multiple settings in which individuals 
live their lives, rather than the foundational structure of an autonomous, reflexive subject 
presupposed by a string of 'why? ' questions. 
Bellah's findings and Stout's comments support the suggestion that autonomy in the sense 
generally accepted by philosophers is far more rarely exercised in liberal democracies than Raz 
and Fitzmaurice appear to presume. In further support, we may recall D'Costa's remarks on 
"secular fundamentalism" and the other evidence gathered in Chapter 2, ranging from the 
methodology of the study of 'race' to Asad's exploration of the mythic foundations of liberalism in 
responses to book-burning, which all testify to the limitations of reflexive self-questioning in 
liberal societies. This is not to suggest a simple lack of thought, but rather that deeply rooted 
preconceptions determine the channels along which thought flows. In this context the cherished 
value of autonomy, in so far as it neglects and even helps to conceal such preconceptions by 
promoting a myth of neutrality, can a vehicle for the assertion of cultural bigotry. 
Thus both popular and intellectual arguments witness to a powerful belief in the superiority of 
6 Bellah's account of the incoherence of contemporary moral discourse provides empirical support for Maclntyre's argument inAfter Virtue (see chapter 4 below). 
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liberal society justified by a kind of social Darwinism. This is best understood not only as 
supported by rational argument or appeal to evidence, but also as driven by the needs of liberal 
societies in response to their particular histories. The conditions of autonomy as defined by Raz 
and Fitzmaurice are therefore rarely, if ever, fulfilled in practice. Indeed, as we have seen (1.10, 
and further below, 4.4) MacIntyre argues that such conditions are in fact impossible to meet, and 
traces the pressure to meet them to elements introduced into Western tradition by Descartes and 
Hume, elements which have led to the damaging consequences of insupportable foundationalist 
projects, and relativist despair or irresponsibility. 
So, in place of autonomy we find an alternative tradition which denies its traditionality; a liberal 
tradition, or perhaps even "secular fundamentalism", which sometimes seems to justify this tag 
through its intolerance to challenges to its authority. Traditional cultures, it asserts, hold back 
development; one way or another they must perish. What are the implications of this evidence for 
Raz and Fitzmaurice's defence of liberal superiority in terms of autonomy? Clearly, much as it 
might be prized, evidence for the practice of autonomy as "reflective determination by the 
individual of how best to instantiate her fundamental goals and values" (Fitzmaurice 1993 p. 68) 
in Western societies is distinctly lacking in practice, at least in so far as autonomy is understood 
in the traditional philosophical sense of proceeding from fundamental premises by rational 
argument. Indeed if Maclntyre is correct, such a procedure is practically impossible. Certainly, at 
this stage, we can claim that it is not co-extensive with liberal democracies. What, then, is left for 
autonomy? 
At the end of her paper Fitzmaurice recognises that as a procedural virtue autonomy is in itself 
insufficient for a good life, and that: 
The individual who critically reflects must start from a pre-reflective set of goals and values, 
and must be able, on reflection, to settle on a set of goals sufficient to make up a life with 
continuous character. To be autonomous is not to be free floating, but always to be engaged 
in a kind of dialectic between reflectiveness and embeddedness. (1993 p. 68, emphasis 
added) 
What is the impact of this admission on her argument for toleration based on the value of 
autonomy? If it is recognised that traditional, heteronomous knowledge is in fact a precondition of 
the exercise of autonomy, and that autonomous knowledge is always embedded in a 
heteronomous base, then we see that the contrasts between autonomy and heteronomy have been 
overdrawn. Instead, it seems that conditions which favour a balance between the ideal 
abstractions of heteronomy and autonomy, between trust and suspicion, respect and scepticism, 
better describe the optimum conditions for learning and making educated choices; in other words, 
for a mature autonomy. 
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Thus, whereas autonomy is often understood as independence from particular ties, Fitzmaurice 
now concedes that it is, in fact, dependent upon them; she argues that a notion of autonomy which 
refuses to recognise cultural context is in fact untenable. Autonomy, understood as a capacity for 
living independently and acting freely based on an ability to think critically and establish one's 
own conclusions, depends not on isolation from one's community or disregard of normative 
values, but rather on a skilful understanding of and attachment to other people and to one's 
context. Hence autonomy, like rationality for Maclntyre, is contingent upon a particular 
substantive tradition and cannot exist independently of tradition; autonomy is a procedural virtue. 
The notion that critical reflection is always already embedded in cultural tradition is central to 
Maclntyre's thought, together with an account of the relationship between critical reflection, 
tradition and social and material context. Maclntyre additionally stresses the role of narrative in 
constituting 'embeddedness', when he writes: 
We enter human society with one or more imputed characters - roles into which we have been 
drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others 
respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. ... 
Deprive children of 
stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words. 
(1985 p. 216) 
Fitzmaurice's recognition of the importance of cultural identity in sustaining autonomy, can, 
together with these insights, be used to reformulate the liberal virtue of autonomy. Autonomy can 
be defined as an embeddedness-reflectiveness dialectic, in which the ability to choose intelligently 
is seen to be always contingent on an established stock of meanings. The question of whether this 
is appropriately seen as a liberal understanding, or is better viewed as a description of traditioned 
reason, is one which shall be taken up in the discussion of Maclntyre in Chapter 4. But in this 
context the important conclusion is that the continual undermining of established cultural 
meanings comes to be seen not as progress towards enlightenment, but rather as destructive of the 
very possibility of new learning. 
Further to the argument in Chapter 2, this understanding has relevance for the discussion of free 
speech in The Satanic Verses controversy. It can be seen that publications which undermine a 
conununity's sense of identity may damage rather than promote that community's ability to adapt 
to new situations, and also opens up for exploration, alongside traditional minority values, the 
contingent values of liberalism. 
From this understanding of autonomy a case can be made for protecting and supporting minority 
cultures, not simply for reasons internal to their traditions, but actually because the goal of 
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education is to produce autonomous individuals, because to develop autonomy one first needs 
'cultural embedding'. If it is accepted then arguments concerning censorship become essentially 
contestable. In this account of autonomy, publication of material offensive to minority cultures 
cannot be justified by a knee jerk reference to freedom of speech, but only by engagement in 
explanation and justification of the goods which are being defended, which are to be weighed 
against those under attack - particularly the costs to minority groups of cultural corrosion. We 
now consider further the roles of cultural embeddedness and the problem of 'recognition' in liberal 
societies. 
3.5 Cultural Embeddedness and Recognition in Liberal Societies 
Many minority groups want to see their particular identities recognised more fully by the societies 
in which they live. This is perceived both as a matter of justice, demanding equal recognition for 
cultural groups, and of survival; a devalued culture may wither and die. Such demands involve a 
complex of arguments, and clash with another view of equality, which would see recognition of 
differences as discriminatory. We now turn to these issues, and particularly to Charles Taylor's 
work on the "politics of recognition" (1992), considering it in relation to the Maclntyre-based 
narrative conception of identity developed thus far. 
Taylor seeks to understand how 'recognition' came to be such a significant demand in the 
multicultural politics of his native Canada, and how it can best be achieved to the satisfaction of 
all involved. He identifies the underlying idea behind such demands as: 
The thesis ... that our 
identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. (Taylor in Taylor with Gutmann eds. 19947 p. 25) 
Taylor traces the origins of this conception of recognition to the breakdown of hierarchical 
relationships with the advent of modernity (see Chapter 1, especially 1.12). He argues that there 
are two traditions of equal respect stemming from the Enlightenment, one associated with 
Rousseau and emphasising a cohesive society as the context for equality; the other associated 
with Kant, stressing the rational capacity of the individual, which is held to be universal. Both 
have difficulty in recognising difference. Rousseau's account is seen to place such emphasis on 
the collective will and the absence of differentiated roles that it precludes recognition of cultural 
differences (Taylor 1994 pp. 48-5 1). Ironically Rousseau is also seen to have contributed to the 
rise of demands for recognition, by his transformation of the concept of conscience from inner 
7Henceforth, 'Taylor 1994'. 
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access to standards of right and wrong to access to inner feelings as an end in itself, in his notion 
of "le sentiment de 1'existence (Taylor 1994 p. 29 note 5). 
Taylor thinks that some interpretations of the Kantian tradition of equal respect, based on the 
recognition of universal capacities, do permit only a "very restricted acknowledgement of distinct 
cultural identities" (1994 p. 52). But he argues that other interpretations are possible, and 
illustrates his case using recent Canadian constitutional debates. One example from this context 
is the clash of interpretations of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights in relation to Quebec, 
which was recognised by the Meech Lake amendment as a "distinct society". This enabled the 
Quebeckers to pass legislation designed to preserve the French language, for example restricting 
access to Anglophone schools, and insisting on the use of French in businesses above a certain 
size, and on French commercial signage. 
For many Anglophone Canadians this legislation conflicted with the individual rights and anti- 
discrimination measures in the 1982 Charter. Taylor locates their argument in a tradition which 
emphasises state neutrality on questions of the good: "a liberal society cannot accommodate 
publicly espoused notions of the good" (Taylor 1994 p. 58). Taylor gives Dworkin's distinction 
between a procedural commitment to equal respect and a substantive view about the ends of life 
as an example of this view; we have discussed others above. Taylor considers that such an 
interpretation of the Kantian tradition cannot provide much room for recognition of difference. 
But, he argues, the Quebeckers who espoused the collective good of preserving French culture 
can also make a case from within the liberal tradition. 
Such a model allows that a particular good may become a matter of public policy if the nature of 
the good requires that it be sought in common. The preservation and renewal of cultural 
traditions in Western societies may be seen as such goods. In this context the defining 
characteristic of a liberal society is how it treats its minorities; does it accord to them the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the liberal tradition, "rights to life, liberty, due process, free 
speech, free practice of religion and so on" (1992 p. 59). In recent times, the list of'liberties' has 
been greatly expanded by the process of constitutional review. Taylor's model depends on a 
distinction between fundamental liberties and those which are important but revocable if public 
policy provides an adequate reason for doing so. In the case in question the 'adequate reason' is 
cultural survival: 
They [i. e. forms of liberalism which recognise collective goals] are willing to weigh the 
importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the importance of cultural 
survival, and sometimes opt in favour of the latter. (Taylor 1994 p. 61) 
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If such a position puts limits on the goods of liberalism, represented by limiting the expansion 
areas of uniformity and liberty created by constitutional review, then so too are other goods 
limited by the need to sustain a liberal polity. As Galston, who presents an argument with many 
similarities to Taylor's, writes: 
In the very act of sustaining diversity, liberal unity circumscribes diversity. It could not be 
otherwise. (Galston 1991 p. 4) 
What are the implications of this form of liberalism for The Satanic Verses controversy? Taylor 
seems to suggest that liberal diversity cannot include Islamic views on the relation between 
politics and religion (1994 p. 62). But he does not consider how Muslim appeals expressed in 
terms of the politics of recognition should be viewed within the framework that he has developed. 
The situation of the Quebeckers differs from British Muslims in several respects. The latter do 
not constitute a majority in any significant political unit, and therefore are not in a position to 
legislate. The latter are also a religious group rather than simply a cultural group. Yet for both 
groups the issue of survival of a way of life is felt to be at stake by some within each community. 
In specific terms, should certain forms of insults against or portrayal of Islam be prohibited on 
the grounds of 'recognition', that is because the public reputation and self-image of a minority 
group may be damaged? Casting the net wider, does the issue of survival provide a legitimisation 
for Muslim schools? After all, a presupposition of liberalism as defined above8 is that liberal 
societies can provide circumstances in which such communities can prosper, not become extinct 
or be driven underground. 
The merit of a scheme like Taylor's or Galston's is that by removing the myth of liberal neutrality 
and (in Galston's case) providing an account of liberal virtues, they create a position from which 
liberals can enter into negotiation with non-liberals from the perspective that both of them have a 
territory to defend. Paradoxically, this may enable Muslims and liberals to come closer to a 
shared viewed of controversial situations. For example, Taylor writes: 
as many Muslims are well aware, Western liberalism is not so much an expression of a 
secular, post religious outlook that happens to be popular among Western intellectuals as a 
more organic outgrowth of Christianity - at least as seen from the alternative vantage point of 
Islam. The division of church and state goes back to the earliest days of Christian civilisation. 
The early forms of separation were very different from ours, but the basis was laid for 
modem developments. The very term secular was originally part of the Christian vocabulary. 
(Taylor 1994 p. 62) 
Here Taylor is able to come to an appreciation of Muslim objections to liberal claims to 
8i. e. as "an account of the manner in which diverse moral communities can coexist within a single legal community' (Galston 1991 p. 45). 
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neutrality. In doing so he is exercising what Maclntyre considers to be a virtue: a sense of one's 
own tradition. Maclntyre insists this is not to be confused with "conservative antiquarianism": 
It is rather the case that an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those 
future possibilities which the past has made available to the present. Living traditions, just 
because they continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate and 
determinable character, in so far as it possesses any, derives from the past. (1985 p. 223) 
It is from the exercise and development of this kind of virtue, a virtue which can be shared both 
by Galston and Taylor's versions of liberalism and at least some parts of Islamic tradition, that a 
mutual understanding which can form the basis of shared arrangements can develop. However, 
this virtue involves not just a threat to liberal pretensions to neutrality, but also to fundamentalist 
versions of Islam which hold that it is possible to reproduce the life of the first Medinan ummah 
(community) without reference to intervening history. Such a return to roots without a sense of 
tradition betrays its modernity, in so far as modernity's social projects have attempted to proceed 
from universal foundations to universal ends, bypassing historical contingency. 
For Maclntyre this historical amnesia is both dangerous and destructive. It is a symptom of a 
culture in which moral life has become disembedded from social life, it is the source of a loss of 
coherence in moral life, and is destructive of a proper sense of moral responsibility. He attacks 
modem individualism in the following terms: 
From the standpoint of modem individualism I am what I choose to be. I can always, if I 
wish to, put in question what are taken to be merely contingent features of my social 
existence. ... 
I may be legally a citizen of a certain country; but I cannot be held responsible 
for what my country does or has done unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such 
a responsibility. Such individualism is expressed by those modern Americans who deny any 
responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black Americans, saying 'I never owned any 
slaves'. ... the 
Englishman who says '1 never did any wrong in Ireland; why bring up that old 
history as though it had something to do with me? ' or the young German who believes that 
being born after 1945 means that what Nazis did to Jews has no moral relevance to his 
relationship to his Jewish contemporaries, exhibit the same attitude, ... according to which the 
self is detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses. (1985 pp. 220-1) 
Maclntyre's argument is not simply that we should learn the lessons of history - as if history was 
something we could detach ourselves from - but rather, more radically, that every aspect of our 
being is shaped by the history of our tradition. In a way this may seem obvious, and yet in an age 
in which rapid technological change means that the knowledge of our parents or grandparents 
seems of no more use than nostalgia, it runs deeply against the grain. Technological change is 
only one of a mass of reasons why this is so; 'modern individualism' is another, changing child 
rearing patterns, where children grow up apart from their grandparents, is another. The point is 
that without this sense of being part of an unfolding, formed but not yet determined history, 
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liberalism has little chance of being able to comprehend, let alone recognise, the claims of 
traditional minority groups in so far as these are articulated in terms of their own traditions. 
At 3.2 we considered John Patten's claim that Rushdie's freedom of expression and Muslim 
freedom to protest must both be permitted to maintain freedom and democracy. This argument 
rests on the claim of the liberal state to arbitrate' neutrally between different conceptions of the 
good. Yet on closer inspection liberal theorists proved unable to justify this claim to neutrality, 
turning instead to a claim for the moral superiority of liberalism based on the notion of autonomy. 
This notion also turned out to be culturally specific, and to embody the experience of Western 
history, a history in which competing religious convictions have caused so much bloodshed. Thus 
it has been seen that the development of the virtue of autonomy sprang from European attempts 
to deal with Christian pluralism, and in so far as it brings the wisdom of this experience to bear 
on contemporary pluralism, autonomy merits consideration. More compellingly, however, from 
the standpoint of traditional minorities coming to terms with living in western cultures, autonomy 
reflects the social and economic conditions of the West, and is present in powerful discourses to 
the extent that justifications in other terms are unlikely to get much of a hearing. 
There are therefore strong reasons for traditional minorities to come to terms with Western 
prizing of autonomy. Yet images of autonomy as a kind of Cartesian detachment are misleading. 
Common western discourse turns out to lack the reflective self-justification prized by 
philosophers. Reason, rather, comes embedded in cultural forms, and autonomy is more 
accurately viewed as dialectic between reflection and embeddedness; autonomy is always 
contingent on heteronomy. Unbridled cultural and religious iconoclasm therefore cannot be 
justified by appeals to autonomy. 
A new conception of autonomy as a reflectiveness-embeddedness dialectic can be developed using 
Maclntyre's idea of narrative identity. However, the crisis precipitated in social sciences by 
recognition that the old concept of autonomy is unsustainable has led to a rift between 
practitioners in this field who abandon legislative claims, 9 and political theorists who remain tied 
to making such claims. This rift means that while traditional minorities can make a good claim 
within western discourse for a modified conception of autonomy, conditions for its reception 
90n the abandonment of legislative claims by social scientists Bauman writes: 
If the legislative role is retained by the new vision, it is confined to intra-communal territory 
always acutely aware of the limits of its application ... either the very possibility of extra- territorial claims is denied, or the impotence of reason in the face of power-supported tradition 
is recognised; in both cases the effort to invalidate alternative forms of life, positive ideologies, 
cultures etc. as erroneous, biased or otherwise inferior has been all but abandoned. (1992 p. 19) 
By contrast Maclntyre argues that such judgements continue to be made tacitly, and that there are 
grounds for making such judgements (1971p. 244-259; and below Chapter 4). 
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appear unpromising. Nor is such inter-disciplinary division the only obstacle facing the advocacy 
of this reconceived autonomy. We have seen that for Fitzmaurice traditional minorities begin to 
satisfy conditions of autonomy when they enter debate, specifically reflexive self-justification, 
with Westerners. This justification of Islamic practices using the terms of liberal discourse has, 
as we have already seen, been practised by Muslims who have sought to justify their case against 
The Satanic Verses in terms of freedom of religion, equality before the law, and, drawing on 
liberalism's Christian roots, blasphemy. In more sophisticated form it is practised by intellectuals 
such as Akhtar and Mernissi, as we saw briefly in Chapters 1 and 2, and shall see again in 
Chapter 5 below. There is a methodological parallel between these practices and those of post- 
colonial writers, both using Western discourses to legitimate the claims of minority or 
subordinate groups in global society. 
However, an open question remains as to how far traditional minorities can adopt modern (and, in 
the West and increasingly across the world, at least among the economically successful, liberal) 
discursive practices without compromising their integrity, or corroding their traditionality. We 
have seen that autonomy is a culturally specific virtue, and reflexive self-justification is a 
practice associated with a particular modern form of society. How far, then, can traditional 
minorities adopt this practice without threatening the integrity of their culture? Can such 
minorities pick and choose from the West, even something so pervasive as a form of rationality, 
and retain essential elements of their cultural complex? Or will their religion and culture become 
just window dressing for an essentially Western product? 
Implicit in many liberal claims, whether Raz's "no other way to prosper" or Fitzmaurice's 
appropriation of Maclntyre's epistemological crisis, is the claim that the way of life which 
sustains the value of autonomy is corrosive of heteronomy. In this situation minority (I mean 
subordinate) cultures must adapt to the dominant mode of life, including adopting its mode of 
reasoning, or perish. We have seen that exaggerated contrasts between heteronomy and autonomy 
undergird such claims, at least in part, but the challenge, if less dogmatically asserted, remains; 
what kind of accommodation can traditional or religious beliefs afford to make with modernity? 
One kind of answer to this question would be to argue that a particular kind of highly reflexive 
rationality is specific to modem societies, and is highly corrosive of traditional forms of 
legitimisation. For example, Milbank argues that traditions which enter into reflexive justification 
"betray an alienation from the seamless narrative succession of tradition that never felt the need 
for dialogical self-justification" (1990b p. 178). But is this diagnosis correct? Or have cultures in 
encounter always produced syntheses analogous to the products of the juxtaposition of Western 
and other cultures today? In Chapter 1 (1.13) it was suggested that it is better to understand 
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heightened reflexivity as occurring whenever cultural systems interact in such a way the 
difference cannot be resolved as social stratification, with the modem conditions as but an 
extreme and prolonged example of such a situation. In Chapter 4 it will be argued that 
Maclntyre's conception of epistemological crisis enables such conditions to be understood as 
normal phases in the life of traditions, but that order may be achieved in their midst without 
social stratification by reinterpreting hierarchy in terms of values, drawing on the tradition of 
virtue ethics. But before examining MacIntyre's ideas, to do justice to liberal responses to 
plurality it is necessary to consider another defence of a universal morality along liberal, Kantian 
lines - that found in the later work of Jürgen Habermas. 
3.6. Habermas' Communicative Ethics 
Habermas' ethics is understood not to be contingent on particular culturally rooted practices, but 
rather founded on a kind of reciprocity implicit in the fundamental processes of communication. 
Thus as White writes of Habermas' theory: 
Reciprocity is ... a viewpoint not tied to any particular culture or 
historical period, but rather 
is available to all actors, and as such, it can always provide a potential consensual standard 
for conflict resolution. (1988 p. 86) 
Habermas provides new arguments for sustaining the liberal distinction between and preference 
for the right over the good. It has been argued that such an distinction depends upon the false 
premise of liberal neutrality, in particular the judicial neutrality of the state and the rational 
neutrality of the autonomous individual. Because liberal neutrality fails, it is only possible to 
build practices on the basis of particular conceptions of the good, sustained by traditions; any 
distinction between the right and the good is therefore a pragmatic rather than logical one, the 
'right' defining the boundaries within which the state will enforce its conception of the good, 
beyond which traditions may compete. Civic education in this context involves an initiation into 
those substantive virtues promoted by the state to support public life: into those duties and that 
awareness of rights needed to be a competent citizen. 
But if Habermas is correct and a universal morality is implicit in spoken communication, then 
there is an alternative source of a minimal morality which consists of the right as opposed to the 
good, Moralität as opposed to Sittlichkeit. Although Habermas allows that this minimal morality 
must be filled out by substantive ethical traditions, his theory would place civic and moral 
education on a fundamentally different footing, which may well have implications for 
programmes of civic education, in particular circumscribing the role of traditions within them. 
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The claim for universality can be expressed in foundationalist or non-foundationalist forms. In its 
foundationalist form, historically the dominant one, reason proceeds from premises which can 
also be universally agreed, premises which can be expressed as propositions. However, the 
difficulty of stating these premises has led many to abandon that task, but some maintain 
nonetheless that rationality is universal. Such a position is taken by Habermas (White 1988 p. 
129), for whom it has great ethical significance, since he argues that without reason to adjudicate 
in a society with competing conceptions of the good there is no hope for justice: 
Under modem conditions, philosophy can no longer stand in judgement over the multiplicity 
of individual life projects and collective forms of life, and how one lives one's life becomes 
the sole responsibility of socialised individuals themselves ... 
Hence, what is capable of 
commanding universal assent becomes restricted to the procedure of rational will formation. 
(Habermas 1993 p. 151) 
Habermas makes a distinction between two kinds of rationality - instrumental and 
communicative. Instrumental rationality is that which links goals, means and ends; it is problem- 
solving rationality. It can be exercised individually or by groups, but in each case its focus is the 
goal oriented subject, exemplified in scientific method and bureaucratic procedure. Its role has 
been greatly extended in modernity, where its 'adiaphorising' consequences have been condemned 
by Bauman (1.13). But where for Bauman instrumental reason is reason, and hence "morality is 
not safe in the hands of reason" (1993), for Habermas reason is also communicative, and here lies 
the hope of ethics. 
For Habermas all conversation, or 'speech-acts, rest on a certain kind of reciprocal trust, which 
cannot be broken without self-contradiction. This trust has to do with the necessary conditions for 
sustaining interaction in community; these are that speech-acts are intentional and that claims 
made could be verified if necessary. To enter into conversation is to depend upon the normative 
structure implied in these conditions. These obligations of conversation cannot be rescinded in 
the same way as a specific moral principle: 
An agent who is part of ongoing contexts of communicative action commits a performative 
contradiction if he denies that he is accountable for the normative claims his actions raise. 
(White 1988 p. 51) 
While countless exceptions (deliberate deception, genuine mistakes, irony, sarcasm) can be 
invoked where such reciprocity is violated, Habermas argues that these are all parasitic upon the 
'moral capital' of the "speech-act immanent obligation". The use of this image (i. e. 'moral capital') 
indicates the parallel between the role of communicative action in sustaining morality for 
Habermas, and the role of tradition in Maclntyre. What Habermas in effect asserts is that every 
speech community is a teleological community aimed at the goal of continuing social interaction, 
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and there is a certain minimal ethics implied in the sustaining of any such community. Thus 
Habermas' speech communities can be seen as traditions without a history or a future - except 
that of ongoing communication. Stripped of all particular content, the model is held to be 
universally valid. 
This is an intriguing proposal, but questions arise over just what is universalisable from this 
model, particularly the sense of reciprocity implied in communicative action, and hence about the 
kind of ethics which can legitimately be built upon it. My argument is that Habermas insinuates 
a sense of reciprocity which is not, in fact, implicit in the minimal communication community he 
postulates. As a result he deduces a fuller minimum morality from his model than I think he is 
entitled to claim, and the shortfall suggests that one cannot relegate substantive ethical traditions 
to the secondary role to which he assigns them. 
Habermas claims that the structure of mutual recognition of validity claims is one which implies 
reciprocity in the sense of the reversibility of moral claims; thus rules I apply to you can also 
apply to me, the claims I make of you, you can also make of me. Yet there seem to be few 
situations of such precise equality in real relationships; role and context would seem to define the 
nature of mutual recognition, and reciprocity with the connotation of reversibility need not be 
implied. He does recognise that not all relationships are fully reciprocal (i. e. reversible), but 
argues that there is a certain symmetry ("incomplete reciprocity") which in some sense anticipates 
full reciprocity, which is premised on equality and reversibility. For example, consider the 
following passage: 
In communicative action a relationship of at least incomplete reciprocity is established with 
the interpersonal relation between the parties involved. Two persons may stand in an 
incompletely reciprocal relationship insofar as one may do or expect x only to the extent that 
the other may do or expect y (e. g. teacher/pupil, parent/child). Their relationship is 
completely reciprocal if both may do or expect the same thing in comparable situations (x = 
y) (e. g. the norms of civil law). In a now famous essay Alvin Gouldner speaks of the norm of 
reciprocity which underlies all interactions ... This expression is not entirely apt, since 
reciprocity is not a norm but is fixed in the general structures of all interaction. (Habermas 
1979 p. 88) 
My disagreement here is perhaps small, but significant. If reciprocity is understood in the weak 
sense of common recognition of social norms by participants in conversations, then the claim is 
acceptable. But Habennas seems to want to make the stronger claim that this kind of 
recognition is an incomplete version of full reversibility and equality. My argument is that there is 
nothing intrinsic to the structure of communication which entitles Habermas to make this move; 
smooth and sustainable communication is not dependent on equality but on mutual recognition of 
common norms. Habermas' decision to assert that reversible moral obligations, rather than 
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mutually recognised but different ones, are a fuller realisation of the implicit telos of all 
communication communities springs from elsewhere - from an Enlightenment narrative - not from 
the universal conditions of communicative interaction. 
The identification of responsibility with a strong (reversible) notion of reciprocity is also at the 
root of Bauman's objection to Habermas' "tireless endeavour" (1993 n. 30 pp. 220-1). Instead, 
Bauman takes his moral cue from Levinas, whose concept of faciality is radically asymmetrical 
(1.13 above). But so too are the ethics of many traditions; pre-modern Christianity and Islam for 
example. There is no reason why the mutual recognition of claims implicit in a hierarchically 
ordered society should be any less compatible with the viability of speech communities than 
Habermas' reversible reciprocity. 
The differences in notions of reciprocity (mutual recognition of norms, reversibility) may become 
clearer if we consider the kind of claims Habermas makes on the basis of his minimal morality or 
"discourse ethics". 10 Habermas' model provides "discursive constraints on compromise" between 
rival ethical traditions, rather than actually leading to particular solutions, or offering specific 
proposals itself. In this sense it is a valuable conceptual resource for the model proposed here, 
which likewise tries to provide a framework within which competing claims can be considered 
rather than offering a theory which tries to solve all the problems itself, surely a necessary feature 
of a proposal for a democratic society and in an age which has lost faith in the modern project of 
social engineering (Bauman 1991). What, then, are the constraints imposed by discourse ethics? 
White compares Habermas' position with JL Mackie's "simple contractarianism" (in Habermas 
1989 p. 76), in which different parties simply bargain without any constraints on the processes of 
negotiation. In the Habermasian model however: 
... the 
discursive emphases on procedural equality, participation, non-deception and non- 
manipulation provide criteria in relation to which compromises must be called to account. 
(White 1988 pp. 76-7) 
The understanding of reciprocity as mutual recognition of social norms would, I think, also 
preclude deception and manipulation; to participate in a speech community is to recognise its 
rules, even if these are sometimes violated. On these lines, a minimal account of participation is 
also possible. But to insist on procedural equality as a basic premise of communication seems 
plainly to import culturally specific values into a purportedly universal model. It is as if the 
Enlightenment lay hidden in every utterance of humanity from the dawn of time. 
10The use of the term 'discourse ethics' for a minimal morality is somewhat confusing given Habermas' Moralität/Sittichkeit distinction between morality and ethics, but he retains the term because its use has become established. 
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The model does permit, as would Raz's (1986) voluntaristic utopia, that people can voluntarily 
enter into unequal social relations, but they must be free to choose to do so. But this is to miss the 
point that the kind of individual who makes such a choice is clearly a particular kind of socially 
disembedded subject, a subject for whom the telos of a community is already subordinate to 
individual autonomy. Habermas' attachment to this Enlightenment narrative is further evidenced 
in the relation of his theory to Kohlberg's theory of moral development. The modem notion of 
emancipation, of humanity developing from the particular to the universal via the employment of 
a monolithic reason, is in Kohlberg's model inscribed on the moral development of every 
individual (White 1988 pp. 66-8). 
But if part of the structure of negotiation imposed by Habermas is rejected, what constraints on 
negotiation does a model of traditions offer beyond simple contractarianism? The aspects of 
discourse ethics implied by recognition of social norms (i. e. non-deception, non-manipulation, a 
weak notion of participation) have been accepted. However, the model holds that the obligations 
imposed by speech communities cannot be separated from the history and telos of those 
communities. The force of Wittgenstein's remarks on the impossibility of reducing language to 
simple rules applies here; the obligations implied in language cannot be separated from the 
subtleties of performance and the 'depth' of context (Monk 1990). As Alexander (1985) writes in 
his critique of Habermas: 
there is an inevitable investment in the world of things and the world of ideas which has some 
kind of dogmatic, uncritical status ... there seems to 
be abundant evidence that modems still 
seek to understand the contingency of everyday life in terms of narrative traditions whose 
simplicity and resistance to change make them hard to distinguish from myths. (Alexander 
1985 p. 420) 
The constraints imposed by a model of traditions in interaction relate to the teleological 
orientation of traditions. The burden of proof placed on any agreement between traditions is to 
show how the compromise reached relates to the teloi of the communities involved. This needs to 
be considered in the context of a fuller account of the relations between practices, the unity of an 
individual life and the virtues, which must wait until the next chapter. However, for now it can be 
noted that this larger perspective of the telos of a tradition cuts out the possibility of short-term 
interests dominating, as in a contractarian model. By drawing attention to the larger bodies of 
tradition to which living communities belong it also brings history into focus, and thus raises 
questions of relationships of power between traditions. 
A model of which understands liberalism as a tradition, indeed as the tradition which 
predominates in the cast of modem institutions and economic arrangements, would encourage a 
greater awareness of ends sought and responsibilities implicit in rights, rather than purely 
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negative freedom. Such an understanding also opens up the path to a deeper liberal understanding 
of other traditions, as well as rendering liberalism in a form in which its morality becomes 
comprehensible to those anchored in such traditions. Thus such a model provides a basis for 
communication in a plural society, which Habermas' discourse ethics cannot. However, if we are 
using 'tradition' in Maclntyre's sense, it must be recognised that it is not straightforwardly 
possible to identify liberalism as a tradition. To consider this and other complexities, a more 
detailed consideration of the work of Alasdair Maclntyre will now be presented. 
Chapter 4: 
Maclntyre and Tradition 
4.1 Introduction: Maclntyre's Early Work. 
In Chapter 1 (1.6) MacIntyre's concept of tradition was introduced as a way of thinking 
through problems thrown up by cultural difference, intellectual incommensurability and 
political and social co-existence. MacIntyre challenges the classic Enlightenment dichotomies 
of reason/tradition and fact/value by arguing that "all reasoning takes place within the context 
of some traditional mode of thought" (1985 p. 221); all facts are comprehensible only within 
a prior evaluative framework. However, this refutation of Enlightenment absolutism does not 
entail an all-embracing relativism; rather, reasoned exchange between traditions becomes 
possible under certain historical conditions. Nor does it involve the levelling of knowledge 
claims across all fields of enquiry; for example, and particularly in his earlier work, 
MacIntyre stresses the difference between the status of knowledge in the natural and social 
sciences (1971,1973). 
The preceding chapter (3.5) has elaborated on the significance of Maclntyre's insistence on 
examining the tradition-location of argument by considering liberal accounts of cultural 
minorities. In spite of a rhetoric of equality and neutrality, such accounts have been shown to 
presuppose and promote the culturally specific Western value of autonomy. 
Judging by the quantity of material published in response, Maclntyre's most influential work 
has been After Virtue (1985). 1 think it is also possible to argue that this is the central work in 
his 'canon', both because it draws on previous work to present a startling new thesis, and 
because it sets the agenda for his subsequent publications. I shall therefore make After Virtue 
central to my presentation of Maclntyre's work in this section, drawing on earlier and later 
works and secondary materials to provide a context for and to develop issues raised within it. 
Maclntyre began his career as a Christian philosopher engaged in dialogue with Marxism. He 
appears to have been drawn to both because: 
Christianity like Marxism is a form of praxis, i. e. a unity of theory and practice and hence 
tying thought or commitment of a morally imperative kind to actions in the world. (McMylor 
1994 p. 10) 
In his first published work Marxism: An Interpretation (1953)1 this attraction to praxis is justified 
in Christian theological terms, indeed through his reading of the parable of the sheep and the 
goats (Mt. 25: 31-46). MacIntyre derives five main points from the parable: societies and not just 
individuals (and hence, for my purposes 'public space') are to be redeemed; the reality of evil; it 
I Out of print: cited in McMylor 1994 pp. 1 and 176. 
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is for God alone, not humanity to make judgements about the salvation of individuals; humanity 
should show mercy in practical ways - for it is in the form of those in need that we encounter God 
in this world (McMylor 1994 p. 7). Maclntyre retains this early conviction of the fundamental 
unity of thought and action embodied in social context throughout his work. Thus McMylor 
comments: 
almost always in MacIntyre's work it is the holding in tension of the relationship between the 
internal content of the argument and the surrounding social world which is vital for the 
development of the position. (1994 p. 31) 
In the sixties much of Maclntyre's work concerned the credibility of religious belief and practice 
in the contemporary context. Thus in 1963 he described John Robinson's Honest to God as: 
a form of practical atheism, for it clothes ordinary liberal forms of life with the romantic 
unreality of a catacombic vocabulary. (1971, p. 19) 
McMylor comments: "At this stage then obviously Maclntyre was not any sort of orthodox 
Christian" (1994 p. 41), but I suggest quite the contrary: seeing Christian faith as a form of life 
Maclntyre rejects forms of theology which simply clothe secular ideas and legitimate secular 
practices in the language of Christian devotion; or in this case an amalgam of Christian piety and 
existentialist philosophy. I suggest that after the 1960s Maclntyre backs away from explicitly 
theological formulations because he finds the paths taken by contemporary theologians 
increasingly incredible; either because, in the case of liberal theology, it is difficult to distinguish 
in substance from secular liberalism, or because of a retreat into a Wittgensteinian fideism which 
fails to connect with social context (McMylor 1994 pp. 33-5). A third Christian response, which 
Maclntyre identifies with TS Eliot and the Tractarians, is to attempt to appeal to elements of the 
past embedded in the present in order to build something new; McMylor adds the names of CS 
Lewis, GK Chesterton and Maclntyre himself to this list (1994 pp. 35-6). It is in this context that 
Maclntyre's present commitment arises; this is to an Augustinian-Thomist form of Christianity 
and its institutionalisation in the Catholic church (McMylor 1994 p. 174). 
MacIntyre's method - and it is very largely his method and its implications that I am 
interested in appropriating and developing - is one which combines insights from history 
(especially the history of science), philosophy and social science. In works prior to After 
Virtue, including A Short History of Ethics (1967a), Secularisation and Moral Change 
(1967b) and Against the Self Images of the Age (1971), he presents an interdisciplinary 
approach to understanding ethics in historical and social context, and argues against the 
academic isolation and ahistorical approach of much moral philosophy. 
2 This early approach 
is well illustrated in the second of these works. 
In Secularisation and Moral Change (1967b) Maclntyre argues that economic and social 
change made the claims of any one group in society to represent the whole of society 
2He makes these points himself in the preface to After Virtue (1985 p. 1). 
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implausible, and that this underlies both the decline in religious practice and the 
fragmentation of moral discourse observable in England since the early nineteenth century. 
The persistence of residual religious practice amongst the working class is explained in terms 
of the absence of an emergent coherent secular alternative, and amongst the middle and upper 
classes as due to insulation in some sectors from the impact of social change. This argument 
fits the evidence that decline in religious observation preceded the dissemination and 
assimilation of intellectual critiques of religion (for example the public impact of biblical 
criticism, Darwinism or Marxism). The differential impact of urbanisation and 
industrialisation on the United States is understood to be due to the formation of a civil 
religion which provided moral coherence, although at the expense of theological content; the 
ideology of 'one nation under God', he argues, takes precedence over the particular content of 
religion (1967b pp. 32-4,60-3). The formation of a secularised civil religion is seen to be 
facilitated by appeal to religion providing a common link between diverse settler groups and 
the creation of a shared egalitarian ethos arising out of the experience of the American 
Revolution, an experience which preceded class differentiation caused by the industrial 
revolution. Thus incomplete secularisation and European-American differences are explained 
in one neat thesis which brings together a diversity of evidence and disciplinary perspectives. 
This summary suggests a functionalist and reductionist account of religion, and indeed it 
comes from a period when he appears to have been distanced from Christianity (McMylor 
1994 p. 41). This situation was to alter in the 1980s when, for reasons which will become 
apparent in considering After Virtue and Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (1988), he 
became convinced that the Thomistic formulation of Aristotelianism provides the most 
coherent response to the moral dilemmas of modernity. However, prior to this period it is 
apparent that he was already committed to a position which sees human understanding as 
inextricably tied to context, a position which may be described as 'historicist', and yet avoids 
the reductionist and relativist tendencies often associated with such accounts. His 
development of this position can be seen in several of the essays in Against the Self-Images of 
the Age, (1971), and can be illustrated by considering the account of the relation between 
rationality and context in "Rationality and the Explanation of Action". 
The main thesis developed here is a defence of rationality as an explanatory concept in 
sociology, a thesis which in turn entails that sociology is necessarily evaluative, and cannot be 
'value-free' or 'neutral'. In reaction to the intellectual imperialism of earlier academics those of 
the late '60s (Maclntyre cites HR Trevor-Roper's "The European Witch-Craze" in Religion, 
the Reformation and Social Change) were jettisoning any attempt to make cross-cultural 
judgements about rationality. In response MacIntyre argues that rational and irrational 
thought can be differentiated by reference to the relation between context of production and 
the thought produced. Irrational thinking is that which can be reduced without remainder to a 
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response to context, whereas rational thinking cannot be so reduced, but always requires 
further explanation in terms of the system of thought involved: 
the explanation of rational belief terminates with an account of the appropriate 
intellectual and norms and procedures; the explanation of irrational belief must be in 
terms of causal generalizations which connect antecedent conditions specified in terms of 
social structures or psychological states - or both - with the genesis of beliefs. (1971 p. 
247) 
He argues that even in forms of history and social science which attempt to abandon the 
distinction between rational and irrational thought, such a distinction is made tacitly in the 
explanations of beliefs and behaviour offered. Rationality emerges in this account as a 
function of orderly and consistent relations between agreed terms within a cultural frame of 
reference. Thus: 
... the problem of rationality 
is a problem of the relationship of the beliefs and norms 
which define the roles which structure action in a given social order and the beliefs and 
norms of the agents whose behaviour is characteristically governed or defined by these 
roles. (1973 p. 256) 
Whatever this cultural or historical frame, some agreements across frames about the kind of 
relations between terms which are orderly and consistent are necessary in order to attempt 
any representation of the culture at all. Thus some aspects of rationality are necessarily 
universal: 
To understand what is said in a given culture, we must learn to classify the forms of 
utterance ... 
We shall not be able to do this except on the assumption that the laws of 
logic are embodied in the linguistic practice of the community which we are studying.... 
So far as this element of rationality is concerned, then, there is no question of us judging 
the rationality of alien cultures in terms of our criteria. For the criteria are neither ours 
nor theirs, but simply the criteria, and logic is the inquiry which formulates them. (1973 
pp. 249-50). 
Therefore, Maclntyre distinguishes two elements in rationality. First, the linguistic element: 
the logical foundations of language which are a prerequisite for communication and 
translation. The second element to is specific to genre. Here he cites Mary Douglas' argument 
that the purity and pollution codes of other cultures would be misconstrued as misguided 
health and safety standards; understood as such they are indeed irrational, but in the context 
of comparative anthropology a genre can be identified within which they may be seen as 
rational. Analogously, the author of Genesis 1-3 may be defended from the charge of writing 
poor evolutionary biology because the genre of his writing has been misidentified. But it is 
important to note that he can only be defended form such a charge if we are able to identify 
the rules of the genre of which he is making use, and that even within that genre if he breaks 
those rules in a way which cannot be interpreted as poetic innovation. 
I 
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Maclntyre later develops his account of rationality, especially in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (1988) which will be considered below (4.4), but his early work provides a 
context for understanding the relation between context and thought espoused in After Virtue, 
which can be described as 'historicist'. Maclntyre's historicism fits a more traditional 
definition of the term as the thesis that "human understanding is always a 'captive' of its 
historical situation" (D'Amico in Stern 1994 p. 146) rather than Popper's sense of "an 
approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim" 
(Popper in Stern 1994 p. 158 note 2). It is clear from "Rationality and the Explanation" that 
historicism need not entail reductionism, and hence relativism (for if belief can be reduced to 
context it follows that it will vary as a function of context, the relativist thesis), but 
developing a form of historicism that is resistant to relativist charges is a major achievement 
of After Virtue, and will be of central importance to my deployment of Maclntyre's ideas to 
develop a theory of multiculturalism. The argument developed in After Virtue will now be 
considered. 
4.2 After Virtue: The Failure of the Enlightenment Project 
After Virtue has both an epic sweep and a fastidious grasp of detail. From an apocalyptic 
vision of a civilisation after virtue, 3 we are presented with a survey to witness that this 
apocalypse has already happened, undetected. Whether articulated academically in the 
Cambridge of Moore and Stevenson, or embodied in the management of business and 
bureaucracy which shape our working lives or in the practice of the therapies that play such a 
role in interpreting our private lives, a form of moral theory is overtly or tacitly accepted 
which reduces moral utterance to the statement of personal preference: emotivism. 
4 Yet 
simultaneously we continue to function as if the opposite of emotivism were true: human 
rights, legal systems and the continuation of moral argument itself each presuppose that at 
least a minimal morality can be universally and rationally founded. 
Thus Maclntyre argues that contemporary moral discourse is characterised by two 
contradictory features. Firstly, the sets of moral concepts invoked by different protagonists 
are incommensurable, fundamentally different to one another in ways that cannot be resolved 
within a single conceptual scheme. But secondly, in spite of this diversity, moral arguments 
are presented as if they are supportable by universally recognisable rational arguments. The 
effect of the first feature is to reduce moral discourse to statements of preference, for which 
no reasoning can be provided, and this is the picture of morality represented by emotivism. In 
3"[W]e have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of 
morality" (1985 p. 2). 
4Maclntyre defines emotivism as "the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically 
moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, 
insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. " (1985 pp. 12-13) 
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this account moral language becomes a mask to conceal the expression of essentially 
arbitrary will, as Nietzsche argued; only the moral assumptions and not the arguments of 
emotivists like CL Stevenson (in Maclntyre 1985 pp. 19-20) prevented them from reaching 
Nietzsche's conclusion. 
The second feature, argues Maclntyre, persists as a rhetorical device also unsubstantiated by 
argument; for the presence of the first feature (the continuation of a variety of 
incommensurable moral schemes) already suggests that the project of finding universal 
rational foundations for morality (the 'Enlightenment project') has not succeeded. It is 
possible that such a foundation has been found but is not yet recognised; Maclntyre confronts 
this possibility by addressing the work of some of the most eminent proponents of this 
project: Kant (pp. 43-50), Rawls (pp. 246-252), and also Gewirth's Reason and Morality, 
which he chooses because "it is not only the most recent of such attempts, but also because it 
deals carefully and scrupulously with objections and criticisms that have been made of earlier 
writers" (p. 66). Maclntyre's objection to Gewirth's argument takes the same form as my 
objection to Habermas' theory of communicative action (above 3.6), namely that it illicitly 
imports a specific Enlightenment value and interprets it as universal. Thus where Habermas 
legitimately draws attention to the reciprocity embedded in communication but illicitly 
universalises an egalitarian form of reciprocity, Gewirth legitimately specifies necessary 
conditions for the exercise of rational agency but illicitly insists that the recognition of these 
conditions logically entails the necessity of their protection as rights. As Maclntyre 
comments: 
One reason why claims about goods necessary for rational agency are so different from 
claims to the possession of rights is that the latter in fact presuppose, whereas the former 
do not, the existence of a socially established set of rules. ... 
They are in no way universal 
feature of the human condition. (1985 p. 67) 
We shall deal with the sense in which Kant's arguments are held to fail by Maclntyre below, 
and Rawls has already received consideration independent of Maclntyre (3.3). But 
Maclntyre's central argument for the failure of the Enlightenment project 
5 does not depend on 
a detailed refutation of all foundationalist projects. Rather his argument is that within the 
frame of reference within which it was set up, the Enlightenment project was bound to fail. 
A third feature of contemporary moral discourse noted by Maclntyre is the diverse historical 
origins of the moral schemes invoked in contemporary usage, and here lies a clue to his 
response to the dilemma of contemporary morality. For Maclntyre proceeds to narrate the 
history of the development of the contradiction between the manifest diversity of moral 
schemes and the continued widespread assumption of universal rational foundations as a 
single complex history of the failure of the 'Enlightenment project'. But he does not wish to 
5Maclntyre dates the Enlightenment project between 1630 and 1850 (1985 p. 39). 
115 
argue that all morality is thus groundless, but rather to argue that the attempt to justify 
morality in the Enlightenment project in particular was misconceived. The central problem 
which Maclntyre identifies here is the rejection of certain features of Aristotelian accounts of 
reason and morality. In particular, the Enlightenment emptied reason and morality of 
teleology; thus reason is reduced to calculation and morality to rules. 
This rejection of teleology is traced by Maclntyre to the influence on influential 
Enlightenment thinkers of developments in science and theology in the North European 
intellectual context. For Protestant and Jansenist Catholic theologies reason is seen as so 
tarnished by the Fall that it is incapable of perceiving humanity's true ends; hence the 
foundation for a teleological account of morality is weakened. At the same time, in 
seventeenth century science Aristotelian teleological notions of causality were being 
overturned: 
Reason does not comprehend essences or transitions from potentiality to act; these 
concepts belong to the despised conceptual scheme of scholasticism. Hence anti- 
Aristotelian science sets strict boundaries to the powers of reason. Reason is calculative; 
it can assess truths of fact and of mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm 
of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it must be silent (1985 p. 54) 
Maclntyre traces a history of the influence of this new conception of reason from Pascal to 
Hume to Kant to Kirkegaard. It is the Jansenist Pascal who first recognises the coincidence 
between the instrumental view of reason promoted by experimental science and the 
"Protestant -cum-Jansenist" account of fallen reason (1985 p. 54), and it is in Pascal's 
Pensees that the moral agony of the criterionless self confronted with the external demands of 
divine law receives one of its earliest and most dramatic treatments (1985 p. 40). The effect 
of a purely instrumental understanding of reason promoted by these scientific and theological 
developments was to render a teleological account of reason incredible, and hence to 
undermine faith in reason's capacity to tutor the will, a faith which had underpinned medieval 
Christian, Muslim and Jewish accounts of ethics, each of which derived from the Aristotelian 
threefold account of moral structure (1985 p. 53). The three elements of this structure were: 
untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised- 
its-telos, and the precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the 
other (1985 p. 53) 
The effect of emptying reason of its teleological content was to uncouple the three 
components of this account and displace the second component -a teleological account of 
human nature. Aristotelian moral structure is thus replaced by a two-fold scheme of 
humanity-as-it-is and the need for a rational ethics to police this condition. Thus the 
Enlightenment project is to provide a rational basis for such ethics, without the crucial 
teleological middle term which made sense of its ancestors' formulations (1985 pp. 54-5). 
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Maclnytre sees this as an impossible task, and charts the failure of Hume, which he sees as 
issuing in the recognised criterionless self of Kirkegaard's Enten-Eller (1985 p. 42). 
Maclntyre notes Hume's familiarity with Pascal's writings, and his Calvinist upbringing. For 
Hume it is passion and not reason which drives us to action (1985 p. 48). How, then, to shape 
a rational ethics? Hume can only do so by illicitly imposing without justification a normative 
standard of passions - "those of a complacent heir of the revolution of 1688" (1985 p. 49), 
and excluding other passions (those of Levellers and Catholic ascetics for example) as 
deviant, absurd or criminal (1985 pp. 48-9). 
Unlike Hume, Kant rejects passions as the basis for morality, and instead turns directly to 
reason. Kant argues that only those moral maxims should be admitted which can be 
consistently universalised, which means that we can consistently will that everyone should 
always act on them. However, to maintain those maxims which he wishes to uphold, such as 
'Do not commit suicide' Kant is, according to Maclntyre, forced to resort to: 
notoriously bad arguments, the climax of which is his assertion that any man who wills 
the maxim'To kill myself when the prospects of pain outweigh those of happiness' is 
inconsistent because such willing contradicts an impulse to life planted in all of us. This 
is as if someone were to assert that any man who wills the maxim'Always to keep my 
hair cut short' is inconsistent because such willing 'contradicts' an impulse to the growth 
of hair implanted in all of us. (1985 p. 45) 
The very fact that Kant is forced into special pleading for certain maxims indicates that he is 
already committed to a substantive morality not contingent on the principle of 
universalisability. But not only does the universalisability test fail to pass those maxims 
which Kant wishes to permit, but it permits many which he would wish to exclude as trivial 
or immoral: Maclntyre gives the examples of 'Always eat mussels on Mondays in March' and 
'persecute those who hold false religious beliefs'. MacIntyre argues that the substantive 
morality which Kant is in fact trying to defend is summed up in the maxim: 
Always act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, as an 
end and not a means. (in Maclntyre 1985 p. 46) 
In his attachment to this maxim MacIntyre understands Kant to stand in sharp contrast to 
emotivism and in a long philosophical tradition running back to Plato, all of whom wish to 
make central to ethics a refusal to treat a person as "a mere instrument of my will, without 
any regard for his rationality" (p. 46). But, argues, MacIntyre, without a teleological account 
of human nature binding reason and morality Kant cannot provide reasons for this position. 
Hence the universalisability defence of even this maxim fails, since its opposite can be 
consistently universalised: 
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'Let everyone except me be treated as a means' may be immoral, but it is not inconsistent 
and there is not even any inconsistency in willing a universe of egoists all of whom live 
by this maxim. (1985 p. 46) 
The dilemma presented in Kirkegaard's Enten-Ellen is seen to make sense in the light of the 
failure of such brilliant philosophers as Kant and Hume to secure the Enlightenment project. 
Here ethics is not based on passion or reason but on choice; not a moral choice between good 
and evil but a choice between morality and amorality, represented by the voice 'A' of the 
aesthete commending pleasure and voice 'B' commending morality (1985 p. 42). No reason 
for preferring the one to the other can be given prior to commitment to one or the other. For 
Maclntyre this is only the logical and necessary outcome of a moral tradition stripped of a 
teleological account of human nature. 
Thus the Enlightenment project is seen to fail, and in a culture heavily indebted to the 
Enlightenment its failure appears as the failure of all morality, as Nietzche was thus led to 
argue (Maclntyre 1985 p. 113). 
6 But, argues Maclntyre, the failure of this project should 
rather be seen as a local one with global implications due to the ascendancy of Western 
culture; in particular, the near universal spread of Weberian7 forms of bureaucracy and 
management. However the failure of the Enlightenment project, and even its widespread 
social embodiment, does not mean that all morality has necessarily failed. A return to the 
Aristotelian scheme of the Enlightenment's predecessor culture provides the possibility of 
reuniting reason and morality. To this end Maclntyre begins another history: that of the 
Aristotelian moral tradition from its ancestor in Homeric and urban Greece, through Greek 
tragedy and Plato and Aristotle himself, through its Christian and medieval successors, and 
on to attempt to recover by reflection on this history a historicised version of Aristotelianism. 
Maclntyre's account of the development of the Aristotelian tradition of ethics covers much of 
the same ground as A Short History of Ethics (1967a). However, in After Virtue the use of 
material outside the Greek tradition makes an appearance, and hence an implicit claim to be 
presenting a cross-culturally valid model of the development of moral frameworks may 
perhaps be discerned. 
8 His account of the virtues in heroic societies in both books stresses the 
close connection between social role and morality, the adequacy of the latter corresponding to 
6" It was Nietzsche's historic achievement to understand more clearly than any other philosopher ... 
not only that what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will, 
but also the nature of the problems that this posed for moral philosophy. " 
7Maclntyre argues that one of the consequences of the failure of the Enlightenment project, "belief 
in an irreducible plurality of values" is "an insistent and central Weberian theme" (1985 p. 109). 
The containment of this plurality by management and bureaucracy and the masking of a lack of 
objective foundations by an illusion of 'effectiveness' is what is intended here by "Weberian forms of 
management and bureaucracy". 
8 Certainly a prima facie case might be made for discerning a parallel development between Islamic 
and Christian/post-Christian societies. Pre-Islamic Arabia typifies a heroic society, interrupted by a 
religion which makes universal claims across ethnic boundaries and coincides with urbanisation, 
then encounters and incorporates Aristotelian moral ideas, and is interrupted by the impact of 
modernity. 
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the degree of success in completion of the former. However, this correspondence between 
performance of role and moral adequacy is sometimes threatened even in the telling of the 
stories: in both Homeric epics and some Icelandic sagas a reflective distance from the society 
portrayed permits the perception of moral ambivalence of a kind unavailable to the 
characters: 
To be a suppliant, to be a slave, to be slain on the battlefield is to have been defeated; and 
defeat is the moral horizon beyond which nothing is to be seen, nothing lies. But defeat is 
not the Homeric poet's moral horizon .... 
What the poet of the Iliad sees and his 
characters do not is that winning too may be a form of losing. ... 
In Gilsa Saga 
Sursonnar what the saga writer understands, as his characters do not, is the 
complementary truth of the Iliad: losing on occasion may be a form of winning. (1985 p. 
128) 
Another feature of heroic societies is the correspondence between the natural order and the 
moral order of society. This correspondence is denied by the Sophists, who see ethics as 
relative to social context and real motivation to lie in the 'natural man' (1967a p. 16). In A 
Short History of Ethics Maclntyre argues that the Sophists are mistaken in their identification 
of 'natural man'; for their pre-social man turns out only to be 'heroic man', the moral hero of 
Homeric society out of place in the Greek city state, where social proximity and complexity 
calls for different, gentler virtues to those of the warrior. In general, 'natural man' apart from 
a particular society is a moral fiction, and any tradition which depends on such a character 
stands indicted. This includes any attempt to divine a universal human standpoint beyond all 
culturally particular forms, whether Rawls' occupier of the Original Position, or the 
criterionless self in Kirkegaard's Enten-Eller or later emotivist forms. Here MacIntyre shows 
his early historicist colours: 
What the sophists, and the long tradition which was later to follow them, failed to 
distinguish was the difference between the concept of a man who stands outside and is 
able to question the conventions of some one given social order and the concept of a man 
who stands outside the social order as such. (1967a p. 18) 
However, another, more persuasive representation of moral pluralism is considered in After 
Virtue: that portrayed in the Greek tragedies, especially those of Sophocles. By contrast with 
both Plato and Aristotle, Sophoclean drama portrays conflicts between goods as caused by 
something other than human error, which can therefore be of no value in human learning. In 
Sophoclean drama tragedy lies in the binding claims of conflicting moral goods. Maclntyre 
also sees this view as contrasting with the moral pluralism of modems such as Weber or 
Berlin, because in Sophocles belief in an objective moral order is upheld while it is recognised 
that from a human perspective rival goods cannot be reconciled, whereas in Weber or Berlin 
rival goods are simply incommensurable, and the choice between then ultimately arbitrary. 
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Hence rival moral truths retain authority on a Sophoclean account which are lost in Berlin's 
'agonistic liberalism': 9 
The interest of Sophocles lies in his presentation of a view equally difficult for a Platonist 
or a Weberian to accept. There are indeed crucial conflicts in which different virtues 
appear as making rival and incompatible claims upon us. But our situation is tragic in 
that we have to recognise the authority of both claims. There is an objective moral order, 
but our perceptions of it are such that we cannot bring rival moral truths into complete 
harmony with each other and yet the acknowledgement of the moral order and of moral 
truth makes the kind of choice which a Weber or a Berlin urges on us out of the question. 
For to choose does not exempt us from the authority of the claim which I choose to go 
against (Maclntyre 1985 p. 143). 
It seems to me that Sophoclean tragedy here provides a resource for a theological 
understanding of moral pluralism, one which can accept the force of what Shanks calls 
"negative revelation" (Shanks 1995, especially Chs. 1 and 3). Maclntyre does not forget this 
Sophoclean theme, and argues against Aristotle's view that the conflicts represented in Greek 
tragedies arise solely from individuals' flaws of character, such that the cultivation of the 
appropriate virtues would ultimately remove the occasion for such conflicts. Rather, the 
conflict of good with good which constitutes tragedy arises prior to individual character flaws 
(1985 p. 163). However, such conflict, while tragic, is not meaningless or necessarily 
pointless. Rather, as Maclntyre approvingly cites John Anderson's contention, "it is through 
conflict and sometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are. " 
(1985 p. 164) 
However, it is suggested that Maclntyre has a tendency to suppress this Sophoclean insight in 
works following After Virtue, where the interests of defending what has by then become a 
Thomistic Aristotelianism leads to the suppression of conflicting but genuine moral insights 
in alternative traditions. Nonetheless, recognition of the value of conflict is the one point on 
which Maclntyre disagrees with Aristotle. A second, and it is the first point made by 
Maclntyre in his treatment of Aristotle's account of the virtues in After Virtue, is the former's 
historicism (1985 p. 146). Aristotle saw his own account as so transcending those of his 
predecessors as to render theirs irrelevant. By contrast, on Maclntyre's historicist account, 
tradition "embodies a very unAristotelian theory of knowledge according to which each 
particular theory or set of moral or scientific beliefs is intelligible and justifiable - in so far as 
it is intelligible and justifiable - only as a member of a historical series. " (1985 p. 146). 
Closely connected with this is a third area of disagreement: where Maclntyre stresses the 
relationship between the character of virtues and the narrative form in which they find their 
characteristic expression, no such connection is made by Aristotle. Thus Aristotle's account is 
91 am borrowing this term from Gray (1995a, b), who uses it both to describe Berlin's work in a 
particular (1995a pp. 141-168), and to develop a more general position in dialogue with Berlin 
(1995b pp. 64-86). 
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not only unhistoricised but uncontextualised, in the sense that he offers no theory of the 
relationship between discourse and social context. 
A fourth area of disagreement is over what Maclntyre calls Aristotle's "metaphysical 
biology": the idea that different social classes of people have different inherent natures which 
orients them to different ends. 
10 Hence slaves, women and barbarians are incapable of taking 
part in political life. Thus part of the teleology of Aristotle's ethics is constituted by this 
account of different human natures, hence an alternative ordering principle must be supplied 
if an Aristotelian ethics is to be revived. It will be seen below (7.2) in Milbank's treatment of 
Ruskin that the Christian socialist tradition provides an alternative in the form of a hierarchy 
of values, rather than of people or social groups. 
In spite of these areas of disagreement, Maclntyre argues that many aspects of Aristotle's 
ethics remain cogent, and indeed are essential as a perspective from which to understand what 
has gone awry with modem ethics, and how this might be put right. So what are these 
positive features of Aristotelianism, and how does Maclntyre attempt to reconstruct this 
tradition? 
Aristotle argues that every activity aims at a particular good, and hence defines a'good' as 
that towards which a particular human activity is oriented. The good which we pursue for its 
own sake, and for which we pursue other goods, is the good, which Aristotle calls 
eudaimonia, which might be translated 'happiness' or'flourishing' (Maclntyre 1967a p. 59, 
1985 p. 148). Virtues are those qualities which tend a person toward the telos of eudaimonia, 
vices those qualities which lead him or her away. Hence for Aristotle ethics is the "practical 
science of human happiness in which we study what happiness is, what activities it consists 
in, and how to become happy" (1967a p. 57). Reason can help us to define what happiness is, 
and the cultivation of virtues, which are of two kinds (intellectual, acquired through study, 
and habitual, acquired through practice 1985 p. 154), enables us to transform our human 
nature from its untutored state towards its telos. 
Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of means-end relationship (1985 pp. 148-9). In the first, 
ends can be characterised independent of means, but in the second the means are an intrinsic 
part of the achievement of the ends, and the two cannot be characterised independently of one 
another. 
11 Virtues can be understood as means to the end of the good life for a person only in 
the latter sense: 
10 To grasp this idea it may be helpful to compare it with those of varna and jati ('caste') in relation 
to dharma ('duty', 'order') in Hinduism 
11This second kind of intrinsic means-ends relationship is strikingly illustrated in Gandhi's 
philosophy of peace: 
I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it 
does is permanent. (in Easwaran 1983 p. 43) 
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For what constitutes the good life for a man is a complete human life lived at its best, and 
the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life. Thus we cannot characterise the good for man 
without already having made reference to the virtues. (1985 p. 149) 
A parallel point is Aristotle's distinction between two kinds of pleasure or enjoyment. 
Maclntyre introduces a distinction between internal and external goods to help explain this. 
Internal goods are those which are contingent upon the performance of a particular activity, 
while external goods are unrelated to particular activities. Thus, one can only gain the 
enjoyment from a particularly subtle strategy in chess by being able to play chess to a certain 
level of competence; by contrast the public attention and wealth attained by becoming a chess 
champion could be achieved in many other quite different ways. This former kind of pleasure 
cannot be mapped onto a utilitarian calculus since internal goods are necessarily 
incommensurable - thus an Aristotelian scheme expose the weakness of one of the two major 
moral schemes of modernity (the other being a rights-based morality of laws, 1985 p. 244). 
A further point is that although internal goods are incommensurable, on Aristotle's account 
the virtues promoted by their pursuit are not. Thus the Aristotelian scheme allows for a 
diversity of goods to be pursued within a common framework of virtues. However, a critic 
may argue that this achievement of unity from diversity is possible only at the expense of 
confining difference to practices, in a parallel manner to the confinement of difference to 
private life achieved through the distinction between right and good in liberalism. Whereas the 
latter has been shown to fail because any conception of the right presupposes a particular 
conception of the good, the former is in difficulty if the unity of the virtues can brought into 
question. 
This introduces a fifth point on which Maclntyre dissents from Aristotle (and indeed Aquinas, 
1985 p. 179): the unity of the virtues. Maclntyre agrees that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the virtues: courage, honesty, loyalty and practical intelligence all contribute inter- 
actively to the building and sustaining of community; but he denies that the lack of one or 
some virtues precludes the genuine possession of others. Thus he argues that it would be 
wrong to deny that a Nazi could possess the virtue of courage, and indeed that such denial 
would make the task of moral re-education even more difficult since it implies a denial of any 
point of moral contact. Hence he writes: 
... and conversely: 
Non-violence is like radium in action. An infinitesimal quantity of it embedded in a malignant 
growth acts continuously, silently and ceaselessly until it has transformed the whole mass of 
diseased tissue into a healthy one. Similarly, even a little of true non-violence acts in a silent, 
subtle and unseen way and leavens the whole society. (in Easwaran 1983 p. 156) 
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I take it that if any version of moral Aristotelianism were necessarily committed to a 
strong thesis concerning the unity of the virtues (as not only Aquinas but Aristotle 
himself were) there would be a serious defect in that position. (1985 p. 180) 
This does not in itself deal with a more radical attack on the thesis of the unity of the virtues: 
the possibility that the virtues themselves may be incommensurable. However, we have 
already seen Maclntyre's response to this in his account of Sophoclean tragedy: here he 
expresses a faith that virtues are commensurable but only sub speciae aeternatis, a 
perspective unavailable to us, and hence the ineliminability of tragic conflict, which can 
nonetheless be an occasion for retrospective learning. 
There is another aspect of Aristotle's ethics which can help to counter this defect: that the 
exercise of virtues be seen as part of the unity of an individual life, and that life in turn part of 
the life of the polis. The significance of these two locations for the exercise of the virtues is 
best left until Maclntyre's own position has been more fully spelt out; for this is the context in 
which Maclntyre discusses them, and to which he adds a third, the context of a tradition of 
enquiry. But one aspect requires comment now; to the extent that Aristotle presupposes the 
social environment of the Athenian polis any restated Aristotelianism must be able to provide 
an account of an alternative context for the exercise of the virtues. 
A morality of the virtues has as its counterpart a morality of rules, but in contrast to modem 
ethics preoccupied with the specification of rules in an Aristotelian scheme rules "find their 
place in a larger scheme in which the virtues have the central place" (1985 p. 257). This 
provides the starting point for an Aristotelian critique of the second moral scheme of 
modernity; a rights-based morality of rules. The main purpose of rules in an Aristotelian 
scheme is to prohibit actions which would lead to the breakdown of the moral community: "an 
offence against the laws destroys those relationships which make the common pursuit of the 
good possible" (1985 p. 152). Thus "there is relatively little mention of rules anywhere in 
Ethics" but "Aristotle 
... recognises that 
his account of the virtues has to be supplemented by 
some account, even if a brief one, of those types of action which are absolutely prohibited. " 
(1985 pp. 150-152). 
Maclntyre's account of Aristotle's ethics thus shows up many points of agreement and 
disagreement. Agreement on the characterisation of goods and the common good in relation to 
human goals, on the identity of the common good with the flourishing of persons in 
community, on the centrality of virtues as the means to achieve such goals in so far as means 
are understood as intrinsically related to goals, on the necessity for such a teleological scheme 
to make sense of a morality of rules, and on the role of practical reason in the identification of 
goals and the cultivation of intellectual virtues. He dissents from Aristotle in his rejection of 
the attribution of different essential natures to different kinds of people, in his historicism, in 
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his rejection of a strong thesis of the unity of the virtues, in his view of the necessity of 
tragedy and value of conflict, and in his thesis on the role of narrative in relation to virtue. 
However, true to his historicist thesis Maclntyre does not seek to build directly form 
Aristotle, but rather from the Aristotelian tradition, whose strength lies not only in Aristotle's 
original formulation of his ideas but also in its ability to provide a cogent account of the 
relation between reason, ethics and society in a great variety of historical and cultural 
contexts. In particular he turns to Aristotelianism in its medieval re-discovery and 
manifestations, a context in which, as Europe emerged from the fragmentation of the Dark 
Ages, it was necessary to forge unity out of diversity: 
The moralisation of medieval society lies precisely in creating general categories of right 
and wrong and general modes of understanding right and wrong - and out of them a code 
of law - which could replace the particular bonds and fractures of an older paganism. 
(1985 p. 166). 
A central intellectual problem for adapting Aristotelianism to a Christian context is to relate a 
morality of virtues to a morality of implacable divine law (1985 p. 170). Maclntyre sees Alan 
of Lille (writing in the 1170s) as relating the two by seeing pagan virtues as important 
resources for solving political and social problems, especially in mediating between "the 
particularist claims of the intense local rural community" and the "universal claims of the 
church" (1985 p. 171). Theologically: 
The virtues of which the pagan writers treat are useful qualities in creating and sustaining 
earthly social order; charity can transform them into genuine virtues, the practice of 
which leads to man's supernatural and heavenly end. (1985 p. 171) 
In this Alan anticipates Aquinas' re-orientation of Aristotelianism within a Christian 
framework, which Aquinas was able to achieve using newly translated works of Aristotle 
some ninety years later. 
12 However, in After Virtue Maclntyre does not consider Aquinas' 
work in any depth, emphasising rather the great "variety and untidiness" (1985 p. 180) of 
medieval uses of Aristotle over Aquinas' systematisation. In this untidiness he finds several 
common themes which he sees as marking an advance on Aristotle, the chief of which is an 
appreciation of history, the product of the interaction between Aristotelianism and Jewish, 
Christian and Islamic traditions with their shared sense of salvation history, and which gave 
the cultures influenced by them a sense of their own history: 
... the medieval vision 
is historical in a way that Aristotle's could not be. It situates our 
aiming at the good not just in specific contexts - Aristotle situates that aiming within the 
polls - but in contexts which themselves have a history. ... 
The virtues are then on this 
medieval view those qualities which enable men to survive evils on their historical 
journey. (1985 p. 176) 
12Aquinas wrote Summa contra gentiles between 1259 and 1264 (Kung 1994 p. 100). 
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Maclntyre emphasises the variety of influences on medieval thought, including another 
inheritance from classical culture - Stoicism. In Stoicism the many virtues are replaced by the 
one virtue of living in conformity with the cosmic order. Right action is divorced from the 
achievement of any goal, and so the teleology of Aristotelianism is absent. In A Short History 
of Ethics Maclntyre identifies Stoicism as a doctrine of the Roman upper classes (1966 p. 
108); in After Virtue he sees it as a "permanent moral possibility" in the Western tradition 
whenever the kind of context which can provide "an intelligible relationship between the 
virtues and the law" disappears, as when the city state was replaced first by the Macedonian 
kingdom and later the Roman imperium. In such a fractured, plural setting there "would be no 
genuine shared common good" (1985 pp. 169-70). It is ironic in this context that Aristotle 
tutored Alexander the Great, who extended the Macedonian kingdom to fonn the largest 
Empire the world has ever seen. For it was the conditions created by Alexander which led to 
the divorce between virtue and law, and to a morality of laws and a concept of duty divorced 
from teleology which runs from the Stoics through Kant13 to Rawls, and which Milbank 
summarises as the "Stoic-liberal-nihilist tendency" (1990a p. 330). 
From medieval Europe, Maclntyre charts the fate of the virtues in modernity, pointing out 
that in the absence of a teleological scheme they are reduced to qualities for the cultivation or 
suppression of the passions. He identifies in Jane Austen the last bearer of a teleological 
scheme of virtues, arguing that the restricted social world of Austen's novels reflects the 
restriction of social contexts in modernity within which a moral scheme in the Aristotelian 
sense can be sustained: 
Morality in Jane Austen is never the mere inhibition and regulation of the passions ... 
Morality is rather meant to educate the passions... Jane Austen is in a crucial way the last 
representative of the classical tradition [of the virtues]. (1985 pp. 241-3) 
From this history Maclntyre then sets about constructing his own position. He accepts that 
the virtues enumerated by Aristotle are very different to, and indeed contradict, those listed by 
medieval Christian Aristotelians (e. g. humility), 14 and that the medievalists' virtues are 
different again to those found in Austen (e. g. 'constancy', 1985 pp. 241-2). However, he 
discerns continuities which enable one to identify these virtues as part of a historical series, 
and abstracts from this history a scheme which provides a restatement of Aristotelian ethics 
13As Maclntyre recognises, Kant (in the second book of the second Critique) did in fact see a 
teleological framework as a necessary presupposition for a rational account of morality; but later 
followers of Kant saw this as "an arbitrary and unjustifiable concession to positions he a had already 
rejected" (1985 p. 56). Maclntyre also recognises that his assertion that in Kant "the notion that 
morality is anything other than obedience to rules has almost, if not quite, disappeared" (1985 p. 
236) is unfair, in particular in neglecting "the ways in which Kant is Christian and/or Stoic" and 
"Kant's notion of moral community" (1994 p. 448). However, he goes on to argue that precisely 
those areas in Kant which he neglects (moral community, Christianity) are those which cannot be 
made sense of in terms of the Enlightenment project, and therefore confirm his central thesis about 
that project's failure (1994 p. 450). 
14"Aristotle certainly would not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have been horrified by St. 
Paul" (1985 p. 184). 
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for the present day. We are now in a position to present Maclntyre's response to the question 
raised at the end of the last section, namely, 'if the moral crisis of modernity is linked to the 
development of modem economic forms which corrode traditions, what chance is there of 
reviving a sense of tradition under modern conditions? ' 
4.3 MacIntyre's Neo-Aristotelianism 
The first point to notice is that Maclntyre's diagnosis of the failure of the Enlightenment 
project challenges one of the assumptions of this question; namely, the primacy of economic 
forms in determining moral life. For example, in After Virtue Maclntyre points out the 
difference between his and Marx's account of why modem societies cannot hope to achieve 
moral consensus, in the context of Marx's argument in the 1860s that it was pointless for 
English trade unionists to appeal to justice in disputes with their employers: 
Marx was of course mistaken in supposing that such disagreements over justice are 
merely secondary phenomena, that they merely reflect the interests of rival economic 
classes. Conceptions of justice and allegiance are partly constitutive of the lives of social 
groups, and economic interests are often partially defined in terms of such conceptions 
and not vice versa. (1985 pp. 252-3) 
Moral schemes then, are not simply passive reflections of material conditions, so it is at least 
appropriate to ask the question whether Maclntyre, by presenting a moral theory, can suggest 
a way to sustain traditions under modem conditions. Secondly, although Maclntyre's 
conception of 'tradition' has not yet been discussed in detail, sufficient has been said of his 
presentation of the Aristotelian tradition to identify that it is congruent with my use of the 
term in 3.5, and that its coherence is threatened by the same aspects of modernity which were 
identified as corrosive of traditions there, namely the dominance of instrumental and reflexive 
forms of rationality associated with modem economic and social forms, and the modem 
mixture of cultural disembeddedness and global interconnectedness. 
MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian moral scheme consists of five levels which provide contexts for 
the development of the virtues: "practices", which provide a primary social context, the 
diversity of virtues and vices developed by each individual, the context of the unity of an 
individual life, the context of a moral community, and the context of a tradition of enquiry 
which can reflect on its own development and locate the moral community in a historical 
narrative. To sustain moral community it is necessary, as we have seen, to have as a 
counterpart to this morality of virtues a morality of laws. This morality of laws depends on 
the morality of virtues in two senses: first, because the whole point of having the laws is to 
maintain the boundaries of the moral community whose purpose is the development of the 
virtues, and second because the administration of the law requires the virtue of justice. On 
Maclntyre's account of the social world this virtue is essential because social life can never be 
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reduced to rule governed behaviour - fortuna is ineliminable15 - and therefore justice can 
never be dispensed mechanically. This scheme also requires as its counterpart an account of 
practical rationality, in terms of which it can be defended as the most rational available, an 
account provided in Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (1988). 
For Maclntyre then, the primary context for the development of virtues are "practices", of 
which he offers his own definition: 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially constitutive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. (1985 p. 187). 
Thus practices are complex social activities involving technical skills which systematically 
realise and develop goods internal to the activity. Maclntyre gives examples as diverse as 
chess, football and natural sciences, arguing that creating and sustaining human communities 
("households, cities, nations" 1985, p. 188) was widely understood as a practice in the ancient 
and medieval worlds. 
An important point for Maclntyre is that practices embody internal goods, excellence in a 
practice is pursued for its own sake; for the pleasure or satisfaction derived from the practice 
itself rather than any external form of reward. By contrast external goods lie beyond and bear 
no intrinsic relation to an activity, such as working to earn money or performing to attract 
praise. For MacIntyre modernity is dominated by external goods, which are corrosive of 
practices; thus football and opera have become multi-million pound businesses, creating 
tremendous pressures on participants to divert attention from internal to external goods; the 
same could be said of the increased administrative burdens on teachers or health 
professionals. 
However, although practices are prone to corrosion by systems developed to serve the 
interests of external goods, they possess a resistance in so far as they retain their conceptions 
of internal goods. Thus while emphasis on external goods may lead to professional fouls in 
football and drug-taking in athletics, notions of fair play and standards of excellence intrinsic 
to those sports persist. Maclntyre does not deny the validity of external goods altogether, 
indeed he accepts the vital role they play in maintaining institutions necessary to sustain 
15 Maclntyre's objections to positivist social science are outlined in After Virtue Chapter 8, where he 
develops Machiavelli's account of the nature of predication and generalisation in social life in 
contrast to the Enlightenment's, and which begin from Machiavelli's invocation of "Fortuna, bitch- 
goddess of unpredicability; we cannot dethrone her" (1985 p. 93). 
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practices (1985 p. 196). But it is when external goods predominate that practices are 
corroded, and, as we shall see, virtues collapse. 
In so far as practices are pursued for their own sake, for the love of playing football, singing 
or researching quantum theory, they resist reduction to the utilitarian calculus characteristic 
of modernity, to a cost-benefit analysis which must assume a universal currency. And yet 
precisely that self-containedness, that focus on internal goods, is at the same time a weakness 
in the face of the universalising ambitions of modem forms. For such practices too readily 
become isolated areas of expertise within the complexity of modern societies. At 1.13 above 
Bauman's adiaphorization account of the Holocaust was illustrated by quoting material which 
showed how engineers working on the construction of the machinery of the 'Final Solution' 
were insulated from the facing the moral consequences of their actions both by a neutralising 
technical vocabulary and a complex division of labour. Both insulating devices were 
identified as characteristic of modernity. The challenge for Maclntyre is to respond to the way 
in which strong commitment to an internal good - in this case excellence in technical problem- 
solving - did not produce resistance to, indeed led to co-option in the process of, genocide. 
Part of the Aristotelian conception of the goods for which practices are pursued, is that goods 
are never pursued entirely for their own sake, but rather each good is pursued for the sake of 
another good, and so on, so that all goods are arranged within a hierarchy the summit of 
which would be the good (Maclntyre 1967a p. 59). It is this teleological dimension of the 
entire Aristotelian scheme which the 'bottom-up' account of practices given thus far omits, 
and it is this dimension which means that Maclntyre's scheme needs to be understood as 
linked teleologically to a hierarchy of goods. Maclntyre's scheme may therefore be 
represented thus: 
practices - virtues - unity of an individual life - moral community - tradition of enquiry 
MacIntyre develops this point in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? in discussing Aristotle's 
account of practical rationality (1988 pp. 134-6). He points out that Aristotle does not 
attempt to specify what the supreme good is, or to choose between the various candidates 
available to him; rather what is important is the assumption of a supreme good as the telos of 
ethical life; indeed of life as a whole. Basing an ethics on an unspecified telos may seen 
unreasonable, but MacIntyre invites us to consider the parallel of modem natural science: 
From a standpoint outside of any established scientific community, on the basis of data 
uncharacterised in terms of any established theory, there are and can be no sufficiently 
good reasons to suppose in respect of any particular subject matter of enquiry, let alone 
in respect of nature as such, that there is one true fundamental explanatory theory. Only 
for the inhabitants of such a community, who possess some established theory or sets of 
theories and who have so far characterised the data in terms of them, can the question be 
put: In the light of the norms of evaluation which we now possess, which of the presently 
competing overall theories is the best, or can we conceive of a better? That there is a true 
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theory to be found is a presupposition of the ongoing activity of the scientific community; 
that there is a supreme good for human beings is a presupposition of the ongoing activity 
of the polls. (1988 p. 134) 
Thus Maclntyre argues that an unfounded assumption of underlying unity can support a 
rational ethics, just as it underpins a rational science. As we have already seen, this 
assumption does not lead MacIntyre to deny the importance of conflict in the life of the 
individual and in social life as it does Aristotle, both because fortuna is ineliminable, 
(although we can learn to moderate its effects), and because without the perspective of 
eternity we cannot see the resolution of apparently incommensurable goods, so tragedy is also 
ineliminable. But it does mean that within each practice there is referral to a greater good than 
the good of the practice, and hence to other elements of Maclntyre's moral scheme as a 
defence against the vicious ends to which practices may be put. These other elements will 
now be considered. 
4.4 Virtues 
Maclntyre initially defines virtue as: 
an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
presents us from achieving any such goods. (1985 p. 191) 
Thus virtues refer to certain learned consistencies of attitude or behaviour which enable the 
achievement of goods internal to practices: Maclntyre cites justice, courage and honesty as 
examples (1985 p. 191). However, rather than floating above particular practices in the 
Enlightenment sense where they function to tame the passions, virtues have a teleological 
educative role and are acquired through the exercise of practices. In particular it is the 
discipline exercised in developing mastery of particular practices which develops the virtues: 
goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our 
relationship to other practitioners. We have to recognise what is due to whom; we have to 
be prepared to take whatever self-endangering risks are demanded along the way; and we 
have to be prepared to listen carefully to what we are told about our inadequacies and to 
reply with the same carefulness for the facts. In other words we have to accept as 
necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence the 
virtues of justice, courage and honesty. (1985 p. 191) 
It seems here that Maclntyre is arguing that these virtues will simply arise through 
participation in practices, an interpretation which he confirms when he writes that, "the 
virtues need initially to be defined and explained with reference to a practice" (1985 p. 200). 
However, virtues are not reducible to practices, and can provide the basis for criticism and 
hence improvement of practices. Thus the interaction between practices and virtues can be 
described as a 'virtuous circle': social practices develop which require the maintenance of 
virtues to sustain them, virtues which in turn enable critical reflection on the practice, and so 
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on. This explanation fits Maclntyre's account of the development of virtues from heroic 
societies, where they are indistinguishable from social roles, to more complex societies such 
as the Aristotelian aolis, where they attain a critical independence from social roles and 
particular practices. Thus virtues, though contingent on, are not reducible to practices. 
However, none of this removes a significant difficulty raised by the gas van example. 
Maclntyre's theory places the genesis of moral discourse in practices remote from the 
mainstream of modem forms of life. What resources does such a theory which have for 
overcoming the numbing of moral instincts caused by entanglement in the complex causal 
networks central to those forms of life? For while Maclntyre's account is suggestive of an 
interesting relationship between embeddedness and the development of general standards of 
integrity, in a society where practices persist only in compromised form and on a small scale, 
divorced from the major institutions and dominant discourses, there seem to be little grounds 
for optimism that virtues could develop from practices in ways which could have any serious 
impact on society. Indeed, Maclntyre himself seems to endorse this conclusion when he 
writes: 
the tradition of the virtues is at variance with central features of the modem economic 
order and especially its individualism, its acquisitiveness and the elevation of the values 
of the market to a central social place. ... 
it also involves a rejection of the modem 
political order. (1985 pp. 254-5) 
Hence his turn to small communities, as survivals of communal practice consistent with a 
tradition of the virtues, and as potential sites for its regeneration. In particular in an American 
context he mentions some Orthodox Christians and Jews, Irish Catholics, and black and white 
Protestant groups from America's South (1985 p. 252). In a UK context one might suggest he 
could have pointed to certain communities of New Commonwealth heritage, including 
Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Afro-Caribbean Christians. But what of the public arena? His 
model of the development of virtues seems possible only within small, relatively homogenous 
communities, and he appears to confirm this in the conclusion to After Virtue: 
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which 
civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages 
which are already upon us. ... 
We are waiting not for Godot, but for another - doubtless 
very different - St. Benedict (1985, p. 263). 
Yet for all this pessimism about modern moral life, Maclntyre does point to ways other than 
social isolation by which virtue-based ethics can resist being undermined by modernity. He 
acknowledges that a moral structure defined solely by practices and virtues would be 
"pervaded 
... 
by too many conflicts and by too much arbitrariness" (1985 p. 201). Hence, as 
we have already seen with practices, the teleology implicit in an Aristotelian account of goods 
suggests that the virtues need embedding in wider contexts. Hence Maclntyre's second 
130 
definition of virtue makes both this teleological component and the need for virtues of 
community-building explicit: 
The virtues are therefore to be understood as those dispositions which will not only 
sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will 
also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the 
harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish 
us with increasing self knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalogue 
of virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kinds of households 
and the kinds of political communities in which men and women can seek for the good 
together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the 
good. (1985 p. 219) 
The first of the wider contexts within which practices and virtues need to be embedded is the 
unity of an individual life. Maclntyre emphasises the way in which common-sense 
understandings of personal identity - in contrast to atomistic social scientific accounts such as 
Goffinan's frame analysis - presuppose such a unity, the unity of a narrative quest (1985 pp. 
218-9). This narrative can in turn only be understood with reference to broader cultural 
narratives; hence MacIntyre's objection to liberal individualism, cited at 3.5 above. A 
rejoinder to his position at this point might be to object that such cultural narratives may be 
evil; an Afrikaner narrative, modelled on that of ancient Israel, supported apartheid, while 
Nazism, through völkishe ideology, sustained a powerful narrative (Shanks 1995 p. 51). Yet 
Maclntyre insists that the inescapability of embeddedness in cultural narratives does not mean 
that the individual is unable to criticise them: 
... the 
fact that the self has to find its identity in and through its membership in 
communities such as those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city'and the tribe does 
not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of those forms of community. 
Without those particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it 
is in moving forward form particularity that the search for the good, the universal, begins. 
(1985 p. 221) 
Each moral community can itself be understood as part of a historical narrative, which is 
where the fifth level of virtue-based moral structure, tradition, comes in. 
4.5 Traditions of Enquiry 
At 1.6 Maclntyre's concept of tradition was introduced in the context of social scientific ways 
of representing minority communities and community relations. By contrast with theories 
which focus all attention on the prejudicial pressure exerted by majorities against minorities, 
(a vital but one-sided approach), 'tradition' seemed to provide a way of analysing minority 
groups which enables consideration of their creative responses to prejudice, one which is able 
to represent the integrity of their cultural heritages. Thus 'tradition' stood in contrast with the 
restricted sense of 'culture' often operative in 'multicultural' theories and practices (Hulmes 
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1989, Newbigin in Hull 1981). At that stage, the understanding of tradition proposed seemed 
extremely broad, coinciding with Shils' argument that: 
Traditionality is compatible with almost any substantive content. All accomplishments of 
the human mind, all patterns of belief or modes of thinking, all achieved patterns of social 
relationships, all technical practices and physical artefacts or natural objects are 
susceptible to the process of transmission; each is capable of becoming a tradition. (Shils 
1981 p. 16) 
However, such a broad interpretation of tradition may not be compatible with Maclntyre's 
argument as outlined in this chapter. In particular, can liberalism be considered a tradition in 
MacIntyre's sense? This section will consider MacIntyre's concept of tradition in further 
depth, and attempt to answer this question. MacIntyre uses 'tradition' differently to both 
liberals and conservatives since the Enlightenment. Both of these have tended to contrast 
tradition with reason, whereas for MacIntyre reason is always embedded in a tradition of 
enquiry, or lapses into incoherence. Thus MacIntyre sees tradition as "an historically 
extended, socially embodied argument" (1985 p. 222). Tradition is not immune to self- 
criticism but partly constituted through it. 
By contrast with liberal versions of minority rights, a model of a plural society as constituted 
by traditions in interaction does not presuppose an autonomous individual disembedded from 
community and culture (Rawls), nor advocate or assume the liberalisation of the minority 
communities (Raz, Kymlicka). Rather change internal to a tradition is understood to be driven 
by recognition by members of that tradition of the inadequacy of existing practices or 
concepts to sustain or extend the goods which shape that tradition, and is achieved by the 
reformulation of tradition. Thus 'tradition' provides a way of understanding cultures in 
interaction and transition which respects the autonomy of each cultural tradition. 
However, this account of tradition remains too simplistic; to become more adequate, an 
account of the development of Maclntyre's use of the term is needed. Only then may its 
application as a basis for understanding inter-cultural exchange in plural secularised societies 
become convincing. 
Maclntyre's use of the term appears to vary throughout his corpus, at least sufficiently to 
cause some confusion amongst his readers. This is particularly so in his application of the 
term to Western thought. Thus in a paper published in 1977 he appears to see modem 
Western thought as part of a single, albeit complex tradition (p. 461). In After Virtue 
however, he sees it as a collection of fragments left over from older, incommensurable 
traditions. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? it has been claimed that liberalism is treated 
as a single tradition in apparent contrast to After Virtue (Mulhall 1994 p. 220), while in 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1991) at least two different uses have been 
discerned. In the latter work the dilemmas of contemporary moral enquiry are seen in the 
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mirror of the three mid to late nineteenth century types; the Thomism of Jesuits such as 
Kleutgen and Cornoldi, liberalism as represented by the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, and the subversive postfoundationalism of Nietzsche (1991 Chs 2-4). 'Tradition' 
seems at times to apply only to Thomism, but at other junctures to embrace the rival versions 
of moral enquiry. Thus Horton and Mendus comment: 
... there 
is... a tendency to run together tradition with Thomism such that the two 
become co-extensive. Yet surely Thomism is a particular tradition, and commitment 
to it entails much more than simply commitment to the idea of tradition? Similarly the 
other versions of moral enquiry are sometimes counterposed to tradition while at 
other times they seem to be understood as distinct alternative traditions. (Horton and 
Mendus 1994 p. 13) 
However, this confusion can be removed when it is realised that Maclntyre has used tradition 
in two basic senses, the first sense of which refers to a broad cultural and historical context, 
the second more specifically to a tradition of intellectual enquiry. In a recent paper (1994) 
Maclntyre explicitly makes this distinction in response to two of his critics: 
Mason failed to take account of the different characteristics ascribed on the one hand to 
traditions of enquiry, within which, so long as they are in good order, there are shared 
standards, and on the other hand to those larger social and cultural traditions within 
which traditions of enquiry are embedded and to which they stand in varying 
relationships. Mulhall supposed that in taking note of the fact that liberalism, originally 
the critic of all appeals to tradition has itself become a tradition, 
16 
and that some liberal 
theorists have become aware of this, I was now ascribing to liberalism the kind of 
coherence characteristic of a flourishing tradition of enquiry, whereas what I was 
recognising was that liberalism has become the kind of social and cultural tradition in 
which incoherence may be, and in the case of liberalism is, at home. (1994 pp. 292-3) 
Traditions of enquiry, then, are such that 'shared standards' can be appealed to in the course 
of argument, while liberalism is by contrast a "set of agreements to disagree" (1994 p. 292). 
Traditions of enquiry, if they are healthy, are also characterised by conflict, unlike the 
Burkean understanding of tradition which contrasts the stability of tradition with conflict: 
Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes 
Burkean, it is always dying or dead. (1985 p. 222) 
However, the conflict is fundamentally different to liberal conflict, because it is contained not 
by agreement to disagree but by shared standards of rationality. To understand the relation 
between rationality and tradition it is important to consider Maclntyre's argument in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, and it is to this text that we therefore turn. 
In After Virtue Maclntyre recognised the need to provide an account of practical rationality 
as a necessary counterpart to his account of virtue (1985 p. 260), in order to account for the 
16 i. e. liberalism has become a tradition in the sense that it is appealed to as an authority because of 
its historical standing. 
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"rival and incompatible evaluations of the arguments" presented there (1988 p. ix). Such an 
account of the reasons for the existence and failure of alternatives is a necessary condition for 
the rational vindication of a tradition of enquiry (1988 p. 362). However, in the intervening 
period he discovered that accounts of practical rationality are so closely tied to accounts of 
justice that the history of each required the history of the other (1988 p. ix). The result was 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988). 
In contrast to After Virtue. 17 Maclntyre opts for a straightforward chronological approach in 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, tracing the history of conceptions of justice and practical 
rationality over territory partly familiar to readers of After Virtue, from Homer's heroic 
society to urban Athens, from Plato to Aristotle and on this time to Augustine, to Aquinas 
(who now becomes a major figure), then seventeenth century Scotland and Hutcheson, Hume 
and contemporary liberalism via the efforts of Reid and Stewart. At this point a vindication of 
the practical rationality of traditions of enquiry against both Enlightenment and Nietzchean 
versions of practical rationality is mounted (Ch. 18), a project continued across a wider range 
of moral enquiry in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1991). In Chapter 19 he 
considers the importance of language to tradition, emphasising the limits of translation into 
global languages and the processes involved in acquiring a 'second first language', while in 
Chapter 20 he suggests how those living among the fragments of tradition in modernity might 
go about finding themselves a living tradition, and expresses his own preference for the 
Thomistic tradition of enquiry, as an as yet undefeated version of Aristotelianism. 
Chapter 18 is of particular importance, because there he vindicates the rationality of 
traditions against relativistic and perspectivist challenges, and lays out his model of traditions 
in interaction. It is this model which I argue can provide a basis for re-thinking 
multiculturalism. In fact, the argument presented here is largely anticipated in his 1977 paper 
on 'epistemological crises'. Furthermore, MacIntyre acknowledges that this argument does not 
depend upon the specifics of the history recounted in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
when he states that the argument is developed from presuppositions embedded in the practices 
of traditions of enquiry rather than actually being advanced within any of them. 
18 So the 
scientific traditions of enquiry of the earlier paper serve as material from which to develop the 
argument quite as well as the traditions of justice and practical rationality discussed in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, so long as they fulfil the criteria of traditions of enquiry. 
17The narrative of After Virtue might have been more straightforward if it had began with the 
history of the virtues in the pre-modern period (Chs. 10-13), followed this with the subsequent 
history of the abandonment of the Aristotelian scheme in modernity (Chs. 4-6), examined the 
philosophical and social consequences of this (Chs. 16,17,2,3,7,8, ) culminating in the choice of 
"Nietzche or Aristotle? " (Ch. 9), and laid out a revised Aristotelian alternative (Chs. 14-15,18). 
18"Notice that the grounds for an answer to relativism and perspectivism are to be found, not in any 
theory of rationality as yet explicitly articulated and advanced within one or more of the traditions 
those enquiry-bearing traditions, but rather with a theory embodied and presupposed by their 
practices of enquiry, yet never fully spelt out, although adumbrations of it, or parts of it, are to be 
found in various writers, and more especially in Newman" (1988 p. 354). 
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Therefore it is not strictly necessary to follow the history recounted in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? in order to present Maclntyre's argument for the rationality of traditions or his 
account of traditions in interaction. The status of this argument also means that it applies not 
just to traditions which Maclntyre happens to consider, but to any tradition which qualifies as 
a tradition of enquiry, an important point when considering applying claims generated by the 
argument to non-western traditions. Nonetheless, it will be useful to consider Maclntyre's 
account of the relationship between practical rationality and justice in Western thought, in 
order to gain a fuller picture of the contrast which he develops between modern and 
Aristotelian modes of thought, and a further insight into the development of the Aristotelian 
tradition on whose revival he pins so much hope. 
Practical rationality refers to the kind of reasoning which issues in action, or in modem 
versions 'may contribute to action' would be better, since the Aristotelian connection between 
reason and deed has by this stage been broken. MacIntyre distinguishes two use of dikaiosune 
('justice') in Aristotle; firstly the distributive sense, consisting of "the exercise of all the 
virtues by each citizen in his relationship to other citizens" (1985 p. 103), and secondly 
corrective, in the sense of the attempt to restore breaches of the just order by individuals 
failing in the exercise of justice in the first sense. 
Contrary to most commentators, Maclntyre argues that Aristotle's account of practical 
rationality cannot be understood without his account of justice (1985 p. 103), and both 
presuppose the exercise of the virtues. The connection between the three virtues is well 
illustrated in the following passage: 
Education into the virtues involves the mastery, the disciplining, and the transformation 
of desires and feelings. This education enables one to exercise the virtues so that one not 
only values each of the virtues for its own sake, but understands the exercise of the 
virtues as also being for the sake of ... enjoying that 
kind of life which constitutes the best 
life for human beings. And the knowledge which enables one to understand why this kind 
of life is in fact the best is only to be had as a result of having become a virtuous person. 
But without this knowledge rational judgement and rational action are impossible. To be 
uneducated in the virtues is precisely to be unable as yet to judge rightly what is good or 
best for oneself. (1988 pp. 109-110) 
The relations envisaged here are precisely the opposite of the modem liberal conception of 
those between practical rationality, justice and the self exemplified in Rawls' device the 
'Original Position' (above, 3.2). For Rawls the occupant of the Original Position can choose 
justly and rationally precisely because he or she is free of any social relations, whereas for 
Aristotle the ability to choose rationally and justly depends on being embedded in particular 
social relations. 
The contrast between modern and Aristotelian accounts also shows up in other comparisons. 
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Unlike some modern accounts in which reason and desire act antagonistically, for Aristotle 
the virtues serve to educate desire, producing rational desire (rohairesis . 
To act rationally is 
to be able to correctly characterise a situation, to identify the good in a situation in relation to 
a hierarchy of goods, to identify the action necessary to achieve that good, and to do it (1988 
pp. 125-6). For each of these procedures the virtue of practical intelligence (phronesis) is 
necessary (1988 p. 126); and here another contrast to modernity, at least in some versions, 
emerges; innocence, as a lack of knowledge, can be no virtue. For Aristotle the outcome of a 
practical syllogism is action (1988 p. 135), again differing from most modern accounts of 
practical rationality in which no action may equally be the outcome. 
19 The idea that no chain 
of reasoning is ever sufficiently compelling as to require a particular action is so prevalent in 
modern moral philosophy that Maclntyre is forced to find a modem analogy in a quite 
different field of modem life - characteristically a game - in order to express the force of a 
practical reasoning on an Aristotelian scheme: 
A hockey player in the closing seconds of a crucial game has an opportunity to pass to 
another member of his or her team better placed to score a needed goal. Necessarily, we 
may say, if he or she has perceived and judged the situation accurately, he or she must 
immediately pass. What is the force of this "necessarily" and this "must"? ... we recognise 
the necessity and immediacy of rational action by someone inhabiting a structured role in 
a context in which the goods of some systematic form of practice are unambiguously 
ordered. And in doing so we apply to one part of our social life a conception which 
Aristotle applies to rational life as such. (1988 pp. 140-141) 
Thus much of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is taken up narrating the Western 
tradition's journey from Aristotle's conceptions of justice and practical rationality to modern 
liberalism's, providing a complementary narrative to the fate of the virtues in After Virtue. 
The social context within which eudaimonia, "the conception of a single albeit perhaps 
complex supreme good [which] is central to Aristotle's account of practical rationality" (1988 
p. 133) is worked out is greatly extended by Augustine, from the Greek city (polis) to the 
eternal City of God (Civitas Dei). The latter city not only transcends death, but excludes no 
one, "neither Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free, male nor female" (Gal. 3 : 28). Furthermore, 
these claims stand in a different historical narrative to that of Aristotle, one with its own sense 
of history: the Judeo-Christian tradition which Maclntyre traces from the Deuteronomist to 
Gregory VII (1988 p. 150-163). Augustine's catalogue of virtues also differ from Aristotle's, 
particularly in the inclusion of humility and charity which are held to be prerequisites of 
justice, and in conceiving of justice as fundamentally a matter of the relation of the soul to 
God, the lawgiver. But Augustine's major innovation is his invention or discovery of the'will' 
(voluntas 
. 
Whereas for Aristotle reason is its own motivation, for Augustine the will is 
necessary prior to reason: 
19In Maclntyre's view such inaction may be justified within a modern frame of reference (1985 p. 
341); the reasons for this will be considered when the modern conception of practical rationality is 
examined below. 
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The human will is ... the ultimate 
determinant of human action, and the human will is 
systematically misdirected in such a way that it is not within its own power to redirect 
itself. (1988 p. 157) 
This systematic misdirection is, for Augustine, the result of the Fall (Gen. 3), and specifically 
Adam's choice of love of self rather than love of God which effects all humanity, such that 
only grace can intervene. 
Augustine's creative synthesis of neo-Platonism with the Biblical tradition, while rejected in 
Eastern Christianity (King 1994 p. 71), was dominant in the West until the thirteenth century 
when new translations of Aristotle began to become available from the Islamic world. At this 
juncture it was, Maclntyre argues, Aquinas' achievement to synthesise Aristotelianism with 
Augustinianism, although his achievement was largely unrecognised by his successors (1988 
p. 207). As far as justice and practical rationality are concerned, the nub of the problem 
facing Aquinas is that for Aristotle practical rationality follows only from moral education, 
yet for Augustine, following Paul, even those lacking such education have sufficient 
20 knowledge of God's law to stand condemned. 
Aquinas' solution had been partly anticipated in commentaries on Jerome's interpretation of 
the story of Cain (Gen. 4), where a distinction was made between svnderesis, knowledge of 
good and evil which cannot be eradicated, and conscientia, such knowledge which can 
(Maclntyre 1988 p. 184). Thus in the context of conflicting Augustinian and Aristotelian 
traditions, Aquinas argued that the ineradicable synderesis provides the basis for 
condemnation, while conscientia is fallible and stands in need of education. Other elements of 
synthesis followed; in translating prohairesis ('rational desire') with electio Aquinas imports 
the notion of voluntas (will) (1988 pp. 188-90); Aristotle's telos (end) of eudaimonia (human 
flourishing) is extended beyond contemplation, which was always situated within the olis, to 
the contemplation of God in the beatific vision (1988 p. 192); justice (iustitia) now has its 
foundation not in the good ordering of the polis but in the being of God (1988 p. 198). 
In spite of these changes, Aquinas retained the basic structure of Aristotelian practical 
rationality, while enabling a scheme whose moral terms of reference had been the polis with 
its restrictive citizenship to be extended to all humanity; indeed, to the entire cosmos. Thus 
where Aristotle rejects the morality of non-Greeks as that of barbarians incapable by nature 
of political life, Aquinas sees in synderesis a basis for condemnation, salvation and moral 
education. 
20For 
example, Paul writes in Romans: "Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, 
namely his eternal power and deity, has clearly been perceived in the things that have been made. 
Therefore they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honour him as God or 
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were 
darkened" (Rom. 1: 20-1). 
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Two further features of Maclntyre's account of Aquinas may be noted. First, the openness of 
the Summa Theologiae, in the sense that its structure presupposes that the arguments which it 
considers may always be continued in unpredicted ways: 
Every article in the Summa poses a question whose answer depends upon the outcome of 
an essentially uncompleted debate. For the set of often disparate and heterogenous 
arguments against whatever position Aquinas' enquires have so far led him to accept is 
always open to addition by some as yet unforeseen argument. And there is no way, 
therefore, of ruling out in advance the possibility that what has so far been accepted may 
yet have to be modified or even rejected. (1988 pp. 171-2) 
This feature of dialectic is common to Aristotle and Aquinas, and is important in Maclntyre's 
conception of a tradition of enquiry. Secondly, Maclntyre argues that Aquinas' account of 
justice is unique in the range of topics which he considers (1988 p. 202). Maclntyre stresses 
features which are in conflict with liberal modernity: the incompatibility of a state ordered to 
educate people into virtue with the modern proceduralist state contingent on a distinction 
between the right and the good (1988 p. 200-1); the subjection of secular to sacred power (i. e. 
the Pope, p. 201); the limitation of the ownership of private property by human need (p. 199). 
However, Aquinas' successors failed to build on his achievement, such that when the 
Aristotelianism of the Scottish university establishment in the eighteenth century faced 
Hume's sceptical challenge, it was unable to respond effectively. For Hume, by stark contrast 
with Aristotle, "reason is practically inert. It cannot by its very nature move us to action" 
(1988 p. 285). In considering After Virtue we have already seen Maclntyre's reasons for this; 
Calvin's radicalising of Augustine's account of bad will, the emphasis on reason as purely 
calculative and the rejection of Aristotelian theories of causality in the natural sciences. The 
result is that Hume builds his account of practical rationality, of the genesis of action, on the 
passions. The passions also occupy a central place in Hume's account in another sense: 
Hume, like other Enlightenment thinkers, follows the 'way of ideas', which attempts to start 
thinking afresh from internal and external observation. Such a method is fundamentally 
antagonistic to recognising its debt to any form of tradition: 
... the way of 
ideas by its very nature excluded acknowledgement of fundamental 
intellectual indebtedness to philosophical writing. All the materials for the particular 
author's account of perception, thought knowledge, the passions, the will, and the beliefs 
giving expression to these have to be drawn, whether the particular author's version of the 
way of ideas is Cartesian or empiricist, from the stock of ideas presented to and in the 
consciousness of one single individual mind, that of the author. (1988 p. 290) 
How is it possible to move from such a solipsistic method to any account of consistent 
personal identity or social relations necessary for an account of moral responsibility? Again, 
Hume's answer is his account of the passions. For Hume, some passions differ from the raw 
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data of sense impressions in having an inner directedness, an innate idea crucial for the 
genesis of action: 
Those passions in which an idea is an essential component of the passion Hume calls the 
indirect passions, and it is these which play a central part in generating those actions 
which constitute the exchanges and transactions of social life. (1988 p. 292) 
The passions of pride and humility play a central role in organising our responses to others; 
we seek that which elicits admiration in others enabling the maintenance of pride, and to 
avoid that which elicits disapproval. Humility here seems to be more like humiliation than the 
Christian virtue. 21 The maintenance of self-esteem as the goal of social life would seem an 
appropriate translation in contemporary idiom. Moral life thus becomes a matter of the 
regulation of intentional passions through reciprocal social relations. On this account, reason 
can only ask questions as directed by the passions (1988 p. 305). There is nothing natural 
about justice, rather this a necessary artifice to ensure the stability of society, generated by 
our displeasure at our own suffering and an "uneasiness" at that of others (1988 pp. 309-10). 
As will be evident from this account, Hume anticipates many of the features of modem 
liberalism. Yet Maclntyre regards Hume's work as part of a tradition of enquiry in a sense 
that he denies to modem liberalism. Why is this? Maclntyre argues that Hume continues to 
presuppose a particular kind of social background to identify the self in his account of 
practical reasoning, in particular a background in which arenas of public choice still function 
as places of debate concerning agreed or rival conceptions of the good, rather than as forums 
for bargaining between individual preferences (1988 p. 338). 
22 The demise of public reason 
reduces the primary premise of a practical syllogism to a bald expression of personal 
preference. The structure of a practical reasoning thus becomes: 
From the initial premise of the form 'I want it to be the case that such and such' the 
reasoner must move to answer the question about how what he or she wants may be 
attained by action and which of the available alternative courses of action is preferable. 
But the conjunction of the initial premise ... and the secondary premise or premises 
obtained by answering this question will not of itself necessarily yield the conclusion as to 
what the reasoner should do. For it may well be that the course of action thus decided 
upon would ... 
frustrate some other want of the reasoner. Hence an additional premise is 
required for any sound practical argument in which the initial premise is an expression of 
preference, and the following form of the set of required preferences emerges: 'I want it to 
be the case that such and such; Doing so and so will enable me to achieve its being the 
case that such and such; There is no other way of so enabling me which I prefer [the new 
premise]; Doing so and so will not frustrate any equal or stronger preference. (1988 pp. 
339-340) 
21For a fuller account of the Christian virtue of humility, and to contrast it with antique and modern 
uses, see Wengst (1988). 22 For a fuller account of this transformation see Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere (1989), a discussion of which is presented at 1.12 above. 
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The result is that the connection between premises and action is far looser than on any of the 
previous accounts considered from Aristotle to Hume; indeed MacInytre accepts Audi's 
contention that a practical judgement rather than an action is complete as a conclusion to this 
form of practical reasoning: 
The range of possible intervening considerations which may interpose themselves between 
practical judgement and action is at once too large and too indeterminate for there to be 
even an appearance of unintelligibility when practical reasoning produces no further 
outcome. (1988 p. 341). 
This indeterminacy is the basis for Maclntyre's claim that liberalism lacks the coherence to 
constitute a tradition of enquiry, but instead continues only as a set of agreements to disagree 
within which no progress is possible. This means that for a model of cultural exchange as 
traditions in interaction, liberalism cannot register as a tradition. Only if there are strands 
within liberalism which enable more determinate forms of practical reason can liberalism be 
considered more than an arbitrary cage for the containment of difference. 
Thus we return to Maclntyre's proposed alternative, the tradition of enquiry, of which those 
stemming from Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and Hume have received some consideration. 
As was stated above, the argument of Chapter 18 of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? for 
the rationality of traditions of enquiry is largely anticipated in the 1977 paper 
"Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science", so my account 
here will make reference to both sources. 
MacIntyre proposes three recurrent phases in the normal life of a tradition (1988 p. 355). In 
the first, stable, phase the tradition is sustained without major challenges, (though remember 
that healthy tradition is always partially constituted by debate about the particular goods 
which give the tradition its purpose). The second phase is characterised by crisis; challenges 
internal or external to the tradition threaten its coherence and viability, established authorities 
are called into question - this is called an "epistemological crisis" (1977 p. 455). The third 
phase is resolution of the crisis, which is achieved by satisfying three criteria (1988 p. 362). 
The reformulated tradition must: (i) be able to explain the reason for the crisis, (ii) show how 
it has resolved the conflict which caused the crisis, and (iii) demonstrate that it can do this 
while retaining substantive continuity with the original tradition: "[s]ome core of shared 
belief, constitutive of allegiance to the tradition, must survive the rupture" (1988 p. 356). An 
explanation or insight (or other cultural product) originating outside the tradition may become 
part of the transformed tradition as part of the process of resolving an epistemological crisis. 
Maclntyre stresses the difference between this account of a tradition of enquiry and Cartesian 
or Hegelian accounts: 
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Traditions fail the Cartesian test of beginning from unassailable evident truths; not only 
do they begin from contingent positivity, but each begins from a point different to that of 
the others. Traditions also fail the Hegelian test of showing that their goal is some final 
rational state which they share with all movements of thought. (1988 p. 361) 
This admission, he concedes, exposes his account of traditions of enquiry to relativist and 
perspectivist critiques, which he defines as follows: 
The relativist challenge rests upon a denial that rational debate between and rational 
choice among rival traditions is possible; the perspectivist challenge puts in question the 
possibility of making truth-claims from within any one tradition. (1988 p. 352) 
These challenges are seen as the product of reaction to the Enlightenment's view of 
rationality, that is "one in which truth is guaranteed by rational method and rational method 
appeals to principles undeniable by any fully reflective person" (1988 p. 353). Maclnytre 
makes his response to such challenges by returning his concept of the epistemological crisis. 
4.6 Epistemological Crises and Traditions in Interaction 
As we have seen, Maclntyre proposes that traditions develop in particular historical 
circumstances, and that therefore the practical rationalities that they develop in response to 
particular needs do not conform to some common extra traditional standards, although 
common principles of logic apply in each case. However, when two historical traditions 
interact, it is possible that participants in the two different traditions can come to recognise 
that participants in the other tradition are reflecting on the same issues, defining 'the same' not 
by some external, universal standard, but by standards internal to the tradition in which the 
participant already stands (1988 p. 358). 
MacIntyre's model cannot guarantee resolution between traditions, for it offers no standard 
external to particular traditions to which to appeal. Such standards can, we have already 
seen, always be exposed as some particular standard writ large. But, unlike the radical 
incommensurability of most postmodern positions which abandon public space, Maclntyre 
provides a way of making sense of interactions between traditions. Such sense is not 
guaranteed, but Maclntyre shows us how it can happen. 
Interaction between traditions occurs by a process of 'translation'; a process Maclntyre 
describes as learning 'a second first language' (1988 pp. 370-387). Such a process does not 
23 We have already seen him argue that logic is cross-culturally constant in "Rationality and the 
Explanation of Action" (1971). He affirms this position in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?: 
All the traditions with which we have been concerned agree in according a certain authority to 
logic both in their theory and in their practice. Were it not so, their adherents would be unable 
to disagree in the way in which they do. (1988 p. 351) 
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presuppose a common reality to which we can have direct access; rather the only realities to 
which we can have access are tradition embodied languages. The language of each tradition 
cannot be understood by an outsider except by coming to grasp the grammar of that language, 
a grammar not reducible to linguistic rules, but constructed in relation to the totality of the 
culture of the tradition. 
On such a model it is possible for participants in traditions which begin with quite different 
practical rationalities - incommensurable foundations - to come to recognise that another 
tradition is not only addressing common issues, but may be able to propose solutions to 
problems not available within their own tradition: 
When they have understood the beliefs of the alien tradition they may find themselves 
compelled to recognise that within this tradition it is possible to construct from the 
concepts and theories peculiar to it what they were unable to provide from within their 
own conceptual and theoretical resources, a cogent and illuminating explanation - cogent 
and illuminating, that is, by their own standards - of why their own intellectual tradition 
was unable to solve its own problems or restore its coherence. (1988 p. 364) 
In this way traditions may develop commonalities - shared conceptions, shared practices - at 
certain points, while remaining quite different at other points. Thus this model provides a way 
of thinking how differences between traditions might be resolved while each tradition retains 
its integrity; indeed, each tradition retains its integrity precisely by drawing on the resources 
of another tradition. 
The very fact that as a part of this process a tradition must come to recognise the inadequacy 
of its own position to date, and to accept defeat in respect of truth by another tradition, 
refutes the relativist and perspectivist challenges, for on their accounts such self-criticism is 
not possible (1988 pp. 364-5). To this the relativist may reply that it may be possible for 
traditions to co-exist for long periods without precipitating epistemological crises for one 
another, such that the relativist account would, under those conditions, be accurate. However, 
conceding this point does nothing to damage the account of traditions in interaction advanced. 
Here, Maclntyre's riposte is that relativists must advance their claims from within a particular 
tradition seems correct, but not entirely relevant (1988 p. 367). The cases in which the 
relativist argument can be held to apply must in any case, under modem conditions of 
globalization (1.1), be relatively few. 
Anticipating the discussion at 5.8 for a moment, the relativist argument given could not be 
appropriately used by Muslim governments to resist Western probing on human rights issues, 
since the vast majority of Muslim countries both incorporate features of Western legal 
systems from which rights discourse is largely derived and are signatories to the United 
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
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as well as there being substantial evidence for 
grassroots movements supporting human rights (e. g. Dwyer 1991 pp. 159-181), all of which 
demonstrates that rights discourse has already penetrated Muslim states and societies. 
It may seem rather odd to defend human rights in the context of presenting Maclntyre's 
arguments, given that he describes them as "fictions" (1985 p. 70). However, while the 
concept of human rights may be a moral fiction in the sense that users of the term imply that 
such rights are justified by universal rational arguments, this does not mean that the tradition 
of human rights does not embody genuine moral insights, nor that the discourse of human 
rights ought not to be used to campaign for just and humane treatment for people within and 
across cultural and national boundaries. Rather, what I take MacIntyre's critique to imply is 
that a historicised account of rights in terms of intellectual and moral traditions can better 
help to promote justice than a dehistoricised, decontextualised account, which can only 
respond to cultural difference with incomprehension and shrill protest. 
Maclntyre responds to perspectivism by criticising its failure to recognise the importance of 
truth to tradition-constituted enquiry. Traditions are not masks to be worn and discarded: 
genuinely to adopt the standpoint of a tradition thereby commits one to its view of what is 
true and false, and in so committing one, prohibits one form adopting any rival 
standpoint. Hence the perspectivist could indeed pretend to adopt the standpoint of some 
one particular tradition of enquiry; he or she could not in fact do so. The multiplicity of 
traditions does not afford a multiplicity of perspectives among which we can move, but a 
multiplicity of antagonistic commitments, between which only conflict, rational, or non- 
rational, is possible. (1988 p. 368) 
On such an account, the only possible outcome of an encounter between traditions is victory 
or defeat. Yet we have already seen Maclntyre present a case in which synthesis, rather than 
victory or defeat is the outcome of encounter: Aquinas' reconcilation of Aristotelianism and 
Augustinianism. Indeed, it is to this synthesised tradition that he offers his own allegiance. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 19 on "Tradition and Translation", he describes the process by 
which one can acquire a 'second first language', and thus enter another tradition from the 
'inside', not by transposing the grammar of one's first language, but by being learning a new 
grammar, with its depth of local and historical reference. 25 In addition, in spite of his 
dismissal of the perspectivist stance, he writes in a positive though qualified way of the 
benefits of possessing "the concept of an alien culture in [a] secondary mode", in certain 
contexts: 
We possess such concepts without being able to employ them in the first person, except 
as dramatic impersonators, speaking in a voice which is not our own. But this does not 
24 Even Saudi Arabia, which refused to endorse the UDHR and has a legal system which claims to 
be based solely on Sharia, "has subsequently ratified a number of [the UDHR's] specific 
conventions" (Mayer 1995 p. 11) 
25Maclntyre's account of translation is considered further at 7.5 below. 
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mean we cannot understand what it is to be and to believe within another tradition by acts 
of conceptual imagination in some types of case. (1988 p. 395) 
There is here an evident tension in Maclntyre's attitude towards the practice of empathetic but 
secondary engagement with another tradition. On the one hand he condemns the practice in so 
far as it is seen to constitute a mode of enquiry sufficient in itself for someone unrooted in a 
tradition. On the other hand, he recognises that it presents the possibility of acquiring genuine 
if limited understanding for someone rooted in a tradition, and for someone not rooted in a 
tradition who recognises nonetheless the limitations of the practice of secondary engagement. 
Thus the contours of Maclntyre's project have been outlined, so it is now possible to assess 
further criticisms which have been made of it, and, positively, how it may contribute to the 
project of rethinking multiculturalism. 
4.7 Criticisms of MacIntyre 
Such is the range of history, people and ideas considered throughout Maclntyre's work that 
he is open to criticism on a huge variety of fronts. His comments on particular figures and 
topics, especially in After Virtue, are often sketchy and difficult to make sense of without 
prior knowledge - indeed, he describes even the second edition of After Virtue as a work in 
progress. When these considerations are combined with the fact that I have, inevitably within 
the constraints of the thesis, provided only a brief treatment of his work, the number of 
potential points of criticism becomes vast. 
However, here I shall be concerned only with those aspects of Maclntyre's work which are 
important for this thesis, namely his model of traditions in interaction as a basis for re- 
thinking multiculturalism in modern, plural, secularised societies, an application which itself 
demands further qualification and explanation, although I hope that the contours of this 
application have already been made evident. For this, it seems important that his main 
historical thesis of the failure of the Enlightenment project with its consequences for morality 
and practical rationality must be defensible. Secondly, in establishing a general model of the 
rationality of traditions of enquiry Maclntyre's model needs defence from the charge that he 
has reinvented the Enlightenment project, with its imperialistic implications. Thirdly, moving 
on to my constructive project, it is necessary to demonstrate that Maclntyre's virtue based 
theory has some relevance beyond critique in a modern society, such that critique could be 
translated into action, through the appropriate practical syllogism. 
Firstly, then, the historical case. Commenting on After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? Robert Wokler writes: 
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To my mind it is all wonderfully confused, both in method and substance, generally and 
in detail. (1994 p. 115) 
Wokler begins by questioning the idea of a single 'Enlightenment project', given the range of 
thinkers and movements between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries connected in 
Maclntyre's narrative by this phrase. But even granted use of the term, which he also points 
out was not used by alleged participants in the project themselves, he questions the balance of 
Maclntyre's presentation, particularly his neglect of the French philosopher (Wokler 1994 p. 
116-7). 
Again developing his arguments in the French context, Wokler attacks a fundamental aspect 
of Maclntyre's method, namely the interactions between ethical and societal forms: 
The connections between normative principles and social institutions which Maclntyre 
seeks to draw seem to me elusive and inconsistent. (Wokler 1994 p. 120) 
In particular, he asks "why the Enlightenment project should issue in the moral disorder of 
contemporary culture but not noticeably in the chaos of the French Revolution? " (Wokler 
1994 p. 120), for Maclntyre defends the Jacobins as one of the last upholders of the classical 
tradition of virtues (MacInytre 1985 p. 243), although they stood in a much more direct 
relationship to Enlightenment culture than the twentieth century thinkers and social practices 
which MacIntyre argues have been so profoundly influenced by it. Furthermore, Maclntyre 
seeks to exonerate the tradition of the virtues from any blame for Jacobin responsibility for 
the Terror, against accusers such as Berlin and Bell. MacIntyre argues that it was not the 
tradition itself but a partial recognition of its weakness together with a desperate attempt to 
impose it politically which led to the Terror (1985 p. 238). But if the virtues are exempt from 
blame for their political imposition, why in the twentieth century should the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment be "responsible for conduct of persons unaware that they were endeavouring 
to put Enlightenment ideas into practice? " (Wokler 1994 p. 120). 
There are two questions being asked here. First, why should the Enlightenment Project have 
such large long distance consequences (in time and culture) when it appears to have had little 
influence on an event within its own time and culture? Second, why are strong causal links 
between philosophy and practice invoked in one case and not another? 
Each of these criticisms will be considered in turn. First, the unity of the Enlightenment 
project, and Maclntyre's identification of this with the founding of morality on universal 
rational principles. For Maclntyre this project was bound to fail because Enlightenment 
thinkers failed to identify wherein the rationality of morality lay, that is in the teleological 
ordering of particular moral traditions, in their orientation toward a unified conception of the 
good. To vindicate this part of Maclntyre's historical thesis it is not strictly necessary to show 
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that all or indeed any Enlightenment thinkers actually saw themselves as contributing to such 
a project; although some clearly did, and other important thinkers have endorsed Maclntyre's 
view of the project (e. g. Gray 1995a pp. 147-151). Rather, it is sufficient to show that the 
accounts of morality which emerged from this period were in fact devoid of the teleological 
structure which characterised ethics prior to this period. Both Maclntyre's treatment of liberal 
thinkers and those presented earlier in the chapter serve to substantiate this point. 
This argument also covers the second criticism of Maclntyre's presentation of the 
Enlightenment as unbalanced; if he has correctly identified the predominant forms of moral 
thinking before and after this period, and a simple change in the structure of such thinking, 
that will suffice to maintain his thesis so far. However, this brings us to the third criticism, 
the relation between "normative principles and social institutions", as Wokler puts it. 
Regarding the Jacobin case, it is worth pointing out first that Maclntyre's characterisation of 
Jacobins as upholders of a tradition of public virtue seems to be uncontroversial, for it is also 
accepted by those such as Isaiah Berlin and Daniel Bell who disagree with him in their 
evaluation of the role of that tradition played in the genesis of the Terror. Locating this within 
Maclntyre's wider analytic framework, it can be said that at that juncture of modernity in 
France a tradition of the virtues remained a cultural possibility, although a fragile one, as the 
effects of what Karl Polanyi has called, the "Great Transformation" were not yet fully felt, 
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although they were already making an impact. Indeed on MacIntyre's account it was both a 
perception and denial of this fragility which led to St. Just's excesses (Maclnytre 1985 p. 
239). However, Maclntyre insists, the presence of a living tradition of the virtues does not 
preclude the presence of vice, but rather provides a context within which vice can be 
recognised as such, as against the confusion of incommensurable moralities which he 
identifies with modernity. 
Maclntyre's answer to why the Enlightenment project can be invoked to explain twentieth 
century events more powerfully than closer eighteenth century events is the persistence of 
traditions of the virtues in certain eighteenth century contexts, traditions far rarer and less 
influential today due to the spreading effects of the Great Transformation. Wokler 
misunderstands Maclntyre's case if he is reading it as a particular eighteenth century 
26 McMylor (1994) has argued that there is a strong connection between Polanyi's account of the 
disembedding of traditional economic forms from social life under capitalism, and the disembedding 
of morality from social life since the Enlightenment in Maclntyre's account: 
... just as the wide diversity of pre-market economic forms all require some embedding within 
some wider set of social relations to avoid economics being a narrow means-end relationship of 
self-interest, so with Maclntyre's account. In order for virtue to be exercised, or even 
understood, there must be criteria embodied in some shared account of our own context. When 
such an account collapses, then the moral self is as disembedded as economic relations are in 
the marketplace. (McMylor 1994 pp. 107-8) 
Maclntyre himself invokes Polanyi in his own discussion of the relation between economic and 
moral forms (1988 p. 211). 
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philosophical error suddenly manifesting itself in twentieth century history with no apparent 
causal connections. Rather, Maclntyre shows, if perhaps too sketchily, how the consequences 
of this error are embodied in powerful institutional forms such as modem bureaucracy and 
management. Again, it is that these forms have attained cultural significance and that they 
embody the kind of moral theory MacIntyre associates with the failure of the Enlightenment 
project which are central to upholding his argument, rather establishing precisely the 
processes involved in the development of this state of affairs; although without such a history 
it is true that alternative explanations may be unjustly neglected. 
One further point needs to be made about the strength of Maclntyre's historical thesis. As far 
as I am aware, he doesn't explain the reasons for seventeenth century natural science's 
rejection of Aristotelianism in any but the barest terms, (in particular considering the relations 
between Aristotle's science and ethics, and why seventeenth century scientists should have 
been led to reject Aristotle's ethics as well as his science), other than invoking that other 
source for the triumph of a calculative understanding of reason, Jansenist and Protestant 
accounts of the consequences of the Fall. A consideration of this, as well as the reasons for 
the earlier Reformation rejection of Aristotle, would be helpful. 
The second area of Maclntyre's account which needs defence will now be considered: the 
accusation that in developing a generic account of tradition reason he presents, in spite of 
himself another version of Enlightenment foundationalism. For example, John Milbank27 has 
argued that Maclntyre's understanding of resolution between traditions is "pure Hegelianism", 
and "a new mode of foundationalism" (1990a p. 328). He describes the process as one in 
which: 
perfectly contingent starting points progressively but negatively struggle free of the 
historical chrysalis and float upwards toward universality. (1990a p. 328) 
While Maclntyre sometimes invites this kind of interpretation when he writes of approaching 
truth through the dialectical process of argument within and between traditions, I do not think 
it is necessary to interpret his work in this way. The new formulations arrived at by mutual 
interrogation between traditions can simply be understood as more adequate to the contexts 
which they address, adequate, that is, in terms of the traditions which constitute that context, 
and not as closer approximations to some universal truth. 
So we turn to the third area, the relevance of Maclntyre's critique of the Enlightenment 
project to modem Western societies. As regards Thomism, the particular tradition of enquiry 
with Maclntyre chooses to identify himself, Haldane questions the feasibility of any kind of 
revival of this tradition given its present influence in Britain: 
27 Milbank's work will receive fuller treatment in Chapter 7 below. His criticisms of Maclntyre will 
be addressed at 7.5. 
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Indeed in Great Britain I doubt there are sufficient Thomists to constitute a football team 
(even assuming that age and infirmity were not disqualifications) (1994 p. 100) 
However, my proposal does not depend upon a revival of Thomism. Rather, it is concerned 
with identifying a range of traditions and practices which might be seen to promote virtues. 
Various religious communities might be identified as traditions of this kind, including those of 
the New Commonwealth immigrant groups. Indeed, there is evidence that members of a 
number of these groups are attempting to build virtuous communities within but distinct from 
the secular mainstream, for example in the field of education where there are growing 
numbers of private supplementary and full-time schools run by Muslim, Hindu and Afro- 
Caribbean Christian groups (Parker-Jenkins 1991, Bowcott 1996). 
Secondly, from my account above it must be clear that Maclntyre's works are not sectarian in 
the sense of `only concerned with a narrow audience', or `giving limited and stereotyped 
treatments of opposing views'; rather, they engage with an extremely wide range of parties. 
However, there is more to the `sectarian charge' than this. To consider the substance of this 
charge more fully we turn to Joseph Kotva, who has defended not only Maclntyre but other 
Christian virtue theorists such as Stanley Hauerwas and Gilbert Meilander (Kotva 1994 p. 
35). Kotva admits that: 
Hauerwas, Maclntyre and Meilander have all made remarks that sound like a call for 
community isolation and withdrawal. (1994 p. 45) 
Kotva's defence has two main parts. Firstly, he argues that selective engagement in public 
affairs is compatible with Christian virtue theory. Secondly, he argues that the participation 
of virtuous individuals in public affairs does in fact have a more substantial impact than is 
widely realised. Of what does this selectivity consist? It consists in remaining rooted in a 
community of virtue, and of discerning from this standpoint what forms of public 
participation are appropriate: 
Sometimes one cannot remain or become a just and virtuous person and run a business or 
teach in the established schools. There may, however, be other times when faithfulness or 
virtue requires heading a university or running for office. (1994 p. 46) 
Kotva outlines several ways in which the health of societies depends on the exercise of the 
virtues, contending that "the most profound form of service a Christian community can 
provide is the cultivation of people of virtue" (1994 p. 46). He points to the importance of 
virtues in good leadership and good citizenship, and specifically to the contribution of 
communities of virtue to areas of social justice such as mediation and victim-offender 
28 Although he is chiefly concerned to develop his argument in a Christian context, Kotva also 
recognises that "There is no reason to assume that Christian communities are the only ones that can 
inculcate virtue" (1994 p. 47) 
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reconciliation, and one might add contemporary and historic prison and mental health care 
reform. His remarks on political leadership are worth quoting, because they bring out the 
importance of virtues specifically for the recognition of ambiguity and tragedy: 
we have a greater chance of being a just society if our leaders do not view or rationalise 
all their acts as right and just, but can acknowledge ambiguity and tragedy. This, 
however, requires virtues like truthfulness and courage. (Kotva 1994 p. 47) 
These points at least suggest how communities of virtue can make an impact on the whole of 
society and so contribute to the common good, and this will be expanded in the following 
Chapters 5 and 6 which will consider Muslim and Christian communities respectively in 
further detail. However, the concern remains that economic relations in capitalist systems are 
necessarily corrosive of co-operative social relations, of goods internal to practices, and of the 
common good. But must this be so? Or could it be that the ideologies which have 
accompanied capitalist economic relations have exaggerated the competitive individualist 
elements necessary for its operation? 
Gray (1995a)29 argues that too many aspects of modernity which are in fact only 
contingently related have been run together as if they were necessarily so. In particular he 
argues that the only aspects of modernity which have been truly globalized are an 
instrumental attitude to nature (disastrously in his view) and market economics. The latter 
does not, he suggests necessarily promote either individualism or democracy, and he points to 
East Asian societies as developing market economies without individualism, and to China as 
doing so without democracy. Traditions may fare better under such circumstances. 
However, even in Western societies it might be argued that the contrast between individual 
and collective interest has been overdrawn. Just as a theory of evolution which stresses 
competition between individuals and species at the cost of co-operation has presented a 
distorted picture, so have economic theories based on a false opposition between co-operation 
and competition. Of course, advocates of market systems have always claimed that these are 
the most efficient way of meeting everyone's needs; but these needs remain defined in terms of 
individual interest (Smith in Jordan 1989 p. 12). However, it is possible to argue that 
individual and collective interest cannot be simply separated: 
When people act together for the sake of mutual benefits in which they all share, then 
they are acting both in others' interests (because others gain from their actions) and in 
their own (because they gain also). ... The value of shared association cannot be split into individual portions, any more than the value of a good party, a good meeting or a good 
religious ceremony. (Jordan 1989 p. 16) 
It is therefore appropriate to seek examples of co-operative practices in capitalist societies 
which can form the basis for developing a politics of the common good. Jordan is far from 
29Gray's position is discussed further at 7.6 below. 
149 
alone in making the argument that social relations in capitalist societies are better conceived 
in terms of shared interest; few communitarians go as far as Maclntyre in asserting the 
incompatibility of advanced capitalism with traditions of civic virtue (e. g. Stout (1989), 
Poole (1991)). Connolly (1981), Jordan (1989) and McMylor (1994) all point to the 
republican tradition as offering resources for the development of such virtue, while at the 
level of practices and using the example of baseball Stout (1989) argues that capitalist 
societies can place a high value on internal goods, even if the pressure of external goods is too 
great for many. 
Connolly even argues that the visible interconnectivity of advanced capitalist societies, 
enabled by the mass media and supported by democratic institutions, creates conditions in 
which it is reasonable to expect individuals to sacrifice self interest for the common good, if 
the latter is seen to be to the long term benefit of all. In this context, he defines the common 
good as an "appeal to a shared set of purposes and standards which are fundamental to the 
way of life prized together by the participants", and argues that: 
The participants have an obligation to respond to these appeals, even when the net 
interests of everyone, when each consults only his own interests moves in another 
direction 
... 
The citizen with civic virtue is asked to give presumptive priority to those 
dimensions of his own good shared with others. (In McMylor 1994 p. 169) 
However, none of these communitarian arguments seem to take serious account of cultural 
diversity. Rather, there is a general appeal to shared ways of life or preunderstandings which 
remain uninterrupted by cultural difference. 30 Such generalisations lead to liberal accusations 
of conservatism and recourse to individual rights and the value of autonomy; but as we have 
seen, cultural survival is not easily protected by such schemes. The same vagueness haunts 
multiculturalist assertions that cultural diversity enriches the common life of a society. What 
is needed is a more specific and differentiated account of how a range of traditions may 
nurture civic virtue, and it has been suggested that Maclntyre's theory can provide the basis 
for such a model. Without it, well-intentioned multiculturalist assertions will remain subject 
to the criticisms of superficiality and tacit subordination of minority cultures to a peripheral 
role, while opponents can simply continue to assert that cultural diversity undermines 
coherence. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Despite its deficiencies, Maclntyre's account can help to develop a model of public space 
which more adequately reflects religious and cultural diversity than the alternatives 
30Connolly's formulation is typical: "to participate in life is to carry an enormous load of settled 
criteria of judgement, standards of appraisal and beliefs. In sharing a language we share imperfectly 
these pre-understandings, and we bring them to bear on specific issues. " (In McMylor 1994 p. 170) 
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considered. In particular, Maclntyre's achievement in constructing a way of thinking of 
moral, epistemological, social and economic life together is not rendered void by his inability 
to point to much from which civic virtues might develop in modern societies. In fact, 
Macintyre's rejection of modem institutions is immediately qualified: 
the rule of law ... 
has to be vindicated, injustice and unwarranted suffering have to be 
dealt with, generosity has to be exercised, and liberty has to be defended, in ways that are 
sometimes only possible through the use of governmental institutions. But each particular 
task, each particular responsibility has to be evaluated on its own merits. (1985 p. 255) 
This view is the direct product of Maclntyre's verdict that modern societies do not, except at 
the fringes, and therefore mostly away from the public arena, provide the social contexts 
necessary for the sustaining of practices, and hence virtues. Engagement in the public arena 
therefore comes to be thought of as making forays from a base in disparate tradition- 
locations. In so far as minority communities sustain practices, and this can include Muslim 
and Christian communities in Britain and elsewhere in the West, MacIntyre provides an 
account of how their moral traditions can be preserved, and of how they can influence society 
(through his models of traditions in interaction and epistemological crises), even if he is not 
optimistic about the impact such influences can have. 
However, it is possible, adopting a Maclntyrean account, to go beyond Maclntyre in 
presenting a more optimistic model for the development of civic virtue. The movements made 
by some liberals (e. g. Galston, Taylor) towards acknowledging the importance of cultural 
membership for sustaining individuals and communities, in all areas of life from the 
intellectual to the economic, makes it possible to reconceive of public space, even within 
modernity with its structural tendency to the dominance of external goods, as an interaction 
between traditions, and on the basis that traditions, including forms of liberalism, may come 
to recognise themselves as traditions. Thus while liberalism as a whole may be too incoherent 
to constitute a tradition of enquiry as Maclntyre argues, traditions within liberalism may have 
a coherent vision of the common good which can enable them to be regarded as such, even if 
their liberal convictions are an obstacle to them recognising themselves in this way. 
31 
On such a basis, liberals may still wish to argue that for historic reasons, primarily to do with 
the emergence of liberalism from the religious strife of post-reformation Europe, liberalism 
has developed particularly effective ways of handling religious diversity. To which minorities 
may reply that liberalism also developed as a legitimisation of colonialism, pointing perhaps 
instead to the relatively peaceful accommodation of minorities within Islamic, Hindu or 
Buddhist civilisations, although they must then deal with the criticism that such 
accommodation was only achieved at the cost of social stratification. 
31 For example, Maclntyre's treatment of Mill in his paper on education into public virtue suggests 
that Maclntyre regards Mill as having recognised his own tradition location, in contrast to his 
twentieth century heirs (1987). 
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Liberals can point to the capacity of capitalist societies to sustain and nurture practices (e. g. 
sports, professions), while traditioned minorities can highlight the virtues sustained by their 
communities. Each can point out the costs of the others' success. Such a model would also 
preclude the appeal to a return to moral values via religion without taking account of the 
communities and practices in which those values are embedded. The costs and benefits of 
virtue-sustaining practices and detraditioned individualism can thus be seen as part of the 
same model, which could provide a framework for public debate. 
Regarding Bauman's presentation of the moral problem of modernity as the blunting of moral 
instinct by societal complexity, and the critique of practices as the fundamental building 
blocks of Maclntyre's theory as unable to address this problem, it is possible to argue that 
recognition of one's location in a tradition, which MacIntyre regards as a virtue (1985 p. 
223), is able to provide a powerful diachronic critique of present practices. What MacIntyre's 
account perhaps lacks is a vision as broad as it is long, a synchronic vision of the distant 
implications of particular practices in complex societies. 
The virtue of awareness of tradition location can also be enriched by a recognition of the 
impossibility of knowing oneself fully, of inevitable flaws in the mirror of historical enquiry. 
In this context Turner writes: 
An older view of tradition, Oakeshott's and Polanyis's, was that much of the tradition was 
tacit and inaccessible to the persons who were the bearers and continuers of the 
tradition itself. (1990 p. 184) 
Milbank makes a similar point in the context of narrative: 
more attention must be paid to the structural complexity of narrative, and especially the 
way in which it has to assume a never fully represented synchronic setting (1990a p. 385) 
Thus an awareness that we all participate in traditions, an awareness that Maclntyre 
promotes and which he helps us conceptualise, can be developed by paying more attention to 
the synchronic setting in which we perform and in which we construct our narrative histories, 
histories that always say more than we are able to articulate, and which always assume more 
than we are able to justify. The practical implications of the position developed in this chapter 
will be examined more fully in relation to education in Chapter 8. Now attention will be 
focused on the Islamic tradition, and particularly on Muslims in Britain, to consider their 
responses to the challenges of plurality in modem societies. It will also be asked whether it is 
appropriate to understand Islam as a tradition of enquiry, as a first step to applying a model 
of 'multiculturalism as traditions in interaction' to the British context. 
Chapter 5: 
Islam and Justice in the Secular City 
5.1. Muslim Aspirations and Liberal Minority Rights 
How to translate a residual Muslim identity into a self-consciously Islamic identity is the 
challenge facing Islamic thinkers and leaders in the 1990s. (Lewis 1993b p. 169) 
This challenge faces not only Muslim leaders and opinion-formers, but British society as a whole, 
and perhaps especially educators and legislators. For if we are interested in creating a just polity, 
then we need to begin to learn to read skilfully not only the diverse claims now made by British 
Muslims, but also the tradition from which they come. 
In this chapter we shall examine Muslim responses to and resources for living as minority 
communities in predominantly post-Christian secularised societies. In the West, Muslims operate 
in a political culture where an important vocabulary available for groups within society to 
express their shared hopes is that of human rights. In Chapter 3 (3.3-3.4) we saw that rights 
discourse reflects an individualistic political culture which may be at odds with that of traditioned 
minorities, and that since 1945 notions of collective rights have fallen further out of favour. 
Nonetheless, Muslims have not been slow to adopt the language of rights to express their claims 
(UKACIA 1993). Yet the question remains: how adequate are existing conceptions of minority 
rights for expressing Muslim aspirations? 
For existing models of minority rights, the tradition to which the minority belongs, indeed the 
particular aspirations which minorities have, play no part: equality is defined in terms of the 
dominant way of life in society. This can be illustrated by recalling two cases considered in the 
preceding chapters. First, Chapter 1 (1.4) recounted a dispute in the field of 'race' relations 
between Ballard (1992) and Goering (1993), fought in the pages of New Community. To recap, 
Ballard's thesis was that approaches which emphasise the construction of categories of 'race' and 
processes of racial discrimination by dominant groups tend to neglect the individual and collective 
resources for resistance possessed and mobilized by minorities. Goering countered that Ballard 
dangerously relativises values, emphasising the importance of agreed standards in the quest for 
equality. The significant point is that while the relativising of agreed standards and equal rights 
might seem to present a slippery slope to prejudicial discrimination and ghettoization, such 
standards and rights may also conceal a cultural bias which is tacitly imposed on minority 
groups. 
A second case is Kymlicka's (1989) revised liberal justification for minority rights. Kymlicka's 
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view is that minority rights are best defended without appeal to the specific content of the ways of 
life which minorities are seeking to defend (3.4). His concern is that arguments constructed with 
reference to the particular content of traditions tie individuals within such communities to 
conformity to traditional ways of life; this may not only infringe on the rights of individuals as 
part of a national or universal polity, but could also ossify or freeze traditions themselves. In 5.4 
we shall consider'Women Against Fundamentalism' as a group which supports this stance. One 
aspect of Kymlicka's argument is that individuals suffer from the effects of discrimination 
whether they choose to follow traditional practices or not, and he seeks to build his argument for 
special rights on the basis of this inequality. 
Two difficulties with Kymlicka's approach are relevant here. Firstly, the corrosive effects of 
majority cultures on minority cultures are not reducible to the impact of discrimination by the 
majority against the minority. Simply seeking to sustain beliefs and practices different to those of 
the majority population, or, to use Berger's phrase, sustaining membership of a cognitive 
minority, itself imposes a strain. For example, a non-practising Pakistani Muslim may suffer 
discrimination in employment or harassment because of the colour of his skin; but the cognitive 
dissonance to which he is subject will be of a quite different order from that of the British Muslim 
who seeks to adhere strictly to shari'ah (Islamic law). 
Secondly, as Kymlicka's argument itself illustrates, the context in which an argument is 
developed may influence the argument produced. Kymlicka's argument is developed mainly in 
relation to the Inuit, an indigenous Canadian group, who, he contends, should retain certain land 
and voting rights within their territories, regardless of whether or not they retain traditional modes 
of life. In the case of the Inuit, their culture is closely tied to their mode of production, and the 
defence of this through special territorial rights may be sufficient to sustain their whole way of 
life. But no such close connection exists for British Muslims, whose faith has prospered in a wide 
variety of economic and cultural contexts. It therefore seems wise to consider the particular ways 
of life one is seeking to defend within one's argument. So this chapter will examine some aspects 
of Muslim life in Britain, augmenting the picture presented in Chapter 2 by concentrating on 
Muslim aspirations and Islamic law. 
However, to ask how Muslim aspirations might be recognised more fully, assumes the 
desirability of as full a recognition as possible of Muslim claims. Yet this is a contestable 
assumption, and also depends on what is meant by the term 'recognition'. One sense is simply 
understanding Muslim claims, a second that of responding to those claims by taking action to 
help meet them. This chapter focuses primarily on the first sense of recognition. ) So an attempt 
1The second sense of recognition has already received some attention at 2.12 and will receive further 
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will be made to present Muslim aspirations and Islamic understandings of justice relevant to and 
accessible within the public arena. The presentation falls into two parts. Sections 5.2 to 5.5 
examine claims which Muslims have in fact put forward, while 5.6 and 5.7 attempt to indicate the 
breadth and character of resources within the Islamic tradition which Muslims may choose to call 
upon in response to the challenges of maintaining and renewing their communities in western 
contexts. Akhtar's work in 5.5 provides something of a bridge between a range of widely 
expressed views in 5.2-5.4, and the potential challenge of an alternative tradition with its own 
distinct conceptions of justice and modes of reasoning in 5.6 and 5.7. 
One reason for presenting such alternative conceptions of justice and reasoning is to challenge the 
complacency of a dominant secular outlook which believes it has the monopoly on justice and 
rationality, in the spirit of Maclntyre's challenge to modern ethics from the standpoint of 
Aristotelian tradition. Indeed, Maclntyre recognises that his account of the development of 
Aristotelianism is incomplete without taking account of Islamic forms: 
Islamic thought requires treatment not only for its own sake but also because of its 
contribution to the Arisotelian tradition, but this too I have had to omit. (1988 p. 11) 
Maclnytre also mentions entirely non-western - Indian and Chinese - traditions with their own 
stories as counterparts to his, suggesting that a fuller conception of the common good would need 
to account for the significance of these and other traditions in the society under consideration. 
However, it is noticeable that in locating bearers of virtue-sustaining traditions in contemporary 
American society Maclntyre omits both these groups and Muslims, citing only certain 
conservative Christian and Jewish communities: 
the older moral tradition is discernible in the United states and elsewhere among, for example, 
some Catholic Irish, some Orthodox Greeks and some Jews of an orthodox persuasion, all of 
them communities that inherit their moral tradition not only through their religion, but also 
from the structure of the villages and households which their immediate ancestors inhabited 
on the margins of modem Europe. (1985 p. 252) 
Yet these minorities do not exhaust the list of such communities present in the West. Muslim 
communities also constitute a significant and widespread minority in Europe and North America, 
and many retain and all are heirs to the kind of holistic and teleologically defined understanding 
of human life which Maclntyre identifies as tradition. The following quotation shows a 
contemporary Muslim indicating the importance of directing all aspects of life to the divine telos, 
in the context of education: 
Education should aim at the balanced growth of man's spirit, intellect, the rational self, 
feelings body and the senses ... 
The ultimate aim of all Muslim education lies in the 
attention in the treatment of education at 8.2-8.5 below. 
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realisation of complete submission to God on the level of the individual, the community, and 
humanity at large. (Islamic Academy 1985 p. 78) 
5.2 British Muslim Concerns: (i) Background 
Some of the relevant background was considered in Chapter 2 (2.5-2.10); here two fresh areas 
will be emphasised. First, the differences between British Muslim groups need to be located in the 
context of a range of options facing British Muslims as possible responses to modernity, a 
modernity generated by and closely intertwined with the West (Ahmed 1992, above 2.10). 
Secondly, a sketch of the cultural context in which Muslim concerns for family life are embedded, 
and their relation to the economic context will be presented. 
A typology of Islamic responses to modernity can help to locate the options available to British 
Muslims. The nature of the connections between economic, social, political and religious life in 
part define contemporary Muslim thinking. Rippin (1993) considers several typologies for 
categorising modem Muslim groups, but throughout the book makes most use of a simple 
threefold classification of modernist, radical and traditionalist (Rippin 1993 p. 28). 
'Fundamentalist' is rejected in favour of 'radical' because the former can be a misleading term 
applied outside its original Christian and post-Christian secular context, since: 
virtually all Muslims are 'fundamentalist' in their attitude to scripture (Rippin 1993 p. 38) 
Furthermore, while radical Muslim groups are united in their emphasis on implementation of 
religion in all areas of life, Christian fundamentalists are divided. However, I retain 
'fundamentalist' where Muslims themselves choose the term, as with 'Women Against 
Fundamentalism' (5.4 below) and Akhtar (5.5 below), where the term is discussed in more depth. 
Rippin sees attitudes towards "Islamic totalism", the extent to which "Islam is seen as 
encompassing all of life in its social, political and economic spheres" as crucial to this scheme 
(1993 p. 35). All Muslims (except secularisers, who Rippin admits are "not Islamic as such", 
(1993 p. 36), accept totalism in some sense; their differences lie in their interpretation of this 
view. Thus: 
Islamic modernism wants Islam to be the basis for political life as well as the religious but 
perceives a need to reinterpret those structures in light of contemporary needs, frequently 
with clear and unapologetic adoption of Western notions. (1993 p. 37) 
For radical Islamists, all Western notions are to be regarded with suspicion, but this suspicion 
tends to be more strongly directed at Western social and political thought than at Western 
science, which radical Islamists are often at pains to accommodate within an Islamic framework. 
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But like the other categories, radical Islam comes in a wide range of forms. For example, at 5.5 
we shall consider Shabbir Akhtar's attempt to combine radicalism with philosophical and 
theological rigour in a Western context. In fact, Rippin wonders whether Akhtar may justify a 
new category outside the tripartite scheme, alongside the Islamic intellectualism of figures such as 
Mohammed Arkoun. For while Akhtar's writing supports the traditional side of radical Islam, it 
is newly embedded in a theology structured by western philosophical arguments (Rippin 1993 p. 
43, Herbert 1993a). 
For traditionalists, Islam also embraces each aspect of life, but this is so in a pre-reflective sense; 
encounter with modernity has not yet generated the self-awareness which has led to an 
articulation of a response to the Western secular/religious divide evident in secularist, modernist 
and radical positions. According to Rippin: 
Traditionalism maintains its allegiance to past methods and has not dealt with the threat and 
the attraction of the West. (1993 p. 40) 
Such attitudes are common amongst "the elite, Sufis and the lower classes, and in the Saudi 
Arabian context" (1993 p. 40). Traditionalism is significant in the UK where South Asian Islam, 
strongly influenced by Sufism, for example in the two largest groups the Brelwis and Deobandis, 
predominates, and where most South Asians are drawn from the lower strata of South Asian 
society. Such unreflective traditionalism, which seeks to perpetuate itself without engagement 
with the challenges of modernity, can be found in a wide variety of forms adapted to different 
cultural contexts, in some of which they may originally have emerged as reforming groups. Thus 
'traditionalism' does not necessarily denote proximity to the practices of early or classical Islam, 
but rather a resistance to engagement with changing circumstances which can be exhibited at any 
stage in the life of a tradition. However, as Maclntyre reminds us, such resistance to change may 
provide the context for the preservation of forms which may be a source of hope for the future. 
Second, culture, family and economics. A commonplace contrast between Muslim and non- 
Muslim attitudes in Britain is likely to be made in terms of the individualism of non-Muslims 
compared with the community and family orientation of Muslims and, indeed, other South 
Asians. Certainly, the indications are that the extended family pattern has been to a large extent 
maintained, in spite of such disruptive influences as migration, changed patterns of economic 
activity and the high financial cost of large housing units on the British market. This is reflected 
in social statistics. For example the 1981 Labour Force Survey, which found that 28% of Asian 
households contained three or more adults, compared to only 8% of white households (Poulter 
1986 pp. 68-9). This figure, of course, excludes those who can't afford very large houses but 
choose to live in the same neighbourhood to share meals and other aspects of domestic life, and 
those who live further apart but retain close social bonds in other ways. Thus Shaw comments on 
157 
the "marked continuity with life in Pakistan" which Pakistanis in Oxford have been able to 
maintain: 
on the whole, traditional attitudes to the use of domestic space have persisted and traditional 
roles continue to be expected of family members. Perhaps the most striking is the way in 
which the values ofjointness and co-operation have been maintained. The ideology of 
belonging to a wider kin group still exerts a powerful influence over relationships between 
scattered family members. (1988 p. 83) 
Such social solidarity can be interpreted as a strategy to counter the effects of prejudice in the 
wider community by drawing on cultural resources (see 1.4 above); but such a view, like its 
correlate that a revived interest in Islam by second generation Muslims for whom such cultural 
traditions have become attenuated, does not preclude the possibility that such a lifestyle may be 
desirable in itself, and may exert an enduring attraction, rather than simply providing 'temporary 
shelter' in a hostile environment. At any rate it is important to observe that British Muslims share 
not only an Islamic tradition, but also for 70-80% of them a South Asian context from which they 
or their parents have come. Thus social groupings such as biradari ('the group I belong to ; Shaw 
1988 p. 99), practices such as lena-dena ('gift exchange'), continue to exert an influence on life in 
Britain, and hence constitute a significant part of the motivational matrix in which British 
Muslim demands are made. 2 
Consideration of the interaction of cultural and economic factors can help to balance any 
potential overemphasis on ideological 'religious' factors in the life of British Muslims. Neither 
should the extent to which Muslims participate in the secular ideologies and aspirations of the 
majority be under-estimated (See Goering 1993, above 1.4). For while, as we have seen, the 
arrangements of domestic economy of British Muslims remain distinctive due to extended family 
patterns and gender roles, nonetheless in many ways British Muslims share the economic 
concerns of others in the British population. There is a danger that in highlighting issues of 
religious identity the central role of more mundane matters can be overlooked, and an exaggerated 
picture of a culturally isolated or radicalised and religiously obsessed group created. 
The wider economic picture and its impact on Muslims is also significant. As we saw in Chapter 
2 (2.6) the PSI report (1993) and other socio-economic indicators suggest that Muslims from 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds are amongst the poorest in Britain. While this overall 
picture needs to be balanced by the picture of enterprise and success painted by some studies 
(e. g. Werbner 1991), factors such as disproportionately high unemployment among ethnic 
minority groups, especially young people, need to be given full consideration. How does this 
2Also relevant in this context are patterns of marriage and divorce; see Poulter 1986 for the legal issues, 
Shaw 1988 for an ethnographic study. 
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context influence the attractiveness of different options open to British Muslims? It can be argued 
that the need to focus resources on wealth generation may divert attention from religion. But 
economic hardship may also highlight faith's significance, particularly in a religion which in 
various ways makes close connections between religious and economic, social and political life. 
Religious networks may become a focus for economic and political mobilisation. 
5.3 The Diversity of Muslim Hopes and Fears. 
A striking contrast between the different styles of participation in British society sought by 
different Muslims was evident in the presentations of Ishtiaq Ahmed, of Bradford's Community 
Relations Council, and of Dr Munir Ahmed, representative of 'Young Muslim's UK', at a day 
conference titled "Islam in the West: the Bradford Experience", held in Bradford in July 1992. 
The conference was organised by the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. Dr 
Munir Ahmed presented the sophisticated face of radical Islam; immaculately groomed in a smart 
suit, he saw Britain as a field for da'wa ('invitation' or 'mission'), and British Muslims primarily 
as agents for the spread of Islam. By contrast, the more casually dressed community worker 
challenged this perception, arguing that Muslims came to Britain primarily for economic reasons, 
not mission, and that the present priorities of Muslims concerned political representation and the 
achievement of a modest prosperity. 
According to Philip Lewis, the Bishop of Bradford's advisor on inter-faith matters, similar 
differences were in evidence at the UK Islamic Mission's annual conference in 1991 (Lewis 
1993b pp. 164-7). Here the majority of delegates were primarily concerned to obtain a 
sympathetic hearing for the concerns of British Muslims. Once again the delegate from the 
'Young Muslims UK' represented the radical face of Islam: 
Dr Ahmed pointedly reminded the seminar that the Prophet did not labour in Mecca for 
thirteen years for minority rights but rather to rid society of idolatry and to achieve success in 
this world and the hereafter. Muslims were in Britain, the land of kufr (disbelief), not to ask 
for 'petty little things' but to offer the greatest gift, Islam and the Qur'an, a light for all to 'save 
ourselves and all humanity from the fire'. (Lewis 1993b p. 166) 
While radical Islam may be a minority view on such committees, it represents an option for 
young Muslims attractive in the context of the traditionalism of mosque elders and the prejudice 
against their faith and ethnicity in the wider society. It has also been radical Muslim groups, 
especially the Jamaati-Islami (party of Islam) which have been most active in reaching out to 
Muslim youth through groups such as Young Muslims UK, producing attractive materials in 
English and confronting the obstacles to practising Islam in a non-Muslim culture. Hence their 
influence among the young has been out of proportion to their representation amongst the first 
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generation. More radical Islamic groups have also taken root, especially among students, 
including Hizb-ut-Tahrir ('Party of Liberation'), whose anti-Zionist stance, membership policy 
and confrontational style has led to media attention and controversy. 
The issues which troubled one delegate at the Islamic Mission's conference are taken by Lewis as 
an indicator of mainstream contemporary British Muslim concerns. Dr Wasti, a Vice President of 
UK Islamic Mission, presented the following "shopping list of Muslim demands": 
new legislation to prevent discrimination against Muslims in employment, housing and 
education; legislation to prevent the defamation of Islam, accommodation of Muslim family 
law and the provision of voluntary-aided Muslim schools. (In Lewis 1993b p. 164) 
Each of these four items falls squarely within the public arena I have been seeking to address in 
this thesis. Further, each concerns specific legal measures which may be reflective of the 
centrality of law to Islam, and indicative of the need to address Muslim concerns through legal 
modes of reasoning (Herbert 1993b). But perhaps most significant for the common good is that 
these demands are articulated in terms of the English legal system, and embody a willingness to 
negotiate within that common framework. Furthermore, the means through which the delegates 
sought to carry forward their arguments were principally through increased participation in the 
wider British society; through school governing bodies, local councils and other organs of local 
democracy, and through seeking the election of Muslim MPs within the mainstream political 
parties. As Lewis comments: 
The seminar's stress on pragmatism, increased participation in the institutional life of the 
nation, especially politics, and a willingness to engage in self-criticism was seen as the key to 
winning a sympathetic hearing for Muslim concerns. These emphases seem congenial to 
increasing numbers of Bradford Muslims. (Lewis 1993b p. 165) 
We have already noted the radical voice of dissent from the representative of the Young Muslims 
UK; in this context we may additionally observe both his powerful appeal to Islamic origins, and 
his dissent from the politics of conciliation and co-operation advocated by other delegates. For 
example, he describes Islam as, "a religion of the Book "intended to prevail over all other ways of 
life" (Lewis 1993b p. 166). How significant is this apparently uncompromising position for 
British Islam? We have already reviewed arguments concerning the appeal of radical Islam for 
young people. As a survival strategy, it is supported by the sociological argument that minority 
groups which erect the strongest barriers between themselves and the surrounding culture are 
most likely to retain numbers: distinctiveness survives plurality. This is probably one factor, but 
in the case of Muslim groups it is complicated by Islam's refusal to accept the confinement of 
religion to the private sphere. Thus a return to or revival of most forms of Islamic belief will 
naturally lead to political engagement, and hence to disputes in the public sphere. In this context 
the worldview of the group is subject to contestation and refute from which an acceptance of a 
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private role for religion would have insulated them. 
Both of the two largest Muslim groups in the UK, Barelvi and Deobandi, originated as reform 
movements in the nineteenth century on the Indian subcontinent, but reforming origins have not 
generally been revived in Britain; in key areas such as the education of imams in British culture, 
or providing relevant and accessible educational materials for the second and third generations, 
response has often been slow (Raza 1991, Lewis 1993b). 
Lewis' evidence suggests a variety of factors may lead to the reform of traditionalism. Perhaps 
most significant is the discontent of young Muslims with the conservatism and cultural distance 
of their elders. Radical Islam may act as a spur to mainstream community politics. British born 
Muslims are not prepared to accept second best, or to put up with racism. As we have seen, 
'Young Muslims UK' seeks both to bridge the cultural gap and provide grounds for political 
engagement by following the radical Islamist route of building a bridge directly from Islamic 
origins to the present, bypassing 'cultural accretions', and hence undermining the authority of 
elders. Such radical groups may force the mainstream to become more politically active to avoid 
losing the young. 
5.4 The Search for Representation and Recognition 
(i) The Muslim Institute, Muslim Manifesto and Muslim Parliament 
The Muslim Parliament has provided another forum for the presentation of radical Islamist 
views, but as Lewis points out, its neglect of local accountability in selection of its members may 
have undermined its credibility. The 'Parliament' is the brainchild of Kalim Siddiqui, founder and 
director of the Muslim Institute. During the 1980s the institute identified closely with the 'Islamic 
Movement', a mostly Sunni network supporting the Shi'i revolution in Iran, and "engaged in an 
increasingly lively interchange with the British media" (Nielsen 1991 p. 468). These two 
strategies attracted radical Islamist sympathies, especially amongst Muslim youth. The launch of 
'The Muslim Manifesto' at a public conference in London on 14 July 1990 also led to media 
controversy. 
The document describes itself as "a common text defining the Muslim situation in Britain" and 
seeking "to provide a common framework for the healthy growth of all parts of the community as 
well as a common Muslim identity and purpose" (Nielsen 1991 p. 469). The text operates 
between the poles of obedience to British law and the obligation on Muslims to live in "pursuit of 
Allah's good pleasure alone". The context is perceived to be a hostile British society which 
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combines the anti-Islamic inheritance of Christendom with the anti-religious bias of the 
Enlightenment: 
No religion, least of all Islam, is to be allowed a place in public affairs, even those affairs 
that affect Muslims themselves ... 
It is for Muslims to 'grow up' and join the mainstream of 
western civilization. (in Nielsen 1991 p. 470) 
Two of the issues raised by the document - hostility to Islam and education - are discussed 
elsewhere in the thesis. 3 The tine of the document can be indicated by noting its conservative 
interpretation of jihad (i. e. as armed struggle rather than struggle to establish Islam in a broader 
sense), thus ossifying relations with other groups in a western milieu into implacable opposition. 
Perhaps this interpretation is not surprising in the context of perceived hostility; and yet it does 
not represent the range of Muslim opinion: 
Many Muslims would regard their struggle to achieve an acceptable Muslim lifestyle in 
Europe to be their great ýiý had, and they certainly do not think of an armed struggle! (Nielsen 
1991 p. 474) 
Thus while aiming to provide a common framework for all Muslims in Britain the Manifesto 
succeeded only in expressing the views of a minority within the minority. The same can be said of 
the Muslim Parliament, whose 155 original members were selected from the forty Muslim 
Manifesto groups which Siddiqui had set up around Britain (Parekh 1992 p. 4). Nonetheless, it 
will be apparent from the criticisms of liberal accounts of minority rights (3.3-3.4,5.1) that there 
is evidence that even the most accommodating of liberal positions has an 'assimilationist 
undertow'. This perception is apparently reflected in the Muslim Manifesto in the statement "It is 
for Muslims to 'grow up' and join the mainstream of western civilization" (in Nielsen 1993 p. 
470). 
Such statements urge us to ask ourselves how much and what kind of coherence in belief and 
practice a plural, liberal society requires, and how much of what is at present expected is the 
product of prejudice, and not of necessity. Also, in so far as minority groups seek greater control 
over their own members, we are urged to raise questions about the relation between individual 
rights and the rights of cultural and religious communities, recognising that the survival of such 
communities may be at stake. Without radical groups like the Muslim Parliament, perhaps such 
important questions are less likely to be asked. Thus while they are unrepresentative and gain 
disproportionate media coverage which could inflame prejudice, this cost to the Muslim 
community needs to be weighed against their ability to put issues on the public agenda. 
3Education at 2.8 and 8.2-8.5, hostility to Islam at 2.6 and 2.11. 
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(ii) The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) 
The efforts of the Muslim Institute illustrate both the difficulties in creating a Muslim 
representative body, and the demand for representation in the public arena by British Muslims. 
During the early to mid 1990s the focus of campaigning for Muslim rights seems to have shifted 
to other organizations, for example The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA). 
Formed during The Satanic Verses controversy in 1989, it indicates the growth in the 
organization and sophistication of Muslim groups in the public presentation of their opinions. An 
example is its glossy 1993 submission The Need for Reform: Muslims and the law in multi-faith 
Britain, presented to the Home Secretary to represent Muslim views on racial equality legislation 
at the time of the Commission for Racial Equality's (CRE) second review of the 1976 Race 
Relations Act. The document suggests some convergence of Muslim opinion on the direction 
which campaigning for greater recognition for Muslims should take, witnessed by the wide range 
of organizations represented. 4 
The UKACIA document calls for an end to the dominance of race as the defining category of 
difference in British legislation, and seeks legislation outlawing racial vilification, incitement to 
religious hatred, and discrimination on religious grounds (1993 pp. 17-18). The An-Nisa Society 
et al. 's response to the CRE's review looks at a wide range of implications of the dominance of 
racial and ethnic categorization, pointing to the implications in the areas of fostering and 
adoption, housing, service delivery and policy monitoring (1993 pp. 41-50). The sophisticated 
engagement with detailed policy issues contrasts with the dualism of the Muslim Institute's 
presentation the Muslim Manifesto; here is a serious engagement with liberal arguments and 
institutions. Yet the extension of religious identity into more areas of life is for some groups a 
cause for great concern, and may be seen as more dangerous than the apocalyptic rhetoric of the 
Institute. An example of such a groups is 'Women Against Fundamentalism'. 
(iii) Women Against Fundamentalism 
Some Muslims fear that an increased assertion of religious identity among British Muslims may 
provide an opportunity for traditional male leadership to reassert its authority over Muslim 
communities in a way that represses diversity, and especially the views of women. This position 
is represented by the "Women Against Fundamentalism" (WAF) group, formed on 6 May 1989, 
once again in the wake of the Rushdie Affair. WAF consists of women from different religious 
4Organizations contributing to the UKACIA production (1993) include: An-Nisa Society, Muslim 
Women's Helpline, Muslim Wise, The Muslim Update, Union of Muslim Organizations. 
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backgrounds and none. WAF opposes 'fundamentalism', which is understood as a phenomenon 
found across different religious traditions. WAF recognises the diversity of religious traditions, 
but argues: 
What is common to all fundamentalist movements, however, is that they claim their version 
of religion to be the only true one. They use political means to impose it on all members of 
their religion and feel threatened by pluralist systems of thought. (Saghal and Yuval-Davies 
1990 p. 3) 
Those arguing for increased recognition of religious or cultural identity have criticised 
multiculturalism as subordinating culture to liberal ideology at crucial points (e. g. Hulmes 1989). 
By contrast, WAF have argued that multiculturalism already goes too far in defining individuals 
in terms of their cultural background. WAF emphasises the internal diversity of minority 
communities and the rights of individuals to shape their own identities. This latter point is 
especially crucial for women, who according to WAF, are seen by 'fundamentalist' groups as the 
main agents in the transmission of tradition, and therefore: 
at the heart of all fundamentalist agendas is the control of women's minds and bodies. (1990 
p. 1) 
One particular problem which stems from the early days of multiculturalist policies (1970s) is the 
way in which unelected 'community leaders' are selected to represent minority views. Yasmin Ali 
(in Saghal and Yuval-Davies 1992) has pointed out that this pattern reproduces the selection of 
'representatives' in colonial practice, and has led to the dominance of a conservative male 
leadership. The new emphasis on religious identity provides this leadership, threatened by the 
growing autonomy of women and the radicalism of youth, with an opportunity to reassert its 
dominance. 
However, the issue of the democratic accountability of community representatives is analytically 
separable from the wider issue of women's rights and cultural transmission. The former needs to 
be seen both in the context of the widespread loss of democratic accountability in public 
organizations in Britain during the last fifteen years, 5 and of a more general decline in 
democratic participation in the Western world (Johnston 1993). In this wider context, the 
selection of community leaders is another example of the concentration of power in the hands of a 
managerial elite. But although it compounds it, this problem is separable from the issue of 
recognition of cultural and religious membership, and the possible costs of the latter in terms of 
individual rights. 
5Examples of this the loss of elected representatives on hospital governing bodies and the reduction of 
local authority control over education, proliferation of non-elected QUANGOs (Quasi Autonomous Non 
Governmental Organisations). 
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WAF takes up some positions which directly oppose the UKACIA document, for example on the 
issue of religious schools, and over the provision of non-religiously based shelters for women 
fleeing domestic violence. While education is not a major issue in the cited UKACIA document, 
support for separate Muslim schools is clearly implied in the main statement (1993 pp. 4-6), 
while in the supporting evidence the Al-Nisa society et al. write: 
The refusal to grant Muslim schools, such as Islamia Primary School in Brent, London, 
voluntary-aided status is perceived by the vast majority of Muslims as clear evidence of the 
hostility and prejudice prevalent in society at large against them. (UKACIA 1993 p. 44) 
By contrast, WAF's opposition to religious schools is based on the view that: 
All religious schools have a deeply conformist idea of the role of women. They will deny girls 
opportunities which they are just beginning to seize. (1990 p. 2) 
But must this be so? It is either necessarily true, or true in practice, that religious schools deny 
women opportunities? To take one example, the headmistress of Feversham College, Bradford, 
has justified her school precisely on the grounds that the provision of a supportive Muslim 
environment provides parents with the confidence to allow their daughters to continue in 
education, and thus to benefit from greater educational opportunities. 
6 The small number of girls 
now beginning to progress from Bradford Muslim Girls' school to Bradford and Ilkley 
Community College to train as teachers testifies to the fruits of this policy. 
An extension of this kind of approach can be found in those higher education institutions which 
provide additional support for students with cultural or religious needs through means ranging 
from curriculum modifications to special transport, means which therefore may entail different 
programmes and some separation from other students. Two examples are Westhill College 
Birmingham's scheme for teacher training in RE with a specialism in Islam, and S. Martin's 
College Lancaster and Edge Hill CHE's joint scheme for training teachers from minority 
backgrounds, which is explicitly designed to increase the numbers of minority teachers in 
Lancashire. Taking account of religious sensitivities may thus enable wider participation and 
individual fulfilment. Separate schools catering for religious needs may be supported along these 
lines. 
However, the opportunities which WAF has in mind may be of a broader nature; it may objected 
that slightly broadening opportunities from a narrow religiously determined base is an 
unsatisfactory implementation of equal opportunities. Or that education should involve an 
6This information was gathered during an interview in 1992. 
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initiation into pluralism - an empowerment to make individual choices - which is incompatible 
with the ethos of a religious school. One important question here is one of whether a religious 
school can present students with a sufficiently broad and critical perspective to enable them to 
make their own life-choices. 
Such phrasing suggests that the differences between the WAF and UKACIA positions can be 
seen in terms of the autonomy-heteronomy/liberal-traditional minority typology of Fitzmaurice 
which we considered in Chapter 3 (3.4). For WAF, religious schools will not enable women to 
develop the autonomy needed to seize the opportunities available, while for UKACIA without 
sufficient rootedness in their cultural community, and in particular its religious identity, 
individuals will lose meaning, purpose and even effectiveness, since they will not know who they 
are, or where they are going. 
The issue of provision of shelters for women fleeing domestic violence can perhaps be understood 
in the same way. Muslim organizations argue for the importance of support within the religious 
community, secular institutions being unable to appreciate the issues involved. By contrast, 
women's groups may see independent advice and support as imperative, perhaps seeing religious 
communities and attitudes as a major obstacle to empowering women to make their own, 
autonomous, decisions. As was argued in Chapter 3, at the root of minority cultural groups' 
desire for recognition is often a struggle for cultural survival; the struggle to pass on their ways 
of life and/or religious beliefs to their children, in a context in which it will not be impossible for 
these in turn to perpetuate and transmit the tradition to the next generation, and so on. At certain 
points this goal seems inevitably to clash with the cultural value of autonomy so highly prized in 
secular societies. 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that Maclntyre's model of traditions might at least allow us to see 
the opposing points of view with a common framework, without distorting the arguments of each 
beyond the point of recognition by the different parties involved. This possibility of a mode of 
presentation recognised by both parties would be a considerable advance over a position where 
each party simply cannot recognise the other's image of them. According to Maclntyre's model, 
radical innovation is a proper, indeed essential aspect of the development of tradition; yet equally 
crucial is a recognition of the traditional roots from which such innovation springs. The attempt 
to begin again as if from nothing is both philosophically untenable (7.4) and a dangerous illusion. 
Thus both autonomy and the authority of tradition are admitted in qualified form. 
However, it is easier to envisage this kind of theoretical harmonization than to come up with ways 
of sustaining constructive dialogue or even mutual recognition in practice. An abstract synthesis 
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is always vulnerable to the criticism that it is useless unless people come to recognise it and 
realise in practice. At least this kind of model has the advantage that it doesn't dissolve people's 
differences; it leaves distinct identity and unique foundations intact. But what does it suggest in 
practice in this case? 
It may suggest some criticism of WAF's positions, to allow a more positive view of religious 
tradition. For example, WAF calls for: 
A development of social policy that addresses the genuine needs of women, and which does 
not attempt to deal with them on the basis of racist and sexist assumptions as to how they are 
expected to behave according to their particular racial or cultural origin. (1990 p. 2) 
But, what are these'genuine needs'? Who defines them? Do they not include religious and cultural 
needs? Does consideration of religious and cultural background necessarily mean reduction to 
stereotype? The language here seems to imply that these needs are known; yet they are not 
specified. The discourse is reminiscent of the "secular fundamentalism" found by D'Costa found 
in his analysis of the Rushdie affair (1990b, above 2.2), raising the suspicion that here again a 
dominant secular discourse finds it unnecessary to present its arguments, which are so powerfully 
entrenched that their validity can be tacitly assumed. Yet, as with the Rushdie affair, both sides - 
here feminists and Muslim organizations, there the liberal press and Muslim organizations - see 
themselves as under threat from the power of the other group. Muslims see a globally dominant 
secularism, feminists see men seeking to dominate women, journalists see militant Islam 
threatening liberties. 
WAF may respond, for example in the case of women fleeing domestic violence, that it is for 
women themselves to make choices about their lives, and not male community leaders: autonomy 
is different from and morally superior to heteronomy. They are not seeking to impose another 
form of heteronomy, a secular feminist ideology, but to restore autonomy to women. Women can 
choose to go back to their husbands if they want, but let them choose. There is a certainly a valid 
point here, concerning coercion. What WAF fear is that if support for women is left to 'the 
community', then women will be denied real choices. While secular provision may undermine 
religious authority, it does a least offer women a choice. Such arguments are powerful, even 
compelling. However, if the this argument id forwarded form a position which blindly claims 
universal validity then it will continue to provoke Muslim hostility, and hinder the process of 
constructive interaction between traditioned minorities and the secular majority. 
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5.5 Shabbir Akhtar on Muslims, Christians and British Society. 
As we have seen, British Muslims today face a bewildering variety of challenges in attempting to 
shape their identity as a participatory minority community in British society. Many of these 
challenges are common to other ethnic minorities, for example the maintenance of minority 
languages. But British Muslims have probably received the most public attention, as Honeyford, 
The Satanic Verses controversy and the Gulf crisis remind us. Lewis, outlines some specific 
challenges: 
At the moment the Muslim communities in Britain are characterised by a welter of 
experiments and much confusion: should they vote for the British Islamic party? Should they 
endorse the proposal for a 'Muslim Parliament', which shorn of its rhetoric means an Islamic 
equivalent of the Jewish Board of deputies?... Should Muslims continue to support the 
mainstream political parties, while seeking to transcend sectarianism and develop a genuine 
umbrella organisation, which could liase with the government, churches and other public 
bodies?... For how long will it be feasible to depend on religious teachers from South Asia, 
most of whom are not equipped to present Islam as intellectually intelligible and socially 
relevant to British Muslims? (1991b p. 410) 
Five years later the more extreme options of a British Islamic Party and the Muslim Parliament 
have become less prominent, but the fundamental challenges of representation and recognition 
remain. These issues in turn imply challenges for the whole of British society; educationally, 
legislatively and in terms of identity, how do we come to terms with a multi-cultural, multi- 
religious but predominantly post-Christian environment? 
It is in this context that we turn to the work of Shabbir Akhtar, a British Muslim who has been 
concerned with trying to persuade Muslims to reflect creatively, radically and carefully on their 
faith in a British context. Akhtar has been both an activist, concerned to promote what he 
believes to be Muslim interests, and a scholar, who through his writings reflects critically on both 
Muslim and Christian faiths, and on secular beliefs. As such he is a useful person to consider 
when seeking to relate the challenges of life in a multi-cultural society to the theological bases of 
faith and the philosophical bases of secular beliefs. 
Both the extent to which his views represent those of British Muslims, and some aspects of his 
scholarship, can be questioned, questions which draw us back to the issues of representation and 
recognition for British Muslims. For the most part he has stood away from the factionalism of 
British Islam, refusing to get involved in mosque politics, and serving as an independent member 
of the Bradford Council for Mosques. When I first met him in 1991 he was working as 
educational officer for Bradford's Community Relations Council (CRC). Since then he moved 
first to London and then to Hove, pursuing his career as a freelance writer and academic. At this 
time he was briefly involved with Kalim Siddiqui's 'Muslim Parliament', a controversial affiliation 
168 
for British Muslims as we have seen (5.4i). 7 In 1993 he produced a handbook for Muslim 
parents in association with the London based Islamia Schools Trust (Akhtar 1993). Since 1993 
he has taught philosophy in the Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Prior to this 
appointment he also travelled and studied in the Middle East. 
Akhtar has strong Western academic credentials: a Cambridge philosophy degree and a Canadian 
doctorate in philosophy of religion, for which he was supervised by Kai Nielsen. By 1991 he had 
published five books and numerous articles, through which he has addressed a wide range of 
issues, including responding to The Satanic Verses controversy (1989), producing a wide ranging 
critique of contemporary Islam (1990a), exploring the effects of the Enlightenment on 
Christianity (his doctoral work, 1990b), and producing "an Islamic Theology of Liberation" 
(1991b). During his break from tertiary education (up to 1993) he continued producing work of a 
high academic standard, shown in its publication in respectable academic journals such as the 
Selly Oak Colleges' journal Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 
However, his depth of knowledge of his own tradition can be questioned as can his representative 
status for British Muslims, as an intellectual without sectarian affiliation. He lacks a traditional 
Islamic scholarly training, although this deficiency also makes him typical of Muslims raised in 
the West , 
few of whom have such training. His study and teaching in Islamic contexts since 1991 
indicates his commitment to attaining a deeper immersion in Islamic tradition. His work with 
Bradford CRC in education, with the Council for Mosques, and with the Muslim Parliament, 
together indicate close contact in the British Muslim community at a variety of levels. His 
distance from the Brelwi and Deobandi Sufism of the majority of British Muslims may serve as 
much to enhance his relevance to a second generation frustrated with traditionalism, as to 
distance him from the perspective of mosque elders. His familiarity with Western discourses may 
equip him, like a post-colonial Sayyid Ahmed Khan, to explore new ways of maintaining fidelity 
to Islam under changing circumstances. 
Behind this attention to his credentials lie important questions of representation and credibility in 
the eyes of different audiences. Through these questions Akhtar raises in his person the broader 
question of representation: "Who has the right to say what Islam today should be? " Is it the 
Muslim elders, raised in the subcontinent? Or the mostly imported imams? Or British born, 
Western-educated Muslims? Or the array of 'representative bodies' through which any of the 
7For example, a 1991 BBC local radio phone-in in Bradford found that 90% of Muslim callers 
opposed Dr Siddiqui's proposals, although clearly the typicality of this sample can also be 
questioned. 
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former interest groups may express themselves? Or, significantly for those who study British 
Islam, the scholar trained in secular or Christian influenced academia? This is neither an 
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive list, and different forms of representation may be appropriate 
in different arenas. Yet such a list, especially when one adds the popular media through which 
most of the British public receives it impression of Islam, serves to indicate the confusing welter 
of voices and images surrounding British Islam, and can thus serve to help us reflect on our own 
understanding and motivation. 
Frequently, among both scholars and believers, an implicit essentialism operates. 8 It is tacitly 
assumed that there is an essential 'something' which is the'real Islam', against which all else is 
judged. This may be expressed in forms such as 'He's so ignorant of his own tradition' (yet the 
scholar may impose his view of a division between religion and politics alien to Islam), or'But 
the Prophet never intended that', yet the fundamentalist may neglect alternative hadith, or 
generations of traditional interpretation. Selectivity is inevitable if evaluations are to be made of 
a diverse tradition, but the presuppositions involved need to be acknowledged; here I am calling 
for recognition of the importance of what might be called 'implicit theology' or 'implicit 
philosophy'; throughout the thesis the need for reflect upon tradition-location has been stressed. 
Akhtar is an academic who has attacked the 'liberal establishment', which is perhaps the 
backbone of academia, especially in his description of the press response to the fatwa against 
Salman Rushdie as "The Liberal Inquisition" (1989 pp. 37-63,2.11 above). He claims, in certain 
guises, to represent the common Muslim person. Indeed, it was on the issue of The Satanic 
Verses that he first decided to speak out on behalf of British Muslims. He sees "The Liberal 
Inquisition" against Muslims who protested against The Satanic Verses as stemming from a 
pattern of beliefs which D'Costa (1990b, 2.2 above) has described as "secular fundamentalism". 
D'Costa's term here fits Akhtar's accusations against liberalism well; both highlight and protest 
against a position which refuses to recognise the contingency of Western secularism, thus 
propagating an ideology which, like other ideologies co-opted under the Western label 
"fundamentalism", claims that society can only prosper peacefully when its own ideology 
prevails. 
It was in this context that Akhtar spoke, campaigned and wrote with indignation, In several 
articles in the press, and especially in Be Careful with Muhammad!, he attempted to explain to a 
non-Muslim audience, and to articulate on behalf of Muslims, the pain which the publication of 
The Satanic Verses had caused to Muslims. As he explains in the preface to this book: 
An illiterate woman in Bradford went to see her teenage daughter's schoolteacher, who said to 
81-lalliday's (1996) comments on linguistic essentialism are pertinent here, see 8.1 below. 
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her: 'The Satanic Verses is brilliant! In Britain we like to read great literature. ' She remained 
silent and returned home. This book is an attempt to explain that inarticulate believer's 
anguish. (1989 Preface) 
Many Muslims were offended by The Satanic Verses, but were also uncertain about the 
appropriate response. In her Letter to Christendom (1989) the expatriate Syrian Muslim writer 
Rana Kabbani explains: 
I was caught, it seemed to me, between two tyrannies - that of Ayatollah Khomeini's 
unacceptable death sentence against a writer who had poked fun at the prophet Mohammed 
and, in reaction, the harsh condemnation of the West of what it saw as a barbaric alien 
culture. (1989 p. ix) 
Akhtar has been less compromising in his approach. In September 1991 in the Muslim News he 
wrote that the opposition to The Satanic Verses had been "absolutely right", while on 'The Late 
Show' in December 1991 he added that he had learned nothing from the whole controversy. 
Akhtar is also prepared to use the label 'fundamentalist' to describe himself. Fundamentalism is a 
word often associated with fanaticism, interpreted most charitably as the misguided reaction of 
the insecure to the threat of change (Gill 1989). But it is worth distinguishing the 
'fundamentalism' which Akhtar and other Muslims choose as a badge of self-identity, from the 
various psychological and sociological reductions which have been offered of it. The latter, 
Akhtar admits, play a part in explaining some people's behaviour; but they do not tell the whole 
story. 9 Akhtar's understanding of 'fundamentalist' corresponds closely to the first use of the term 
by the conservative Christians who wrote a series of tracts known as The Fundamentals between 
1908 and 1915, that is as a return to fundamentals of belief (Corner in Coggins and Houlden 
1990 p. 243). Thus Akhtar writes of his own position: 
Islam at any given period of its history is authentic only in so far as it resembles the original 
faith... [this is] a view with which I have, in most moods, a lot of sympathy. (1990a p 19) 
He has also defended a 'dictation' theory of inspiration of the Qur'an (1991 a), analogous to 
Christian fundamentalists' position on the genesis of their scripture, the Bible. Yet this view can 
apparently be combined with considerable flexibility in interpretation, as indicated by following 
statement: 
Islam is properly to be seen as a raw material entering the world from heaven, waiting to be 
moulded and shaped. (1990a p. 20. ) 
Thus Akhtar takes Islamic fundamentalism seriously as a pious and potentially defensible 
9His point here parallels Milbank's permission of 'ad hoc reductive suspicion' at 7.2 below. 
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strategy, certainly one to be defended polemically against secular fundamentalism, such that he 
writes: 
What the English newscaster calls suicide may still be martyrdom in God's eyes. (1990a p. 
189) 
Religion might still be something worth dying for, certainly something worth getting angry about; 
and the revelation to Mohammed is still, to use Christian terms I do suspect he may find 
appropriate, 'good news; he is an 'evangelical Muslim'. But he combines this with considerable 
respect and sympathy for atheism, to the extent that he presented atheistic arguments with such 
force in "A Faith for All Seasons" that the Muslim Times reviewer felt he had lost his faith. I° He 
believes that a critical and reflective spirit belongs in the Muslim faith alongside zeal, creating 
tensions which he has difficulties in resolving, but which are of interest to anyone who seeks to 
combine critical study with devotion to faith. 
The use of the term 'fundamentalist' must also be considered in the context of Islamic revival 
movements, which have traditionally understood themselves to be returning to the fundamentals 
of Islamic faith. As Esposito writes: 
The concepts of renewal (taidid) and reform islah are fundamental components of Islam's 
worldview, rooted in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. Both concepts involve a call 
for a return to the fundamentals of Islam (i. e. Qur'an and Sunna; more widely the praxis of 
the early, especially Medinan, ummah. ) (1994 p. 115) 
Differing Western and Islamic views of fundamentalism also need to be understood through the 
contrast between Enlightenment and Islamic worldviews, The Enlightenment's polemic against 
tradition, its rejection of its own past as one of unreason opposed to the new age of reason, and 
its beliefs in progress and evolution, contrast with Islamic beliefs in an originally perfect 
revelation and its ideal expression in the life of Mohammed and the early ummah. This Islamic 
understanding forms part of a view of history, frequently repeated in the Qur'an, in which Allah 
continually sets his people on the straight path through prophetic revelation and from which they 
wander, only to be corrected, wander again, and so on, until the final and definitive revelation in 
the Qur'an itself. The emphasis on revelation as setting the boundaries to right living, and on the 
human tendency to wander from these prescribed boundaries, indicates Islam's affinities to the 
other Semitic faiths, and its contrast with the more optimistic narratives of the Enlightenment, 
particularly those emphasising human capacities for self-improvement, freedom and autonomy. In 
spite of these contrasts, Aklitar sees the possibility of some sort of rapprochement between 
Islamic and Enlightenment traditions in his The Light in the Enlightenment (1990b). He sees the 
Enlightenment's emphasis on rationality as challenging Islam to rediscover its own formidable 
"Personal communication, 1991. 
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intellectual tradition. In this context that Akhtar's criticisms of contemporary Islam need to be 
understood. 
Akhtar believes that generally Islam has failed to respond constructively to the challenges of 
secularism: 
At least since the end of the nineteenth century the entire house of Islam has been surviving 
on an intellectual overdraft. (1990a p. 204) 
He seems to perceive the central challenge here as an intellectual one, whereby an increasingly 
comprehensive materialist understanding of the world renders theistic interpretations increasingly 
irrelevant. He writes of this threat: 
Secularity is becoming more and more pronounced even in the most traditional Muslim 
countries. (1990a p. 9) 
Western secularity poses a serious threat to ... all the theistic faiths. (1990a p. 13) 
Such a position does not require a once-for-all knock-down proof for or against the theistic case, 
but rather its effects can be seen as cumulative and attritional in the manner described by post- 
foundationalist thinkers such as Richard Rorty, 11 who illustrates this kind of effect with 
examples from earlier European intellectual history: 
Europe did not decide to accept the idiom of Romantic poetry, or of socialist politics, or of 
Galilean mechanics. That sort of shift was no more an act of will than it was a result of 
argument. Rather, Europe gradually lost the habit of using certain words and gradually 
acquired the habit of using certain others. (1989 p. 6) 
Such a process does not depend upon vast numbers of people understanding an argument, but 
rather can have a largely unrecognised and far more widespread effect than a formal argument 
ever could. Rorty borrows an image from Davidson to help us picture this process: 
Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught us to 
think of the history of a coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, 
and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors. (1989 p. 16) 
Hence, for example, scientific revolutions become "'metaphoric redescriptions' of nature rather 
than insights into the intrinsic nature of nature" (Rorty 1989 p. 16). Such an argument can be 
applied to all forms of knowledge, since for many it no longer seems possible to found human 
knowledge systems on incontrovertible premises - the foundationalist goal. Akhtar accepts these 
anti/post foundationalist arguments, for example in the following passage: 
11Rorty's argument concerning the power of metaphor was first introduced at 1.13 above. 
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The recent attacks on classical foundationalism have helped us to realise that it is possible to 
arrive at a rational stance in several different ways such that the rationality of our believings 
is not necessarily tied to a foundational construal involving the derivation of inferences from 
agreed premises. (1990b p. 134) 
Instead, it is understood that knowledge systems grow up and maintain themselves organically, as 
the coral reef metaphor used earlier illustrates. Knowledge is, to use MacIntyre's terms, tradition 
bound. This position finds empirical support in Bellah's work, summarised at 3.4 above, which 
suggested that the moral discourse of middle Americans cannot be understood in foundationalist 
terms (Bellah et al. 1985). Bellah explained his results in terms of the dominance of individualism 
in American life, which makes it difficult to make sense of life in a broader, purposive 
framework. But, as we saw, Stout argues that Bellah's subjects may well participate in a broad 
structure of meaning, but that if this structure does not take foundational form it will be show up 
using Bellah's methods of inquiry. The lives of middle Americans - or anyone else - may gain 
their meaning from participation in a variety of 'stories' woven around particular relationships 
and settings; not by deriving their lives from basic moral principles. Stout illustrates his 
argument from the case of 'Brian Palmer': 
Brian's justification of life does not, as the authors think, rest on a "fragile foundation" (1985 
p. 8), for it does not rest on a foundation at all. It rests on the details of his story. It is by 
telling his story and by implicitly invoking its evaluative framework that Brian initially 
understands his life... "Habits of the Heart" seems at times to assume ... that what 
Brian's life 
needs is a philosophical foundation -a principle that will stop the regress of answers to 
Socratic questions. (1988 p. 198) 
Rather, the stories which Stout proposes make sense of Bellah's subjects' moral discourse may 
form part of practices which maintain internal goods; and hence resist the individualism of which 
Bellah sees their incoherence as symptomatic. These practices may be sustained by family 
networks, networks of friends, clubs, associations and local communities. It is clear from the 
following statement that Akhtar recognises the strength of such post-foundationalist arguments: 
One cannot, it seems, claim that one belief system is superior to another without begging the 
question against the opponent, or at least without appealing to a highly controversial standard 
of rational plausibility. The philosophical arsenal cannot ensure victory for any given party; 
there seems to be no higher tribunal for settling fundamental controversies. (1990a p. 105) 
The implication would seem to be that the task of trying to demonstrate that one belief system is 
conclusively superior to another is futile. Furthermore, acknowledgement that belief change is 
driven by forces far more pervasive than argument alone would seem to severely limit the role of 
apologetics as traditionally conceived; rational argument is but one weapon in the persuasive 
armoury. Nonetheless, Akhtar asserts the need for a creative theological response to defend the 
reasonableness of theism: 
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Unless the theologian can find a creative mechanism- a metaphysic, a mode of thought- to 
express old insights, render them relevant and compel new ones, theism will become 
effectively irrelevant even if it expresses eternal truths. (1990a p. 16) 
For this task he finds the attempts of most contemporary Muslim apologists sadly deficient. For 
example, on attempts to defend the scientific inerrancy of the Qur'an he writes: 
There is much optimism in the Muslim camp, with some writers even claiming to have 
rendered the Koran fully acceptable, in terms of its scientific content, to western scientific 
humanity... the entire attempt is nothing but a remarkably ingenuous and facile handling of 
scripture in the service of unconvincing apologetic ends. (1990a pp. 52-4) 
He points to the inconsistency of apologists who rejoice when scientific claims tally with the 
Qur'an, and then either declare scientific views wrong or irrelevant when they conflict. For 
Akhtar their fundamental error is hermeneutical because such apologists ignore the primary 
intention of the text. Thus: 
The emphasis on the secular scientific resources of the Koran loses all focus on its rich 
resources as a religious document... It was delivered in the first instance, in essential part, as 
an indictment of Arab paganism. That was the original intent of the revelation. It would be 
nothing less than laughable to suggest that the Koran was motivated by a desire to supply 
scientific learning, and that enigmatically, to a generation placed one and a half millennia 
later in the stream of history. (1990a p. 56) 
Yet by insisting on a primary 'religious meaning' he runs the risk of falling into the trap which he 
believes to have caught so many "sophisticated Christians", such as Richard Swinburne (1990a p. 
70). The trap lies in the hermeneutical procedure of distinguishing cultural husk from true 
religious message. For, he argues, it is not possible to: 
distinguish in any unquestion-begging way ... 
between the religious message presumed to be 
true and the culturally specific incarnation presumed to be false. (1990a pp. 70-71) 
It is not easy to see how these last two statements can be held to be consistent with one another. 
In the first he suggests that original primary intent can be reliably discerned, implying that 
anything else, such as explanations of natural phenomena, are of secondary significance. Yet in 
the second quotation he questions the validity of such a procedure. The tension between the two 
passages seems to me illustrative of the unresolved tensions between fundamentalism and reform 
present in Akhtar's work. 
For the most part Akhtar does not deny that creative re-interpretation of Islamic tradition can and 
must take place, as implied in the above reference to the need for the theologian to find a "creative 
mechanism" to "express old insights, render them relevant and compel new ones". He insists that 
interpretation takes place in some sort of creative fidelity between the two hermeneutical poles of 
the original intent of the text and a serious and balanced view of the modem world, and contrasts 
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such a method with much recent Muslim work in the radical Islamist camp, in which modernity is 
seen as a Western plague, and extra-Islamic claims are ignored. 
Why should it be that much modern Muslim thought is so hostile to extra-Islamic claims? As well 
as sociological and historical explanations (dramatic loss of power since the eighteenth century; 
colonial and neo-colonial experience), Akhtar argues that questioning and speculation have not 
generally been encouraged in the Islamic tradition. In the Qur'an, he argues, while a reflective, 
meditative mood is encouraged at certain points, the dominant emphasis is on obedience and 
submission. Hence he writes: 
There are no specifically Islamic reasons for encouraging a Muslim to undertake any unduly 
critical study of his basic religious convictions. (1990a p. 36) 
When it comes to translating these basic religious convictions into practice, he notes that the 
dominance of the imams has tended to fossilise interpretation of Islamic law (shari'ah . 
In doing 
so, he appears to joins a succession of Islamic reformers who have argued that the gate of i'tý ihad 
(new interpretation of Islamic law) should be re-opened (see 5.7 below). Esposito writes of this 
reforming tradition: 
Despite the general tendency in Sunni Islam after the tenth century to follow ( glid) the 
consensus of the community, great renewers or revivalists like al-Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, 
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and Shah Wali Allah claimed the right to function as 
mujtahids, practitioners of i'tý ihad, and thus to reinterpret Islam in order to purify and 
revitalise their societies. (Esposito 1994 p. 116) 
Akhtar also finds grounds for optimism in Islam's evaluation of'ilm (knowledge). He sees in 
Islamic arguments for the compatibility of science with the Qur'an a grain of truth, in that he 
understands the Qur'an to contain a positive view of the human search for knowledge. Here the 
faith/knowledge distinction which he sees as characteristic of some Christian theology is absent, 
'ihm (knowledge) and iman (faith) being seen as quite compatible. He also sees the Islamic 
understanding of the human intellect as uncomplicated by the taint of original sin. Indeed it is a 
"basically optimistic" (1990a p. 34) account, which does not provide justification for failing to 
engage with the intellectual challenges of modernity. Nonetheless, it is to Christianity that Akhtar 
looks for a more positive response to modernity, arguing that: 
Christianity is the only faith in the Semitic trio whose adherents still continue seriously to 
produce intellectual self-defence when challenged by the alien convictions of the 
contemporaneous age. (1990a p. 13) 
For Akhtar, this statement implies a huge deficiency in Islamic thinking Yet at the same time, he 
sees in Islam's resistance to modernity a source of strength, and in Christianity's adaptation to 
modernity capitulation to the secular enemy. Again, his desire to establish credibility for Islam in 
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a Western philosophical milieu, and his attachment to Islamic fundamentalism seem at odds. 
With respect to the British Muslim community, Akhtar's insistence on raising awkward questions 
has at times put him in a difficult position. Yet his philosophical and theological engagement with 
Western tradition may mark a new phase for Islamic thinking in the West. As Rippin concludes: 
Just what the future might hold for this development is certainly unclear. For many Muslims, 
it would seem that even the opening of such questions for debate is going too far. For Akhtar, 
however, the failure to treat such questions openly and honestly could spell the end of Islam 
as a viable religion in the modem, secular context. (1993 p. 43) 
5.6 Shari'ah: Sources, and Response to Change (i): Istihsan 
By contrast with Kymlicka's Inuit (indigenous Canadian people, Chapter 3), British Muslims are 
inheritors of a vast and complex legal tradition. Islamic law (shari'ah) and jurisprudence (ffi_qh_) 
are the central practical and intellectual disciplines of Islam. The term fi_ literally means 
'understanding', that is of shari'ah (Coulson 1964 p. 3), and involves the "elucidation and 
application of the shari'ah" (Momen 1985 p. xix). Ethics (ilm-ul-akhlag) are understood to be 
derived from shari'ah; there are no 'natural rights' or 'natural laws' beyond or above shari'ah to 
which to appeal, although as we shall see below the disputed principle of istihsan involves 
something like an appeal to a higher principle within shari'ah. The absence of a tradition of 
natural law, and the subordination of reason to revelation, suggests that any consideration of 
ethics in a plural 'context with Muslim participants cannot seek common ground apart from 
shari'ah. The centrality of shari'ah in Islam further suggests that any attempt to formulate policy 
and law for a society which includes Muslims and intends to be truly multi-cultural and multi- 
faith in its recognition of its citizens, must seek to recognise the importance of shari'ah for 
Muslims. 
It is also important, however, to distinguish between the centrality of shari'ah in a theoretical 
account of Islamic tradition and its prominence in the lives and on the agendas of Muslim 
minorities in Western countries. In the UK, for example, Jorgen Nielsen (1994) has argued that 
the minimal use made by British Muslims of the two shari'ah councils12 suggests that popular 
support for demands for the institution of Islamic family law by some Muslim groups is not 
strong13 - and this in the area of law which has remained most intact in Muslim sending societies 
(Ayubi 1991 pp. 35-47). Nonetheless, the distinctive character of shari'ah is important for an 
understanding of Islam and Muslim communities, and if Maclntyre is right that understanding 
12These are (i) run by Prof. Zaki Badawi at the Muslim College, Creffield Rd, Ealing, and (ii) run by 
Mohammed Darsh under the auspices of the Muslim Home League. 
13E. g. by the Union of Muslim Organisations (1975); in Nielsen (1993,1994). 
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and agreement between traditions can only be achieved through an engagement with the 
substantive content of traditions and not through reference to external, a priori and supposedly 
universal criteria, then it is necessary to engage with this central feature of Islamic tradition. 
It has been suggested that a helpful way to approach the interaction between traditional cultural 
minorities in the West and western society is to use Maclntyre's conception of tradition, and in 
particular his analyses of interactions between traditions (1977,1988,1991). As we saw above 
at 4.5, MacIntyre's account of western traditions is problematic, because of the range of 
meanings carried by a single term. However, as suggested at 4.5, it is possible to resolve some of 
these difficulties if one sees Maclntyre as using 'tradition' in two basic senses: in the stronger 
sense of a tradition of enquiry, capable of generating determinate forms of practical reasoning in 
the context of a shared telos, and in the weaker sense of a collection of ideas and practices with 
some common themes and shared history. Liberalism qualifying only as the latter, although some 
formulations of liberalism may qualify as the former (Galston 1991). 
It may be noted that contemporary social theory may have become sceptical of such accounts 
because of the fateful impact of teleological narratives of society in modernity (e. g. nationalism, 
fascism, Marxism). Hence contemporary theories of society (especially liberal theories) tend to 
exclude a teleological dimension, making it difficult to consider them as traditions of enquiry in 
Maclntyre's sense. 
However, in Islamic traditions a teleology of submission to divine will revealed in shari'ah 
remains powerfully present. To assert this is not to capitulate to Islamist ideology which seeks to 
homogenise the complex history of constrained disagreement between Islamic traditions, or to 
attempt to over-simplify relationships between shari'ah and society, but rather to suggest that 
both traditions within Islam, and the Islamic tradition as a whole, can be understood as traditions 
in Maclntyre's stronger sense of 'tradition of enquiry'. 
It has been argued that any theory which seeks to recognise Muslim interests in a plural society 
needs to provide some representation of shari'ah; but the obstacles to this are considerable. The 
first problem of representation is its diversity and complexity. As we shall see in further detail 
below, the four Sunni law schools madhahib , agree that there are 
four main sources or 
principles usul of law, but there are substantial differences between these schools over the 
interpretation of some of these. However, all are agreed that the Qur'an is the primary source of 
law. Revealed in Arabic, for many Muslims the Qur'an is held to be strictly speaking 
untranslatable, and this provides a second problem of representation. The special status of Arabic 
as the language of revelation can be seen in the world-wide resistance to the use of vernacular in 
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prayer and the prestige of memorising the Qur'an in Arabic. Thus while it is only understood by a 
minority of Muslims in the world (although many more are able to recite sections of the Qur'an), 
the Arabic language remains persistently normative across the Muslim world. 
The importance of the Qur'an to shari'ah, and of Arabic to the Qur'an, complicates my attempt at 
representation as an 'outsider' with no knowledge of Arabic. Furthermore, the art of translation 
has a particularly prominent place in Maclntyre's account of traditions in interaction (1988 pp. 
370-389). As we saw at 4.4, and shall discuss further below at 7.5, in an ideal Maclntyrean 
presentation of Islamic concepts the translator's understanding of Arabic would be such that it 
becomes a'second first language'. Yet the importance of bringing distinctive Islamic concepts into 
conversation with Western concepts, especially in relation to the specific task of asking what 
relevance such an interaction might have for the construction of forms of community and political 
life in countries with minority Muslim populations may to justify this attempt, acknowledging 
that without this competence it can only be done 'second hand', relying on the interpretative skills 
of others. 
There are four main Sunni law schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, each named after a 
legal scholar of the eighth or ninth century CE. It has been argued that first two owe their 
distinctive character to origins in particular localities; hence the urban, cosmopolitan setting of 
Kufa is reflected in Hanafi law, while the strong tribal ties of the Arabian peninsula are evident in 
Maliki law (Coulson 1964 Ch. 2). By contrast, Shafi'i and Hanbali schools owe their origins to 
controversies in filth; in particular they reflect a desire to curb deviation from revealed law by the 
use of independent reason or opinion ra' ). Initially these law schools operated in different 
geographical localities, although an adherent of one school had the right to be tried under that 
school even if he was living under the jurisdiction of another, an aspect of legal pluralism to 
which we shall return. However, by the late middle ages the dividing lines between the law 
schools were already beginning to relax, a process which has continued until the present to the 
extent that "in the legal practice of countries of the Near and Middle East, they [i. e. divisions 
between the schools] have almost totally disappeared" (Coulson 1964 p. 33). 
Each of these schools recognises four sources usul) of shari'ah: Qur'an, Sunna (the practice of 
the Prophet, derived from hadith, traditions about his life), &a (consensus of the community) 
and giyas (analogical reasoning). The Shi'a recognise these first three sources, but the Sunna of 
the Imams are also included in the second, while giyas is rejected in favour of the broader 
category of i (reasoning, intelligence). For both Sunni and Shi'a Islamic law is divided into two 
broad areas: ibadat (duties to Allah; the five pillars plus jihad and mu'amalat (human relations). 
Most differences between Sunni and Shi'a are in terms of mu'amalat, in the spheres of marriage, 
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divorce and inheritance (Momen 1985 p. 338 note 1). 
The Qur'an gives very little internal indication of the conditions which prompted its revelation, 
and therefore the hadith provide essential contextual clues to its interpretation, as well as other 
details of Mohammed's life, whose behaviour is held to be normative. In the event of internal 
inconsistencies, as in the case of zina, below, the later revelation supersedes the earlier one. 
Where Qur'an and hadith are unclear or do not legislate, the consensus of the community ('ijma) 
can function as a source of law. The meaning of'ijma is disputed; for Shiites, Hanbalis and 
Wahhabis 14 it is restricted to the generation of the companions of the Prophet and their 
immediate followers (Glasse 1989 p. 361), while for other schools it refers to the continuing 
Islamic community, although traditionally only to the 'ulema. Also, where the Qur'an or Sunna 
are unclear reasoning may proceed by analogy i as) from these sources. Al-Shafi'i was 
particularly influential in presenting a coherent theory of law which confined the use of reason to 
analogy, a model which gradually gained acceptance from jurists in other schools (Kamali 1991 
p. 261). 
This system was developed during a two hundred year period which saw the consolidation of 
authority in the Islamic community (Rippin 1991). During the period of the Prophet and the 
'rightly-guided caliphs' (in Sunni thought) religious and political authority were identified and 
unified in the person of the prophet or caliph. But following the death of Ali caliphal authority 
was diminished, particularly by the failure of the caliphate to establish a united Islamic polity. 
Amongst the Sunnis this led to a gulf between religious ideal and political reality, manifest in the 
'ulema's (religious scholars) suspicion of the caliphate, although these remained largely 
supportive of whatever political authority was in power, in exchange for recognition of their legal 
authority (Ayubi 1991 Ch. 1). Amongst the Shi'ites the death of 'Ali led to the development of the 
doctrine of the imamate, in which the unity of religious and political authority were preserved. 
There were also early divisions between the Sunni 'ulema which led to the development of the 
four law schools. 
The esteem of the 'rightly-guided' caliphate and the limitations imposed on all authority by 
dependence on the complete and final revelation of the Qur'an can be seen in the case of the 
penalties for zinc (illicit sex). This example can be used to illustrate the juristic process of 
deriving the law from the authoritative sources, and the range of differences between the Sunni 
law schools. Zina refers to sexual intercourse outside marriage or concubinage, or in certain 
extenuating circumstances. 15 In the Qur'an, chastity and fidelity are seen as characteristic of a 
14Wahhabis: a Sunni reform movement originating in eighteenth century Arabia, now the legal tradition 
of Saudi Arabia. 
"These are covered by shubha: the 'resemblance' of a criminal act to a legal act, (Gibb and Kraemers 
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believer, while there are warnings against zinc (17: 32,25: 68,33: 30). Sura 4 provides probably 
the earliest basis for legislation, stipulating the need for four witnesses (v. 18, Arberry 1983 p. 
74) and prescribing the confinement of guilty women, but allowing scope for leniency: 
And when two of you commit indecency, 
punish them both; but if they repent 
and make amends, then suffer them to be; 
God turns, and is All-Compassionate. (4: 20, Arberry 1983 p. 74) 
However, this verse was abrogated by a later revelation, the occasion for which may have been 
suspicion of infidelity by one of the Prophet's wives (Gibb and Kraemers 1961 p. 658): 
The fornicatress and the fornicator- 
scourge each one of them a hundred stripes, 
and in the matter of God's religion 
let no tenderness for the them seize you 
if you believe in God and the Last Day; 
and let a party of the believers witness their chastisement. (24: 2, Arberry 1983 p. 352) 
The penalty is clear and unambiguous, and therefore gat'i, 'definitive', (Kamali 1991 p. 21). 
However, the second caliph'Umar is reported to have known a Qur'anic passage not found in the 
extant text, which reads: 
When a married [or 'mature' muhsan, Gibb and Kraemers 1961 p. 658] man or woman 
commits zina, their punishment shall be stoning as a retribution as ordained by God. (Kamali 
1991 p. 157) 
These texts provide two examples of naskh (abrogation). Usually naskh refers to the over-ruling 
of a law in the Qur'an or Sunna by a later revelation (within the lifetime of the prophet). This is 
naskh-al-hukm, in which the law in the earlier text is wholly or partially abrogated, but the text 
itself remains part of the Qur'an, and is illustrated in the relationship between the first two texts 
above. Only the particular content of the earlier text which is at variance with the later text is 
abrogated (e. g. in this case, the punishment); that which is not specifically abrogated (e. g. the 
requirement for four witnesses) remains in force. However, the third passage which does not 
appear in the extant Qur'anic text is regarded as naskh-al-tilawah, a text whose ruling remains in 
force, but whose words are not part of the Qur'an (Kamali 1991 p. 157). 
Thus in fighh flogging and stoning are separated as punishments for zing for two different 
categories of offenders. Offenders are judged to be muhsan ('mature'; this might be understood as 
a state of 'sexual majority') if they are free and have had intercourse in a legal marriage, whether 
1961 p. 658). 
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that marriage is extant or not (Gibb and Kraemers 1961 p. 658). The law schools vary over 
various details: 
According to Hanafis and Hanbalis, both the guilty parties must fulfil these conditions; the 
Hanafis also demand that the muhsan should be a Muslim, while the Malikis consider neither 
of the punishments applicable to a non-Muslim. According to the Hanbalis, the guilty 
muhsan is at first flogged, then stoned. The banishment for a year after flogging is limited by 
the Malikis to the man, by the Hanafis to the discretion of the imam. (1961 p. 658) 
All this suggests that Islamic law is highly conservative in its method, since scope for 
development in response to changed circumstances is confined to strictly governed derivation 
from the authoritative sources. However, as we have seen, these methods can lead to quite diverse 
outcomes. Furthermore, the principles of istihsan and i'tý ihad provide further means by which 
response to change can be made. The principle of istihsan will now be considered, leaving i'tý ihad 
for later for 5.7. 
Istihsan literally means "to approve, or deem something preferable" (Kamali 1991 p. 246), and 
refers to the preference for the best of a number of possible solutions to a particular problem. 
Karnali (1991 p. 245) likens istihsan to equity in Western law in the sense that both can involve 
an appeal to justice beyond the letter of the law. However, whereas in Western thinking this can 
mean an appeal to natural law beyond positive law, no such higher law is posited in Islam; rather 
the only appeal that is permitted is to a higher (i. e. than a particular ruling) intention within 
shari'ah. Karnali points out that the concept has a history of controversy in Islamic tradition: 
A glance at the existing literature shows how the ulema are preoccupied with the polemics 
over istihsan and have differed on almost every aspect of the subject. (1991 p. 246) 
In the early literature of the Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki schools approval is expressed of 
somewhat differing definitions of istihsan which have in common a "departure from existing 
precedent on the grounds of more compelling reasons" (1991 p. 249). However, the highly 
influential al-Shafi'i unequivocally condemned istihsan as "arbitrary law making in religion" 
(1991 p. 258), and his growing influence across the law schools seems to have led to a defensive 
technical redefinition of istihsan as a branch of -q as. 
Karnali argues that this technical 
redefinition remains unconvincing and is clearly at variance with the use of istihsan by both Abu 
Hanifah, who was influential in the early development of the principle, as well as with the 
concept as refuted by al-Shafi'i (1991 pp. 259-261). Karnali goes on to argue that a clear limited 
role for istihsan as a principle of fich independent of i as would help to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice and facilitate response to diverse conditions. 
Influential in Kamali's account are two early formulations of istihsan. Firstly, he cites Imam 
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Malik's comment that "istihsan is nine-tenth[s] of human knowledge", in conjunction with Abu 
Zahrah's gloss that "maslahah ('public interest') ... accounts 
for the larger part of [this] nine- 
tenth[s]" (1991 p. 248). Here istihsan is seen as a principle of judgement which is intrinsic to 
f_ghh, and indeed to other areas of human knowledge. Secondly, he quotes ibn 'Arabi: "istihsan is 
to abandon exceptionally what is required by the law because applying the existing law would 
lead to a departure from some of its objectives" (1991 p. 249). 
Such a principle formalises a flexibility which Kamali argues must be exercised occasionally, in 
response to new conditions and exceptional circumstances, and therefore is in fact exercised even 
by those who deny its validity, as al-Amidi, himself a Shafi'i jurist, has argued of Shafi'i (Kamali 
p. 259). Better, therefore, to formally recognise this principle and thus to be able to set proper 
limits on it. More positively, such a principle enables the development of law in accordance with 
revealed principles. Thus Karnali suggests that the priority of oral testimony in Islamic law at a 
time when methods such as "photography, sound recordings, laboratory analyses etc. " may be 
equally or more reliable should be reconsidered, and that istihsan provides a way of doing this 
(1992 p. 248). The higher principle within shari'ah affirmed here is that the law requires the most 
reliable form of evidence, which is why oral testimony was originally prioritised, and why this 
priority must be re-examined in the light of new developments. 
An issue of more obvious relevance to the thesis, the case of Salman Rushdie, may provide an 
appropriate case for the exercise of istihsan. While, as argued in 2.2, it is possible to see the 
rationale for Khomeini's verdict within shari'ah, it could also be argued that applying the law in 
this case could lead to a departure from its objectives, which include justice(adl), mercy raluna 
and public interest (maslahah . 
5.7 Shari'ah: Legal Pluralism, Practice, and Response to Change (ii): I'tJ ihad 
As indicated above, early in their history (from the ninth century until the late middle ages) the 
four Sunni law schools operated within distinct geographical spheres of influence (Coulson 1964 
p. 33), although adherents of a particular school had the right to be tried under the law of that 
school even if living in another jurisdiction. Such legal pluralism was also frequent in Christian 
dominated Europe during the medieval period, with ethnic groups defined by religion and 
language often permitted by the ruling power to operate their own legal system. For example, 
Alfonso I of Aragon granted to his Muslim subjects in Tuleda in 1115 CE that: 
'They shall be and remain in lawsuits and in pleas under the Nadi and their al ugaciles (judge 
and deputies), as it was in the time of the Moors'. It was repeatedly specified that their 
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disputes be regulated by Islamic law (Sunna), not by any other custom. (Bartlett 1993 p. 
208) 
In the early years of Reconquest Spain such pluralism also applied in cases of inter-ethnic, and 
therefore inter judicial, conflict. Thus Alfonso I's decree continues: 
'If a Moor brings a lawsuit against a Christian or a Christian against a Moor the Nadi of the 
Moors shall render judgement on the Moor according to Islamic law tuna) and the Nadi of 
the Christians shall render judgement on the Christian according to his law'. (Bartlett 1993 p. 
209) 
This tradition proved persistent, so that 150 years later the Hospitallers of Aragon used the same 
formula: 
If a case arises between a Christian and a Saracen, the amin shall be the judge of the 
Saracen and a Christian shall be the judge of the Christian'. (Bartlett 1993 p. 209) 
Like the provisions for protected minorities within Islam dhimma)16 these decrees need to be 
placed in the context of "a great array of disabilities that were applied to native populations in the 
newly colonised areas" (Bartlett 1993 p. 211), and certainly do not reflect any concept of equality 
of religion or ethnicity. The degree of autonomy and the resolution of differences between these 
legal communities was largely governed by the power relations between the groups. Nonetheless, 
such legal pluralism, containing different legal communities within a common polity in both 
medieval dar-al-Islam and Christendom differs significantly from the shift towards legal and 
administrative uniformity which began in Europe in the late middle ages, and which heralded the 
emergence of the modem state. Thus in Europe in the late middle ages such legal pluralism 
declined, to be gradually replaced by a legal uniformity operating on territorial lines: 
The long-term trend between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries was away from 
personality to territoriality of the law, away from pluralism to uniformity. The road to un roi, 
une loi, une foi was a long one, but this is certainly a paved section of it. (Bartlett 1993 p. 
220) 
The legal structure which modem Europe inherited from the medieval period stems from three 
sources: Roman law, customary law (which refers to the inherited legal customs of a people) and 
the canon law of the Catholic church (Crump and Jacobs eds. 1926). In England the 'common 
16Dhimma: the status of recognised religious minority within an Islamic jurisdiction. At the time of the 
Prophet these included the other'people of the Book' (i. e. Jews and Christians) and Zoroastrians. They 
enjoyed some legal autonomy and control over internal community affairs, and were protected by the 
Islamic authorities in return for payment of a poll tax 'i a. They were not allowed to join the military, 
and generally not to take high government office. Their conditions varied through history and under 
different rulers; while their status is generally compared favourably with Jewish minorities under 
Christendom, they were sometimes persecuted (see Ye'or 1985). 
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law' tradition (so-called because it was common to all free English men) provides an additional 
source, and was initiated by Henry II as a counterweight to baronial authority in reforms between 
1164 and 1170 (Nicholas 1992 p. 225) . 
The twelfth century saw a revival of Roman law, 17 
although this tradition had not been entirely lost during the preceding centuries; for example 
elements had been incorporated into the law codes of Germanic rulers (Nicholas 1992 pp. 243-4). 
Written law increasingly replaced oral codes, and partly through adoption of practices from 
ecclesiastical courts, trial by jury gradually began to replace trial by ordeal or combat (Nicholas 
1992 p. 226). 
Each of these measures contributed to the production of more systematic legal procedures, and 
these were complemented by an array of administrative and bureaucratic reforms. The principal 
driving force behind the institutionalisation of government was the mushrooming cost of wars, 
compelling kings to discover new and more efficient ways of raising revenue from their subjects 
(Nicholas 1992 p. 458). Here too was the genesis of medieval forms of representation which laid 
the foundations for the development of democracy, for the kings found that they could not extract 
ever greater taxation without consent. In different parts of Europe these developments took 
different forms; thus Germanic areas drew on their tradition of representation in local assemblies 
(Nicholas 1992 p. 244), in England the Roman law providing for the granting of proctorial power 
by a constituency to a representative eventually led to the development of a parliamentary system 
(Nicholas 1992 p. 462-4), while in the Iberian peninsula and France systems of representation 
based on estates developed (Nicholas 1992 p. 461 and pp. 465-6). 
These changes, combined with the development of the capitalist mode of production, gave rise in 
Europe to the social, political and economic complex referred to as 'modernity'. This complex 
was to impact on the Muslim world principally through the experience of colonisation by 
European powers, after balance of power between Europe and the Ottomans shifted decisively in 
Europe's favour from the late seventeenth century. Hence, as was stated first at 2.10 above, the 
modem state, Western legal practices, democratic government and capitalist production were 
each initially experienced by Islamic societies as external pressures, a point which will also be 
salient when we discuss human rights below (5.8). 
The pressure for Muslim countries to adapt to Western models of legal, social and political 
practice, has increased the tendency observed above for a cross-fertilisation between the law 
schools. Thus where shari'ah has become part or the law of a nation state there has been a 
pressure towards harmonisation between the law schools. The case of laws concerning women 
17For a further discussion of the impact of twelfth century reform in Europe on the development of the 
characteristic institutions of modernity, see the discussion of Milbank's work at 7.2 below. 
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well illustrates the pressure to modernise, with the most liberal laws from each school often being 
selected by reformers. Thus Coulson (1964 pp. 36-7) writes that in Maliki Tunisia the law of 
marriage guardianship has been overturned in favour of the Hanafi position which enables 
women to conclude their own marriage contracts, while in Hanafi Syria the wider Maliki grounds 
for a woman to petition for divorce have been adopted. Such an eclectic approach to the law 
schools provides a further mechanism to enable adaptation to changing circumstances, and is 
illustrated in the UK by the practice of Mohammed Darsh (Nielsen 1994). 
Further flexibility in shari'ah is possible at the level of implementation. Popular western opinion 
of Islamic law tends to see it is extremely rigid in theory and highly arbitrary in practice. But the 
complexity of shari'ah indicated above belies this perception, as does it implementation in 
practice, in at least some contexts. One such context is examined by Rosen in his (1987) study of 
shari'ah courts in contemporary Morocco, which is based on fieldwork conducted over a twenty 
year period. Rosen writes as an anthropologist also engaged in study of the American judicial 
system during the same period. One of his concerns is to refute the apparently widespread 
Western perception of the arbitrary nature of Islamic judicial discretion at the level of 
implementation by the qgchl (magistrate). An illustration of this perception is provided by Lord 
Justice Frankfurter, here quoted by Makdisi: 
This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi 
under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency 
(1985 p. 64) 
Makdisi cites four examples of similar remarks made by American judges between 1948 and 
1980. Rosen argues that the gaclis in his study were not 'dispensing justice according to 
considerations of individual expediency', but rather exercising a coherent rationality. 
Furthermore, he contends that the logic exhibited by the Moroccan gadis was closer and hence 
more sensitive and appropriate to the population with which he was dealing than that of their 
American counterparts. On this basis it is possible ask whether there may, after all, be lessons to 
be learned from the 'kadi under a tree' for Western systems of judicial rationality arguably grown 
distant from that of the population which they serve (Fraser 1984). 
A structural difference between Western and Islamic legal systems also supports the contention 
that Islamic law can be closer to logic of the population served. This is the lack of a case law 
tradition, and the consequent absence of a special legal rationality or 'artificial reason' exercised 
at the level of implementation, as developed in the West. 18 By contrast Islamic law does not rely 
"Rosen illustrates the concept of artificial reason in English law with the example of as Sir James 
Coke's response to James I's meddling in legal affairs: law is not common sense, or even regal sense 
(Rosen 1987). 
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on an artificial reason developed by immersion in case history, but rather in its local application 
by the gadis depends upon exercise of the same reason as that culturally embedded in society. 
The emergence of a form of artificial reason developed through case law was prevented by an 
early separation between judges (adis and the scholars ('ulema ; the former had no right to 
legislate, but only to apply existing law, so no genealogies of law based on the contingencies of 
case law could develop. 
However, this structural advantage can also be reversed, for it meant that legal tradition 
developed in isolation from the 'interruptions' of everyday life, since it was not shaped in response 
to particular cases. Thus, while at the coal face of dispensing justice the gadi's reason remained 
culturally relevant, this group were increasingly obliged to proceed without the benefit of 
scholarly discussions, which frequently became preoccupied with imagined cases, idealised and 
abstruse. The gulf between the 'ulema and gadis was further widened by the development of 
caliphal courts independent of shari'ah courts, while a gap opened up between the gadis and the 
people by the political (initially caliphal) appointment of gadis. 
Thus while shari'ah was seen as all-encompassing and unified in theory, 19 in practice it has 
tended to operate in parallel with a system of grievance courts which have taken over jurisdiction 
in many matters of public law. As Esposito comments: 
Though in theory the Shari'ah was the only officially recognised system of law, in practice a 
parallel system of caliphal laws and courts existed from the earliest times. ... 
Shari'ah courts 
... were 
increasingly restricted to family law and the handling of religious endowments, ... Grievance courts dealt with public law (criminal, land and commercial regulation). (1994 pp. 
87-100) 
In his study, Rosen develops some further generalised contrasts between Western and Islamic 
law: 
Islam, with its heavily contractual image of the relationship between God and man, its 
insistence that each man is responsible for his own actions, and its emphasis on the freedom 
of man to engage in negotiated arrangements that do not violate some clearly prescribed 
claim of Allah, encouraged exchange relationships of a highly personal nature. The law could 
enforce those aspects of human relationship that touched on the prescriptions of God as 
contained in the Qur'an, but unlike the Old Testament of Roman Canon Law the number and 
extent of these divine claims on man was rather small. (Rosen 1987 p. 60) 
This can be contrasted with the Enlightenment picture of a limited secular sphere subject to 
19As Fazlur Rahman states, "Islamic law, from the beginning, was conceived as an indivisible totality in 
the sense that it derived from God's word and hence possessed the same and uniform divine sanction" 
(in Weeramantry 1988 p. 3). Rahman argues that this understanding is implied in the Qur'an itself, 
where God's primary purpose in sending revealed books is said to be to settle disputes between people - 
and the Qur'an is the final and definitive revealed book (Surah 2: 213). 
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unlimited human regulation (Bauman 1992a) bounded (if at all) by a privatised sacred sphere 
which is not permitted to impinge on the public sphere. A contemporary example of this 
Enlightenment model is Rawls' concept of 'political liberalism' (1993 and 3.1,3.2), in which a 
political sphere characterised by overlapping consensus concerning certain practical matters is 
fenced off from the competing claims of comprehensive theories, such as religions. Thus what is 
central and unnegotiable for Islam (divine revelation) is peripheral and essentially contestable for 
liberalism, while what is central, and if not unnegotiable then essential for liberalism (i. e. an 
'overlapping consensus') can be open for negotiation in Islam. 
Thus, two areas of limitation on Islamic law have been noted. As we have just seen, while it 
claims universal validity for its core obligations and prohibitions, it does not claim universal 
scope, but instead allows considerable room for negotiation between individuals (Rosen 1987). 
And, as we saw above, limitations were placed on its scope by the development of caliphal 
courts. These limitations placed on shari'ah courts by rulers reflected not only the reluctance of 
rulers to be bound by shari'ah, but also the limitations of shari'ah procedure, such as reliance on 
sworn testimony, the absence of cross-questioning of witnesses, and the exclusion of 
circumstantial evidence. A third limitation has been the widespread Sunni belief in a decline of 
conditions since the demise of the last rightly guided caliph, which has been taken to imply that 
the application of shari'ah should be tempered to the tenor of the times, as it would be 
inappropriate to impose full penalties in a corrupt age. 
A fourth limitation is that the validity of shari'ah is to some extent dependent on the willingness of 
individuals and communities to consent to it, for it is binding only to a limited extent on 
dissenting religious communities within Islamic territories, and also limited in the scope of its 
application for Muslims outside Islamic territories. Thus Schacht writes: 
Islamic law does not claim universal validity; it is binding for the Muslim to its full extent 
only in the territory of the Islamic state, to a slightly lesser extent in enemy territory, and for 
the non-Muslim only to a limited extent in Islamic territory. (Schacht 1964 p. 199) 
This aspect of the personality of law, which varies in scope of application not just with territory 
but with the beliefs and cultural identity of the subject, contrasts with the territorial definition and 
egalitarian ethos of modem Western law. However, also Western legal systems vary in the extent 
to which they recognise legal plurality; English courts are able to refer some aspects of 
inheritance and family law to appropriate authorities in Jewish and Muslim communities given 
the consent of all parties (Nielsen 1994), and have been shown to accommodate cultural 
difference in the adjudication of a number of cases (Poulter 1987 and above 2.12). 
Given these limitations, in Muslim societies shari'ah has thus persisted both as part of everyday 
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life, governing but also drawing upon practices and relationships in Islamic communities, 
providing some stability in the face of political turmoil, and also acting as an ideal. From the 
eighteenth century its practical influence has been further diminished in some areas by colonial 
rule (although most administrations retained it in some form), and by attempts to reform and 
integrate it with modem legal systems in modem and post-colonial Muslim countries. These 
factors lead Nielsen (1994) to argue that shari'ah is more remote from the lives of everyday 
Muslims in Muslim countries than British law is to Britons. He explains Rosen's (1987; see 
above) very different conclusions in terms of the location of Rosen's fieldwork in an isolated area 
where the impact of urbanisation and central administration (colonial or modern Muslim) had 
been minimal. 
But even if Nielsen is right, and Rosen's work is unrepresentative of popular perceptions of 
shari'ah among Muslims in the modern world, this does not necessarily diminish the value of 
Rosen's study for the argument here. If Rosen enables us to reach behind the intrusion of 
modernity to see the closer relations between law and local cultural meanings which prevailed in 
pre-modern Islamic societies then this is valuable as a insight into a living tradition, in 
Maclntyre's sense. It provides a challenge to consider whether a more organic relation between 
law and culture is desirable or possible in more complex modem societies. However, the presence 
of the personality of law in medieval Europe and its decline with the advent of modernity suggests 
that such an organic relationship cannot survive the impact of modernity. Yet if it is deemed 
desirable, it remains an open question as to whether it can somehow be reconstructed. At any 
rate, Rosen's work has served its primary function of demonstrating that Islamic legal rationality 
in practice is not arbitrary. 
In spite of these various limitations and processes of change, the status of shari'ah as an ideal has 
been preserved by several factors. Firstly, the unquestionable authority of its primary source, the 
Qur'an and Sunna, through which an appeal can be made back to the ideal era of the Prophet, 
and, in the case of the majority of Sunnis, the first four caliphs. Secondly, the separation of 
judges and jurists gave shari'a some autonomy from social and political vicissitudes. Thirdly, the 
'closing of the gate of i'tý ihad' (literally 'effort'; this refers to new interpretation) around the tenth 
century, further insulated shari'ah against change. This doctrine exerted a powerful conservative 
influence on Sunni Islamic law, which persists up to the present. Shi'as, by contrast, have never 
stopped the practice of i'tt ihad, and indeed its use has increased since the mid nineteenth century 
(Momen 1985). Furthermore in Sunni Islam, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some 
reformers have seen fit to 're-open the gate' of iitý ihad, as well as challenging the legitimacy of the 
original 'closing of the gate' (Esposito 1994 p. 116). Even relatively conservative scholars like 
'Abdur Rahman, who reject most modern attempts at reform, insist that i'tý ihad if properly 
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exercised in the sense of "an effort or exercise to arrive at one's own judgement ... the use of 
human reason in the elaboration and explanation of shari'ah law" (Rahman A 1984 p. 69), 
remains an important and legitimate weapon in the religious scholar's armoury in responding to 
changing conditions. In relation to the traditional decision to close the gate of i'tt ihad he 
comments: 
During the period when Baghdad was under the mercy of the nomadic warriors of central 
Asia, [Moghuls, fourteenth century CE] the jurists in Iraq reached a wrong consensus to 
close the door of i'tý ihad which they had not practised much anyway since the tenth century 
AD. No one, in fact, had a right to put a stop to the process of i'ti ihad. (1984 p. 69) 
Therefore, in response to modernity, a range of Muslim scholars have argued for re-opening the 
gates of i'tý ihad, although what this means in practice varies widely. 
20 It has sometimes involved 
a prioritisation of fresh reading of the Qur'an and Sunna over the juristic tradition. But far from 
weakening the sense of the ideal quality of Islamic law, such moves have tended to appeal to it. 
In summary, shari'ah can respond to changing circumstances through a variety of procedures, 
including istihsan, i'tý ihad and drawing on different law schools, and at the level of implementation 
through the discretion of the gadi. Shari'ah has persisted in the Muslim world both as an ideal and 
practice, although the latter has been limited by the presence of parallel caliphal courts and their 
successors, and since the colonial period to largely confined to family law. However, there are 
important exceptions including Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Iran, while in some other 
countries Islamisation programmes have re-extended its scope (e. g. Pakistan, Egypt; Ayubi 
1992). Indeed a much wider range of Muslim countries have expressed reservations concerning 
the universal appropriateness of Western law, in the form of the international law of human 
rights, which will now be considered. 
5.8 Shari'ah and International Human Rights: Tradition and Negative Freedom 
The complex relation between law, social life and politics in Islam (a complexity which belies the 
popular view of an uncomplicated fusion of the two), and the contrasts which have been noted 
between Western and Islamic law, provide a background for considering the relation between 
shari'ah and human rights, a vital concern for the common good in a plural society which includes 
Muslim citizens. In the international arena the Western claim to provide a universal discourse 
finds an expression in documents such as the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR). 
20 Exemplars of the practice include Muhammad'Abduh in Egypt and Muhammad Iqbal in India 
(Coulson 1964 p. 202). 
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Apologists for Islam to the West, such as the Sri Lankan scholar Weeramantry (1988), argue that 
Islam is far more hospitable to human rights than popular Western perceptions might suggest. 
Firstly, he argues that Islamic thought contributed significantly to the development of European 
Enlightenment tradition which underlies present Western articulations of human rights. He 
presents his case by illustrating Islamic influences on a range of seminal Enlightenment thinkers, 
including Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Savigny and the German historical school (1988 pp. 
105-9). He contrasts Locke's disillusionment with scholasticism in his Oxford days with his 
keen interest in the lectures of Edward Pococke, Oxford's first Professor of Arabic, and points to 
the parallels between Locke's 'innovations' in Western philosophy and certain Islamic concepts, 
including: 
trusteeship of power for the benefit of the governed, inalienable rights of the individual 
which no government can take away, and the removability of the ruler if he failed to keep 
his trust. (1988, p. 105) 
Such "thoughts were not new to the Arabs, but basic propositions of their political philosophy" 
(1988 p. 105). However, Weeramantry neglects the Christian sources of Locke's thinking, for 
Locke was influenced both by Thomists, amongst whom "the contention that rulers only have 
legitimacy if they seek to serve the common good" was common, and by Calvinists, who held that 
governments must be bound by law and enshrined the right to resist tyrannical governments 
within their constitutions (De Gruchy 1995 pp. 80-1). 
Furthermore the light of Locke's overriding concern for civic peace (Galston 1991) one may wish 
to question the attribution of inalienable rights to Locke's philosophy; but this phrase also seems 
odd in an Islamic context. Rather, Locke, like Islamic traditions as well as Calvinism and 
Thomism, all stress the common good over individual rights. A fundamental difference between 
this position and later, post Millian, articulations of rights is the concept of 'negative freedom', 
which suggests entitlements without obligations. For the earlier position, rights are reciprocally 
related to roles and responsibilities, and can perhaps best be described as 'covenantal'. 
Thus Locke and other early classical liberals share with Muslims and Christians a theistic 
foundation for human rights, one which includes the role of humanity in creation; as Khalifah 
('Allah's deputy') or as 'steward' in Christian tradition. Historically, freedom in these traditions 
has been exercised within a presumed religious framework. Such an understanding of humanity 
and society contrasts with the autonomous subject and secular public sphere presupposed by later 
theories of rights; indeed the latter were sometimes developed in direct opposition to theistic 
traditions: 
the displacement of God in the interests of human emancipation.. . 
has not meant the 
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displacement of the functions attributed to God, but the shifting of those functions to human 
reason and will. (De Gruchy 1995 p. 235) 
Thus Weeramantry's argument does not take sufficient account of the development of the secular 
Western notion of autonomy and hence negative freedom. Nonetheless, the common theistic root 
with Locke, quite possibly awakened and developed through exposure to Islamic philosophy, 
although not exclusively so, points to aspects of Islamic tradition potentially compatible with 
certain notions of human rights. 
To further support his case, Weeramantry argues that Islamic conceptions analogous to 
international human rights law can be discerned prior to and independent of Western influence. 
For example, shari'ah is both in theory and practice not tied to particular polities. This contrasts 
with Western law prior to the advent of modem international law, although in the West the 
tradition of natural law has long provided a potential anchor for such developments. Furthermore, 
in practice shari'ah has exercised jurisdiction under widely differing conditions: 
Despite vast cultural differences Islamic law has provided an underlying sense of identity, a 
common code of behaviour, for Muslim societies. (Esposito 1994 p. 76) 
Shari'ah also embodies many conceptions of human dignity analogous to human rights discourse. 
Thus Weeramantry argues: 
Every member of the community has the right to share public responsibility with the ruler, 
every individual has the right to correct the ruler and to attack his decisions if he commits an 
error. Life. liberty, property and honour are inviolable... 
Since this elevated position of the individual is preordained and eternal, human freedom 
cannot be transitory or dependent upon a ruler.... Human freedom and dignity do not depend 
upon whether one belongs to the fold of Islam. Being part of the human condition these 
attributes belong to all humans and must be respected by every Muslim. (Weeramantry 1988 
pp. 114-5) 
Such a picture is strongly at odds with Western images of Islamic law, which have been created 
by the human rights records of some Islamic countries, and by liberal horror at shari'ah penalties, 
which is also influenced by orientalist caricature. But while Weeramantry's argument has some 
strengths, it disingenuously omits the crucial difference between modern and premodern tolerance 
- the principle of equality between all human subjects, which has rendered increasingly 
problematic the premodern resolution of difference as social hierarchy. 
In 5.7, drawing on Rosen's (1987) account of a Moroccan shari'ah court and considering other 
aspects of Islamic law, it was suggested that in contrast to any perception of arbitrary tyranny 
Islamic law embodies its own judicial rationality. Yet before Weeramantry's argument that 
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shari'ah is fundamentally affirmative of human rights discourse appears plausible, further 
sources of incredulity must be considered. 
Particular concerns of Westerners focus on the rights of women, specifically in the areas of 
polygamy, unilateral divorce, corporal punishment, and veiling (Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 
1994 p. 32). If we recall the relation between rights and duties fundamental to a theistic 
understanding of human rights, then gender differentiation in shari'ah can be understood in 
relation to different divinely ordained roles in society, although there is a diversity of opinion on 
this point (Rippin 1993 pp. 85-97). Feminist, radical and reformist Muslims have all argued that 
the Qur'an and hadith present a much more active role for women than traditional interpretations 
permit, but it remains to be seen how positions which promote equality, such as that advocated by 
the Moroccan feminist scholar Fatima Mernissi, will fare (Mernissi 1988, Rippin 1993 pp. 115- 
126). 
Contrary to Weeramantry, Mernissi sees the basis of Islamic law in obedience (ta'a) as radically 
opposed to rights-based systems. Thus she writes: 
When we speak about the conflict between Islam and democracy we are in fact talking about 
an eminently legal conflict. If the basic reference for Islam is the Koran, for democracy it is 
effectively the United Nations Charter, which is above all a superlaw. ... 
One law gives 
citizens freedom of thought, while the shari'a, in its official interpretation based on ta'a 
(obedience) condemns it. (1993 p. 60) 
Weeramantry's position apparently also contradicts MacIntyre, who asserts that: 
... there 
is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our 
expression 'a right' until near the close of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of 
expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400, let 
alone in old English, or in Japanese until as late as the mid nineteenth century. (1985 p. 69, 
emphasis added) 
A resolution to this apparent contradiction may have already been provided in the distinction 
between positive rights, entailing responsibility, and negative rights, which are purely about 
entitlement with no qualifying requirements. It is the latter which is particular to modernity, 
although both are ideal types: in traditional systems lapses in fulfilment of duties may not always 
entail a precisely reciprocal loss of rights, while modem human rights legislation continues to 
make reference to corresponding obligations. Nonetheless, the distinction remains valid, but 
unfortunately, it is one which both Weeramantry and Maclntyre fail to make. 
Maclntyre's assertion needs to be seen in the context of his account of the relation between social 
roles, virtues and teleology. It is only when the teleological fabric of traditions begins to 
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disintegrate that a negative concept of freedom, freedom without purpose, is able to emerge. For 
Maclntyre, presumably, shari'ah would provide a better structure for the defence of human 
dignity and liberty than liberal premises; yet it may be suggested Maclntyre fails to do justice to 
the possibility of a liberalism understood as a tradition (Galston 1991). 
The novelty of the modem conception of negative rights receives support from Gray (1986), but 
he also emphasises that the polarity between individual and collective conceptions of duties and 
rights should not be exaggerated. Thus he states that "the dominant idea of natural rights among 
the ancients was duty based" (1986 p. 4), but he sees in Roman jurisdiction before Constantine 
"the achievement for a period of Roman history of an individualistic legal order" (1986 p. 5) 
The context of debates about human rights in the Islamic world today also needs to be considered. 
While declarations of rights may be largely inspired by the desire to protect minorities, their 
supposed universal character makes criticism of the cultural assumptions which inform them 
problematic, and they have been criticised by Muslims for their reliance on Western conceptions. 
Thus Kevin Dwyer reflects on his experience of working as an American anthropologist 
investigating concepts and practices of human rights in the context of the Arab world: 
To those who argue that attaining full human rights is a universal human aspiration, others 
may respond that the notion of human rights is simply a product of one particular 
civilisation's history. ... many 
Middle Easterners have ideas about human rights that ... must be understood in the context of the sustained engagement between the Middle East and the 
West going back to the time of Muslim penetration into Spain and Europe in the eighth 
century, through the Crusades of the eleventh century and beyond, and into the more recent 
colonial and post-colonial periods. This context has forged complex, many-tiered, starkly 
ambivalent, and often actively hostile attitudes in many Middle Easterners towards Western 
traditions, Western forces, and Westerners themselves. The idea of 'human rights', closely 
associated with the West over the last few decades, is prey to the same complexity. (Dwyer 
1991 pp. 1-2) 
Can the divergence between the theory of Weeramantry and the history of conflict described by 
Dwyer be reconciled? Dwyer and Weeramantry both agree that it is the denial of an Islamic voice 
in the formulation of existing 'universal' conceptions of human rights which is at the root of many 
Muslim objections to human rights, rather than the notion of human rights per se which is 
antithetical to the Islamic spirit. Thus while Weeramantry argues that Islamic voices influenced 
the genesis of rights discourse in Europe, he also contends that they have subsequently been 
neglected, and urges their inclusion: 
While the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and succeeding documents built up an 
important body of universal doctrine, there has been a mounting volume of criticism of these 
norms on the basis that they incorporate Western-oriented ideas and that, especially at the 
time of the Universal Declaration, insufficient note was taken of other traditions, especially 
the Islamic. ... 
If [the benefits of the UNUDHR]... are to be preserved and built upon, more 
understanding of the Islamic legal tradition is important. (1988 p. 168) 
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But if Dwyer's apparent differences to Weeramantry converge to a common observation on the 
neglect of specifically Islamic conceptions of human rights, the question arises: if contemporary 
Western and Islamic conceptions of human rights are premised on contrasting understands of 
God, the world and human nature, can they be deployed in constructive interaction in shared 
contexts? 
Positive and negative freedom and rights can be presented as fundamentally different. Yet, as we 
found with contrasts between the practice of freedom in Western and traditional societies (e. g. 
censorship, 2.12), it is possible that the extent to which modern negative conceptions of human 
rights are free from responsibilities has been exaggerated by liberal apologists. For example, at 
2.12 Poulter's analysis of the interaction between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
in European law was discussed. The latter insists that even material which may "shock, offend or 
disturb any section of the population" must be permitted in the interests of "democratic society" 
(Poulter 1990 p. 18). Yet Poulter also shows that the implementation of this legislation in the 
case of Whitehouse vs. Lemon, where Gay News' appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 
was rejected, suggests rather different principles operate in practice. Furthermore, Poulter notes 
the emphasis on responsibilities and obligations in the wording of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
It is possible that a clearer recognition of the contextual constraints inevitably operative on 
human rights in practice, and of the obligations which citizenship in any society entails, would 
help Muslims and liberals to develop a more closely shared picture of the field of human rights in 
actual societies, even though fundamental differences will remain. On the liberal side there is 
understandable reluctance to muddy the clear waters of human rights with the sediment of 
contextualisation, because the whole point of the rights is that they provide a clear standard 
independent of politics, society or culture. Yet Western insistence on respect for human rights 
will fall on deaf ears until it is realised that such insistence is frequently perceived as at best post- 
colonial paternalism, at worst a cynical ploy to distract from fundamental global inequalities. 
These interpretations touch on larger issues which a change in rights discourse alone is unlikely 
to effect. 
It may be a travesty to compare human rights to Coca-Cola as another American global export. 
Yet an attempt to articulate culturally authentic human rights, even if that threatens the liberal 
humanism which underlies their current articulation, is surely better than a dogged and blind 
insistence that the West alone already possesses 'the real thing'. The paucity of sociological 
accounts of human rights (Turner 1993) makes the process of developing models of the 
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relationship of human rights to culture and society picture more difficult. The insistence on the 
necessity of a clear standard of human rights for their effective operationalization may well 
underlie sociological reluctance to theorise about human rights. Or it may be a symptom of 
modern 'adiaphorization' (Bauman 1989,1.13 above), or of a mistaken fact-value divide 
(Maclntyre 1985,4.1 above). 
Several attempts have been made by Muslim groups to articulate distinctively Islamic 
conceptions of human rights. Two examples are the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of 
Human Rights (UIDR) and the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHR). 
These have been discussed by the Catholic German Bishops' Conference Research Group on the 
Universal Tasks of the Church, as part of their efforts to promote Muslim-Christian co-operation 
in the field of human rights (Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 1994). The bishops were disappointed 
by the failure of these documents to critically address contentious issues such as corporal 
punishment, inter-faith marriage and women's rights. Instead, "the general tendency is to 
'harmonise' contradictions rather than reconcile them critically", a procedure which tends to 
involve subordinating differences to shari'ah, as in the case of religious liberty, where missionary 
work is specifically prohibited by the CDHR (Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 1994 p. 33-4). 
By contrast with official pronouncements, the bishops recognise the openness of some Muslim 
reformers to human rights issues (e. g. Merad, Talbi), stress the importance of Islamic tradition in 
the arguments of these reformers, and look forward to future developments. As we saw with 
Akhtar in some passages, in these there is an attempt to discern intention behind the letter, 
emphasising the original meaning of shari'ah as 'path'. The juristic principle of istihsan, discussed 
at 5.6, is clearly a relevant resource here, as is i'tiý lead (5.7). The bishops quote Merad on istihsan, 
the attempt to discern a higher principle within shari'ah: 
We must therefore strive to peer through the contingencies of history in order to discover the 
very direction in which revelation points, to formulate normative criteria, and to find out what 
God's intention is. But this is a hazardous route to take. (In Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 
1994 p. 36) 
Indeed, too hazardous for most Muslims, and for good reasons; the idea that one can discern the 
intention of God comes dangerously close to shirk ('association', i. e. of something concrete with 
Allah's ineffable mystery). As we have seen, Weeramantry also offers a possible interpretation of 
the Qur'an and shari'ah which is supportive of human rights, but while such a position can be 
supported by historical examples - as in the protected status of subject peoples (dhimmi , which 
contrasts favourably with the arrangements of medieval Christendom, in practice the emphasis on 
obedience and hierarchy has predominated over any emphasis on liberty and universal equality. 
Thus in the present the bishops conclude that "the readiness for open and self-critical revision of 
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the shari'ah tradition is apparently rare", but pragmatically stress that "the opportunities for a 
step-by step mediation between the shari'ah and human rights should not be underestimated" 
(Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 1994 p. 35) 
The bishops openly acknowledge the difficulties raised by human rights for both Christianity and 
Islam: 
It is the inner connection between the ... claim of universality, emancipatory essence, [and] legal implementation ... which constitutes 
human rights as a specifically modern 
phenomenon. ... [H]uman rights cannot simply be deduced form Christian and Muslim traditions. ... Religious liberty is traditionally unknown to Islam, and it does not belong to the traditional values of Christian churches either. (Schwartlander and Bielefeldt 1994 pp. 17- 
21) 
The reason for this is that both have understood human activity in relation to divinely ordained 
human ends; negative freedom is therefore not a right but an invitation to sin. Christianity has 
adapted to the secular open or negative conceptions of freedom, but arguably at the cost of its 
own integrity (Milbank 1990 - see Chapter 7 below). More positively, it could argued that 
Christians have learned to see new possibilities in their tradition and have learned through 
interaction with secular traditions, and that the same may be true for Muslims. Thus it can also 
be argued historically that Christian groups of the 'Radical Reformation' of the sixteenth century 
and the radicals stemming form the English Commonwealth in the seventeenth century were the 
first to advocate freedom of religion and the equality of individuals, both fundamental tenets of 
human rights (De Gruchy 1995 pp. 73-5,84-7). We shall return to the issue of Christian 
perspectives human rights when discussing the implications of Milbank's work at 8.1. 
Historically, Muslims have been suspicious of the free exercise of reason since the defeat of the 
Mutazilites, a tendency which meant that while Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Rushd had a 
great influence on the development of European philosophy, they were marginalised in the Islamic 
world (Leaman 1985). Further, as we saw at 1.7, Mernissi sees the reason for this suspicion more 
deeply embedded in Islamic tradition, in the association of freedom with anarchy in jahý illiya, and 
the converse positive association of submission to Allah with order and peace. Yet, as we have 
also seen (5.7), for some modernists and radicals the gate of iitý ihad is open again. As British 
Muslims are increasingly led by people who are confident in Western culture, the fear of 
innovation (bi'da may yet be replaced by a new flourishing of creative interpretation. Two 
radical Muslim writers who have addressed the British context call for a reclamation of Islamic 
philosophical and humanist traditions (Akhtar 1990, Sardar (ed. ) 1991). Furthermore, given the 
centrality of law in the broadest sense to Islam, it is possible that renewed interest in specifically 
Islamic conceptions of legal rationality could form part of such a revival. This brings us back to 
the question of whether a more positive relation between liberalism and Islam is possible in plural 
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liberal societies. Is there a way of combining virtue sustaining tradition with the psychological, 
social and economic conditions of modernity? The next chapter examines Christian responses to 
this question. 
Chapter 6: 
Christianity, the Plural Public Arena and the Common Good 
6.1 Introduction 
Guide this and every nation in the ways of justice and of peace, that men may honour one 
another, and seek the common good. (Alternative Service Book of the Church of England p. 
125) 
Every Sunday, or whenever the Alternative Service Book version of the communion service is 
celebrated, this prayer is said by Anglicans across the world. But how should Christian 
communities seek the common good in a plural, secularised society? This chapter will apply 
Maclntyre's model of tradition to Christian communities in Britain, both to analyse existing 
practice, and to explore how Christianity as a tradition might respond to challenges of plurality in 
the public arena. Chapter 3 examined liberal responses to plurality, while Chapter 4 presented 
Maclntyre's critique of liberalism, and argued that his model of traditions of enquiry in 
interaction could provide the basis for re-thinking multiculturalism. Chapter 5 sought to apply 
this model to Muslim communities in Britain, considering the shortcomings of liberal models of 
minority rights in meeting Muslim aspirations, characterising the diversity of those aspirations, 
and seeking to understand something of the character of Islam as a tradition of enquiry by 
investigating some aspects of shari'ah, and considering issues concerning Islam and human rights. 
That attempt to apply a tradition of enquiry based model proved to be an exercise in mutually 
critical correlation. For just as understanding Islam as a tradition of enquiry may shed some light 
on Muslim integration into plural, secularised societies, so the emphasis on the distinctiveness 
and intellectual integrity of traditions in Maclntyre is challenged by the diversity of actual 
communities. In particular, the challenge to Maclntyre's model is to recognise the variety of 
traditional and modem influences on Muslim individuals and communities. 
This chapter begins by sketching some of the challenges with which plurality presents British 
Christians (6.2), and then turns to consider the impact of modernity on Christianity, especially in 
Britain (6.3), where, in contrast with most Muslim societies, modernity has been experienced as 
change driven from within society. Three responses to both to modernity and plurality are then 
considered: the theological development of attempts to legislate about salvation (6.4), the inter- 
faith development represented by the German Catholic bishops' paper on Christian and Muslim 
responses to human rights (6.5; see also 5.8), and an older theological response to plurality and 
modernity, that of the Christendom Group between the 1930s and the 1950s (6.6). The latter is 
seen to anticipate postliberal theology in its criticisms of liberalism, but fails to take adequate 
account of religious and cultural plurality. Postliberal theology is then examined (6.7), which 
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forms a background to a fuller consideration of the work of John Milbank, the principal subject 
of Chapter 7. In examining postliberal theology the related charges of 'sectarianism', 'isolationism' 
and 'fideism' will be explored, building on the defence of Maclntyre against this charge (at 4.7 
above). Finally, this chapter examine the functioning of Christian communities as communities of 
virtue in a plural society, taking as examples the evidence presented by Robin Gill in Moral 
Communities (1992,6.8 below). 
6.2 Challenges to British Christians 
The points at which religious plurality is most likely to impinge on the lives of Christians in 
Britain are located in the public arena: in schools, as pupils, parents, teachers and governors, in 
other work place settings or on civic occasions, perhaps through the public celebration of 
festivals, and especially through the media. Issues of religious plurality and ethnicity are also 
likely to be entangled; the churches face the issue of how best to combat racism in society and 
within themselves (Leech 1988). 
Less directly encountered, perhaps, but relevant to many sites of public encounter, is the formal 
means of regulating public space: the law. How should Christians respond to the challenge of 
forming rules for the regulation of public space in a plural society? Some current and recent 
debates have focused on education legislation: on the interpretation of the 1988 Education Act's 
provisions for religious education and worship, 
1 on the partiality of provision for voluntary-aided 
status schools in relation to some minority religious groups, and occasionally on the possible 
anomaly of an 'established' Church of England in a multi-faith, secularised society. As we saw at 
2.12, The Satanic Verses controversy raised another range of legal questions, which partly 
related to the regulation of speech in the public arena. As we saw, further questions may be asked 
about whose interests are served by the present legal boundaries. 2 
Furthermore, Christianity has recently been invoked by some parties as a source of the common 
good - most notably as providing, through the media of religious education and collective school 
worship, a kind of cement to bind the moral fabric of the British nation. 
3 Such a notion seems to 
have influenced recent government policy, as Hargreaves comments: 
recent ministers apparently believe that moral education, a central concern in any system of 
1Also see Chapter 8 (8.5 below). 
2These protect 'national interest', personal reputation (of those who can afford to proceed with libel 
suits), 'racial', but not religious groups (except in Northern Ireland) from incitement to violence or 
hatred, and Christian sensibilities (blasphemy; CRE 1990a, 2.12 above). 
3A view with historic precedent, for example in the Christendom group, considered at 6.6 below. 
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cultural transmission designed to promote social cohesion, is best provided - or in their terms 
'delivered' - through a (largely Christian) religious education (Hargreaves in King and Reiss 
eds. 1993 pp. vii-viii). 
How are Christians to respond to the challenges posed by these issues? Should Christians support 
or oppose Muslim calls for 'separate' schools? Should they welcome or resist a renewed emphasis 
on'Christian basics' in RE? How should they reflect on Muslim outrage at The Satanic Verses? 
These are some of the questions which Christians in a secularised and religiously plural context 
need to address. 
First, let us consider the context of the official Church of England guidance on inter-faith matters, 
as contained in the Faith in the City report (Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban 
Priority Areas 1986). The report devotes one and a half of its 398 pages to "The Gospel and 
Other Faiths"; this perhaps helps to put the significance of religious plurality to Christian 
communities in Britain in some kind of perspective. 
4 The Commission concludes that the 
theological issues involved remain unresolved, but make three main points which focus on 
practical responses. Firstly, they argue that: 
confrontation is no longer an appropriate stance in the face of the evident dedication, 
spirituality and search for truth evinced by so many members of other faiths. (1986 p. 60) 
This position is concordant with a Maclntyrean view of other faiths as traditions with their own 
integrity. Secondly, the Commission urges a holistic consideration of context, which once again 
fits with a Maclntyrean view of tradition: 
Their [i. e. adherents of other faiths] right to practice their religion, and to preserve their 
religious and cultural identity, is not separable from their right to decent housing, 
employment and social provision. (1986 p. 61) 
Where this position falls short of a MacIntyrean position is in recognising that 'the religious and 
cultural identity' of these groups may not be conveniently secularisable, and may include, as we 
have seen, distinctive conceptions of the public arena. Perhaps through encounter with people 
from other traditions Christians can come to realise how tied to a particular secularised western 
context British Christianity is, and be spurred to develop new forms of political theology. 
Thirdly, the Commission recommends that Christian service to the community should include a 
"generous use of church resources", which may involve generosity with material resources, like 
4 This does not represent the Church of England's total output of official guidance on inter-faith matters; 
see for example the Inter-Faith Consultative Group's 'Multi-Faith Worship' (1992), or the Anglican 
contribution to In Good Faith (1991), produced by the Committee for Relations with People of Other 
Faiths of the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the space devoted to inter-faith matters in a report considering the totality of the Church's political 
and social relations is some indication of the priority given to the issue, at least prior to The Satanic 
Verses controversy. 
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premises, or political resources, making use of the churches' place in public life. 
However, to properly address the challenges facing British Christians in inter-faith encounter, the 
context of the relation between Christianity and a secularised public arena must be considered. 
A important question for Maclntyre's diagnosis of modernity to address is: 'Is there a way of 
maintaining virtue-sustaining tradition under modern conditions? ' For, as we have seen, 
Maclntyre argues that modem conditions are corrosive of the kind of tradition which gives 
coherence to moral, social and intellectual life. Christianity has, of all the religions of the world, 
the longest experience of modernity, but does this mean that it has best learned to cope with it, or 
been most corrupted by it? What arrangements has Christianity made with liberalism to ensure its 
survival in liberal societies? Is there a case for Muslims and Christians, as members of virtue- 
sustaining traditions, to make common cause against a common secular enemy? Certainly some 
Muslim thinkers in Britain have suggested that there is, even if their views are not mainstream. 
Thus Sardar has written: 
A joint Christian-Muslim ethical enterprise, designed to generate adoptive and pragmatic 
intellectual and social responses to the problems of our age, would be the most appropriate 
response of the believers to the demands of the postmodern age. (Sardar in Anees et al. 1991 
p. 87) 
Similarly, Akhtar asks: 
Would it not be sensible ... 
for all members of the so-called Western faiths - Judaism and her 
religious offspring - to put up a united front against Western secularity? Would it not be wise 
to become partners in adversity, at least for this part of the journey? (Akhtar 1990a p. 14) 
Yet it is unclear whether Christianity has managed to maintain itself as a tradition in Maclntyre's 
sense under modern conditions. Certainly many Muslims would doubt this, seeing Christianity as 
deeply compromised by secularism? Yet this may not be a reason for Muslim self- 
congratulation; the perceived Christian condition may simply be the eventual fate of all traditions 
under modern liberal conditions. The challenges to Christians of religious plurality in a 
secularised liberal society are therefore not just those posed in opening this section, but also wider 
questioned raised by Christianity's relationship to secular modernity. The impact of modernity on 
Christianity thus provides an important test case for other traditions. 
6.3. The Impact of Modernity on Christianity 
So what impact has modernity had on Christianity? Since the onset of modernity the relationship 
between Christianity and society in Britain has undergone profound changes. These changes can 
5e. g. Siddiqui, discussed at 5.4 (i) above. 
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be mapped onto the arguments already developed in the thesis concerning the relationship 
between economic, social and moral change in modernity (1.8-1.9,1.12-1.13), and the impact on 
the established church (1.1 and 4.1 above). 
One picture of this impact can be derived from work in the sociology of religion over the last 
thirty years on the'secularisation thesis' (Martin 1967,1978). During the last 250 years or so 
Christian institutions have gradually moved from the centre to the margins of political and social 
life, and Christian discourse has been transformed from an integral part of the dominant ideology 
to the marginal discourse of a cognitive minority. Fragments of Christian discourse survive in 
secularised form, certain Christian beliefs persist increasingly in isolation from conventional 
practice, and through institutional and organisational means the churches have retained some 
political significance. However, while the institutional church has declined new religious 
movements and some non-conformist Christian groups have grown, especially evangelical, 
charismatic and fundamentalist groups. These latter groups have also undergone a revival within 
the mainstream churches in recent years, their prosperity attributed to their distinctiveness and 
simplicity which provide identity and meaning in a fragmented and rapidly changing culture. This 
picture presents a brief summary of the secularisation thesis and its recent developments. 
6 
It can be argued that the impact of secularisation in Christianity has been so profound that, for a 
non-western person, whether Canadian Inuit or Algerian Muslim, to meet a European or 
American Christian, is first to meet a representative of liberal modernity, and only second to meet 
a Christian, however the Christian may feel about their own identity. An example of this was 
presented on the BBC Everyman documentary "Mission Impossible" (Nov 27 1994), which 
followed a team of American evangelists during a mission in the Ukraine. Where the Americans 
saw themselves as bringing the culture-free gift of the gospel, Ukrainians saw the presentation of 
an Americanised Christianity which lacked the culturally rooted relevance of the thousand year 
old historic tradition. 
This is doubtless too simple a description of a complex and problematic situation, requiring some 
qualification. First, traditional revival may be closely related to resurgent nationalism, so that 
nationalist rather than religious resentment may underlie hostile reactions to American Protestants. 
Second, Western missionaries have long been aware of the challenge of enculturation, indeed, 
globally intra-cultural mission may have replaced cross-cultural mission as the predominant form 
(Walls 1989). Third, Ukrainian society is a modern society, although one undergoing a painful 
6As we saw at 4.1, Maclntyre (1967) has challenged aspects of this narrative, arguing that the with 
economic differentiation of the Great Transformation the possibility of articulating a vision of the good 
of the whole of society disappeared, and with it not only the possibility of a shared religious vision, but 
of a shared secular one too. 
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transformation from state socialism to democratic liberalism. Three qualifications may be suggested 
immediately. But the example does illustrate the extent to which Western Christianity in Europe 
and North America is now entwined with liberal modernity, such that talk about Christianity as if 
it were a free-floating set of beliefs, or even practices, without account being taken of their social 
context and significance, is profoundly misleading. 
Yet few writings on or efforts at inter-faith encounter reflect adequately on the modem location of 
encounter (Milbank 1990b). This is the principal reason why there is little analysis of the inter- 
faith dialogue literature in this chapter. At a theoretical level many attempts have been made to 
bring Christians closer to people of other faiths by seeking commonalities of belief: 
soteriologically, theologically and ethically (Hick and Knitter 1987, King 1991). At a practical 
level, inter-faith dialogue in has often been the result of considerable individual endeavour and 
collective effort; many conferences have been held and agreements reached (Braybrooke 1992). 
But such syntheses have often been achieved at the cost of abstracting beliefs from their tradition 
location, and by neglect of the context of encounter (D'Costa ed. 1990a). Therefore, well 
intentioned efforts (e. g. Kling 1991) remain flawed by a lack of awareness of the debt of their 
own theology to specifically modem liberal conditions, and of the implications of this for the 
reception of their theology among traditional minorities both within their own countries and 
beyond the Westernised elites of non-western countries. 
Where it is considered, modernity is often seen primarily as an intellectual challenge. But as 
Dorrien writes: 
the question of modernity concerns more than the critical meaning of religious faith. ... the question of modernity is the question of the praxological meaning of Christian faith in a 
world shaped by the development of modern corporate capitalism and its accompanying 
ideologies. (1990 p. 5) 
This weakness in theological pluralism has been forcefully attacked by Surin (1990). As with 
other versions of liberalism, too many particular assumptions are presumed to be universal. Thus 
Milbank has attacked the assumption that dialogue can be conducted around a 'neutral' topic, 
where neutral usually corresponds to the dominant liberal perception (1990b p. 190). He also 
attacks "praxis" approaches, which, following liberation theology, place the emphasis on shared 
engagement in action over reflection. As we shall see in Chapter 7, his objections here rest on the 
view that "praxis" in liberation theology surrenders all the substantive content of Christian 
tradition, possibly leaving the Church in Latin America with some political power, but power 
exercised over secular processes rather than distinctively Christian socialist practices (1990a pp. 
206-258). 
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This is not to deny that much valuable work has been done in the attempt to improve inter-faith 
relations; the tireless efforts of the volunteers of the UK Inter-Faith Network deserve mention in 
this context. Often this mediation is valuable because of the concrete nature of the problems 
involved; pragmatic solutions which respect the integrity of the faith communities involved are 
sought. The Interfaith Network has also been concerned with seeking principled agreement 
between faith communities, and has been particularly concerned with "values in a multi-faith 
society" and "faith communities and public life" (1993). This is a role the Network is well placed 
to perform, for without such principles pure pragmatism can only lurch from crisis to crisis. On 
the other hand, if agreements are reached which simply turn out to be affirmations of secular 
humanist ethics, then this cannot be a long-term solution - at least not if living traditions are to 
persist and receive justice. In such agreements the challenges of religious and cultural differences 
are not faced. It is hoped that this thesis may provide food for thought for groups such as the 
Interfaith Network, offering way of thinking about how to more fully recognise diversity within a 
liberal society such as ours. 
On the model of traditions in interaction which has been developed so far in this thesis, dialogue 
cannot proceed from such neutral ground, whether theoretical or practical. Rather it can proceed 
only from the understanding and performance of ideas and practices within particular historical 
traditions, by the processes of engagement with the texts and practices of other traditions, and by 
interacting with living representatives of those traditions. 
A further manifestation of the uncritical modernity of much theology of religions is its reflection 
of individualistic and legislative preoccupations (Bauman 1992 pp. 1-25), reflected in the focus 
of much discussion on the issue of whether members of non-Christian faiths can or cannot be 
'saved'. This preoccupation indicates a vastly attenuated concept of salvation, limiting discussion 
to the terms of individual, post-mortem persistence, and neglecting, as Hastings points out: 
... the full data of the tradition - including the breath-taking insight of Romans 5 that the grace 
of Christ has abounded more widely than the sin of Adam. (1990 pp. 39-40) 
Nevertheless, the effort to legislate about the salvation of others remains prominent in Christian 
thought about other faiths, and illustrates well the modem characteristics of such a pre- 
occupation. 
6.4 Case Study of Christianity and Modernity (i): Legislating About Salvation 
In the theological arena, one of the main ways in which attention has been focused on this issue 
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has been through the widely used typology for characterising Christian theologies of religion, that 
of 'exclusivist', 'inclusivist' and 'pluralist' categories (D'Costa 1988). The defining characteristic 
of this scheme is the attempt to legislate about how and whether people of other faiths are 
"saved", according to a Christian understanding. Thus for the 'exclusivist' type salvation is only 
possible through explicit commitment to Christian faith. For the 'inclusivist' type salvation is also 
only achieved through Christ, although this may occur without explicit recognition of Christ on 
the part of the recipient, so people of other faiths may be 'included' in the Christian salvific 
framework. Pluralist types allow for salvation through the medium of the adherent's own faith, or 
indeed lack of faith; this position is universalist concerning salvation. 
Some standard criticisms can be made of each of these types. Narrating those outside the 
Christian tradition as excluded from salvation has provided a pretext for coercive attempts to 
convert, exclude from social life (e. g. the ghetto), and persecute (e. g. pogroms), and has at times 
provided a legitimation for attitudes of racial and cultural superiority with devastating 
consequences (e. g. the genocide of native Americans). But denying the need for explicit 
commitment to Christ or the Church (inclusivism), would seem to limit the significance of the 
Church, and indeed of maintaining Christian belief in any form. As for pluralism, this position 
seems to imply some common sort of salvation for which particular faiths are local media; but 
what kind of salvation? To what extent is a word with a specifically Christian history 
appropriate as a generic term for the ends sought by different faiths? Surin protests that at a 
descriptive level the vocabulary of pluralism cannot do justice to the complexities of inter-faith 
encounter: 
the simplicities of religious pluralism simply are not up to the task of characterising the ... 
patterns of speech typically involved in conversation between persons who belong to different 
religions. (in Hanmett 1990 p. 85) 
However, rather than tackling types within this scheme, it is better to challenge the assumption 
supporting the whole structure, namely that legislating about the salvation of people of other 
faiths should have any central role in a Christian response to religious plurality. Lesslie Newbigin 
argues that discussion of the important question of Christian responses to religious plurality has 
been side-tracked by the pre-occupation with a restricted understanding of salvation: 
debate about this question has been fatally flawed by the fact that it has been conducted 
around the question "Who can be saved? " It has been taken for granted that the only question 
was, "Can the good non-Christian be saved? " and by that question was meant not "Can the 
non-Christian live a good and useful life and play a good and useful role in the life of 
society? " but the question was "Where will she go when she dies? " (1989 p. 176) 
Newbigin argues that this is the wrong question, for at least three reasons. First, "it is a question 
to which God alone has the right to give the answer" (1989 p. 177). His central justification for 
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this is the recurrent themes of surprise and reversal in the synoptic judgement parables. Newbigin 
comments: 
I am astounded at the arrogance of theologians who seem to think that we are authorised, in 
our capacity as Christians, to inform the rest of the world about who is to be vindicated and 
who is to be condemned at the last judgement. ... 
Nothing could be more remote from the 
whole thrust of Jesus' teaching than the idea that we are in a position to know in advance the 
final judgement of God. (1989 p. 177) 
This interpretation receives support from theological history in D'Costa's investigation of the 
doctrine extra ecclesiam nulla salus, or "apart from the church there is no salvation" (1990c pp. 
130-147). D'Costa points out that it has only been relatively recently that this doctrine has been 
addressed to the salvation of people of other faiths, having been primarily developed as a way of 
dealing with schismatics, from Cyprian onwards (206-258 CE). Hence: 
the extra ecclesiam doctrine did not address the particular problem of salvation in the world 
religions and hence did not consign the majority of human beings to perdition. (1990c p. 140) 
Furthermore, people who developed this doctrine, including Origen and Augustine, found it 
compatible with believing that people who lived prior to Christ, and hence the church, could be 
saved. The notion of implicit faith applies this move forwards in time, to "those who have never 
historically and existentially been confronted with the gospel" (1990c pp. 142-3). The developed 
role of the doctrine is to assert that salvation is mediated through Christ and the church, a 
position which means that: 
grace could be properly acknowledged as operative outside the visible church, but must be 
causally related to Christ and his church. (1990c p. 142) 
Second, the attempt to legislate about who is saved distorts the Christian understanding of 
salvation. Salvation is not theoretical but enacted, a matter of living of which intellectual assent is 
only a possible beginning. Christian understanding is teleological, in that it looks toward the goal 
of the reconciliation of all things in God through Christ (Eph. 1: 10, Col. 1: 20). But it is a docetic 
heresy (a denial of the humanity of Christ) to focus on salvation conceived primarily in terms of 
life after death, rather than on the working out of salvation as the anticipation and performance of 
reconciliation, in our particular contexts now. Newbigin explains: 
the verb "to save" is used in the New Testament in three tenses: past, present and future. We 
were saved, we are being saved, and we look for salvation. ... 
The question of salvation is 
wrongly posed if it is posed in respect of the human soul abstracted from God's history of 
salvation, abstracted therefore from the question "How do we understand the human story? " 
... 
It follows that our dialogue with people of other faiths must be about what is happening in 
the world now and about how we understand it and take our part in it. (1989 pp. 178-9) 
Thirdly, Newbigin objects to the individualism and anthropocentrism of this approach; the 
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common good is collapsed into presumptions about the survival of individual souls, the focus is 
on individuals in isolation rather than as constituted through their relationships with one another 
and with God. The focus on this perspective illustrates the primacy for contemporary Christians 
of the Enlightenment (especially Cartesian) notion of the autonomous individual subject (3.3-3.4 
above); yet this is but one perspective, and the survival of the individual soul has little or no place 
in some other faiths, and is not necessarily central to Christian traditions.? 
Next we turn briefly to a specific example of a very different Christian response to plurality in 
the context of modernity, one which shows an awareness of the tension between the demands of a 
teleological tradition and those of a modem conception of autonomy rooted in a negative 
understanding of freedom. 
6.5 Case Study of Christianity and Modernity (ii): Muslims and Christians Facing the 
Challenge of Human Rights 
A further example of the tension in contemporary Christianity between traditional roots and 
modem influences is illustrated in the German Catholic bishops' document Muslims and 
Christians Facing the Challenge of Human Rights (1994), which featured in the last chapter 
(5.8). In this document the official Catholic reluctance to recognise human rights is put down to 
the historic antagonism between protagonists of rights and the church, thus tactfully avoiding any 
mention of a possible fundamental conflict between traditioned and modem conceptions of the 
person and morality, and relegating Vatican resistance to historical accident. However, it may be 
argued that Vatican reluctance may have its roots in the unwillingness to subordinate the telos 
(ultimate goal)of caritas (the love of God) to any external constraints, and especially to a system 
which stresses negative freedom, a conception of emancipation corrosive of tradition. 
Thus the Bishops' response shows us something of the extent to which Western Christianity, 
including at least some parts of Roman Catholicism, has become intertwined within liberal 
culture. It also tells us something of the resistance any attempt to criticise that culture is likely to 
face; the idea of not supporting human rights seems profoundly reactionary and morally repellent 
to modern sensibilities. Here a perspective which can see both Christianity and liberalism as 
historical phenomena can help. The perspective of a tradition of enquiry can help us to recognise 
the dangers both of the concept of negative freedom and of the tendency of capitalism to corrode 
7lt can be argued that the body/soul duality is alien to the earliest Christian thought, and develops only 
in response to gnosticism (Rowland 1985 pp. 285-299), and later, with Origen, Platonism (Brown 1988 
pp. 163-4). Paul's understanding of sari ('the flesh') may be better translated as 'desire' or 'bodily 
desire/appetite', to avoid dualistic connotations. 
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tradition (including the moral tradition of liberalism). It can also help us to understand the 
dynamic nature of tradition, thus opening up the possibility of a theology which recognises a 
limited conception of negative freedom within a distinctively Christian telos. 
6.6 Case Study of Christianity and Modernity (iii): A Counter-Cultural Response to 
Modernity: The Christendom Group 
The formation of the Christendom group can be traced to 1922, when a collection of essays 
introduced by Charles Gore were published under the title The Return of Christendom. This was 
followed by the publication of the journal Christendom and the formation of the Chandos Group, 
a discussion group which met regularly at a London restaurant, and whose members included 
Maurice Reckitt, VA Demant and TS Eliot. Eliot also belonged to the Moot Group alongside 
Reinhold Niebuhr and RH Tawney; both groups discussed social and political issues from a 
theological perspective (Markham 1994 p. 30). The contemporary relevance of this group has 
recently been assessed by Ian Markham in his book Plurality and Christian Ethics (1994). 
Markham also presents his own thesis for a Christian affirmation of plurality developed partly 
from his evaluation of the work of the group, and sees the group, particularly Demant, as 
anticipating the work of MacIntyre and postliberal theologians. His work therefore provides a 
useful introduction to the Christendom Group in the context of the concerns of this thesis. 
Demant saw capitalism as self-undermining, in the sense of corroding its own moral capital and 
social cohesion (inherited from pre-modem society). We have already seen the later critics 
Maclntyre and Habermas argue a similar case, and Demant's position is also close to Eliot's in 
The Idea of Christian Society (Markham 1994 p. 52) . 
Demant interpreted socialism as an 
attempt to solve these problems though state intervention (Markham 1994 p. 49). However, the 
identity of the citizen and the loyalty inspired by the state are, like those of the capitalist 
consumer, too 'thin' to bear the weight of human needs for meaning, belonging and self-worth. A 
return to something between the state and the individual, to family, community and civil society is 
implied; in Demant's case his organic conception of human societies also led him to an ecological 
concern, to knit people not only to one another but to the earth which nourishes us all. 8 But 
beyond this yearning for the recreation of community is a conviction that it can only be realised if 
society is united by a common transcendental telos by a revival of Christianity enabled by the 
state defending Christian values through legislation, education and in the public arena: 
8Markham cites the following passage: "The earth's self recovering rhythm is broken under the spur of 
technocratic, megalopolitan and commercial aggression. This betrays man's stewardship of the earth" 
(1994 p. 52; from an unpublished article). 
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As Demant put it there is something inadequate about a culture which only enables those who 
are saints to be moral. 
9 (1994 p. 54) 
This is strikingly similar to Muslim defences of legislation regulating morality; however, it faces 
the same objections in a plural society. Markham highlights three problems. Firstly, whilst in the 
1920s the constitutional position of the Church of England, its academic privileges and the 
limited presence of non-Christian minorities "conspired to create the impression that Christianity 
was the only major religious option" (1994 p. 56), factors such post war immigration and the 
declining cultural and political influence of the established church have deeply undermined such 
an assumption. 
Secondly, in this changed context the privileging of one religious tradition requires support 
through public reasoning in a context in which its priority can no longer be assumed. Here the 
group's failure to give any credit to the Enlightenment, in particular the secular narrative of the 
emergence of tolerance from the religious strife of the seventeenth century (3.2 above), means 
engagement in public debate is likely to prove difficult: 
Medieval Christendom is not attractive to modern secularists. For all the drawbacks of 
modernity it is at least free of medieval intolerance. (Markham 1994 p. 55) 
Thirdly, the group failed to give serious theological and philosophical consideration to plurality. 
It is in this context that Markham advances his own case for a Christian advocacy of tolerance 
and plurality. For Markham, plurality can be affirmed and moral and intellectual coherence 
maintained simply through theism, without the degree of societal integration which the 
Christendom Group, or for that matter Maclntyre, see as necessary to sustain moral life. 
Accepting the secular narrative of the genesis of toleration as a creative response to religious 
conflict in the seventeenth century, Markham argues that secularism was indeed necessary to 
teach Christianity tolerance. However, secularism's discovery of tolerance was `accidental' or 
unfounded; to make sense ethics must presuppose an intelligible universe, but nothing in a purely 
secular view can support this. In response he invokes Aquinas' cosmological argument, arguing 
that theism alone can uphold the intelligibility of the universe. 
The basis for toleration in Markham's argument is agreement on the intelligibility of the universe 
grounded theologically in the oneness of God as creator, together with the empirical observation 
that the universe is complex and difficult to understand; we therefore need diverse others in our 
9 In this Demant once again expresses similar views to Eliot; the implication is a "plurality within strict 
limits" in which "public policy ... should protect a broadly Christian ethos" (Markham 1994 p. 53). 
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search for truth. Markham's insistence on a common genesis to support an assumption of the 
intelligibility of the universe mirrors Maclntyre's argument for the need for a unifying telos to 
render moral language intelligible, and thus opens up a new perspective on MacIntyre's argument. 
Seen in this light Maclntyre's telos, which we have already seen described broadly as 'searching 
for the good life for man' could be read as an agreement on the ultimate unity of human destiny 
quite compatible with a recognition that this is difficult to discern and therefore we need diverse 
others in our search for it. Therefore, far from a recipe for sectarianism, it becomes an argument 
for toleration. Here, then, is one way to combine a communitarian theological ethics with 
toleration in the public sphere. 
However, Markham's argument faces at least two important difficulties. Firstly, the unifying 
factor required to render belief in the intelligibility of the universe reasonable does not have to be 
God; atheistic alternatives for grounding rationality ranging from Aristotle's pre-Christian telos 
(4.2) to Habermas' postmetaphysical universal pragmatics (3.6) need to be considered. Secondly, 
as empirical support for his argument he points to the 'American discovery' that commitment and 
tolerance can go hand in hand, as witnessed in the 'Middletown III' social attitudes survey, which 
found typical Americans to be more tolerant and yet more religious than their 1920s counterparts 
(Markham 1993 p. 120). Yet this evidence, and the exposition of Neuhaus which follows, fails to 
demonstrate that American society has found constructive ways to respond to serious religious 
and cultural differences manifest in public arenas. The increasing violence of pro-life anti- 
abortion protest, the rise of the Nation of Islam, and the perpetuation of ethnic ghettoization each 
suggest otherwise. 
Markham cannot be blamed for failing to find a panacea for these problems, but his failure to 
represent them at all is disturbing. At a sociological level, his analysis of religious plurality fails 
to locate it with sufficient depth within particular modem contexts. At a theological level, I 
suggest that in spite of his reflections on the Christendom group, he fails to draw sufficiently on 
the breadth and specificity of the Christian tradition. I have attempted to address this sociological 
shortcoming in the analysis presented in 6.3 to 6.6, and this will be continued at 6.8 and 6.9 when 
we examine how Christian communities can be seen to contribute substantively to the common 
good in multi-faith Britain. To address the latter, theological, shortcoming we now consider a 
body of work which has been termed 'post-liberal theology' (Lindbeck 1989). 
6.7 Postliberal Theology 
The Christendom group provided an example of a counter-cultural Christian response to 
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modernity stemming from the experience of European and especially British history in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Antecedents for their work can be found in the activities of Oxford 
Movement and writings of the Tractarians in the 1830s and 1840s. We now return to the present 
to consider'postliberal' theology, a counter-cultural theological response in the second half of the 
twentieth century, particularly in the American academy, although in the next chapter we shall 
concentrate on the work of a British theologian who fits the description 'postliberal', John 
Milbank. 
Postliberal theology resembles Macintyre's project in the sense that both appeal to traditioned 
communities as the practical and epistemological basis for action and reflection. From a Christian 
perspective, postliberal theology moves beyond Maclntyre in the sense that it seeks to spell out in 
more detail the implications of the Christian gospel and the church communities which it creates. 
Nonetheless the work of these theologians can be seen as complementary to Mactntyre's exposure 
of the weakness of the Enlightenment project and its successors. Thus in The Eclipse of Biblical 
Narrative (1974) Frei writes a narrative complementary to MacIntyre's of the transition in 
biblical hermeneutics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a transition which involved the 
displacement of narrative as a primary interpretative category, substituting instead either a 
'timeless' transcendent content (as in 'demythologisation'), or else offering a materialist reduction. 
In either case the 'true meaning' lies either 'above' or 'beneath' the narrative. This differs to earlier 
allegorical interpretation where the allegorical meaning was seen as in harmony with narrative 
sense. On the denial of the primacy of narrative Frei writes of Schliermacher: 
In short, for Schlicrmacher as for his predecessors, the sense of a narrative could in no way 
be either the narrative itself or its descriptive shape or its narrative structure. (1974 p. 307) 
Similarly, in The Nature of Doctrine, the work in which he coined the phrase 'postliberal 
theology', George Lindbeck writes of the transition from reading strategies in which the sacred 
text 'absorbs' the world to strategies in which the world absorbs the text, and then attempts to 
revive the former. I Je describes this as "intratextual theology": 
Intratcxtual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than 
translating scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs 
the world, rather than the world the text. (1984 p. 118) 
By using the title 'postliberal' Lindbeck marks a decisive break with the liberal model of religion 
which holds that "different religions arc diverse expressions ... of a common core experience 
... present 
in all human beings" (1984 p. 31). 
A contemporary example of the liberal approach can be found in the work of David Tracy, who 
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is of rclcv. zumcc here both because he has devoted substantial energy to developing a hermeneutics 
which seeks to maintain the integrity of the Christian tradition and a 'relevance' to the 
contemporary world, and because he has reflected seriously on the role of theology in a plural 
society. 'T'racy envisages three audiences for theology: the academy, the church and the public 
arena. These correspond to three types of theology: fundamental, systematic and practical. 
Schüssler-Fiorenza describes the significance of Tracy's conversational method, and in particular 
his engagement with l-labermas, as follows: 
Tracy shows that a communicative understanding of rationality is significant for the nature of 
public theology. It compels theology to recognise that the public with which theology is in 
dialogue is neither an abstract universal public nor a monological reason, but rather a public 
constituted by open conversations, plural discourses and diverse communities. (Schüssler- 
Fiorenza 1990 p. 5) 
Tracy does a great service to theology by drawing attention to the different publics which it may 
address. Yet, there are at least two problems with his account: firstly, his work to date is so 
focused on methodology that it is as yet unclear what his practical theology would entail. 
Secondly, the distinctiveness of a Christian contribution to conversation becomes unclear; Stout 
also attacks Tracy on both these grounds (1988 pp. 165-6). Thus while Tracy's emphasis on his 
respect for the resources of 'classics', on forms of communication which resist the 
bureaucratisation of the lifcworld (Habermas' terminology - see 3.6. above), and his awareness of 
plural audiences and arenas of interaction are attractive, the question remains: what is there to 
distinguish his position from a composite of avowedly secular writers, such as Habermas, 
Galston or Stout? 
At one level, Tracy retains some Christian distinctiveness by emphasising the importance of the 
Biblical tradition as a key to responding to the tragic history of the twentieth century. However, 
questions can be raised as to whether the hermeneutics employed to access this tradition are 
governed by prior secular assumptions. Similarly, in a religiously plural context, Tracy's 
recognition of non-Christian sources is welcome, but from a postliberal perspective one may ask 
whether he only achieves this recognition by appealing to a secular category of human experience 
more fundamental than religious traditions. Passages such as the following imply that he does: 
contemporary Christian theology is best understood as philosophical reflection upon the 
meanings present in common human experience and the meanings present in the Christian 
tradition. (1975 p. 34) 
In method, he seems to give philosophy priority over any distinctive methodology which theology 
might offer. Even in substantive content, it is unclear whether "common human experience" or 
"Christian tradition" is given priority. By contrast, the idea of a philosophy more fundamental 
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than Christian theology, and of human generic human experience more fundamental than 
Christian tradition, is decisively rejected by postliberals. Instead Lindbeck, for example, proposes 
a cultural-linguistic model of religion in which: 
A religion defines a language and a practice, shared by a community, and that language 
makes new kinds of experience possible. (Placher 1989a pp. 18-9) 
Thus tradition, cultural mediation, is held to be prior to experience, and constitutive of its 
possibilities. Such writers illustrate Maclntyre's idea of tradition in substantive form, and 
whereas Maclntvre's Thomism seems too diminished as a historical tradition for realistic 
revival, IU Lindbeck and Frei's accounts of interpretation and theology are arguably close enough 
to the beliefs and practices of a variety of Christian groups to present themselves as plausible 
models of self-understanding and self criticism. 
I lowever, the comparison with Tracy suggests a serious charge which has been levelled at 
postliberal theologies - that they arc 'isolationist' or 'sectarian', and do not encourage engagement 
beyond the confines of the Christian community. 11 Whereas Tracy explicitly addresses the 
responsibilities of theology in diverse settings, postliberal theology seems more concerned with its 
own internal development. A similar charge could be levelled at the model of plural societies as 
traditions in interaction as developed so far here, both because it has been argued that 
communities in which virtue can be developed require substantive commonalities, and because it 
has been argued that many modern practices are corrosive of the common good. 
Thus a 'Catch-22' situation appears: to build a viable common good you cannot adopt modem 
practices as these are corrosive of tradition; but if you do not adopt modem practices in a modem 
society, you are forced into isolation. All that seems to be left to do in the public arena is to play 
the role of pre-exilic Jeremiah, warning of the impending doom welling up in contemporary 
wrongdoing, and the hope that the cultivation of Christian virtue within Christian communities 
will somehow 'spill over' into the public arena. However, at 4.7 we considered Kotva's argument 
which makes this Jeremiah role more positive and influential than it might at first appear; 
characters of virtue can continue to make a real difference in public life even in institutions which 
militate against the cultivation of virtue. This case will now be further strengthened by examining 
Bruce Marshall's defence of George Lindbeck's project of'absorbing the world' into the scriptural 
text. 
1QAt 4.7 above Haldane's comment that "in Great Britain I doubt there are sufficient Thomists to 
constitute a football team" (1994 p. 100) was noted in support of this view. 
Of course this also raises questions of'Which Christian community/ies? '; the reliance of Christian 
theologians on secular university settings rather then ecclesiastical sponsorship further complicates this 
question. 
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As already indicated, the metaphor of 'absorbing the world' occurs in Lindbeck's The Nature of 
Doctrine (19114), and refers to a mode of reading scripture in which the reader's experiences are 
interpreted in terms of the scripture rather then the other way around; scripture has hermeneutical 
priority. Christian scripture is seen as the basis of a worldview within which all other knowledge 
and cxpcriciicc is framed: "take every thought captive to obey Christ" (1 Cor. 10: 5). 
As Marshall considers the 'isolationist' charge against this position, the first form is that'extra- 
scriptural' evidence is ignored by this procedure (1990 p. 84). Marshall sees this as simply 
misdirected, since if the project is to absorb the world into Christian categories then it is clearly 
not isolationist in the sense of completely disregarding extra-scriptural evidence; instead the 
project is precisely to absorb such evidence by locating them in a Christian 'order'. A second form 
of the charge is one of bias or imperialism; by cramming all phenomena into a Procrustean 
scriptural bed, extra-scriptural reality is not denied but distorted. Marshall's response to this is 
that the foundationalist project of discovering bases for knowledge apart from any particular 
tradition has failed, or at least has not yet succeeded (1990 pp. 87-8); in the meantime the task of 
making sense of the world must proceed somehow, and the "assimilative power" of the Christian 
narrative makes it a plausible way to proceed. 12 
Marshall then addresses a third, more subtle, form of the imperialist charge: the choice of the 
Christian narrative as the hermcneutical key to the world is too rigid; it is bound to ignore 
insights which may be gained from other perspectives (1990 pp. 88-9). Marshall's response is to 
object that strong forms of this charge fail because they require the logically and psychologically 
impossible: the simultaneous suspension of all beliefs. Marshall uses Wittgenstein's argument that 
all doubts presuppose some background of certainty to support his case. However, he accepts a 
tccakcr form of the argument that Christians need to be prepared to revise their beliefs in 
response to external challenges; otherwise the project of absorbing the world will indeed have 
failed. 
A further problem which may be raised for the project of 'absorbing the world', and which does 
not seem to be addressed by Marshall, is that every reader's understanding is always already 
formed by extra-scriptural influences and interests, so that a re-pristinization of a scriptural 
'«worldvvic"' is simply not possible under modern, secularised conditions. Another is that the 
project appears not to reckon with a possible plurivocity of scripture. Partly, this first point may 
be addressed by contesting the secular assumption that there necessarily exist more 'fundamental' 
determinants of action than religious tradition. This response in turn suggests the important 
t 2Marshall devotes considerable attention to developing the sense of assimilative power; see 1990 pp. 
76-82. 
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qualification that neither Marshall nor Lindbeck envisage an isolated individual interpreting 
scripture alone, but rather a community of interpretation standing in a historic series of tradition. 
But it does seem important to raise the suspicion of extra-scriptural and extra-traditional 
influences on individuals and communities; otherwise a kind of fundamentalism in which the 
authority of leaders usurps the authority of scripture and tradition can be the outcome. The same 
applies to the question of plurivocity; an assumption of univocity can too easily serve to 
legitimate the readings of an authoritarian leadership. 13 Thus it is possible to permit secular 
explanations ad hoc, without subscribing to a secular reductionism. 
Such defences can take much of the sting out of the isolationist charge. However, the question of 
why to prefer a Christian narrative to others available in a post-foundationalist world remains, 
and while it does so an arbitrariness hangs over the postliberal attempt to 'absorb the world' from 
a Christian perspective. For this we shall turn to Milbank (1990a), who provides a simple answer 
to this question: all other conceptions of the social and political reduce to the constraint or 
celebration of violence. Only Christianity assumes the ontological priority of peace, and so holds 
out the hope of truly harmonious community. The next chapter will critically examine the reasons 
given for this claim. 
As we have seen, Maclntyre articulates a conception of tradition which situates and opposes 
modem liberalism. Milbank largely concurs with this project (1990a p. 327), but argues that 
Maclntyre underplays the distinctive elements of Christian tradition. Milbank provides a 
thorough and provocative framework for examining the relationship between Christianity and 
modernity. I le both exposes the secular assumptions in modern theological positions (across the 
range of liberal, neo-orthodox, liberation and fundamentalist theologies) and exposes the 
theological genesis of secular conceptions of the political and social. In Wittgensteinian terms, 
Maclntyre 'changes the aspect' by enabling us to see secular ethics anew through the eyes of 
'tradition'. 14 Milbank succeeds in 'changing the aspect' once more, focusing on social theory 
rather than moral philosophy, and from a more overtly Christian perspective, which 
problernatises the concept of tradition developed so far. This chapter now turns to consider some 
practical examples of Christian contributions to the common good, by looking at the role of 
Christians in 'caring' activities (Gill 1992). 
13For an analysis of this process at work see Boone K 1989 The Bible Tells Them So: the discourse of 
Protcstant Fundaiucntalism SCM, London. 
I''in particular, sec Aflcr Virtue (1985) Chapter 1, where MacIntyre imagines a society which has lost a 
coherent scientific framework, using the analogy to suggest that contemporary Western society has lost a 
coherent ethical framework. 
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6.8 Rescuing the Common Good? Gill's 'Moral Communities' 
Gill's book Moral Communities (based on his Prideaux lectures 1991) sets out to ask what 
sustains practices of "caring beyond self-interest" (1992 p. 1) in contemporary British society, an 
enquiry which turns into a consideration of the role of religious communities in sustaining such 
practices. Gill is concerned to establish the "social significance" of religious ethics. In doing so he 
presents a range of evidence relevant to this thesis. But for this thesis, following Maclntyre, the 
question is not whether Christians 'do good', defined in some free-floating sense which has been 
shown to be incoherent (4.1), but whether and how a Christian telos sustained by Christian 
conununitics engaged in practices in the public arena. 
Unfortunately, it is far from clear that sustaining Christian community and building up the 
common good, in the sense of participating in political, social and cultural activities alongside 
others to build up community life, are compatible in a plural liberal society. In this connection 
Gill cites Bryan Wilson's work, which suggests that it is those groups which erect the most rigid 
boundaries around their communities, and confine their charity to within their own communities, 
which best sustain their memberships. Wilson calls such groups 'sects'; Brethren, Mormons, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, The Unification Church and Scientologists are examples (Gill 1992 pp. 68- 
9). By contrast, groups which begin by sharing the internal characteristics of intense, supportive 
community life and clear boundaries between themselves and the outside world seem to lose these 
characteristics, and ultimately members, when they engage more fully in the public arena: 
once a sect does genuinely attempt to influence society especially in areas of care - the 
Salvation Army today is an obvious example - it soon becomes denominationalised in the 
process. By taking this step, so Wilson argues, such a sect is likely to become secularised 
itself. (Gill 1992 pp. 69-70) 
Nonetheless, Gill also shows that there is evidence that participation in Christian communities is 
related positively to involvement in caring activities. For example, Gill cites David Gerard's work 
on motivation for involvement in voluntary work (in Abrams et al. 1985), based on a study 
conducted in 198 1. Strikingly, individuals scoring high on a scale of religious commitment were 
far more likely to engage in voluntary work than those who scored low on the scale, such that: 
roughly half of those in the highest category on the combined scale undertook voluntary 
work; almost nine tenths of those on the lowest category undertook none at all. (Gerard in 
Abrams et al. 1985 p. 84) 
Furthcnnorc, involvement in a Christian community emerged as the single most significant 
predictor of the likelihood of an individual being engaged in voluntary work: 
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Using multiple regression techniques on the 1981 sample, David Gerard suggested that 
attendance at religious services at least once a month was the most significant variable in 
predicting whether someone is involved with voluntary work. (Gill 1992 p. 20) 
These findings are broadly supported by the European Values Systems surveys (Gill 1992 p. 19). 
l lowwwcvcr, Christians did not of en mention their faith as a reason for engaging in voluntary work, 
a pattern that fits with a tendency for caring organizations with Christian foundations (e. g. 
Samaritans. Relate, Alcoholics Anonymous) to play down their religious roots. The latter groups 
may well be keen to emphasise their universal availability, but both individuals and organizations 
may wish to avoid making the immodest claim that Christians are more caring then others, 
especially given numerous counter-examples. But whether this muting of Christian connections is 
a conscious strategy or not, the connection between caring activities and involvement with a 
Christian community persists. Thus, as Gill suggests, it is at least possible that: 
an outward secularity can frequently disguise a less than secular inside. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that we have tended to underplay the religious contexts of care in our 
society. (1992 p. 21) 
This line of argument is indirectly supported by another piece of research in a caring context, this 
time on the coping strategies of people suffering from chronic illnesses (Williams 1984). Gill 
cites evidence from the European Values Study that people with religious beliefs are far more 
likely to discern some overall purpose in life than others. Williams' evidence shows how people 
with chronic illnesses tell stories which help them to make sense of their experiences; religious 
beliefs often provide the framework for these stories, and'forgotten' religious resources are 
revisited. Indeed the story of faith may entirely displace the need to create a personal story: 
Betty exemplifies a situation where both 'causal' analysis and narrative reconstruction may be 
transcended when the tclos of life is gently enshrouded within a powerful theodicy. She does 
not need to reformulate my question [i. e. 'Why do you think you got arthritis'] because: 
'people say: "Why you? " Well, why not me? Better me who knows the Lord'. (Williams 1984 
p. 180) 
The stories told by such people, not all of them overtly committed Christians like Betty, provide 
another example of where "an outward secularity" may "disguise a less than secular inside" (Gill 
1992, above); where the cracked concrete of modernity's ambiguity-dispelling myth (Bauman 
1991) is disrupted, the green sinews of religious recovery may begin to show through. 
I lowcvcr, there are problems with Gill's evidence which must be considered before drawing 
conclusions from it for the thesis. Chiefly, these concern 'construct validity', i. e. whether the 
categories constructed for the analysis of interactions between variables are adequate. For 
example, for the purposes of this thesis, how far does a high score on Gerard's religious 
commitment scale correspond to participation in a telos sustaining community? All that can said 
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is that participation in a Christian community as indicated by fairly regular attendance at 
Christian worship, correlates with engagement in unpaid caring activities. On this basis, it is not 
implausible to suggest, as Gill does, that participation in a worshipping community, where care is 
received from and given to others, and where worship of a caring God is enjoined, may be a 
significant explanatory factor. But correlation does not imply causation. 
Concerns may also be raised about the construct of'care' used here, especially the possibility of 
an attitude-behaviour discrepancy. In a judicial context, such a discrepancy has recently been 
highlighted by the feminist sociologist Carol Smart, in the context of parental disputes over child 
custody. She notes that paternal expressions of "caring about" children - an attitude not an action 
- often take precedence over the actual historic division of care ("caring for" - performance) in the 
decision of the courts (Smart 1991). Thus men adopt the traditionally feminine discourse of care 
«hich proves more powerful in custody cases than the continuing female practice of care. 
I lowever, the Christians in Gill's evidence aren't simply expressing "care about", since all the 
crucial variables are performative: both church attendance and voluntary activity. 
A third example of a suspect construct is the identification of certain sects as examples of a 
successful strategy for sustaining Christian distinctiveness and membership in modern liberal 
societies. Most of the sects mentioned (e. g. Mormons, Jehovah's witnesses, Scientologists) can 
only be loosely described as Christian, and would certainly be excluded if one applied the criteria 
of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. One could therefore argue that a trinitarian orthodoxy could 
engender a different community dynamic, one which would enable successful engagement in 
society without falling prey to secularising tendencies. However, I am not aware of any evidence 
that orthodox groups are better able to cope with the competing demands of openness and 
distinctiveness than their less orthodox cousins. Furthermore, the claim that trinitarian orthodoxy 
leads to generosity beyond the confines of the church seems implausible on historical grounds; it 
does not seem as though pre-modern Christian groups behaved any differently (certainly any 
more openly) towards groups which did not share their telos, than members of any other tradition. 
What, then, can be concluded about the two lines of evidence which have been developed from 
Gill, namely that Christian communities resist secularisation best when they limit their 
engagement in the public arena, but that Christian communities seem to be supportive of, indeed 
disproportionately constitutive of, sustaining the common good in the public arena through caring 
activities? The logic of the latter does seem plausibly to be related to the telos of these 
conununities as celebrated and sustained in worship. Gill describes the process which may be at 
work here: 
any care we that we show to others has already been shown to us by a God who cares. 
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Goodness beyond self-interest is identified as the true telos of a world created by a God who 
acted and continues to act in creation beyond self-interest. (Gill 1992 p. 82) 
-l-hus the care shown by Christians appears not to be rooted in secular premises, but to spring 
from the historic roots of religious traditions. However, the concern remains that it may still be 
the case that modernity is living off the moral capital of such traditions which it persists in 
eroding: the denominations who supply the caring Christians are shrinking denominations (Wolffe 
199-1). In this context a liberalism which recognised its dependence on such traditions, as, for 
example Galston (1991) does, and which enacted that recognition, may go some way toward the 
creation of a public culture in which they can be sustained. But answers also need to come from 
within communities themselves. 
At this point we can review to Muslim suggestions for Muslim-Christian, and even Muslim- 
Jcwish-Christian alliances. Although Gill's empirical evidence refers to Christian communities, he 
sees his argument as applying equally to Muslims and Jews. This is because he sees the role of 
worship as a common link between the content of tradition and performance in society: 
For Judaism, Christianity and Islam it is worship that provides the link that I believe is 
especially crucial for effective care in society - the link between logic and structures. Within 
each of these traditions individuals who believe in theory there is a God who cares (and who 
encourages then to care) are confronted in worship with this caring God.... Within worship 
the stories, myths, scriptures, rituals and liturgies that are carried by faith communities 
become part of our living response to the God we encounter in worship. In this profound 
sense they take on a new objectivity for those who worship. ... 
Within worship moral values 
take on a more demanding and insistent shape than they do outside worship; they change the 
very way we see the world. And worship itself becomes a form of care, requiring that we 
should go out and help the world to become more God-like. (Gill 1992 p. 81) 
Such an argument goes some way to showing how traditions can contribute to the development of 
the common good in a plural society, and hence to providing a theoretical and practical 
underpinning for Sacks' (1990-1) vision of society as a 'community of communities'. We now 
turn to a radical challenge from within the Christian tradition to Macintyre's model of tradition: 
that of the English theologian John Milbank. 
Chapter 7: 
Beyond Tradition? Milbank's Christian 'Radicalization' of Maclntyre 
7.1 Beyond Secular Reason: An Introduction to the Work of John Milbank 
JAI gigantic claim to be able to read, criticise, say what is going on in other human 
societies, is absolutely integral to the Christian Church, which itself claims to exhibit the 
exemplary form of human community. For theology to surrender this claim, to allow that 
other discourses -'the social sciences' - carry out yet more fundamental readings, would 
therefore amount to a denial of theological truth. The logic of Christianity involves the 
claim that the'internlption' of history by Christ and his bride, the Church, is the most 
fundamental of events, interpreting all other events. And it is most especially a social 
event, able to interpret other social formations, because it compares them with its own 
new social practice. (Milbank 1990a p. 388) 
Chapters 5 and 6 attempted to demonstrate the value of a concept of tradition developed from 
Macintyre in Chapter 4 for thinking through the challenges posed to Islam and Christianity 
by religiously plural, secularised societies, concentrating on the theme of rescuing some 
notion of the common good, and in the locale of Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It 
is hoped that it has been shown that the concept of tradition enables a mode of representation 
which goes some way towards doing justice both to the integrity and diversity of faith and to 
the complexity of the socio-political environment within which faith subsists. However, this 
chapter will call into question that concept of tradition, and indeed the concepts of the social, 
political and economic which have so far been discussed or presupposed. It will do so through 
an examination of the work of John Milbank, a British theologian whose major work 
Theology and Social Theory (henceforth TST) is significantly subtitled 'Beyond Secular 
Reason'. 
Some of the book's major themes are already anticipated in his 1987 article "An Essay 
Against Secular Order", in particular the interests in Augustine and Hegel, while some later 
articles can be seen as developments of the thesis presented in the book. Thus the 
ccclesiological and christological dimensions of his thought are developed in the 1991b article 
"Tire Name of Jesus: Incarnation, Atonement, Ecclesiology", while his position is presented in 
condensed form in the unusual summa on'Postmodern Critical Augustinianism' (1991a). Of 
particular relevance to religious plurality is his contribution to D'Costa's Christian 
_ niqucness 
Reconsidered, provocatively titled "The End of Dialogue" (1990b). Given this 
balance, the strategy followed here will be to focus on the book, drawing in arguments from 
the articles as relevant. 
While not generating the controversy of The Satanic Verses in the public arena, Milbank's 
book certainly stimulated debate amongst theologians, with some whole issues of theological 
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journals dedicated to its discussion. ) However, the book is addressed to two distinct 
audiences, theologians and social theorists, and it seems to have received little attention from 
the latter. Academic specialisation may be largely responsible for this receptive imbalance; or 
it may be, as we saw above with the moral philosopher Stout, that social theorists have 
concluded after reflection that religious thinkers have nothing 'surplus' to contribute to secular 
thought. 2 Whatever is the case, this chapter seeks to go some small way to redressing this 
imbalance by comparing Milbank's work with that of British-based political theorists John 
Gray (7.6) and Fred Halliday (8.1). 
Milbank deserves attention in this thesis not only because he is a British representative of 
postliberal theology (whose affinity to Maclntyre's thought has already been described, 6.7), 
but also because he specifically engages with and challenges MacIntyre's concept of 
'tradition'. Ile sees Macintyrc's project as part of a "benign postmodernism" which has tended 
to be "optimistic about the possibility of admitting irreducible difference, and the historical 
situatedness of all truth-claims, without lapsing into a perspectivism which denies absolute 
truth and value altogether" (1990a p. 261). Indeed, Milbank sees such interests as close to his 
own, and argues that the eleventh chapter of TST could be read as "a temeritous attempt to 
radicalize the thought of Maclnytre" (1990 p. 327). 
Sloth share the view that the varieties of modern social theory are only as valid as their 'fit' 
with modern political practices, which are themselves questionable (1990a p. 326). Indeed for 
both these practices have been successfully called into question by postmodern critics, so that 
no return to liberalism or Enlightenment reason is possible. Instead, for both, nihilism acts as 
strange midwife at the re-birth of virtue, which presupposes a prior commitment to the 
common good, rather than the 'containment of violence' held to be implicit in all forms of 
modern secular politics. 
I lowcver, where Maclntyrc offered us Nietzsche or Aristotle, Milbank offers us Nietzsche or 
Augustine. Nihilism cannot be successfully opposed by any return to universal reason, 
represented by Aristotle's dialectics (4.2), but only by the positing of alternative 'myth', which 
Milbank finds best articulated in Augustine. Like Augustine's City of God, Theology and 
Social_Tlrcon retells the story of an earthly community founded on violence within the larger 
Ic. g. Modern Tlacolo y vol. 8 no. 4 October 1992, New Blackfriars vol. 73 no. 861 June 1992. 
2lronically. Milbank would probably concur with the view that most modern theology has little to 
add to secular thought, but offers his book as a singular exception, building on strands in the 
Christian tradition to offer a counter-reading of secular narratives of modernity, and to articulate 
what he secs as the difference of Christianity. It should also be noted that there are some exceptions 
to the studied or unstudied indifference amongst mainstream political and social theorists to 
religious thought; see Rcnggcr N (1995) Political Theory. Modernity and Postmodernity, or 
flabertnas' contribution to Fiorcnza F and Browning D Jurgen Habermas and Public Theology 
(1991)). 
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narrative of God's redemptive purpose to establish a heavenly community founded on 
harmonious difference. Where for Augustine the community in question is the Roman 
Empire, for Milbank it is western modernity. Where the violent founding of Rome begins 
Augustine's narrative, the beginning of Milbank's account (in the sequence in which it is 
presented) is the failure of Christian community in the twelfth century, which created space 
for new understandings and practices of'the secular'. 
For Milbank, Maclntyre does not go far enough in his deconstruction of modernity, 
particularly in what Milbank claims is a retention of universal reason, albeit in dialectically 
mediated form. This criticism is important for the thesis developed here, since the credibility 
of the claim of Maclntyre's theory of traditions to model interactions between traditions is at 
stake. He also criticises Maclntyrc's interpretation of his antique and medieval sources and 
those sources themselves. But before considering Milbank's engagement with Maclntyre in 
detail it is necessary to locate his remarks in the context of his argument in TST. 
7.2 Outline of Theology and Social Theory 
The book consists of twelve chapters divided into four parts. The first part, 'Theology and 
Liberalism', narrates the origins of liberalism in the founding of political science in the 
seventeenth century, and that of political economy in the eighteenth century. In each case he 
argues that the genesis of these discourses was dependent on prior 'heretical' developments in 
theology and ecciesial practice. This 'heresy' is defined in relation to a denial of Christian 
'orthodoxy ; in particular, Milbank refers throughout the book to "three great denials" 
undergirding modern political theory: 
firstly, of 'Baroque poesis', or the idea that human making is not a merely instrumental 
and arbitrary matter, but itself a route which opens towards the transcendent; secondly, 
of the Christian doctrine of creation [in particular that it was created good, and that evil 
is mere negation], in favour of a reversion to an antique mythology of rational action as 
the 'inhibitor of chaos'; thirdly of Aristotelian ethics/politics [in view of Chapter 4 above 
we could substitute 'tradition'], with its central notions of praxis, virtue and prudence. 
(I 990a p. 148) 
Until the late medieval period 'the secular' had been only a time between Christ's ascension 
and return; but late medieval theology and church practice3 invested the secular with a 
positive content which eventually enabled thinkers like Hobbes and Spinoza in the seventeenth 
century to endow it with a precarious autonomy, thus founding 'political science'. 
3Fronn the hcelfth century (Milbank 1990 a p. 433). 
223 
Milbank argues that the new object of political science which emerged with these thinkers 
depended upon prior heterodox developments in theology, in particular that 'man' is closest to 
the image of God when enjoying unrestricted rights, and the contractual model of these rights 
created by a shift in emphasis from participation in the new creation towards a covenantal 
understanding (1990a p. 15). Such contractualism was not just the theory but the practice of 
the medieval papacy, and not just of papal centralists but also of conciliarists. Furthermore, 
as purely sacramental and charitable bonds failed to sustain community increasing 
rationalisation occurred not only in law but also in pastoral care. Thus in Chapter 12 Milbank 
refers to Foucault's work on the ecclesial genesis of modern 'discipline', again stemming from 
the twelfth century, when new regulative practices - for example governing confession, 
penance, and monastic order - were instituted, and contributed to increasingly restrictive 
attitudes towards appearance and behaviour in general, such that those outside the norm (c, g. 
homosexuals, 4 lepers, prostitutes) became subject to more intense persecution. Over the 
centuries order became more and more disengaged from practice and purpose, such that: 
... pastoral rule 
became, within the secular state, a rule through the classification of 
populations in terms of medical, psychological, economic and educational canons of 
'normality'. Such rule is a kind of mimicry of ecclesial peace, because it can be based 
upon a consensus, yet the basis of the consensus is not agreement about either "the goal" 
or "the way", but merely a deferral to 'expert' opinion. (1990a p. 433) 
This is one example of Milbank's usage of the Nietzschean technique of genealogy - tracing 
the genesis of a familiar and 'noble' idea or institution to an 'ignoble' source - and here as 
elsewhere Milbank inverts the Nietzschean evaluative polarity by proposing a theological or 
ecclesial genesis for a secular practice, rather than a secular, power based explanation for a 
philosophical or religious belief in the Nietzschean manner. 
However, in the case of seventeenth century political science, its theological location is also 
evident at the surface of the texts produced by Hobbes and Spinoza - substantially biblical 
hermeneutics - but a hermeneutics which rejects allegory and tradition in favour of 
voluntarist/formalist and rationalist methods of interpretation (1990a pp. 17-20). Milbank 
emphasises the importance of revived Roman concepts such as conatus5 and dominium6 in 
defining the individual subject and the sovereign state as the twin poles of the new political 
4See Boswell J 1980 Christian Attitudes to Homosexuality Harvard University Press, US, for 
independent confirmation of this thesis. 
5"Effort, endeavour; inclination, impulse", (Kidd 1995 p. 66); Milbank defines it as "the natural 
effort of each creature at self-preservation" (1990a p. 241). 
6"Dominium over oneself, 'self-government', was traditionally a matter of the rational mastery of the 
passions and this was the basis of one's legitimate control and possession of external objects. ... 
Yet 
at the margins of this classical and medieval theme there persists the trace of a more brutal and 
original dominium, the unrestricted lordship over what lies within one's power - oneself, one's 
children, land or slaves, within Roman private law: "In the later middle ages and in the seventeenth 
century this original Roman sense not only returns but for the first time advances form the margins 
into the centre. " (Milbank 1990a p. 12) 
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science, and constitutive of modern politics. Both concepts, without the constraint of custom 
and virtue which bound them in antiquity, came to embody the idea of a single will forcefully 
suppressing a prior chaos; here we see an example of the second denial of modern political 
theory highlighted by Milbank, that of the Christian doctrine of creation. It is in the analogy 
between the sovereign individual and sovereign state that Milbank sees a common root to 
modern absolutism and modem liberalism, and a rejection of the politics of the common good: 
To keep notions of the state free from any suggestions of a collective essence or generally 
recognised telos, it must be constructed on the individualist model of dominium. 
It is in this inescapable imperative of nominalism? /voluntarism8 that one discovers the 
kinship at the root of modem absolutism with modern liberalism. The same notion of 
dominium promotes both Hobbes' dictum that the sovereign power can never bind itself, 
and his view that the greatest liberty of subjects depends on the silence of the law.... 
One can conclude that 'unrestricted' private property, 'absolute sovereignty' and 'active 
rights' which compose the 'pure-power' object of the new politics, are all emanations of a 
new anthropology which begins with human beings as individuals and yet defines their 
individuality essentialistically as 'will' or 'capacity' or'impulse to self-preservation'. 
(1990a p. 14) 
However, political science was not only constituted by a denial of Christian orthodoxy, but 
also through a return to paganism, in particular the revival of the military-political concept of 
virtu by Machiavelli. The latter is also significant for the emergence of historicism, through 
his revival via Polybius of the pagan cyclical understanding of time. But Milbank also argues 
that figures like Erasmus show that there is no necessary contradiction between 
eschatological time, allegorical hermeneutics, and a form of historicism, since a creative 
tension between the unity of revelation, and distinct phases of revelation, can promote a 
historically reflective consciousness (1990a p. 21). 
Chapter 2 narrates the development of political economy as concerned with the development 
of a politics which requires neither substantive consensus nor virtue. Thus in Adam Smith: 
The justice founded upon this propriety9 is clearly not the 'distributive justice' of classical 
political theory, nor a justice first and foremost concerned with the common good. 10 
(1990a p. 31) 
However, once again, prior heterodox Christian developments are at play. The political 
economy of Smith is seen to owe much to the prior tradition of a natural theology of divine 
design (1990a p. 38), and that of Thomas Malthus to theodicy (1990a p. 42). However, a 
7nominalism - "doctrine that universals or ideas are mere names" (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1982 
p. 688) 
8voluntarism - "doctrine that the will is the fundamental or dominant factor" (Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 1982 p. 1204). 
9'Propriety' in Smith entails "habits of economy, industry and discretion, the judicious spending of 
our own resources" (Milbank 1990a p. 31). 
t0As justice had been for Aristotle and Aquinas (see Chapter 4). 
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revived pagan agonistic strain is again evident, particularly in Stewart (1990a p. 36). The 
development of social science cannot be told in terms of the gradual displacement of divine by 
human agency, since political economists invoked divine causation far more directly than 
medieval thinkers, abandoning the medieval distinction between primary and secondary 
causes (1990a pp. 38,241). Milbank is particularly keen to refute what he describes as "the 
heterogenesis of ends", defined as "separate individual actions resulting in a non-intended 
harmony" (1990 a p. 37). A science of social explanation can only proceed on this basis if it 
assumes the existence of intending agents prior to their projects. Milbank challenges this 
presupposition, arguing that agents are only constituted through their projects, and those 
projects through human interaction. Thus: 
Choice, in its most basic options, is not discovered at the individual level, but within 
social discourse. Only by forgetting this can one establish an economic 'science' which 
divides and rules in terms of private sentiments and'natural' design. Once all this is 
recognised, there can be no more a discovery of a fundamental economic dimension to 
human history, and no alienation of human purpose (which is not primarily 'conscious') to 
the side of nature, reason, or providence. (1990a p. 41). 
Throughout the book, Milbank is keen to refute what could be described as a'myth of secular 
origins'; the idea, present in so many modem discourses in a variety of guises, that beneath 
traditional society or religion lies an autonomous secular layer waiting to emerge. This is 
perhaps most evident in Part II, 'Theology and Positivism', which is devoted to an analysis 
and refutation of some of the major claims of sociology. In contrast to the individualist 
outlook of political economy, which seeks to explain collective behaviour in terms of 
individual wills mediated through markets, the French sociological tradition begins with the 
positivist assertion of the fait sociale, the social totality, an organic whole which can only be 
maintained at the cost of sacrifice - hence the role of religion - while the German tradition 
begins from certain apriori possibilities of relations between individuals (1990a pp. 70,75). 
Milbank refutes these positivisms first by arguing that action cannot be successfully 
understood by beginning either with the individual or the social whole or through a mixture of 
the two, since both are modified by their mutual inter-relation. Instead, the complexity of 
cultural action can only be grasped by narration (1990a pp. 70-1). Here, Milbank 
prospectively intimates his own theory of action, which draws on the work of Maurice 
Blondel (1990a pp. 210-9). Secondly, he argues that the sociological tradition mistakes 
contingent conditions for inevitabilities, for example in the case of social differentiation: 
Weberian sociology betrays and subverts history. It takes as an a priori principle of 
sociological investigation what should be the subject of a genuine historical enquiry: 
namely the emergence of a secular polity, the modem imagining of incommensurable 
value spheres and the possibility of a formal regulation of society. But this eventuality, 
like earlier imaginings, can only be narrated, and it is not traceable to 'fundamental' 
influences. Social differentiation is a contingent historical event (albeit both immensely 
226 
widespread and persistent) in western history, and not the outworking of rationality itself. 
(1990a p. 89) 
Even more fundamental to sociological self-perception, Milbank challenges the mode of 
understanding human behaviour in terms of a binary polarity between the individual and the 
social: 
Both Durkheim and Weber categorise societies in terms of the relation of the individual to 
something social and universal, and this reflects the perspective of modem western 
politics, whose prime concern is the 'bodily' mediation between the unlimited sovereignty 
of the state, and the self-will of the individual. As a grid, or frame, through which to view 
all societies, this perspective tends to occlude the fact that for many non-western, or pre- 
modern societies, what matters is not the binary individual/society contrast, but the 
hierarchical ordering of different status groupings, and the distribution of roles according 
to a complex sense of common value. (1990a p. 103) 
This binary model excludes Sittlichkeit, substantive ethics, and in particular Christian charity 
(1990a pp. 97-8). Nonetheless, in the context of a critical review of scholarship on the 
sociology of religions (Chapter 5), Milbank admits the validity of a sociological 
understanding of religion on an occasional basis, but not as a 'master decoder' applying 
universally valid principles to decode the truth behind the riddle of religious behaviour. Thus 
in the case of correlations between social status and religious affiliation he comments: 
there can be 'elective affinities' between social position and religious allegiance. However, 
one should not ignore the fact that 'social position' may itself be constituted by moral, 
ritual and religious convention ... 
I do not want to deny the place of what one might call 
ad hoc reductive suspicion, nor that sociology (and Marxism), as error not without 
benefit, have vastly extended our awareness of how mere self-interest can persist and 
disguise itself over long periods, and across wide collective spaces. The errors and 
delusions exposed, however, ... are themselves 
historical eruptions: their persistence must 
not be attributed to something ontologically or epistemologically fundamental. (1990a p. 
119) 
Yet Milbank does not want to simply invert the causal relation between society and religion in 
sociology, but to oppose the positivist grammar of sociology with something 'other', a vision 
of society understood not in terms of abstract regularities in the behaviour of individuals or 
social groups, but in terms of substantive practices, roles and the common good. " Thus he 
writes: 
the view that religion concerns the relation of the 'individual' to the 'social' can be opposed 
in the name of 'hierarchical' societies (meaning a hierarchy of values, rather than of 
persons) for which both individuality and collectivity are subordinate to a substantive 
I 1Analogously, it is also possible to the oppose the Kantian positing of universal categories defining 
the finite can be opposed by extending the metacritique of Herder and Haaman. This involves 
arguing that if language is the medium of thought we cannot reach behind it to something more 
fundamental. This re-opens the possibility of narrating the finite in relation to the infinite, an 
avenue most promisingly pursued for Milbank by Blondel, who locates the relation analogically in 
human co-creativity through the indeterminacy of action. This will be examined in further detail at 
7.3. 
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organisation of roles, purposes and values [i. e. traditional societies, in Maclntyre's sense] 
(1990a p. 140) 
The third part of the book, 'Theology and Dialectics', consists of three chapters concerning 
Hegel, Marx and the 'integralist revolution'12 in post-Vatican II Catholic theology, its origins 
and consequences for social and political theology. Milbank is 'for' Hegel in the sense that 
Hegel questions the three denials of modem political theory introduced above (Baroque 
'poesis', Christian creation, Aristotelian tradition), and because Hegel attempts to identify the 
influence of Christianity on history without reducing that difference to some allegedly more 
basic category, as we have seen with sociology (1990a p. 163). But he is against Hegel's 
retention of the Cartesian subject, invention of a myth of negation, and conception of infinity. 
Taking these in turn, while the reflective subject is only a temporary effect for Hegel, it 
remains a necessary part of the dialectical process, and reflects a real difference between 
spirit and matter (1990a p. 155). His 'myth of negation' interprets all difference as a result of 
the negation of identity; hence negation must be at the heart of the creative process: 
[Hegel] conceives of creation as a negation which results in a self-alienation, and so as 
itself a 'fall' both for God and for humanity. (1990a p. 158). 
Hegel conceives of infinity as "really nothing other than finitude itself considered as a present 
totality" (1990a p. 157). Thus, like the political economists' appropriation of natural law and 
theodicy, or Kant's delineation of fixed categories of knowledge, Hegel helps to create a 
secular sphere amenable to total explanation from within itself. 
13 Yet in doing so he ends up 
with a 'residue' of finitude beyond providence -a merely indifferent - not to be 'redeemed' in 
the final becoming of the absolute spirit (1990a pp. 158-9). Thus Hegel also ends up rejecting 
the Christian doctrine of creation in favour of gnosticism, complete with: 
a gnostic myth of a necessarily self-estranged and self-returning God who leaves behind 
him the scattered husks of the merely material and indifferent. (1990a p. 160) 
Nonetheless, Milbank sees much of value in Hegel's diagnosis of modem politics and his 
attempt to re-unite morality and politics through the invocation of substantive ethics 
(Sittlichkeit). For example, Hegel correctly points to the homology between deontological 
ethics and modem politics, which converge "on the point of freedom as mere 'possession' - 
possession of one's self and one's property ... this substantive emptiness makes 
it a licence for 
anarchy and terror" (1990a p. 162). Here one is reminded of the sheer domination aspect of 
dominium in Roman private law, a formality of power gradually unleashed by modernity. 
12"This means the view that in concrete historical humanity there is no such thing as a state of 'pure 
nature': rather, every person has always already been worked upon by divine grace, with the 
consequence that one cannot separate 'natural' and 'supernatural' contributions to this integral 
unity. " (Milbank 1990a p. 206). 
13"Whereas Christianity subscribes to a total but unknowable providence, Hegel denies a complete 
providence, yet claims full knowledge of providence in the limited extent of its workings. " (1990a p. 
159). 
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Milbank also praises the "brilliance" of Hegel's analysis of Jesus' teachings (1990a p. 165), 
the young Hegel interpreting Jesus as the initiator of a new Sittlichkeit, although, for Hegel, 
premature and destined to fail, because it requires the conditions of the modern state for its 
realisation. This Sittlichkeit consisted neither in the promulgation of external law nor in the 
internalisation of law, with the subsequent emphasis on intention in Kantian ethics, but rather 
of an appeal to the concealed 'fact' of natural ties with others - including strangers. 
14 
Furthermore, Hegel distances Christian from antique Sittlichkeit because he sees the 
mutuality which is the telos of these natural ties as incompatible with social relations of 
domination, although equally as undercut by a social philosophy which posits only separate 
independent subjects (1990a p. 165). 
Yet instead of interpreting Jesus' teaching as a radicalisation of the Jewish Sittlichkeit of his 
time, Hegel interprets both Jewish and Roman influences as responsible for an excessive 
legalism of supposedly 'natural' institutions such as "marriage, the family and economic 
relations" (1990a p. 165), so that Jesus' teachings were forced to take an otherworldly turn. 
This was convoluted further after Jesus' death by the institution of sacraments, which rapidly 
came to be seen as gateways to an otherwordly heaven. Such spiritualisation eventually meant 
that although Christianity began by questioning the legalism of the ancient world, it ended up 
evacuating the secular sphere of all value, paving the way for a more virulent secularity. At 
this latter stage Hegel's narrative converges with Milbank's, but Milbank rejects the 
dialectical embedding of this account. He denies the necessity of the rejection of Jesus' 
message, and sees Hegel's interpretation as wrongly assuming the necessity of punishment, 
property rights and exchange relations rooted in the sheerly arbitrary (1990a p. 168). By 
these insistences Hegel refuses the fullness of Christian Sittlichkeit: 
there cannot, for Hegel, be a society ... where processes of 
forgiveness, contrition, and 
expiation form of themselves a self-sustaining cultural process. (1990a p. 167) 
It is this refusal which leads Hegel to adopt the modem politics he began by opposing, and 
leads him to theorise only a "pseudo-Sittlichkeit" (pp. 168-172). 
Milbank is 'for' Marx (Chapter 7) insofar as Marx exposes the cultural specificity of modem 
politics and economics, thus enabling one to envisage an alternative practice (1990a p. 190). 
Marx rejects the sundering of production and value, but in reconceiving production/value as 
an integral whole, he naturalises and homogenises cultural production, denying difference and 
creativity (1990a p. 178). However, in his reduction of value to the to the realisation of 
individual liberty, Marx is a lone modem voice in nineteenth century socialism; more typical 
14This seems close to Levinasian teaching on'faciality' - see the section on Bauman in Chapter 1 
above (1.13). 
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is the linkage of a concern for public values, the integrity and diversity of production, and 
equality and fraternity (1990a p. 196), which Milbank finds exemplified in Ruskin (1990a pp. 
197-200). 
Ruskin's critique of capitalism is close to that of the New Christendom Group (6.7 above); 
indeed, he can be considered their ancestor, although he was not always clear about his 
Christian orthodoxy. Like Marx, Ruskin argues that capitalism sundered production from 
value, but unlike Marx he connected this severance with the loss of the Aristotelian view that 
through 'practice' (in Maclntyre's sense) we can be given an insight into the telos of things 
(1990a p. 199). Like Milbank, Ruskin differentiates between hierarchies of value and of 
domination; the former, as in the teacher-pupil relation tend towards equality as the pupil 
masters knowledge, and hence are self-cancelling; the latter are not, and only multiply 
violence. This distinction is important to understand why Ruskin's appropriation of the 
Middle Ages is not simply nostalgic; the same goes for the entire movement to re-appropriate 
virtue from Ruskin to Maclntyre. 
7.3 Blondel's Integralism 
The late nineteenth century French thinker Maurice Blondel's philosophy of action plays a 
central role in Milbank's thought; indeed, Milbank regards his work so highly as to describe it 
as "perhaps, the boldest exercise in Christian thought of modern times" (1990a p. 217). 
Blondel finds an opening to transcendence in human action, because, paradoxically, he both 
sees intention as always in excess of action, never matching aspiration, and yet every action 
as always in excess of intention, always opening up unforeseen possibilities (1990a pp. 210- 
11). It is both that we cannot achieve what we will, and that we necessarily achieve in excess 
of our willing. Rahner's integralism concurs with the first assertion, but not with the second; 
the consequence is that the transcending capacity of the self remains confined to the 
imagination, in which is embedded a pre-given "supernatural existential" that yearns for God, 
but does not enter the arena of cultural production, thus permitting the re-introduction of the 
binaries which integralism seeks to overcome, and the abandonment of analysis of the social 
and political to secular theories (1990a p. 210; 220-3). 
In contrast with the 'heterogenesis of ends' of the political economists, who find unforeseen 
harmony as the unintended result of agonistic interaction within a closed system, for Blonde], 
both 'excess' intentions and 'excess' consequences require supernatural mediation: 
Every action, at the heart of its intentionality, is inherently, heterogeneous, becoming 
other to itself... . 
(I 990a p. 214) 
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God acts in this action, and that is why the thought that follows the act is richer by 
infinity than that which precedes it. (Blondel in Milbank 1990a p. 210; Note 7 p. 252) 
Human meaning is not to be found in finitude as such, but in the 'surplus' present in human 
action. Thus: 
while theoretically, (philosophically) there is nothing in any finite reality which offers 
true meaning to human beings, yet in action itself - the unexhausted will to act, and the 
unexhausted significance of the cultural products of action -a true meaning is always in 
some measure encountered, although this is only apprehensible by practical reasoning, the 
authentic reason which causes something to happen. (1990 a p. 211). 
Thus Blondel does justice to the Renaissance discovery of the significance of human making 
within a framework which maintains natural/supernatural integrity, in contrast to the late 
medieval voluntarist and nominalist theologies and their political science descendants, which 
saw the'made' (factum of human cultural production as an autonomous sphere of the 
arbitrary, which can only be regulated dominium). 
Like Hamann and Herder in their response to Kant, Blondel adopts a'metacritical 
perspective', which involves the denial of any permanent pre- or trans-linguistic categories of 
thought, on the grounds that we think in language, and therefore cannot reach above or 
beneath it to something more fundamental: 
'Metacritique' does not imply a further critique founded on Kant's initial effort, but rather 
a denial of the possibility of Kant's critical endeavour, from a critical point of view that 
is a more genuine and secure one. This point of view is that of language. If it is true that 
we only think in language, then it is simply not possible to investigate our thinking 
instrument - to say what it can or cannot think in advance of its deployment. (1990a p. 
151) 
Thus against the Kantian idea of the fixity of categories of cognition, Blondel "insists on the 
reality of successive, different appearances, which are the interactions which take place 
between humans and between humans and other beings" (1990a p. 211). Like Hegel, Blondel 
substitutes a phenomenology for an epistemology: 
There is no 'epistemological problem' since knowledge consists in the relations which take 
place between beings and the mutual modifications that ensue. (1990a p. 211) 
Positive science can only narrate causality in the context of established relations, not explain 
the new instance, neither can dialectical science explain this instance as the outworking of 
contradictions, because in Blondel's phenomenology there is no fundamental substance with 
which each new instance could contradict; rather an endless, harmonious series (1990a p. 
212). Blondel arrives at this conclusion through a further analysis of the 'surplus' inherent in 
every action: 
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first, 
... 
in every action there is present an implicit faith that a new and 'correct' synthesis 
will be discovered, and that this self-grounded norm is somehow more than arbitrary.... 
Secondly, the faith in 'true synthesis' implies that the meaning of all synthesis is 
'mediation'. For the ground holding together the products of our action is not substance, 
but an intuited harmony, the combining together in infinite unity of disparate elements. 
(1990a p. 214) 
It is in this sense that grace always already pervades human situations, and does so not as a 
'background' requirement in the transcendental conditions for action (as for Ralmer's Kantian 
version of integralism), but in the historical unfolding of the human drama (1990a p. 216). 
This unfolding stands in historical relation to the perfect act of mediation achieved in Christ: 
Every human action - says Blondel, the philosopher - is prophetic of Christ, or secretly 
refers to him; this is no anonymity of grace in the general character of the human, as for 
Rahner. Rather the anonymous reference is given precise, historical serial positioning in 
relation to the incarnation - whether, before, after, or alongside. (1990a p. 216) 
However, for Milbank, Blondel does not sufficiently stress the necessity for all action to be 
referred to Christ in order to interpret its heterogeneity as 'love'; harmony of difference rather 
than violence of difference. Thus he does not adequately reckon with nihilism, a reckoning 
Milbank himself defers to Part IV, 'Theology and Difference'. 
However, he turns first to consider further the consequences of the Ralmerian version of 
integralism for Latin American liberation and European political theology. Milbank is 
alarmed to find political and liberation theologians embracing a theory which empties 
Christian ethics/politics of its substantive content, abdicating responsibility for the analysis of 
the social and political to Marxism or another secular theory. This is because such theologies 
are adopting Karl Rahner's version of integralism, instead of Blondel's. 
As we have seen, 'integralism' is the view that human beings have always already been 
affected by divine grace, such that 'natural' and 'supernatural' influences on the integral whole 
are indivisible. Milbank agrees with liberation theologians such as Gutierrez, Segundo and 
Clodovis Boff that the council failed to recognise the political implications of integralism, 
concerned as it was to distance itself from the earlier'integrist' politics, which had advocated 
a clerical dominance based on a "totalizing" theology which had to be accepted 'whole' (1990a 
p. 207). He further accepts the liberation theologians' conclusion that the consequence of 
integralism should be that the political and social are inseparable from the soteriological, and 
that the experience of base communities and lay leadership in Latin American makes 
nonsense of the "distinction of planes" (between spiritual and secular, corresponding to a 
clergy/laity distinction) model of conciliar theologians such as Congar (1990a pp. 206-7). 
To use terms already familiar in this thesis (5.8), the Rahnerian version incorporates an 
Enlightenment conception of negative freedom which cuts free from the telos of Christian 
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tradition. The consequence of the Rahnerian position is that "the social process itself is 
identified as the site of transcendence, of a process of 'liberation' which consists of gradually 
removing restrictions upon the human spirit" (1990a p. 229). The result of this is that the 
locus of salvation becomes an anonymous ethical decision in the secular realm: 
The content of salvation is therefore decided at the level of a Kantian principle of 
practical reason, and theology, including an apparently 'orthodox' Christology and 
trinitarian doctrine - merely provides an elaborate regulative apparatus to secure this 
content and bestow upon it an infinite significance. (1990a p. 229) 
It is this sacralized categorical imperative which provides the basis for the political 
engagement of liberation theology. What is absent here is a sense that the Christian practice 
of love might require a specific set of practices, virtues and traditions to sustain it. Thus he 
writes: 
For these theologies, the single imperative to 'love' others, which means to desire their 
liberation, is supposed to well automatically from the depths of the human heart. All 
other moral prescriptions must be judged according to 'situational' criteria, as to whether 
or not they maximise human love and freedom. There is no sense here of the impossibility 
of giving any content to love, or the exercise of freedom, unless we articulate them in 
terms of a complex set of virtues, which means appeal to a particular form of human 
social existence. (1990a p. 230) 
Thus the ethics of political and liberation theology incorporate the classic Enlightenment 
formulation - best represented recently by Habermas - that Moralität (morality deduced from 
universal rational foundations) is prior to Sittlichkeit (ethics grounded in concrete practices). 
This can be seen in European political theology in the case of JB Metz. 
Metz departs from Habermas in asserting the need to go beyond the ideal speech situation and 
its foundation in existential encounter by recalling the memory of the suffering of human 
communities, and thus invoking a sense of responsibility for them. Yet he does not include 
within his model an account of the reasons for this suffering, crucial in Christian tradition to 
account for the suffering and death of Christian martyrs, and indeed for the passion of Christ 
(Milbank 1990 a p. 239). Instead, senseless suffering predominates, mirroring negative 
freedom. While this may present an apt image for the twentieth century, it does nothing to 
define any substantive Christian practice, any basis for Sittlichkeit, which Milbank sees as 
essential to covey the difference of Christianity. 
Continuing this theme of the need for Christianity to show substantive difference to secular 
reason, Milbank agrees with Rahner and his followers that moral imperatives are mediated by 
reason which participates in divine practical reason. But where, for Rahner, this is on the 
basis of the a priori 'supernatural existential', for Milbank, following Blondel, this proceeds 
historically. He explains: 
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it is, for Christianity, 'restored' by the incarnation of the logos, whose peculiar practice 
upon earth provides us with the key to all human performance. The Rahnerian idea that 
Christian belief provides only 'motivations' for rational ethical behaviour, is by contrast, 
astonishingly shallow. (1990a p. 230) 
Pursuing this argument, Milbank concludes the chapter by considering "the priority of 
praxis" in liberation theology (1990a p. 249-252). Superficially, this resembles the priority of 
action in Blondel. However, it transpires that a dualistic distinction between theory and 
practice is being proposed, whereas for Milbank's metacritical perspective there is no pure 
realm of action prior to theory; rather action is always already theorised (1990a p. 250). Even 
Clodovis Boff, who rejects cruder versions of the priority of Praxis, separates praxis as pure 
ethical performance from theology as second order reflection. Against such a view Milbank 
argues for a'supernatural pragmatics': 
Priority of praxis turns out, in Boff, to mean that there is a theoretically knowable 
structure permanently undergirding the process of the production of wealth which belongs 
to, and defines, 'the order of the real'. On the other hand, religion, in its most 'universal' 
aspect, is located in the noetic order which has a logic quite apart from historical 
practice altogether. 
Against this foundational practice, one should set 'supernatural action', broadly as 
conceived by Blondel. Christian action is always 'textual', it always has theoretical 
presuppositions. On the other hand, theological theory is always a practice, in the merely 
historical sense. (1990a p. 251) 
It should be noted that while the foregoing argument applies to the Rahnerian tendency to 
'naturalise the supernatural', Milbank is equally critical of Protestant neo-orthodoxy. He 
condemns neo-orthodoxy's attempt to render a certain 'supernatural' discourse immune from 
criticism by creating a sharp distinction between the revealed Word of God and human 
religion. He sees this simply as a variation of liberal Protestantism, colluding in the secular 
definition of the political and social as the realm of dominium: 
this sort of neo-orthodoxy15 is itself but a variant of liberal protestantism: a revealed 
word of God which speaks only of itself, which does not really penetrate the realm of 
human symbolic constructions without getting tainted and distorted, must continue to be 
without impact upon the world, and therefore remains locked in a category of the 
specifically religious, just as much as the liberal protestant notion of religious experience. 
(1990a p. 101) 
By contrast with such abstractions Milbank, following Blondel, locates the supernatural in 
collective cultural action (1990a p. 218), and hence his affinity with the Christian socialist 
15i. e. the sort which "insist on the absolute contrast between the revealed world of God and human 
'religion', which as a mere historical product can safely be handed over to any reductive analyses 
whatsoever. " (1990a p. 101) 
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tradition, which he associates with traditions of fraternity, direct economic co-operation and 
organisations of professional and labour solidarity. These act as an embodied critique of 
modernity's tendency to corrode associations which might intervene between the power of the 
state and the autonomy of the individual (1990a pp. 228,243). Furthermore, ultimately, these 
practices are based on an imitation of Christ: 
for Christianity, love is a highly complex, learned practice, which Jesus spells out in fully 
exemplary fashion. It is only because charity is seen as fully defined by Christ's words 
and actions that one can speak of Christ as carrying out an irreplaceable restoration of 
human nature. (1990a p. 236) 
The life of the church is thus seen as an (imperfect! ) re-narration of the life of Christ. This 
theme is pursued in Milbank's articles which follow Theology and Social Theory, where he 
develops his ecclesiological understanding of christology. Thus he seeks to reconcile'high' 
and 'low' christologies in the gospels by reading them "not as the story of Jesus, but as the 
refoundation of a new society, a new kind of community" (1991b p. 317). The consequent 
interpretation of central Christian doctrines runs as follows. "The incarnation has no meaning 
except as 'the beginning', the foundation of the Church, a new sort of community of charity 
and forgiveness" (1991a p. 232). The atonement is understood as "the inauguration of a 
'political' practice of forgiveness, forgiveness as a mode of 'government' and social being. 
This practice is itself ongoing atonement" (199 lb, p. 327). "To remember the resurrection", 
which is "the memory of 'ordinary' conversation, of eating and drinking, continuing beyond 
death", and to "hope for a universal resurrection is a 'political' act: for it is the ultimate 
refusal of all denials of community" (1991a, p. 232). 
7.4 Against Postmodern Nihilism 
The final section of Theology and Social Theory, entitled 'Theology and Difference', begins 
by sketching an alternative science of social interaction (Chapter 9). 16 Here Milbank 
differentiates his account from Ricoeur's attempt to insulate human from natural sciences by 
developing a distinction between explanation and understanding (1990a pp. 263-8). Instead, 
there is a fundamental continuity located at the level of narrative. Natural science describes 
the isolation of repeatable patterns and thus permits instrumental control where these are 
reliable (1990a p. 259). The innovative capacity of human action limits the scope for such 
control. Here, as we saw demonstrated in Milbank's arguments against sociology, there is no 
constant fait sociale or universal subject prior to culture to which to appeal. 
16i e. an alternative is required, having rejected political economy, sociology and dialectics. 
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Natural science is mediated by narrative at three levels, a mediation often concealed by 
positivist accounts of scientific knowledge (1990a p. 269). Firstly, "scientific experiments 
and theories are themselves repeatable narratives" (1990a p. 270). Second, different narrative 
renderings of the same experiment are sometimes possible, suggesting a further narrative 
relation, that of the history of science in which one paradigm succeeds its predecessor by 
enlarging the scope of instrumental control. Third, there is the scientific narration of 
difference through classification, either by abstracting salient characteristics (e. g. to identify 
individuals or species by anatomical features), or by locating characteristics along a 
continuum (e. g. to identify individuals or species by genetic make-up) (1990a p. 271). 
Finally in Chapter 9, Milbank discusses relations between instrumental control, science and 
capitalism. The Frankfurt school and their successors see the main danger to human freedom 
in the encroachment of instrumental reason on 'the lifeworld' (3.6), and Milbank admits that 
this provides a strong account of the development of European totalitarianism earlier in the 
century (1990a pp. 272-3), although he questions their modem concept of negative freedom. 
However, he concurs with Lyotard's insight that both science and capitalism converge on the 
promotion of managed innovation, rather than total control. It is the indifference to 
substantive principles of justice of the mechanisms of management that the greatest present 
danger lies (1990a p. 273). 17 Whereas socialist modernism rejected tradition outright, 
capitalism "will always and forever reterritorialize", in the sense that it can go on 'marketing' 
obliterated values in an "ironical, cynical and sentimental spirit" (1990a p. 274). This factor 
should be borne in mind when considering returns to tradition in contemporary contexts. 
As we have seen, Milbank sees postmodern nihilism as the main intellectual challenge to 
theology, and it to this that he turns in Chapter 10. He sees Nietzsche as the "master of 
suspicion", who challenges Christianity not on the basis of an invented secular foundation, 
but with an allegedly "'baseless suspicion"' (1990a p 278). Other post-modern thinkers are 
treated as providing elaborations of Nietzsche's philosophy, either by pursuing his method of 
genealogy, telling the history of truth as "the narrative of the constitution of strategies of 
power", or by developing his fundamental ontology, which focuses on "difference as the 
condition of possibility for thought and action" (1990a p. 260). 
What is 'postmodern' about these thinkers? Before Kant, finite action was understood in 
relation to the infinite, although theorising this relation had become increasingly problematic 
since the late medieval expansion of the secular. Kant, however, 'solved' these difficulties by 
denying the possibility of comprehending the infinite, instead describing reality in terms of the 
permanent conditions of finite existence - "such as temporality, closed spatiality and 
171n the mechanisms of "supply and demand determined not by considerations of need, desire and 
justice, but the (abstract) desires of the owners of capital and of distributed income". 
236 
mechanical causality" (1990a p. 280). Hence the modern 'metanarrative' (following Lyotard) 
project of understanding the world in terms of the conditions of finitude, such as "production, 
labour, society or instrumental reason" (1990a p. 280). But postmoderns contend that these 
attempts to specify the permanent conditions of fmitude are just as metaphysical as the 
analogical understanding of the relation between infinity and fmitude which had preceded 
them. Instead of laying a new foundation for knowledge, Kant in fact adds another storey to 
the edifice of "self-transgression" - another mutation in human self-understanding. Hence the 
project of genealogy - the telling of the history of these mutations. This, in turn, re-introduces 
the possibility of reviewing the finite/infinite relation, and hence the ontological concerns of 
some postmodern thinkers (e. g. Deleuze 1991, Derrida 1973). 
Milbank begins by considering Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics. Nietzsche saw the root of 
the error that is metaphysics in the Socratic and Platonic attempt to distinguish between 
moral virtue and strength by associating virtue with a permanent, transcendent Good. 
Nietzsche saw this as a negative, defensive, ascetic reaction, the refusal of the weak to 
recognise the triumph of the strong in the struggle for survival, a reaction intensified by the 
Christian fusion of Platonism with the 'perverse' story of a crucified God. 
Milbank reviews Christian responses to this challenge. First, a defence of realism, often 
appealing to Kant, can be made. Second, the critique may be accepted, and an attempt made 
to de-Platonise the Christian understanding of God. Third, a radical difference between Being 
and God can be posited. Milbank sees the first as another guise of the doomed foundationalist 
project, subject to the metacritique outlined at 7.3. He sees the second as a capitulation to 
nihilism which sacralises violence and anarchy, and the third as heretical: if one continues to 
accept both God and Being without their equivalence God must become a being, which 
hopelessly compromises Christian orthodoxy. 
Instead, Milbank first attacks the inconsistencies of nihilists, and then elaborates his own 
Christian alternative (Chapter 12), via a consideration of other 'benign' interpretations of 
post-modern insights, including Maclntyre in this category (Chapter 11). Milbank argues that 
Nietzsche does not proceed on the basis of 'pure suspicion' but actually shows himself to be a 
"positivist sociologist" by declaring as universal a certain agonistic account of primitive 
humanity (1990a p. 283). Here he makes two mistakes, first to naturalise the condition of the 
strong man, the human predator, whereas as Milbank argues that the "behaviour of the strong 
man is never spontaneous, it is always imitative of a cultural paradigm of strength" (1990a p. 
283). Second, Nietzsche also misreads 'primitive' societies (and shows himself to be a 
"political economist") by emphasising the process of bargaining for equivalence between 
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strong men, assuming an original anarchy of value, and ignoring historical and 
anthropological evidence to the contrary. 
18 
Third, Milbank argues against Nietzsche's successors that the element of liberation which 
they retain in their philosophies is inconsistent with a thoroughgoing nihilism, and represents 
in each case a residual Kantianism. Milbank argues that it is Lyotard "who has made the 
most sustained attempt to articulate the ethics of an agonistic politics" yet (1990a p. 316), 
and therefore argues his case in relation to Lyotard's thought. Lyotard models culture as 
competing language games, or "genres of discourse" (Milbank 1990a p. 317). However, 
rather than accept the interactions between these genres as purely agonistic, he attempts to 
'liberalise' or 'democratise' them. He does so in three ways. First, by asserting the rights of all 
individuals to participate. Second, by arguing that the only really serious differences 
("differends") occur between rather than within genres. Third, by limiting the competition 
between discourses such that the "formal integrity" of each is safeguarded (1990a p. 317). He 
justifies the third by equating the multiplicity of genres with Kant's division of the discourses 
on truth, goodness and beauty. 
Milbank argues that each of these arguments fails. First, since genres are not invented from 
scratch in a neutral setting by ahistorical individuals, but rather socially, by groups who are 
always already embedded in language, and language in relations of power, so that the ideal of 
equal participation becomes meaningless. Second, since the rules of a language game cannot 
comprehensively adjudicate what may be said - poetic innovation is always possible - equally 
serious differends can arise within cultures (1990a p. 317). Third, the independence of Kant's 
discourses cannot be sustained - Lyotard himself shows how the discourse of practical reason 
cannot help making theoretical assumptions, and neither can Lyotard's own formulation. 
Therefore, only the nihilist view that "discourses ... necessarily and without 
justification 
impinge upon each other, phrase by phrase" survives (1990a p. 318). Milbank concludes: 
If this is the case, then one cannot try to smuggle back the benignity of Kantian 
liberalism, as Lyotard desires: no natural, 'philosophical' ethics, ontology or politics can 
appeal to a justice which demands that every discourse be allowed to be true to its own 
formality. Between nihilistic univocity and Catholic analogy ... there 
is no longer any 
third liberal path. (1990a p. 318) 
In this context the liberal subject can no longer provide any defence against fascism, which 
can always expose the liberal subject's "illusory universality" (1990a p. 319). As a myth 
fascism can only be opposed by another myth, not argued with. In this context, Milbank 
considers the work of the nouveaux philosophes who, like Milbank, accept nihilist arguments 
against liberalism and invoke religion as an alternative myth, but who also re-invoke the 
18By contrast, primitive heroic societies themselves believe in hierarchies of values and the objective 
equivalence of different objects. (1990a p. 284). 
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subject and human rights, in the hope that "the invoking of such sublimity can make some 
small practical difference between naked totalitarianism and a liberalism that is, nonetheless, 
in essence, totalitarian" (1990a p. 319). Milbank rejects this idea as futile, and resorted to 
only because they have wrongly accepted the nihilist reduction of cultural action to power, so 
that they can only appeal to a purely other-worldly religion (1990a p. 320). Instead, Milbank 
asks: 
... why, 
if power is only an idea, a fiction (albeit a fiction in whose trammels we seem 
inextricably caught), cannot there be an alternative invention of a social and linguistic 
process that is not the dominance of power (that is to say, of power in the sense of 
violence)? (1990a p. 320) 
It is to the imagination of this possibility that Milbank then turns, arguing that such an 
imagining is partially anticipated in Plato and Aristotle's invention of "ethics: the imagination 
of'the good' as an alternative to power" 
19 (1990a p. 321). It is in this context that he 
examines Maclntyre's work. 
7.5 Milbank on Maclntyre 
The first point on which Milbank takes issue with Maclntyre is his account of 
incommensurability (1990a pp. 339-344). In Chapter nineteen on "Tradition and Translation" 
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Maclntyre challenges "one of the defining beliefs of 
modernity"; the "belief in its ability to understand everything from human culture and history, 
no matter how apparently alien" (1988 p. 3 85). 
20 He argues against the possibility of certain 
kinds of translation, in particular, that translation from traditional languages21 into modem 
international languages22 is not, in some cases, possible. This is because the sense of history 
and strong conceptions of truth and rationality presupposed by the author and his or her 
19Here, as elsewhere, Milbank does not adequately distinguish between power and violence. 
However, in his endorsement of Augustine's support for the discipline of 'pastoral' oversight lie 
intimates a recognition of the legitimate use of power and arguably force (e. g. 1990a pp. 398-406), 
and in his refutation of dominium exercises rhetorical power himself. I therefore suggest that 
'violence' would read better than 'power' in this definition of ethics. 
201f I may add a personal anecdote, this is why I chose to do more humanities and sciences rather 
than additional languages at school; I thought it better to know as much as possible in one language 
than to repeat the same knowledge in another language, which I understood to be just another 
arbitrary representation of the same reality. 
211 am using the phrase 'traditional language' as shorthand for the language of a "tradition-informed 
community", which MacIntyre distinguishes sharply from the " internationalised languages of 
modernity" (1988 p. 384). MacIntyre describes a traditional language as "closely tied to the shared 
beliefs of that tradition" (1988 p. 384). 
22Maclntyre argues of "internationalized modern languages" that "it is characteristic of such 
languages that they are tied very loosely to any particular set of contestable set of beliefs, but are rich 
in modes of characterization and explanation which enable texts embodying alien schemes of 
systematic belief to be reported on ... 
in detachment from all substantive criteria and standards of 
truth and rationality" (1988 p. 384). The 'value-neutral' approach of Religious Studies since the 
1960s has surely got to be one of the best examples of this as a self-conscious practice. 
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original audience are rendered invisible in the process of translation and re-contextualisation 
(1988 pp. 384-5). This process greatly alters the sense of a text, no matter how well the 
grammar or syntax are rendered. It is like the re-presentation of artefacts in the glass cases of 
a museum, or of animals in the cages of a zoo; the network of symbols and human community 
within which the artefact lived, the ecosystem within which the animals lived, are both gone, 
replaced by the 'gaze' of a more powerful culture which renders them mere objects of 
curiosity or aesthetic pleasure. In this sense certain meanings of texts in traditional languages 
are not accessible in modem international languages; to this extent these kinds of language 
are incommensurable with one another. 
As Milbank points out, Maclntyre's argument here has been criticised by Jeffrey Stout and 
Stephen Fowl, following the arguments of Davidson and Putnam. Their argument runs that 
incommensurability of meaning cannot be asserted without self contradiction, because to 
recognise linguistic and cultural differences we must already have come to some 
understanding of a language or culture - to be able to recognise them as language or culture at 
all. As Milbank writes: 
If we are unable to make any such connections whatsoever, then the upshot will not be a 
recognition of 'incommensurability', but rather pure incomprehension. (1990a p. 340) 
Radical disagreement presupposes some basis in agreement, which limits how radical it can 
be. On the basis of this, Davidson and Putnam argue that "faced with incomprehension of 
another language or culture, then the presumption must be, not of a radically alien worldview, 
but rather that we have not yet discovered our own linguistic equivalent for those strange 
signs" (Milbank 1990a p. 340). Because of this initial, inevitable, presumption ('charity is 
forced on us' as Davidson writes), no part of another language can be placarded off as 
'incommensurable'. Translation may be very difficult, but not impossible in principle. 
Milbank here follows Fowl in agreeing that incommensurability of meaning is not defensible, 
but neither is it necessary for MacIntyre's case. Rather, what matters for Maclntyre is 
incommensurability of truth: 
One can comprehend two different meanings [thus refuting incommensurability of 
meaning], two different solutions, and yet still have no means of deciding between them 
[maintaining incommensurability of truth]. (Milbank 1990a p. 340, my additions) 
However, Maclntyre provides a further argument which seems to be neglected by Milbank 
and the other critics. He initially accepts their argument that only to the extent that we have 
understood what is allegedly inaccessible would we have grounds for believing it to be such, 
thereby undercutting our claim to its inaccessibility. However, he holds that this only applies 
to a particular understanding of translation: direct translation into our own first language. If, 
however, the discovery of inaccessibility is a two stage process, involving first the acquisition 
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of a second first language and only then, from this new vantage point, recognising the 
impossibility of rendering aspects of this second first language into our first language, then 
the incommensurability of meaning thesis appears sustainable (1988 p. 387). 
What does this argument mean in terms of thinking about the complexities of living in a 
multi-traditional society? I take it to mean that certain kinds of understanding between 
members of different traditions are only available to those able to grasp another tradition's 
language-in-use, and that there are limitations on the meanings that can be conveyed by 
translations into modem international languages, which tend to subsume differences to their 
own powerful, sceptical epistemological assumptions. This puts minority traditions in modern 
plural societies at a kind of 'epistemological disadvantage ; the very language they have to use 
to communicate with the majority undercuts the particular truth claims of their first language- 
in-use. 
However, this reflection suggests two further points not really dealt with by Maclntyre: first, 
the question of the integrity of the individual who acquires a second language-in-use, and 
second, the integrity of tradition in a context where members of that tradition may acquire a 
variety of second languages in use. Initially, it is important not to lose sight of the point made 
above that to grasp a traditional language, as opposed to a modern international language, 
entails more than linguistic ability in a technical sense; imagination, empathy, poetic ability in 
the sense of an ability to innovate, and commitment are all, arguably, also involved. Indeed, 
how far is it possible to understand another tradition in this sense without 'conversion' 723 
Furthermore, Milbank's metacritical perspective suggests that if our understanding, including 
our self-understanding, is constituted by the languages we use such that we cannot (against 
Kant) grasp any pre-linguistic epistemological categories, then the acquisition of a new 
language-in-use must throw into question the identity of the individual. As Milbank writes: 
for an alien tongue to become to be comprehensible to us need not mean that we have 
found some linguistic equivalents [to our first language], merely that we have begun to be 
ourselves alien to our former selves through the process of encounter. (1990a pp. 341-2) 
However, we probably will not, unless we remain in a new linguistic environment for a very 
long time, lose our previous linguistic competence; so we do not become "alien to our former 
selves" in the sense of no longer understanding ourselves. Rather, the individual is in a 
condition where s/he may understand two sets of truth-claims, but lacks any criteria to decide 
between the two. An example of such a juxtaposition of truth-claims is that of the 'thick' and 
'thin' epistemological assumptions of traditional and modem languages. For in their 
230ne may also ask, what is the relation of such conversion to linguistic ability? For example, on an 
understanding which relies on this kind of analogy to language to model tradition, how does the 
Islamic status of the Muslim 'revert', or the British born South Asian heritage Muslim, who knows 
no more Arabic than the shahada, compare to the Christian expert in Qur'anic Arabic? 
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juxtaposition each is mutually problematised, so that their underpinning assumptions are 
transformed into to truth-claims: they cease to be accepted as obviously true and become 
merely claims, open to contestation. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Maclntyre sees this condition as the modern moral dilemma, and 
attempts to solve it by a return to an Aristotelian understanding of the relationship between 
virtue, character and tradition. Integrity and stability of identity is preserved within this 
framework; so although the Cartesian subject is rejected by Maclntyre, a united mental 
subject, whose narrative identity is firmly anchored in tradition, is proposed. By contrast, 
Milbank challenges this: 
... the trouble 
is that both sides of this argument24 still assume a united mental subject. 
Whereas, in fact, we are not wholly united individuals occupying a single holistic world; 
instead we find it quite possible to hold inside our heads several subjectivities, even if 
some of these are merely 'entertained'. (1990a p. 341) 
Milbank continues by arguing that, in continuing to espouse a coherence theory of truth as a 
defence against radical incommensurability within discourses, pragmatists like Davidson and 
Rorty fail to see the implications of their own acceptance of the metacritical insight that we 
cannot get 'behind' signification (1990a p, 342). For, as Milbank argues: 
The absence of any schema separable from content does not imply one world, but an 
infinity of different worlds, discontinuous as well as continuous. This is why pragmatism, 
as Deleuze realises, cannot recognise only a single, pragmatic standard, but must pass 
immediately over into a philosophy of difference. (1990a p. 342) 
This is significant in so far as I have defended Maclntyre's theory of tradition as a theory of 
coherence. MacIntyre was defended against the charge of Hegelianism in this manner (see 
4.7), by arguing that each reformulation of tradition is simply more adequate to its context on 
pragmatic grounds, rather than with reference to some dialectically evolving truth. But if 
there are no watertight signifying systems, but rather only the continual jostle and 
reconfiguration of phrases in dispute, then coherence theories of truth collapse. Thus Milbank 
can argue that not only are individuals composed of multiple subjectivities, but cultures are 
composed of incommensurable elements: 
Within our culture there are cathedrals and nuclear power stations, theologies and 
technologies, arts, sciences, and so forth. In consequence, incommensurability is always 
already present. ... 
The problem of incommensurability, of establishing orders of priority 
amidst these disjunctures (between different arts, between arts, games, science, 
technology and warfare, and within an art, a game, a science itself) is therefore a problem 
internal to every culture, as Plato's Republic already recognises. (1990a p. 342-3) 
24i. e. Maclntyre against Davidson and Putnam. 
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Furthermore, Milbank argues that Maclntyre really subordinates narration to dialectics. 25 
Milbank sees a value to dialectics, but argues that it cannot bear the weight that Maclntyre 
loads upon it. For it cannot cope with 'poetic' innovations within traditions, nor can it deal 
with the displacement of one tradition by another. In particular, Milbank challenges 
Maclntyre's idea, crucial to the theory of traditions presented, that a tradition can recognise 
the superiority of another tradition rationally, by its own criteria. Instead, Milbank argues: 
... there 
is a questionableness about every switch of tradition, which escapes dialectical 
adjudication. What triumphs is simply the persuasive power of a new narrative, which 
gives an important position to some themes and characters in the old plot, while 
abandoning others that were once equally important. (1990a p. 346) 
Milbank also accuses Maclnytre of being insufficiently historicist (1990 p. 327), arguing that 
MacIntyre naturalises an Aristotelian ethical framework of practices, virtues and traditions, 
whereas for Aristotle his framework is "rhetorically locked within the bounds of the polis, 
along with the virtues it commends" (1990 p. 351). This interpretation of Aristotle against 
himself would not matter, if Maclntyre's framework remained valid on other grounds. 
However, Milbank argues that it does not. In particular, he argues that "Christianity implies a 
critique not only of the prescriptions, but also of the formal categories of antique ethics" 
(1990 p. 399). 
He does so first by questioning the degree of continuity between Aristotle and Aquinas found 
by Maclntyre, arguing that the place of charity in Aquinas undermines the antique concept of 
'the mean', which sprang from the conception of the individual as ideally self-contained, and 
in doing so re-defines the form of virtue itself (1990 pp. 359-362). From this Christian 
standpoint antique virtue almost appears as no virtue at all, "squeezed out between prudence 
and the appetites" (1990 p. 362). This contrast becomes even more striking in Augustine 
where the idea of individual virtue is displaced altogether, thus reconciling the antique tension 
between virtue as the cultivation of the soul, and the common good (1990a p. 370), or 
between s the (soul) and polis (city): 
Augustine's real and astounding point is this: virtue cannot properly operate except when 
collectively possessed, when all are virtuous and all concur in the sequence of their 
differences; hence the actual, 'possessed', realised virtues which we lay claim to, least of 
all resemble true, heavenly virtues. On the contrary, the only thing really like heavenly 
virtue is our constant attempt to compensate for, substitute for, even short-cut this total 
absence of virtue, by not taking offence, assuming the guilt of others, doing what they 
should have done, beyond the bounds of any given 'responsibility'. Paradoxically, it is 
only in this exchange and sharing that any actual virtue is really present. (1990 p. 411). 
This exposition comes in the context of wide-ranging analysis of antique antimonies, which 
Milbank argues are overcome in Christian tradition , especially by Augustine. Thus the 
25"the questioning of an assumed position (or of nature) through question and answer" (1990a p. 
345). 
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antique antimony between polis (city) and oikos (household), manifest in Aristotle and Plato's 
inability to see the household as an arena for the exercise of virtue, is also overcome. This is 
possible through the Christian re-understanding of the city as household, and as with the 
tension between soul and the common good, 26 its meaning is transformed in the process. 27 
For in each case agonistic struggle (within the person or city gates) is replaced by 
interdependence. The primacy of the defensive integrity of the individual/city is replaced by 
the primacy of loving/'charitable' relationship. On this account, Christianity provides the first 
(and on Milbank's account only) true theory of the interpersonal: 
What was lacking for [antique reason] was both a notion of the interpersonal, and of the 
collectively corporeal as not 'debased'. Where the predominant figure is of the 
organisation of an interior, then one is confined to ideas of the subordination of below to 
above, or of resistance to all that threatens self-sufficiency. One can think in terms of the 
soul as the discipline of reason over ever-recalcitrant forces inside us, or of the polis as 
material solidarity against an enemy, but not of external relations and outgoings as the 
very substance of thought and virtue. Such a perspective is much more provided by the 
Johannine idea that we are 'in one another'. Here 'participatory mixture', both within 
God, and for ourselves, is prior to the question of what is 'proper' and self-identical. But 
this is not a mere 'spiritual' mixing ... 
At the heart of 'communion' lies the material 
exchange of sacramental elements, and this allows the figure of 'body'to become, for St. 
Paul, that which primarily mediates the divine to us. (1990a pp. 371-2) 
The third antique antimony is between an ontology of self-identity (the 'gods' of truth) and an 
ontology of difference conceived negatively, as arbitrary or random diversity (the 'giants' of 
difference) (1 990a pp. 3 72-6). In overcoming this antimony Christianity, argues Milbank, 
also overcomes post-modem difference, whose project consists in exposing the chaotic 
beneath modem attempts to impose order. Milbank's strategy here is to accept the postmodern 
deconstruction of modernity, but to oppose the postmodern account of difference as conflict 
with a Christian account of difference as harmony: 
The distinctiveness of Christianity, and its point of contrast with both antiquity and 
modernity, lies in its 'reconciliation of virtue with difference', or of Sittlichkeit with 
freedom. 
-Thinking an 
infinite differentiation that is also a harmony: this is what grounds 
the reconciliation of difference with virtue. (1990a pp. 417,427) 
Milbank finds such a 'thinking' begun in the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and Dionysius 
the Areopagite (1990a p. 428). Here creation is perceived as proceeding from diversity within 
God, such that: 
Unity, in this Christian outlook, ceases to be anything hypostatically real in contrast to 
difference, and becomes instead only the 'subjective' apprehension of a harmony displayed 
26Milbank explicitly uses the term'common good' in exposing the antique antimony between 
individual and collective on p. 370: "To invoke justice, the common good, or the city as a whole, 
means, on one available option, to 'ascend' to the soul, yet this involves a paradoxical retreat to the 
individual. " 
27"[T]he Christian polls that is also a household, containing only a ramifying network of 
households (though the monasteries and the 'Christian state' have a potentially abstractive character) 
is no longer exactly a polls, just as Christian virtue is no longer exactly virtue. " (Milbank 1990a p. 
369) 
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in the order of the differences, a desire at work in their midst, although 'proceeding' 
beyond them (as the Holy Spirit). ... 
This entirely reinvents the idea of order. ... 
This 
[Baroque] hierarchy is not an antique, natural order, but nor is it a post-modem 'plateau' 
[Deleuze] where all is indifferent. 'Baroque' hierarchy, ... 
is instead the appearance of the 
divine self-realisation in fmitude, and therefore as a vertical sequence up which each 
individual can contemplatively and actively rise. At its summit lies not a static 
contemplation, but a full participation in the suspension downward of hierarchies (the 
aiding of others by charity) and a greater participation in the suspension forwards of the 
thearchy, God's infinite self realisation. (1990a pp. 428-9) 
It is in this fundamental ontology that Milbank's opposition to the 'stoic-liberal-nihilist' 
continuity between antiquity, modernity and post-modernity, and from it that his Christian 
'counter-ethics' proceeds (1990a pp. 398-417). Thus the contours of Christian 'counter- 
project' that Milbank opposes emerges: counter history, opposing the primacy of secular 
stories with their myth of original violence, counter-ethics, overcoming virtue as self- 
containment with virtue as harmony, and counter-ontology, as the imagination of original 
harmony. 
However, it remains unclear how such a project can be realised in a society largely 
unpersuaded by the Christian narrative. Milbank admits as much when he summarises his 
thesis, and then reflects on the difficulties of applying it: 
One could say that Christianity denies ontological necessity to sovereign rule and 
absolute ownership. And that it seeks to recover the concealed text of an original peaceful 
creation beneath the palimpsest of the negative distortion of dominium, through the 
superimposition of a third redemptive template, which corrects the distortions by means 
of forgiveness and atonement. 
This is all very well, but what of the persistence of the second text, and the way the 
church compromises with it and continues itself to write it? This is the problem that 
Christianity can scarcely claim to have resolved. (1990a p. 417) 
In this context he considers Augustine's justification for the use of coercive force both in 
pastoral discipline by the church, and by the state. He finds Augustine's theory of just 
coercion (in the context of punishment) inconsistent with his ontology of peace, injecting a 
positive moment into punishment itself. By contrast Milbank argues that while punishment 
may be designed to correct, in itself it only demonstrates power, and it is always possible that 
only the lesson of power is learned (1990a pp. 419-422). 28 Therefore he argues that coercion 
28"The revolutionary aspect of his [Augustine's] thought was to deny any ontological purchase to 
dominium, or power for its own sake: absolute Imperium, absolute property rights, market exchange 
purely for profit, are all seen by him as peaceful and violent, which means as privations of Being. 
But his account of a legitimate, non-sinful, 'pedagogic' coercion violates this ontology, because it 
makes some punishment positive, and ascribes to it the action of divine will. This is inconsistent 
because in any coercion, however violent and benignly motivated, there is still present a moment of 
'pure' violence, externally and arbitrarily related to the end one has in mind, just as the 
schoolmaster's beating with canes has no intrinsic connection with the lesson he seeks to teach.... 
Thus although a punishment may be subordinate to essentially persuasive purposes which are at 
variance with the worldly dominium, Augustine fails to see that the duration of the punishment has 
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is only ever a tragic necessity, and calls for the church to be an "asylum ... a social space 
where a different, forgiving and restitutionary practice is pursued", and where "truly just 
economic exchanges occur" (1990a p. 422). 
What does this outline of Milbank's ideas suggest for the Maclntyre-based model of traditions 
developed in this thesis? Some specific points pursued by Milbank against Maclntyre have 
already been discussed, and we shall shortly pursue these further. However, first it may be 
instructive to review some commonalities between the two in the light of the overall context of 
the thesis - that is the pursuit of the common good with special reference to religious diversity 
in modem secularised societies. 
In spite of their differences, there remains considerable convergence between MacIntyre and 
Milbank. Both reject the modern tendency to reduce social relations to the mediation between 
the sovereign state and the sovereign individual, eroding other forms of association or 'civil 
society'. 29 The positive role of churches where civil society has been eroded - for example in 
Eastern Europe and South Africa (De Gruchy 1995) is now well documented. This also 
suggests, in the British context, support for religious communities in their striving to build 
their own educational resources in particular, and hence a support for separate schools and 
distinctive RE provision, to be discussed further below (8.2-8.6). It also suggests resistance 
to the idea of a national religion, and resistance to attempts to enforce this through 
compulsory worship in schools. Furthermore, in so far as religions continue to embody 
different values, they and other parts of civil society may act as a bulwark against the more 
subtle totalitarianism of consumerism, which, Milbank argues: 
permits individual freedom, encourages the thought of the object of freedom as being the 
exercise of personal power, and so the better builds up both the energies and assumptions 
which allow for a general extension of an efficient, all powerful system. (1990a p. 274) 
It is also possible to argue that while both Maclntyre and Milbank reject the nation state and 
focus their attention on the development of communities of virtue, both presuppose that the 
communities with which they are most concerned are able exist civilly alongside, and to 
engage in argument with, other communities. In the case of Maclntyre this is explicit in Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry in his vision of a "postliberal university as a place of 
constrained disagreements", or of rival universities together with "a set of institutionalised 
forums in which debate between rival types of enquiry is afforded rhetorical expression" 
(1990 p. 234). It is also implicit in Maclntyre's argument for the rationality of tradition, and 
to be an interval of such dominium, for the lesson immediately and intrinsically taught here must be 
the power of one over another, and it always possible the victim will learn only this lesson" (1990a 
pp. 419-420). 
29Note here Milbank's support for the practice (wrongly theorised by liberation theologians, in his 
view) of Latin American base communities (1990 p. 408). 
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in his account of reasoned exchange between traditions. However, as we have seen, Milbank 
challenges these accounts. Yet, given his objection to coercion as inconsistent with Christian 
ontology, and given the presence of communities unpersuaded by the Christian story, the only 
societal relations conceivable on Milbank's model range from persecution of the church by 
other communities or the state, to the kind of civil relations with rhetorical mediation between 
communities envisaged by Maclntyre. In this context Milbank's church stands as a reminder 
that secular modernity is only as necessary as its imagination, a church armed only with its 
rhetorical powers to persuade people of the peaceable alternative. 
Yet, accepting this premises, it seems to be possible to go further than Milbank in envisaging 
shared action with other groups, without the capitulation to secular norms which he so 
strongly rejects. In developing his Christian rhetoric, like Augustine before him, he plainly 
draws on sources far beyond the church, 30 and there seems to be no reason why the 
admission of "ad hoc reductive suspicion" (1990a p. 119) from secular sources should not be 
extended to ad hoc co-operation in civic relations, along the lines advocated by MacIntyre 
(1985 p. 255). Considered in this light, Milbank can be interpreted as offering a new way of 
understanding the Christian eschatological dilemma of being 'in the world yet not of the 
world'. Thus we can return to the difficulties raised by Milbank for Maclntyre's account. 
Milbank seems to provide ways of thinking through multicultural existence which seem to 
overcome some of the inflexibilities of Macintyre's model of traditions, although new 
problems of individual identity and coherence of tradition are posed. In particular, 
Maclntyre's model seems to achieve the integration of broader aspects of culture with 
intellectual culture at the expense of creating an excessively rationalistic concept of tradition. 
Rather, it would seem that new elements are mostly incorporated into cultures by ad hoc 
processes rather than through epistemological crises. Similarly, it would appear that 
individuals are capable of entertaining multiple cultural identities and of 'navigating' between 
cultures (1.3). 
Nonetheless, epistemological crises for intellectual cultures and identity crises for individuals 
do occur. Are these to be accounted for solely in terms of an excessively rationalistic concept 
of culture, or of a mistaken desire to cling to the concept of a united mental subject, as 
Milbank argues (1990a p. 341)? I suggest not. Rather, it would seem possible to steer a via 
media between Milbank and Maclntyre, hanging on to the basic insight - incorporated in 
Maclntyre's emphasis on narrative - that we need stories to make sense of our lives. While 
both individuals and cultures can accommodate a great deal of diversity, some coherent sense 
30For example, Deleuze, Foucault and Girard are each acknowledged as sources without which "the 
present book would not have been conceivable" (1990a Acknowledgements), and it must be plain 
from my account of Theology and Social Theory that this debt could be considerably extended. 
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of identity is needed for the mental health of the individual, to enable collective decision 
making, and some coherence in terms of values and practices is necessary for the functioning 
of a society, again to enable decision making. In fact, such a need for coherence is already 
recognised in Milbank's argument for the indispensability of myth (1990a pp. 2-3). 
As we have seen, Milbank's proposed 'therapy' is to abandon the notion of the unified 
individual/culture in favour of one of two models of difference: the postmodern model of a 
flux of elements in endless dispute, which he rejects, or the Augustinian/Blondelian Christian 
model of harmony, in which individual virtue collapses into mutual self-sacrifice. However, 
this is problematic since Milbank's model applies only to the church, outside whose gates he 
sees only dominium. 31 In arguing so strongly that Christianity is the only bulwark against 
nihilism he undercuts Maclntyre's claim to present a general model of virtuous tradition. This 
does not have to mean that the public arena need be abandoned; as we saw above at 4.6. 
Joseph Kotva has argued for the importance of the contribution of individuals and groups 
from virtuous communities to public life. 
But it is also possible to use Milbank's insights to develop a general model of interactions 
between traditions, even though one which exists in eschatological tension, whose telos lies in 
a truly peaceable harmony in contrast to the desert of secular civic peace. Thus it is possible 
to incorporate both Maclntyre and Milbank's insights and thus to see individual identities and 
cultures as necessary constructs - locally and temporarily coherent networks of meaning 
continually re-configured, mostly at the fringes, but occasionally in their fundamental 
structure. Here identity and integrity are woven not into an essentialistic something 'above' or 
'beneath' the flux of becoming, but in the narrative structure told and re-told over time. In this 
context, virtue-sustaining communities (in the broad as well as specifically Christian sense) 
can find points of contact in the public arena for the pursuit of the common good, which may 
be seen as imperfect anticipations of their own distinctive teloi. Indeed, Milbank's emphasis 
on the rhetorical mediation of tradition, in contrast to MacIntyre's emphasis on rationality, 
gives greater grounds for optimism for the preservation of distinctive traditions. At the same 
time, the defence of the need for stories or myths of identity preserves the coherence defence 
of MacIntyre's account of rationality from Milbank's deconstruction, with the result that ad 
hoc rational exchange between traditions remains a possibility. What is uniformly resisted by 
traditions, on this account, is the modern reduction of other forms of life, of the diversity of 
languages to pre-linguistic categories of thought, of the differences of history to the 
ahistorical constructs of sociology, and of the diversity of cultural production to the 
uniformity of capital. 
31or the possibility that we can "receive Christ again, from the unique spiritual resources of other 
cultures", which turns out to mean "the continuing work of conversion" (1990b p. 190). 
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How might such an account be applied? The reply to this will fall into two parts. First, in this 
chapter, a comparison with a key thinker in current political theory, John Gray. Then, in the 
final chapter, a consideration of two applications: to human rights, and to education. 
7.6 Tradition in Babel: Maclntyre, Milbank and Contemporary Politics 
It can been argued that the early 1990s saw a convergence between liberals and 
communitarians on questions of ethics and community in plural societies, or more precisely a 
'communitarianisation' of liberalism (Ferguson, forthcoming). This was seen in Chapter 3 
above in Rawls' concession that his theory is co-extensive with a particular form of society 
(Rawls 1993), and in Kymlicka's reconsideration of the importance of community for 
liberalism (Kymlicka 1989). One important insight in this process has been to see a 
distinction between the goal of tolerance and the particular methods of achieving it advocated 
by proponents of the Enlightenment project. Thus the intention of creating a society in which 
different forms of life can peacefully co-exist is separable from the methods of (a) discovering 
a universal reason to adjudicate rival claims, and (b) a separation of public from private to 
exclude certain claims from the public arena, in particular religious ones. 32 There has been 
an attempt to get behind (a) and re-think (b) by returning to early thinkers such as Locke (e. g. 
Galston 1991). 
It should be noted that the Enlightenment goal as described here is exactly what Maclntyre's 
substantive vision of rival traditions in interaction envisages, and it has been argued that such 
a state of affairs is also presupposed by Milbank; thus there is a convergence on an interim 
goal of civic peace between divergent communities. It is also possible that forms of liberalism 
with distinctive virtues as conceptualised by Galston (1991 pp. 213-237) may pass the test of 
being sufficiently coherent to constitute a tradition in MacIntyre's stronger sense, by being 
able to generate sufficiently determinant outcomes of practical reasoning (see above, Chapter 
4.4). 
John Gray's changing outlook can partly be understood against the background of the 
communitarianisation of liberalism. Gray has argued for a postliberal position in which 
liberal institutions are justified not on universal rational grounds, but on pragmatic grounds: 
whereas any form of fundamentalist liberalism was rejected according to which liberal 
forms of life possess universal rational and moral authority, the post-liberal view 
affirmed the near universality, in the late modem world, of varieties of civil society in 
32Also domestic claims, and discourses of sexuality; here the bourgeois public sphere mirrored the 
Pg-lis in its subjugation of oikos to dominium. 
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whose institutions the elements of liberal political morality were preserved. (1995a pp. 
135-6) 
However, Gray now argues that this view was mistaken, in particular because it took 
insufficient account of cultural diversity and presupposed too much culturally specific 
individualism. By contrast, he now argues: 
In political milieux which harbour a diversity of cultural traditions and identities, such as 
we find in most parts of the world today, the institutional forms best suited to a modus 
vivendi may well not be the individualist institutions of liberal civil society but rather 
those of political and legal pluralism, in which the fundamental units are not individuals 
but communities. (I995a p. 136) 
In this turn to community Gray resembles Maclntyre, and he also accepts MacIntyre's 
critique of the Enlightenment project (1995a pp. 147-151). However, like Milbank, he 
disagrees with Maclntyre that the Enlightenment project can be rationally overcome by a 
return to Aristotle or Aquinas: 
the self-defeat of the Enlightenment, particularly as that is expressed in the thought of 
Nietzsche, is the endpoint of that larger and longer Western intellectual tradition of which 
Thomism was one of the most powerful syntheses. There can, in my view, be no rolling 
back the central project of modernity, which is the Enlightenment project, with all its 
consequences in terms of disenchantment and ultimate groundlessness. (1995a pp. 151-2) 
Gray does not consider Milbank's alternative of an equally groundless commitment to a 
different, harmonic, ontology of difference, although he does provide a location for 
considering Milbank's work by his consideration of the Counter-Enlightenment's attempts to 
reverse disenchantment through "the exercise of human creative and imaginative faculties" 
(1995a p. 154). This is the juncture at which Milbank, following Blondel, finds access to 
transcendence (7.3). However, Gray's own view is that "the disenchantment that follows in 
Enlightenment's wake can perhaps be tempered, but not overcome" (1995a p. 154), at least 
within the Western tradition. Gray's argument here is that an understanding of liberal forms 
of life (consisting of individual rights, secularisation, industrialisation, democracy and free 
markets) as intrinsically related to one another and universalisable has failed. Thus Meiji 
Japan "grafted industrialisation and modern technology ... onto the 
intact stem of a wholly 
non-Occidental social structure and cultural tradition", modernisation tends to work against 
secularisation in Islamic societies because an "urban, literacy based culture ... strengthens the 
social position of Islamic scholars"33 (1995a p. 168), while China is engaged in the project 
of developing market institutions without democracy or civil society. Thus: 
33Gray follows Gellner here; see Gellner E (1994) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals 
London Hamish Hamilton, Chs. 3 and 6. 
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Contrary to the ideologues of the New Right, nothing in the project of constructing or 
developing market institutions commits anyone to the adoption of the institutions of 
democracy or civil society (1995a p. 140). 
All that remains of the Enlightenment project of a universal civilization is "the radical 
modernist project of subjugating nature by deploying technology to exploit the earth for 
human purposes" (1995a p. 178). While the resistance to other aspects of Westernisation may 
be globally felt, "there is no evidence, as yet, in the post-Soviet lands, in China or in Islamic 
countries, that the rejection of the Western Enlightenment project is accompanied by 
resistance to the Western humanist project of the technological domination of the earth. " 
(1995a p. 179) It is in this context that Gray begins to sound like MacIntyre again; calling for 
the development of new forms of community rooted in tradition as a bulwark against the 
homogenising and nihilistic tendencies of modernity: 
It is legitimate, indeed imperative, that we seek a form of rootedness which is sheltered 
from overthrow by technologies and market processes which, in achieving a global reach 
that is disembedded from any community or culture, cannot avoid desolating the earth's 
human settlements, and its non-human environments. (1995a p. 181) 
However, Gray moves beyond Maclntyre's gesture towards the actuality of rooted 
communities in After Virtue (1985), and his re-envisioning of the university in Three Rival 
Versions (1991). Gray insists that the cunning of modernity must be harnessed in the 
sustenance of such communities; carefully drafted trans-national institutions will be needed. 
However, to avoid causing greater cultural and environmental devastation such institutions 
must be based on non-nihilist practices and understandings, and Gray considers that: 
It is an open question whether the cultures of Western peoples are still fertile in this 
sense. (1995a p. 182) 
However, he finds some hope in Heidegger's appropriation of Meister Eckhart's concept of 
Gelassenheit, "in which we wean ourselves from willing and open ourselves to letting things 
be" (1995 p. 182). Here, perhaps, he connects with Milbank, who rejects the voluntarist 
Scotist God, found guilty of the unleashing of antique dominium in more virulent form, in 
favour of an immanent trinitarianism which sees harmonic inter-relation at the heart of all 
being. Yet Gray remains sceptical of the West's capacity for self-redemption, concluding that 
"any prospect of cultural recovery from the nihilism that the Enlightenment has spawned may 
lie with non-Occidental peoples" (1995 p. 184). Perhaps a correlation can be discerned here 
with the earlier suggestion that the communities in the West which are most likely to embody 
tradition in Maclntyre's sense, are those of non-western minority cultures (1.6). In this 
section, our discussion of Gray has shown that shows that a similar diagnosis of our cultural 
condition to that of Milbank and Maclntyrean be combined with a faith in the possibility of 
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political action for the common good in the public arena. In this context we turn in the final 
chapter to the issues of human rights and education. 
Chapter 8: 
Tradition and the Common Good: Human Rights and Education 
8.1 Tradition and Human Rights 
This chapter begins by testing Maclntyre and Milbank's views against a contrasting analysis of 
human rights, that of the international relations scholar Fred Halliday in his recent Islam and the 
Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (1996). We shall also consider 
some other recent commentators including the legal scholar Ann Mayer in her Islam and Human 
Rights: Tradition and Politics (1995) and the anthropologist Kevin Dwyer in his Arab Voices: 
The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (1991). 
While the focus of these scholars is on the Middle East, their discussions are of relevance to 
Britain and other Western societies because arguments generated in the human rights debate in 
the Middle East are also used in Britain. ' Human rights discourse is significant for our 
discussion of the common good because it is probably the most influential international ethical 
language, widely accepted in the West and both appealed to and contested by Muslims and other 
religious and cultural minorities in the West, and by governments, groups and individuals across 
the Middle East and Asia. 
The issue of human rights has already been discussed at several points in the thesis (e. g. 1.7,4.5, 
5.1,5.7). Maclntyre and Milbank do not discuss the practice of human rights, but do criticise the 
language. As we saw at 4.5, Maclntyre describes rights as 'fictions', but a positive gloss was put 
on this, suggesting that while lacking universal rational foundations, the construct of human 
rights has utility in opposing injustice across national and cultural boundaries. Thus Maclntyre's 
critique was held to suggest the need for this discourse to become more deeply embedded in local 
contexts rather than its abandonment; such embedding is evident in Dwyer's presentation of rights 
discourse in use in the Middle East (1991). Furthermore, using Maclntyre's model of traditions in 
interaction, it is possible to see the adoption of a culturally re-embedded human rights discourse, 
and some of the institutions which this arguably presupposes (especially a vital civil society), as a 
solution to part of the epistemological crisis posed for Muslim societies by modernity. 
Milbank's analysis of rights seems less open to a positive re-interpretation. In Theology and 
Social Theory the only explicit mention of human rights in the post 1948 sense comes in Milbank 
condemnation of their advocacy by the "nouveaux philosophes" (1990a p. 319, above 7.4). He 
1For example, in Need for Reform: Muslims and the Law in Britain (UK Action Committee on 
Islamic Affairs, 1993, pp. 14-15 and 23-6). 
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does so because he sees this move, like that of Lyotard and other postmoderns, as an illegitimate 
attempt to smuggle a Kantian liberalism back into a postmodern ethics which has already 
exposed the groundlessness of the former. As we saw at 7.4: 
Between nihilistic univocity and Catholic analogy ... there 
is no longer any third liberal path. 
... 
We may hanker after the liberal subject as a bulwark against fascism, but fascism will 
always be able to announce, truly, the illusory universality of the subject. (1990a pp. 318-9) 
It is not so clear, however, what the strength of this criticism is against a disenchanted, post- 
liberal (in Gray's sense) advocacy of human rights. Such a view might see human rights as a 
discourse with a European-American origin (and associated cultural baggage), whose status as 
international moral discourse is due primarily to the Western nations' influence and reaction to 
the atrocities of World War II. This concept and law has nonetheless been taken up by non- 
Western minorities in defence of individual and groups against (mostly) government oppression. 
In such contexts it has been mobilised within local networks of concepts, practices and 
organisations. The pragmatic value of the concept/law lies in its efficacy in mobilising local and 
international opposition to government oppression. Such oppression is contrary to Maclntyre's 
advocacy of free exchange between communities (and relative freedom within communities, 
which are constituted by constrained argument), and also contrary to Milbank's rejection of 
coercion. 
Halliday reviews resistance to human rights, on the basis that these represent Western cultural 
imperialism, as articulated by Muslim and other Asian governments, especially as manifest at the 
June 1993 Vienna UN Conference on Human Rights and the preceding regional conferences 
(1996 p. 133). He provides a useful typology of Muslim responses to human rights, outlining 
five different positions: 
(1) Assimilation: human rights and Islam are entirely compatible - favoured by liberal Muslims to 
fend off both fundamentalist and international criticism, and often drawing on a liberal reading of 
sacred texts. 
(2) Appropriation: an Islamic basis for human rights is more comprehensive than a Western 
(secular or Christian) basis: emphasis especially on the shortcomings of Western positions in the 
areas of economic, cultural and social rights. 
(3) Particularism: Western political arrangements, including human rights, do not apply in 
Muslim societies. 2 
21-lalliday cites King Fahd of Saudi Arabia: "The democratic system prevailing in the world does not 
suit us in the region ... Islam 
is our social and political law. It is a complete constitution of social and 
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(4) Confrontation: Islam provides a comprehensive basis for human welfare and other systems 
should be disregarded or opposed. This differs from (2), in that there is no attempt to argue that 
Islam provides better human rights on a common scale - Islam is different and superior. 
(5) Incompatibility: for a variety of reasons (textual, political, social) human rights are not 
compatible with Muslim societies. This may be because they conflict with the requirements of the 
Qur'an (textual), because the norms of relationship in Muslim society are non-individualist and 
hence inhospitable to the concept (social), or because there is a tradition of authoritarian forms of 
government unfavourable to the development of human rights traditions (political). 
Halliday argues against (1) that while such liberal interpretations may be possible, (although it is 
difficult to see how some texts can be given a liberal gloss), 3 such interpreters miss the point that 
the overwhelming context of interpretation is illiberal, so such interpretations are unlikely to 
prove persuasive: 
Texts are not ... the main reason 
for the difficulties with human rights: in this sense Islam is 
not the issue. What is far more intractable is the political and social context of interpretation, 
the manner in which texts are conventionally interpreted in the contemporary social and 
political conditions of the Islamic world. The 'meaning' of a holy text is therefore, not wholly, 
but largely, a contingent matter. The option of simply rejecting the texts is not open, given 
the claim to divine origin, but neglect sometimes is (Quranic injunctions on, say, slavery, 
have certainly been rejected). However, to assume that a liberal, modern interpretation will be 
derived from these texts is to assume a very different political and social climate in the 
Muslim world. (1996 pp. 155-6) 
Halliday argues that the process of secularisation, in the sense of the exclusion of religion from 
the public and political domains, is in fact a pre-requisite for the development of a tradition of 
human rights, with the consequence that liberalising attempts to re-interpret religious tradition 
from within are destined to failure. thus he writes: 
Secularism is no guarantee of liberty or protection of rights, as the very secular totalitarian 
regimes of the twentieth century have shown. However, it remains a precondition, because it 
enables the rights of the individual to be invoked against authority because it is associated 
with a broader 'culture' of individualism and toleration, which are themselves prerequisites 
for the respect for human rights. Thus whatever the texts, the religious culture and nature of 
the political forces involved, the whole attempt to evolve an Islamic position on human rights 
is doomed. The only response is to promote and await - no doubt for many years to come - 
the secularization of Muslim societies. ... the only 
foundation for human rights can be the 
secularised derivation of natural law that underpins the Franco-American discourse present in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar documents. (1996 p. 140) 
However, this seems at variance with his conclusion that: 
3 In this regard Halliday writes: "with all the interpretative energy in the world, some of the texts 
pertaining to women, non-Muslims and apostates cannot be fudged" (1996 p. 155); in support he cites 
Mayer (1991), the updated edition of which (1995) is used in this thesis. 
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The hope for reinforcing respect for human rights in these states rests as much with the 
elaboration of a liberal Islamic understanding of the issues as it does with the strengthening 
of secularism. (1996 p. 158) 
The only possible reason for the strategy of supporting liberal interpretations of Islam 
comprehensible in terms of the view that only the secularized societies can support human rights, 
is that liberal Islamic understandings will promote the process of secularization, and therefore 
Halliday offers only a highly cynical form of support to liberal Muslims. His argument here 
would seem to run contrary to both Maclntyre and Milbank. It is contrary to Maclntyre's faith in 
traditioned communities' ability to support tolerance within and between communities, and 
ignores Maclntyre's contention that it is only in virtue-sustaining communities that coherent 
moral discourse can be maintained, so that a substantive ethical base (Sittlichkeit) is necessary to 
sustain a moral discourse like human rights Moralität . 
Here, Maclntyre can be criticised for 
failing to show how a virtuous community becomes a tolerant community - especially given the 
record (which he acknowledges) of his prime model, the Athenian olis on its attitudes towards 
outsiders, females, slaves, minors and the unpropertied (4.2). The suggestion that openness to 
new challenges from within and without is necessary for the health of tradition is insufficient in 
this regard. Something positive, like Markham's formulation (6.6) that truth is important, but 
very difficult to grasp, so we need different others in our search for truth, is needed here. 
However, Halliday also fails to show how the secularizing social processes which he sees as 
supporting human rights are self-sustaining, and hence to answer the charge that they are not -a 
charge levelled, as we have seen, by critics as diverse as Maclntyre, Connelly and Habermas. 
Halliday's case is contrary to Milbank in arguing that secularization enables toleration, whereas 
for Milbank secularization unleashes state power, or in its late capitalist form personal power 
(1990a p. 274), such that liberalism always collapses into totalitarianism, whether of the state or 
consumer variety. Here, it may be argued that Milbank pays insufficient attention to the 
institutions of civil society generated by liberalism, although it may also be argued that Halliday 
pays insufficient attention to their fragility in a Western context, thus damaging his argument for 
their universal applicability. Here Arendt's pessimism concerning the frailty of liberal institutions 
of political participation may correct Halliday's position and support Milbank (Canovan 1992 pp. 
202-4). At the same time, Arendt's concern with building of participative political institutions in 
the public arena serves as a judgement against Milbank's retreat into the ecclesial (Canovan 1992 
pp. 232-243). 
Halliday argues that attempts to formulate (2), the presentation of an Islamic basis for human 
rights, are simply incoherent. Given his argument that specific cultural preconditions are 
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necessary for the development of human rights traditions, and are as yet in short supply in 
Islamic societies, it could hardly be otherwise. Following Mayer, he finds that the formulation of 
human rights schemes by Muslim governments and international bodies have in fact been 
incoherent (1996 p. 149). Thus Mayer concludes regarding Islamic human rights schemes: 
The authors do not seem to have approached their task with methodological rigor, as the 
many inconsistencies and deficiencies in their work indicate. At times their rights provisions 
suggest that they have managed to attain only a tentative grasp of what the concept of a 
human right entails. Certainly, they have neglected to think through the historical connection 
between the values and philosophical premises of human rights and the nature of protections 
afforded in international law. Little effort appears to have been expended in pondering the 
jurisprudential adjustments that would be needed to accommodate human rights within an 
Islamic framework. (Mayer 1995 p. 163-4) 
Yet the West does not have it all its own way. Halliday holds that many of the criticisms made by 
Muslims of Western human rights practices are justified. However, this is so not because of a 
superior Islamic perspective on human rights, but rather because of the adoption of human rights 
norms by Muslims making such criticisms (1996 pp. 151-3). But Halliday is incorrect to argue 
that Muslims can only point to inconsistencies between Western human rights theory and practice 
because they accept the universality of rights discourse. Rather, they show only that they 
understand, or can 'entertain' rights discourse; such understanding does not necessitate 
acceptance. Thus it may be that Muslims understand and use human rights alangauge to express 
interests arising form quite other sources; as Milbank would put it, Muslim may merely 'entertain' 
the liberal structure which supports rights discourse. 
Against (3), particularism, Halliday argues that the culture and politics of Muslim countries are 
of the same order as found in other parts of the world, and therefore the argument that human 
rights arc inappropriate in their particular political and cultural context fails. Thus he writes: 
Behind the transhistorical and divinely sanctioned legitimacy lie projects for the acquisition 
and maintenance of political power in the late twentieth century. These may vary, as between 
tribal oligarchies (Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States), military regimes (Pakistan, Sudan, 
Libya) and clerical dictatorships (Iran), but the mechanisms and goals of these projects are 
eminently comprehensible in secular terms and comparable to those of other contemporary 
political systems. ... 
States have embraced Islamist discourses above all where this has served 
to consolidate power at home or to promote the state's interests vis-ä-vis other Muslim states 
or the West. (1996 pp. 149-150) 
How does this relate to Milbank's argument against secular reason, in particular against 
sociological reduction of religion to more supposedly fundamental secular categories? One 
possibility is to view it as an example of the ad hoc suspicion which he permits, without 
conceding to the totality of the secular metanarrative (1990a p. 119). Indeed, it can be seen as 
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confirming Milbank's thesis of the all-pervasiveness of secular reason, leaving the'remnant of 
Christendom' as the sole site of resistance. However, it surely also exposes the danger of this line 
of reasoning. An alternative, religious, order becomes a precious hypothetical possibility, while 
secular reason can explain any actual political or social phenomena. Hence the importance of 
asserting Maclntyre's model of tradition as a mode of analysis in the public arena, albeit in a 
form modified to concede much to Milbank's critique. Halliday implicitly denies the integrity of a 
tradition of enquiry to Islam in his argument that contemporary factors understood in secular 
terms are always more important in determining contemporary outcomes than tradition, whether 
textual or otherwise. 
This brings us to Halliday's response to (4), those Muslims who argue that Islam provides a 
different but better (in a universal sense) alternative ethical-political tradition to human rights. 
Against (4), we have already seen that Halliday favours a secularist approach to safe-guarding 
individual welfare and liberty. At least he is in agreement with the confrontationalists that both 
social and political cultures and textual traditions of Muslim countries and Islam make it difficult 
to square such traditions with human rights discourse. But he disagrees with them in their 
assertion of a unified, monolithic Islam, and in their genetic4 critique of the tradition of human 
rights. Thus under the title 'Myths of Tradition' (1996 p. 146) he argues that Islamic tradition is 
polyvocal, and that much of what is claimed as traditional is recently invented for reasons of 
political expediency: 
while on some questions the weight of Islamic tradition is identifiable and distinct, much of 
what passes for Islam is a particular, contemporary and arbitrarily formulated set of views, 
or local tradition dressed up as authoritatively 'Islamic'. (1996 p. 147) 
In particular, he challenges the way in which shari'ah is presumed to be a unified, comprehensive 
and unchangeable law code, arguing that it is not, "even in Islamic terms". He cites Aziz al- 
Azmeh5 in support: 
Islamic law is not a code. This is why the frequently heard call for its 'application' is 
meaningless, most particularly when calls are made for the application of shari'a - this latter 
term does not designate law, but is a general term designating good order, much like nomos 
or dharma ... 
Calls for the 'application of Islamic law' have no connection with the Islamic 
legal tradition built upon multivocality, technical competence and the existence of an 
executive political authority which controls the legal system. It is a political slogan, not a 
return to past reality. (In Halliday 1996 p. 148) 
There are two parts to the argument presented here. The first appears to dispute the meaning of 
shari'ah partly on etymological grounds, which Halliday suggests a little earlier by arguing that 
4i. e. in terms of origins, in this case, western, colonial ones. 5a1-Azmeh A (1993) Islams and Modernities Verso, London, pp. 12-14. 
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"shari'a, literally 'path' or 'way' ... 
did not initially denote legal code at all" (1996 p. 148), and 
partly by appeal to some permanent, ahistorical meaning of the term. The latter is evident both in 
the al-Azmeh extract ("this last term does not designate law"), and in Halliday("shari'a, literally 
'path' or 'way"'). Yet both in appealing to a fixed and permanent ahistorical meaning and in trying 
to fix a'true' meaning through etymology, Halliday violates his own principles of enquiry. For in 
a later chapter he attacks the practice of "etymological reductionism", and especially "the attempt 
to explain the meaning of words in today's discourse by reference to their classical roots", which 
he describes as "an absurdity" (1996 p. 206). Second, his attempt to fix the meaning of a word, to 
avoid its misuse by those who disagree with him, is inconsistent with his historicist principle that 
"we have to look behind the assertion of a transhistorical body of thought ... and examine 
how in 
the conditions of the modem world a specific tradition has become codified and implemented" 
(1996 p. 147). 
Halliday's argument is also flawed in other ways. Al-Azmeh seems to be pointing out that the 
conditions under which Islamic law was codified differ from those of the contemporary state, and 
possibly that those who call for the implementation of shari'ah are ignorant of these differences. 
But his does nothing to aid Halliday's point that the unity and permanence of shari'ah is fictitious 
"even in Islamic terms" (1996 p. 148). On the contrary, the sketch of shari'ah at 5.6-5.7 
suggested that at least since the tenth century for the majority of Sunnis shari'ah has been 
regarded as a stable and coherent body of law, albeit circumscibed in scope of application by 
political circumstances, and with only relatively minor differences between the four law schools. 
Halliday also accuses confrontationalists' of committing a genetic fallacy by criticising human 
rights on the grounds that the latter derive from a culture that also spawned racism and 
imperialism. Following Mannheim against Marx (1996 p. 212), he argues that the conditions of 
production of an idea tell us nothing about its validity. Thus he states: 
Logically, there is no reason why the origin of a set of moral or legal principles should be 
equated with its validity, in regard to human rights, any more than in regard to democracy, or 
economic development, or natural science. This claim, of a delegitimising hegemonic origin, 
is the fallacy at the root of all discourse against 'eurocentric', 'ethnocentric' and related 
thought. (1996 p. 152) 
Interestingly, Halliday's argument here actually serves to defend Maclntyre and Milbank against 
the charge that however cunningly they attempt to reclaim them, the historic sources they wish to 
retrieve are irredeemably tainted - by ethnocentrism, misogyny, homophobia etc.. We have 
already considered Maclntyre's difficulties with Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology' (4.2). An 
example from Milbank's work could be his use of Ruskin, which emphasises Ruskin's moral 
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critique of capitalism and attempted retrieval of medieval guilds, but neglects entirely his views 
on race, and the centrality of Britain's civilising mission to his teaching (Said 1993 pp. 123-6). 
But is an assertion of the logical independence of origin and validity sufficient to answer a claim 
such as Fanon's that "For the native ... objectivity 
is always directed against him" (in Said 1993 
p. 196)? 6 Furthermore, Halliday's argument would seem to work against Maclntyre and Milbank 
in the sense that both rely on constructing historical narratives which claim to show a continuity 
of ideas across vast stretches of time, space and culture. Thus MacIntyre charts the history of 
virtue from Homeric Greece to Jane Austen's England in After Virtue. As we have seen, Milbank 
traces the triple rejection of Baroque poesis, an immanent trinitarian account of creation, and 
Aristotelian rp axis, from twelfth century scholasticisim to twentieth century social theory. A 
strict divorce of origin and validity would appear to deny the relevance of this exercise for 
understanding contemporary usage of ideas and practices, indeed it would undermine the entire 
genealogical enterprise. 
But what is meant by 'validity'? Halliday does not elaborate philosophically, even in his more 
extensive argument with Said (1996 pp. 195-217). But from what he does write, its meaning 
seems to correspond quite closely to 'knowledge which enables instrumental control', as in 
Milbank's description of science(7.4), Gray's of western manipulation of nature (7.6), and 
Habermas' of instrumental rationality (3.6). Particularly striking is his defence of the validity of 
knowledge acquired in the colonial period: 
If you want to dominate a country, you need to know where its mines and oases are, to have a 
good map, to be aware of its ethnic and linguistic composition and so forth. ... 
To put it 
bluntly: if you plan to rob a bank, you would be well advised to know what the routines and 
administrative procedures of its employees are, and, preferably, have some idea of who you 
can suborn from within the organization. (1996 p. 213) 
Validity refers to how good a job a concept does in performing a particular function: in the case 
of human rights, how effectively it protects individuals and groups from government oppression, 
and of individuals from group oppression. Of course, once groups come into the picture, the 
question of the protection of the group from individual subversion appears (as in The Satanic 
Verses ; some complexities arising here were discussed at 3.5. But in the context of the historical 
projects of Milbank and Maclntyre, it would appear that while origin does not determine validity 
- the whole post-colonial project of 'writing back' would refute that? - the two are not entirely 
6From Fanon F (1961) The Wretched of the Earth tr. Farrington C Grove, New York, p. 77. 7As discussed at 2.4, post-colonial fiction employs the strategy of 'writing back' - spatially from the 
colonial 'periphery' to the metropolitan 'centre' - but also using the same literary techniques which 
contributed to the imagination of Empire subversively. This would not be possible if ideas only 
reflected their original context of production, and hence could not be re-deployed in new contexts 
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independent either. For the history of the use of a concept or practice can shed light on its current 
deployment - light which purely synchronic analyses may fail to shed. The change of aspect 
achieved by MacIntyre on current moral discourse, or of Milbank on current social theory, are 
evidence of this. 
Furthermore, while a close link has been made between Maclntyre and Milbank's historical 
projects and those of the genealogists, a crucial difference is also worth noting. Milbank describes 
the genealogical project as: 
to undermine some present constellation of power by exploding the 'eternal verities' which it 
claims to promote, and exhibiting the 'base' origins of its apparently noble pretensions. 
(1990a p. 281) 
We saw this exemplified above in Milbank's account of Nietzsche's 'exposure' of the origins of 
metaphysics in ascetic reaction to powerlessness (7.4). Milbank and Maclntyre's projects 
certainly fit with the first part of the definition as intended exposures of secular reason, but their 
aim seems less to expose the 'base' origins of this reason as to suggest a certain incoherence or 
error at its point of departure from prior tradition. The aim is less to shame than to correct. Thus, 
for Maclntyre, it is the break up of the teleological structure of moral language, moving from 
humanity as it is to humanity as it should be, which renders it incoherent. For Milbank it is the 
departure from poesis, creation and praxis which shatters the coherence of the Christian 
narrative. Thus, however much Milbank stresses the difference between his advocacy of rhetoric 
from Maclntyre's advocacy of dialectics, the fact remains one must have some determinative 
notion of the shape of Christian belief in order to object to these departures from orthodoxy. 
Hence both are defending the coherence of a theory. 
Returning to Halliday, perhaps the best argument he could offer against confrontationalists (4) 
and incompatibilists (5) would be that the laws, ideas and practices associated with human rights 
are already embedded in the societies of countries whose governments - and some opposition 
Islamist movements - attempt to repudiate them. Thus, as we noted above, Mayer (1995) is able 
to point out that the governments of most Muslim countries are signatories of the major 
international human rights covenants, and thus obliged in international law to uphold the 
provisions of those covenants. Furthermore, there is evidence of substantial popular support for 
human rights movements (Dwyer 1991). Halliday is right that such support is restricted by the 
prevailing political culture in such countries -a condition well dramatised in Memissi's chapter 
on the UDHR in her Islam and Democracy (1993). But I suggest that he is wrong to see long 
with transformed meanings (the genetic fallacy). 
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term secularization as the only solution. Both Mernissi and Dwyer give cause for hope that 
movements which fuse traditional and modem elements to protest against injustice may have 
some impact. I suggest that such movements are more insightfully be viewed as the painful 
outcome of an epistemological crisis at the intersection of traditions, than as the unfolding of the 
metanarrative of secularisation. 
This offers the possibility of defending MacIntyre and Milbank from Halliday's attack on "post- 
modernist rejection of any claim to universality and rationality" and "philosophic doubts about 
the validity of asserting universal entitlements" (1996 p. 158). He describes these positions as: 
a debilitating intellectual fashion indulged in by people who give the impression of never 
having been near a human rights violation ... 
[and] 
... 
for all the solemnity of its utterance and 
the genuine philosophic concern it reflects, a political and legal abnegation that corresponds 
rather weakly to the requirements of much of humanity. (1996 p. 158) 
The model of traditions in interaction not only enables one to make sense of the fusion of modem 
and traditional while maintaining the integrity of tradition, it also enables one to answer a 
possible objection to the above argument, suggested as the best Halliday could offer, that 
governments in Muslim countries should respect human rights. For what if such governments 
could legitimately answer that no such popular movements for rights exist among our peoples? 
Rather than the simple insistence that universal rights exist in spite of the empirical evidence in 
the case of such peoples, a model of traditions in interaction could point to inadequacies within 
existing ideas and practices as junctures where an idea of human rights could help to solve 
present anomalies - or to anomalies generated by inter-cultural encounter. It could do so without 
having to insist on such ideas being always already present, but concealed. Thus it would not be 
committed to the necessary discovery of such anomalies - as a natural law theory is. 
For example, an emphasis on 'rights' stresses the individual, although mention of the always 
implicit flipside of 'duties' brings society back into view. But this still presupposes an individual- 
collective dichotomy. Galtung (1994) provides us with a metaphor to 'unthink' this dichotomy: 
Imagine a hunter-gatherer, or pastoral-nomadic community with people woven together in 
structures that take the shape of nets of rights and duties. The interaction net is made in such 
a way that everybody is relatively well protected. Human beings are of course 
physically/biologically recognizable in this network. And the more densely the net is spun, the 
more difficult or meaningless it will be to detach the individual from the network. Individuals 
are in the net not only in the knot, a useful metaphor and vocabulary. (1994 p. 6) 
In these circumstances, moral obligations need to be defined in terms of 'nets' and not just 'knots'. 
I take it that this is also the point Milbank is making when he argues that: 
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the [sociological] view that religion concerns the relation of the 'individual' to the 'social' can 
be opposed in the name of 'hierarchical' societies (meaning a hierarchy of values, rather than 
of persons) for which both individuality and collectivity are subordinate to a substantive 
organization of roles, purposes and values. 
8 (1990a p. 140) 
Nor is this a merely academic point, as Galtung makes clear when he considers the consequences 
of "verticality" - in the Western case, the characteristic of emphasising the relationship between 
the individual and the state - for minority cultural groups in Western societies. Thus he writes 
The Western position combines verticality and post-medieval individualism in a strongly 
competitive system defining winners and losers. ... 
This excludes collective rights such as 
people's rights and other group rights. Women, age groups, indigenous groups, ancient 
peoples, non-western cultures pocketed inside Western societies are such groups, at the 
bottom of society often engaged in efforts to imitate the states subjugating them. More than 
most, they are in need of human rights to preserve and enhance their group characteristics, 
not only as individuals inside a given social structure. Denial of such collective rights is 
verticality at work. The individualizing prospect of human rights deprives these 
underprivileged groups of their major political asset: mobilization and organized struggle as 
a group. (1994 p. 16) 
In view of this analysis, I suggest that it is through the embedding of global concerns in local 
traditions that the ethical concern which animates human rights is best defended, not by 
unjustifiable assertions of universality. The model of traditions in interaction advanced here can 
help us to conceptualise that process. But this means that MacIntyre's 'new and very different St. 
Benedict' (1985 p. 263) will be found developing new forms of local, national and global political 
participation, not building monastery walls. How might such a project be promoted, for example, 
in the field of education? It is to this question that we now turn. 
8.2 Education and the Common Good 
Education especially reveals the concealed public dimension of political life which even 
liberalism cannot suppress; in deciding what to teach, what to pass on any society expresses 
its view about what is really self-fulfilling. (Milbank 1990 p. 197) 
Even if there were no assimilationist pressure, their [ i. e. minority communities'] self-interest 
and vulnerability as well as the sheer cultural weight of British society would ensure that the 
communities would disappear within a generation or two, leaving behind rootless, feeble and 
fragile black and brown atoms tracelessly submerged in British society and periodically 
resorting to panicky and mindless forms of fundamentalist self-assertion. If we are happy 
with such an outcome, we should continue with the present policy. If not, we need to explore 
81t is because of its closedness to this possiblity that Milbank opposes sociology of religion: "But 
sociology is simply doomed to rediscover, everywhere, the specifically modern confinement and 
protection of 'the religious sphere'. The positivism which defines religion at, beyond, or across the 
boundaries of the 'social fact' is always subverted by a more radical positivism which recognises the 
peculiarity and specificity of religious practice and logic, and in consequence, the impossibility of any 
serious attempt at either scientific explanation or humanist interpretation" (1990a p. 140). 
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a more imaginative and pluralist vision of Britain, and develop a new social and cultural 
policy capable of nurturing ethnic identities within a shared cultural framework. A politics of 
citizenship which both promotes the rights of communities with regard to one another, as well 
as the obligations of communities to each other is an essential precondition of this pluralist 
vision. (Parekh in Andrews 1991 p. 197) 
Parekh may exaggerate the threat to the survival of'minority communities', but in so far as such 
communities can be identified as traditions in Maclntyre's sense he is right in seeing that modern 
societies pose a threat to their survival. In particular, communities which avoid the sectarian 
option and engage with the wider society seem to be most at risk. Yet, if the argument developed 
so far is correct, such tradition-sustaining communities nurture the kind of civil virtues upon 
which liberal societies are in fact dependent. Thus without the kind of "politics of citizenship" 
Parekh suggests not only will be minority communities be threatened, but the common good in 
society will become increasingly attenuated and fragile, and public life increasingly dominated by 
coercion and self-interest. 
This section examines the educational implications of the thesis, seeking to answer the question 
'What of the kind of initiation into a plural society do the arguments presented here suggest is 
needed? ' It begins by developing the argument in broad terms, and then considers the implications 
for the education system in Engalnd and Wales. The question of citizenship concerns what it 
means to be a competent member of society, and of what rights one is entitled to expect from 
society in return. What competencies and expectations does the model of traditions in interaction 
in a liberal society presented suggest a citizen should possess? What kind of education is likely to 
produce this result? 
The thesis indicates that an appropriate initiation into a plural society will need to nurture both a 
rootedness in cultural tradition and some of those abilities and qualities prized by liberalism, such 
as an ability to think critically and make reflective choices. Thus a means of conceptualising the 
plural public arena which recognises the sustaining contribution of religious and cultural 
traditions, as well as liberal abilities and qualities, is needed. This will have as its counterpart a 
model of reflective decision-making which stresses the cultural rootedness of such processes, or 
in Fitzmaurice's terms, some kind of a "reflectiveness-embeddedness dialectic" (1993; Chapter 3 
above). Many controversial issues in education can be analysed in terms of the tension between 
the two poles of this dialectic. In the context of the English and Welsh education system questions 
concerning the cross-curricular elements of citizenship and multicultural education, the subject 
areas of religious and personal and social education (RE and PSE), the debates about 'separate' 
schools, and worship in schools, can all be analysed in this way; this will be the basic method of 
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this section. 
But we begin with general educational models, using these to illustrate the tension between the 
two poles of the "embeddedness-reflectiveness dialectic". This can be achieved by comparing two 
American models of civic education; those of Gutmann (1987) and Galston (1991). The need for 
any form of civic education has been disputed by American liberals during the last thirty years, 
on the grounds that the diversity of groups in society make a common basis for such education 
impossible, and on the grounds that the common basis which must be presupposed in such 
education violates individual autonomy (Galston 1991 pp. 241-2). Gutmann disagrees with such 
calls for abolition, but places the dominant stress in her theory on the notion of autonomous 
decision-making. This can be seen in her description of the key democratic virtue as "the ability 
to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction" (1987 p. 39). 
Galston recognises that autonomy is indeed a liberal virtue, but not the only one, and one which 
taken in isolation produces serious distortion (1991 p. 246). Rather: 
Liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization of choice. To place an 
ideal of autonomous choice at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range of 
possibilities available within liberal societies. (1991 p. 329) 
He points out that knowledge of one's cultural tradition and of that of others is also necessary 
before "conscious social reproduction" can responsibly take place; the virtues of obedience to the 
law, willingness to serve one's country, and respect for the constitution are also prior to it. The 
constitution serves to provide stability insulated to some degree from shifting public opinion, 
while both constitution and law provide frameworks to protect minorities from the tyranny of 
majorities. Perhaps most importantly, he argues that few in practice "embrace the core 
commitments of liberal society through process of rational enquiry" (1991 p. 243). This last point 
is important because it points to the weight placed on a particular kind of reflexive rationality in 
Gutmann's position, an emphasis shared with other liberal writers (e. g. Rawls 1993, Raz 1986, 
Nozick 1974). However, as we saw in Chapter 3 this emphasis is problematic, in particular for 
two reasons. 
First, there is the matter of how widespread the use of such rationality is in Western societies, 
and how widespread in other contexts. In practice, its use and significance appears to be both 
culturally and socially constrained. It has been suggested in the thesis that the development of 
reflexivity may be contingent on societal mobility and other forms of displacement (1.13 above). 
But such objections do not address the question of whether this form of rationality could, even if 
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practised by everyone in a society, actually do the kind of job liberals assign to it; namely to act 
as a shared minimal universal basis for decision making. The analysis of Habermas' notion of 
communicative rationality (3.6) suggests that even the circumscribed role he proposes cannot be 
universally grounded. Rather, a start has to be made with the substantive ethical traditions, 
liberal and otherwise, actually available. 
Liberal educational policies have been criticised for apparently welcoming cultural diversity 
while in fact subordinating cultural traditions to a liberal educational philosophy at crucial points 
without justification for doing so (Hulmes 1989), and for proceeding with an assumption of 
shared cultural values without any attempt to specify what these might be or how they might be 
arrived at (Halstead 1988, White and White 1986). For example, Halstead points out that the 
Swann Report (1985) oscillates between a concept of shared values which all groups hold as a 
matter of empirical fact, and one which requires that "minority groups take on the shared values 
of wider pluralist society" (1985 p. 5 in Halstead 1988 p 216). The latter interpreatation raises 
the question of the societal goals to which traditioned minorities are being asked to agree, while 
the problem with the former is that: 
this minimum framework of values is a very thin one, certainly not sufficient to support a 
common system of education as extensive as we have today. (Halstead 1988 p. 217) 
Thought therefore needs to be given to what this minimal set of values is. In Western societies 
individual freedom of choice is highly valued and kept in check by another shared set of values, 
respect for law and order, and where laws are disagreed with, commitment to democratic process 
to change them. Muslims and other traditioned minorities have few problems with the second set 
of shared values - even the forms of protest shown in The Satanic Verses controversy 
demonstrated this - but are likely to find the model of negative freedom implicit in the first more 
problematic. This is especially so if it means that children are being taught to question the 
fundamental basis of the religious tradition which, their parents believe, sustains meaning and 
purpose. In teens of Galston's model of civic education, it should be noted that the second set of 
values is seen as being prior to the first. 
The account of tradition developed from Maclntyre and Milbank also suggests that the second set 
of values is essential to provide the kind of safe and ordered context within which traditions can 
prosper, but priority is given to the sustaining of these substantive ethical traditions, which are 
seen as necessary to develop respect for authority and reasoned negotiation, and hence the virtues 
of citizenship. Therefore, an education is needed which provides children with an understanding 
of and rooting in tradition, which gives them confidence in both their religious and ethnic identity 
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and British citizenship, and the confidence that tradition can renew itself through change and 
reflection in continuity with the past. The question is, starting from existing arrangements, how 
can this be achieved? 
8.3 Citizenship and Multicultural Education 
Education in Britain, especially in its continuing state of turmoil following the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, is a vast and complex field mined with potential flash points between competing 
perspectives and interests. The brief comments here cannot begin to do it justice; all that is hoped 
is that they might encourage reflection on how the model of traditions offered could serve 
thinking and planning in education. The statutory framework for the provision of education in 
England and Wales is the 1988 Education Reform Act. The Act obliges schools in the state- 
maintained sector to provide a curriculum which: 
(a) promotes the moral, spiritual, cultural, mental and psychological development of pupils at 
school and of society; and 
(b) prepares such pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life. 
(in King 1993 p. 5) 
According to the National Curriculum Council (NCC), part of the delivery of this total package 
are the cross-curriculum 'dimension' of multicultural education and the cross-curriculum 'theme' 
of citizenship education. The NCC describe citizenship education in the following terms: 
Education for Citizenship develops the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary for 
exploring, making informed decisions about and exercising responsibilities and rights in a 
democratic society. (Curriculum Guidance 8, in Fogelman and Edwards 1993 p. 2) 
Eight components are listed: 'community', 'pluralist society', 'being a citizen', 'family', 
'democracy', 'citizen and law', 'work, employment and leisure' and 'public services' (1993 p. 3). 
These elements suggest relationships between the individual, community and society, and between 
different areas of the individual's life, which could provide a promising basis for an education in 
participative citizenship which respects embeddedness in cultural tradition. Unfortunately, 
however, a number of factors militate against the realisation of this possibility, some of which are 
contingent on 'accidental' matters of process, some of which touch on more fundamental issues. 
No definition of multicultural education is offered in government material related to the 1988 Act 
or National Curriculum, but non-statutory guidance states that the entire curriculum should 
incorporate multicultural perspectives: 
multicultural education ... should 
be at the heart of curriculum planning, development and 
implementation (NCC 1991 p. 3) 
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This cross-curriculum status for citizenship and multicultural education legitimises their presence 
in the curriculum, and in theory provides broad scope for their practice; but the fact that cross- 
curricular guidance is not statutory and not subject to national assessment tasks, whereas subject 
requirements are, undercuts the apparent advantage of this cross-curricular status, and means 
that they arc likely to get squeezed out of crowded timetables. According to Hargreaves, the 
production of the NCC documents hastily and in sequence meant that "the opportunity for cross- 
subject collaboration in depth was lost": working parties fixed on subject areas without 
consideration of curriculum integration, and non-statutory guidance appeared only as an 
afterthought (Hargreaves in King and Reiss 1993 p. vii). 
The Act undermined the role of the Local Education Authorities (LEAs) who had been central in 
promoting multicultural education policies, their power being largely transferred to central 
government and school governing bodies, especially in the case of those schools opting out of 
local authority control. The absence of social science subjects from the National Curriculum 
means that there is little analytic framework from which to develop an understanding of 
citizenship or traditions, a position reflected in NCC Curriculum Guidance 8 which stresses non- 
political community participation (community service, charity work) and "citizenship as legal 
status and volition rather than political competence" (King 1993 p. 12). 
Brief consideration of the NCC History Working Group's Final Report and of the Statutory 
Order which followed it will indicate the difficulties for cross-curricular elements in the context 
of particular subject requirements (in Booth 1993). Seventy percent of the units at Key Stages 2 
and 3 (ages 7-11 and 11-14) are on British History, while history is no longer compulsory at Key 
Stage 4 (14-16) (Booth 1993 p. 81). Booth notes the centrality of the whiggish march of 
progress, the chorus of liberalism triumphant : 
the message which comes across on reading the British study units is that British history is 
essentially about the white indigenous people and is the story of the political and economic 
improvement of the great British people. ... 
Unit titles ... certainly give the 
impression of a 
top-down view of our past which moves inexorably towards prosperity, unity and democracy. 
(1993 p. 79) 
However, Booth concludes nonetheless that there is room within the History National Curriculum 
for development of multicultural themes, both in topic and method; the problem is that the 
framework itself "does little to promote multicultural education" (1993 p. 89). 
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The picture is thus one of a certain rhetorical commitment to education for a plural society at the 
non-statutory level, combined with very little support for the realisation of such policy at the level 
of implementation. Thus prior to the question of how a tradition-based model of cultural diversity 
could be implemented is the problem of opportunities to address cultural diversity in any form. In 
this respect the government-backed (though not financially - this had to come from charity) report 
of the Paul Hamlyn Foundation National Commission on Education offers some hope, suggesting 
that citizenship should become a compulsory subject at Key Stages 2 to 4 (7-16) (1993 pp. 55-8). 
In response to research indicating the diversity of ways in which citizenship is being interpreted 
(anything from nature conservation to third world debt, Fogelman 1991), the report offers the 
following affirmation and definition: 
We consider the teaching of citizenship of great importance. We define the subject in a broad 
way to concern the relationship between individuals and the world they live in. It relates not 
only to this country but to the European Community and the world as a whole. It concerns 
the institutions of democracy and the rights and responsibilities of individuals in a democratic 
society; the creation of wealth; the role of public and private employers and voluntary 
organizations; and the opportunities which people have to shape or play a creative part in the 
life of the conununity. (1993 p. 56) 
Given the generally unpromising legislative and political context for addressing cultural diversity, 
what does a model of traditions suggest about modes of citizenship and multicultural education? 
One concern is that, especially given the small amount of time available to address these issues, a 
rather superficial view of culture and tradition will be presented, one quite at odds with 
Macintyre's concept of tradition, which emphasises immersion in practices and devotion to their 
internal goods. As White and White ask: 
What is it for a pupil to be 'introduced' to a practice? According to liberalism, being 
introduced to an activity for which one might opt must be primarily a matter of ... coming to 
understand enough of it to be in a reliable position to judge whether or not one wants to 
incorporate it into one's life plan. (1986 p. 159) 
But to be introduced to a practice on MacIntyre's view one must engage deeply enough with it to 
develop some of the relevant virtues. However, while this model works quite well for practices 
like playing a musical instrument or learning a foreign language, it is not at all clear how it 
applies to citizenship and multicultural education, and the Whites do not explore these areas. But 
it may be suggested that the practice of democratic citizenship, for example, might begin by 
allowing students some democratic control over their time in school or in decision-making 
processes. Skills such as using consumer rights, or writing to their local council or MP about 
issues of concern would also be relevant. In the field of culture, exchange trips with schools in 
different areas of the country, especially between schools with different ethnic mixes, as well as 
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abroad, could be considered. More generally, Macintyre's understanding of the role of practice in 
developing virtues suggests that it is better to engage with some topics in depth, rather than more 
at a shallow level. This suggests conflict with a liberal education seeks to sustain maximum 
choice, but arguably at the cost of any coherent framework to make sense of such choices: 
Ideally, it would seem, pupils are not to commit themselves to a way of life until they have 
become fully acquainted with as many options as possible and reflected on which to pursue. 
... 
But how is such reflection to be carried out? On what do they reflect? What guides their 
choice? Only, it would seem the intensity of maximisation of satisfaction; no other criterion is 
possible. (White and White 1986 p. 151) 
In particular, there is no necessary connection between two goals of liberal education, which are 
to acquire cultural capital for personal satisfaction and to become a responsible and helpful 
citizen. By contrast on Maclntyre's model these goals are intrinsically related, although it has 
been suggested that their connections become how fragile in advanced capitalist societies. 
However, the school environment offers the opportunity for reinforcing the connection between 
practices, virtues, traditions and the common good. It can do so through the very fact that a 
preparation for life takes place largely within one integrated setting, through cross-curricular 
work, through involvement with the local community, and even through a National Curriculum 
which itself can be interpreted as a defence against fragmentation. This raises the issue of 
separate schools. 
8.4 Separate Schools 
While the significance of this issue may be questioned in terms of the numbers of Muslim 
children who would be likely to attend such schools were they to receive voluntary-aided status, it 
remains an important issue of principle for many Muslims (Akhtar 1993, UKACIA 1993). As 
indicated at 5.4, on the simple basis of equity there seems to be little rationale for local 
authorities and the government to continue to refuse Muslim schools voluntary aided status while 
continuing to grant Jewish, Catholic and Anglican schools such status. This is particularly ironic 
as, if the government had faith in the National Curriculum and the ability of the inspectorate to 
police it, such status would be a way of ensuring that Muslims schools operated within its 
boundaries. 
Yet clearly liberal fears about such schools, especially in relation to equal opportunities for 
women, persist (Khanum 1992). At 5.4 we saw that the headmistress of the Muslim Girls' School 
in Bradford (which voluntarily adheres to the National Curriculum) justified the school in terms 
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of its ability to provide girls with educational and career opportunities which parental choice 
would otherwise curtail. Yet such an argument may be taken to construe equal opportunities too 
narrowly. A further aspect to this argument is that schools for minority groups may improve self- 
esteem and hence performance, a case which seems convincing for girls' schools (girls may be 
seen as a minority in Tajfel's sense, 1.3 above). 
The importance of initiation into tradition for a tradition-based model would suggest support for 
such schools, remembering that the health of tradition is measured partly by its capacity for self- 
criticism, and to adapt within the integrity of tradition to changing conditions. McLaughlin has 
argued that even within liberal tradition "there is a less strong and direct connection between 
liberal educational principles and the notion of the common school than is often supposed", and 
that "the legitimate plurality of schooling arrangements" (which include considerations of the 
common good) are "worthy of serious attention" (1992 p. 114). He argues that there are a 
number of valid starting points for "the child's journey towards autonomy and liberal citizenship", 
one of which is: 
the basis of experience of a particular 'world view' or cultural identity; a substantiality of 
belief, practice and value, as in (say) a certain religious school. Such schools, in relation to 
which parents can exercise legitimate rights of choice, would not seek to entrap their pupils in 
a particular vision of the good, but to provide a distinctive starting point from which their 
search for autonomous agency may proceed. (1993 p. 123) 
The extent to which a faith school would be likely to correspond to this proposal is questionable; 
as Nielsen (1981) shows, both the practice of Muslim education in the subcontinent and 
supplementary education (mosque schools) tend towards authoritarian and rote-learning methods. 
But both a common British standard of teacher qualification and commitment to the National 
Curriculum, as well as a more adequate level of funding, provide reason to believe that 
voluntary-aided Muslim schools need not share these features. Indeed it is possible to argue that 
some consensus is developing between some liberals and Muslims concerning a balance between 
grounding in tradition and critical-reflective education. For example, both Fitzmaurice, writing 
from a liberal perspective but one which recognises the importance of "embeddedness", and 
Akhtar, writing from a fairly radical Muslim perspective, make a similar recommendation 
concerning a division between primary (ages 5-11) and secondary (11+) phases of schooling 
(Akhtar 1993 p. 30, Fitzmaurice 1993 p. 68). Fitzmaurice's suggestion is that: 
... the religious complexion of a school should be, within limits and wherever possible, a 
matter of parental choice, and that all secondary schooling should be, as on the French 
model, strictly secular. (1993 p. 68) 
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Similarly Akhtar, writing on this occasion on behalf of the Islamia Schools Trust, states: 
We recommend that the Agreed Syllabus in Religious Education be taught only after the age 
of eleven. Up to that age, children should be educated solely in the tradition of their own 
faith. (1993 p. 30) 
The differences here should immediately be admitted: Akhtar and many Muslims would be likely 
to disagree strongly with Fitzmaurice's suggestion of "strictly secular" secondary schooling on the 
French model, and Akhtar's position on RE represents a pragmatic recognition of the reality that 
the vast majority of Muslim children are and are likely to remain in common schools. It is also 
unclear whether Fitzmaurice's suggestion really makes sense; how could a strictly secular 
education build on a grounding in a faith tradition, and hence avoid a confusing disjuncture 
between primary and secondary phases? But, nonetheless, an agreement in principle to a model of 
primary (though not necessarily corresponding to 'primary school') grounding in a faith tradition, 
followed by an initiation into a wider diversity of viewpoints built on that grounding, seems to be 
present here. 
Furthermore, this model also corresponds to Sacks' idea of a "community of communities" (1991 
pp. 8-10, above, 1.1), and to Parekh's notion of "public operative values" supported by diverse 
cultural communities (1994 pp. 20-6). It also fits with Kohlberg's theory of moral development, 
an important underpinning for Habermas' theory of communicative action (3.6). Kohlberg's 
theory proceeds from the child learning constraints on behaviour in primary socialisation 
(preconventional phase), through competence in a particular moral system (conventional phase), 
to self-chosen ethical principles appealing to coherent, comprehensive and universal principles 
(postconventional phase) (in White 1989 pp. 66-8). Here, however, difficulties emerge; for 
Kohlberg, religious traditions, especially those requiring unquestioning obedience to divine 
decree, only reach the stage of conventional morality. Thus there is a danger that in a model 
based on a primary grounding/secondary reflective distinction religious traditions are relegated to 
the status of base materials for building the autonomous secular subject, base metals for 
Enlightenment alchemy. Here the problem identified by Habermas that modernity must depend on 
pre-modern moral capital is solved by providing a supply for it in primary education in religious 
traditions. But such a model is ultimately profoundly patronising to those traditions. A parallel 
may be drawn here with Halliday's support for the liberalization of Islam bacause he ses this as 
paving the way to secularization (8.1). In each case, (Fitzmaurice, Kohlberg and Halliday) a 
developmental model of growing from religious nurture to secular maturity is present. One may 
speculate here on the hidden hand of Freudian or Marxist theory, or on the influence of the not 
uncommon experience in their middle years or older, of having growing up in a 'repressive' 
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religious environment which leads to a rejection of religion in adult life (see Asad 1990, above 
2.3). 
By contrast, in the model of traditions developed in the thesis it is important to note that there is 
no point at which the autonomous moral subject can simply 'take off from tradition; such an idea 
is sheer delusion. Any hybrid or "personal life project" is always indebted to tradition, which can 
include liberal forms of tradition, in the weaker or stronger Maclntyrean sense. It is important 
then that any primary grounding/secondary reflective model includes the insight that reflection 
can also take place from a properly traditioned standpoint, and cannot take place at all without 
any basis in tradition, whether this is recognised or not. Separate schools are in a strong position 
to make this point, although it is crucial that the civic virtue and critical skills/decision-making 
aspects of citizenship required by the National Curriculum are emphasised here. In common 
schools, it is crucial that the continuing role of tradition is emphasised in the cross-curricular 
elements of citizenship and multicultural education. The mode of delivery of the compulsory 
subject of religious education is also important here, and wil now be examined. 
8.5 Religious Education and Worship 
Firstly, again, the legislative context. Religious education is not part of the National Curriculum, 
but rather a compulsory subject whose syllabuses are set by Local Education Authorities (LEAs). 
Respecting this framework, the requirements of the 1988 Education Act apply only to new 
syllabuses set after this date. The Act requires the establishment of permanent local bodies - 
Standing Advisory Committees on Religious Education (SACREs) - to review the syllabuses and 
their implementation. The membership of SACREs is to reflect the balance of religious traditions 
in an area. New syllabuses are "to reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are 
in the main Christian" but also to take "account of the teaching and practices of the other 
principal religions represented in Great Britain" (DES 1989 in Mitchell 1993 pp. 187-8). Thus a 
new syllabus which falis to reflect this diversity is an illegal one. 
Publicity surrounding religious education in the 1988 Education Reform Act, especially 
concerning the Lords' amendments, has tended to portray it as advocating a return to Christianity 
at the expense of more plural approaches, but the position is more ambiguous than this. The Act 
is the first legislation to express moves since the 1944 Education Act away from the restrictive 
notion of 'religious instruction' towards the more open concept of 'religious education'. Whereas 
the 1944 Act assumed Christianity was the religion in question, the 1988 Act is the first to 
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specify any religious tradition, but in stating the central role of Christianity it is also the first to 
make taking account of other "principal religions" compulsory, and to insist that locally set 
syllabuses reflect the national picture. It is thus possible to interpret this new recognition of 
cultural diversity in a positive light in terms of the representation of religious diversity: 
We can thus see that no syllabus based upon Christianity alone can, any longer, be a legal 
syllabus. ... 
We may say that the requirement of the Act breaks the assumed Christian 
monopoly. (Hull 1989a p. 61) 
The requirement to reflect the national picture is particularly important, as it means that 
authorities with small ethnic communities can no longer justify excluding the religious traditions 
of these groups on the grounds that they are not locally relevant. 
However, as with citizenship and multicultural education, the presence of broad principles 
recognising cultural diversity is, to some extent at least, undermined by a range of factors 
militating against translating such recognition into practice. One is the increasingly restrictive 
interpretation placed on the Act by subsequent government circulars (Hull 1993). Hull points to 
what he describes as a "fundamental distinction" introduced in these circulars between 
Christianity, which is seen as part of British "heritage", and other faith traditions which are 
merely "represented". Such a distinction is neither consistent with the equality of British citizens, 
nor compatible with a tradition-based model which maintains that it is not possible to describe 
fundamental distinctions between traditions on extra-traditional grounds. 
For the same reason school worship, in the sense of all pupils (except for children 'opted-out' by 
parental choice) regardless of faith-community, engaging in purportedly "wholly or mainly" 
Christian acts of worship (in Hull 1989b p. 121), is incompatible with a tradition based model. 
The common good is not achieved by attempting to weld people regardless of tradition into some 
sense of Britislmess based on a diluted Christian ethos, but upon the integrity of faith 
communities (and other communities and practices) in their integrity sustaining a polyvocal 
public discourse. Note here that a collective act of worship for all pupils regardless of faith is a 
quite different matter to providing worship facilities for children from different faith traditions. 
The methods used in religious education are crucial to sustaining a sense of the integrity of 
traditions, which a number of current methods are prone to undermine (Hardy and Newbigin in 
Hull ed. 1981). Experiential, phenomenological and functionalist approaches all tend to share in 
the assumption that religions are culturally specific ways of expressing common fundamental 
human experience or meeting common human needs, implying that these needs are prior to and 
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can be understood apart from religion, which is thus understood as a secondary phenomenon. A 
tradition-based model cannot accept this, as we saw above with Milbank (7.2). 9 It is therefore 
important that if a secular stance is used to present (and hence inevitably to evaluate) religious 
traditions, then such a stance must also itself be open to critical scrutiny. That this is not the case 
is the heart of Newbigin's complaint about the 1976 Birmingham Agreed Syllabus in Religious 
Education, which has been widely used as a model for other syllabuses. Thus Newbigin writes: 
the Syllabus seeks to develop a 'critical understanding' of the varieties of religious experience 
precisely by its uncritical acceptance of a particular stance for living. To the framers of this 
syllabus this stance is simply obviously'what is right'. To an observer from another culture it 
is easily recognisable as a particular stance from the current phase of Western middle class 
culture -a culture which has ceased to believe that the Christian faith is the truth about how 
things really are. The Syllabus does not offer the possibility that the critical faculties of the 
children might be involved in examining this stance, because in order to do so they would 
have to accept uncritically (though provisionally) one of the other stances reviewed. (In Hull 
1981 p. 105) 
The obstacles to delivering a religious education critical of the secular premises of so many 
modes of presentation are formidable. They are compaunded by the fact that religious education 
is taught by staff unqualified in the subject to an extent that would be publicly quite unacceptable 
in other fields. For example, a survey in Wales found that only 43% of staff teaching secondary 
RE had both a general teaching qualification and a relevant degree, diploma or ministerial 
training; 23% did not have any qualification in RE whatsoever (Welsh National Centre for RE, 
1984). 
But even without a theoretical grasp by teachers of a tradition-based model, as with citizenship 
and multicultural education, certain practical or content features could support a tradition-based 
approach. Thus an approach which stresses the communal and lifestyle dimensions of a religion 
is likely to promote a more integral understanding of tradition than a narrower focus on beliefs 
and practices. For example Nielsen (1983) argues that the role of the ummah (Islamic 
community) needs to play a larger role in the presentation of school RE: 
the tendency to concentrate on the outward manifestations of Islam - mosque design, prayer 
ritual and timing, pilgrimage, and the regionally particular forms of Islam - effectively 
ignores, perhaps by implication denies, the deep spiritual values, experiences and meanings 
9"the view that religion concerns the relation between the 'individual' and the 'social' can be opposed 
in the name of 'hierarchical societies' (meaning a hierarchy of values rather than of persons) for 
which both individuality and collectivity are subordinate to a substantive organization of roles, 
purposes and values. Here religion can be so 'fundamental' that one cannot get behind it to either 
society or private experience" (1990a p. 140). 
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which are common to all believing Muslims and which tie them to their fellow believers in the 
ununa before and now. Among these values is that of the community experience of umma 
itself. (1983 p. 99) 
Where Christianity is perceived as a privatised religion the holistic nature of medieval 
Christianity - which can be demonstrated using examples such as the powerful architectural 
media of medieval cathedrals, and the persistence of the connection between Christianity and the 
cycles of agricultural life in harvest festival - could be taught alongside the 'underside' of 
feudalism viewed in democratic perspective. The 1988 Act provides broad scope for such 
interpretation, even though, as we saw with citizenship and multicultural education above, 
positive encouragement is lacking. 
8.6 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
So how far has the thesis progressed in its task of building an idea of the common good in a r' 
plural society based on Sacks' vision of a "community of communities" (1991 p. 8, above 1.1)? 
The medieval vision of a society oriented towards a single telos mirroring God's ordered 
universe, cannot be restored. But a society based around purely around the self-chosen goals of 
autonomous individuals is equally illusory; when liberalism forgets the traditions which nurture 
its virtues, the war of all against all threatens. Drawing on the work of Milbank and Maclntyre, a 
concept of tradition has been developed which 'thinks together' the metaphysical, moral, 
economic, political, social and personal, attempting to represent the complexity of life for 
individuals and communities in multicultural, multifaith, secularised societies. It may be 
suggested that this model could help members of religious and cultural minorities, and the 
secularised majority, to understand one another's positions more clearly, and hence perhaps 
overcome the mutual incomprehension which, it has been suggested, lay at the heart of The 
Satanic Verses controversy. From this mutual recognition practices and substantive conceptions 
of the common good may develop. 
Thus we turn to possible practical outcomes suggested by the thesis. Some sources of hope for 
building the common good on the model proposed can be identified. In the field of education, 
possibilities exist within subjects, as well as through cross-curricular themes and dimensions; the 
theme of citizenship is especially promising if allocated the kind of time and resources the Paul 
Hamlyn Trust report (1993) recommends, although this seems unlikely. A recent decision by the 
Funding Agency for Schools to approve funding for a Seventh Day Adventist run school may 
open the floodgates to funding for schools of other religious minorities - three applications for 
rý 
,, 
276 
Muslim schools are current in Brent alone - although a final decision by the Secretary of State for 
education is awaited (The Guardian 19 Oct. 1996, see also Bowcott 1996). 
However, it must be admitted that many factors count against many of the specific suggestions 
made in this final chapter in the educational arena. If the legislation against religious 
discrimination in employment in Northern Ireland meets with opposition when both political will 
and economic motivation (at least in terms of attracting American inward investment) are strong, 
what hope is there of introducing such legislation on the mainland where such motivation is 
lacking? In discussion with my students while working at Brunel University College, the most 
common response to whether Muslims should be protected under legislation such as group libel 
or incitement to religious hatred was the question that if Muslim countries impose restrictions on 
visiting Westerners, then why should 'we' make concessions to 'them'? Here a basic grounding in 
civic education - specifically that democratic rights should apply to groups in this country 
regardless of the actions of governments in their country of origin - would seem to be the most 
basic educational need. Only on such a basis could a more nuanced recognition of the tradition- 
location of both minority cultures and liberalism be built. It has been argued that both Milbank 
and Maclntyre presuppose such a structure as the location for the flourishing of traditioned 
communities (7.6). 
It may seem, both from this argument and from the earlier discussions of education (8.2-8.5), that 
the position developed is a form of 'traditioned liberalism'. Partly this is the result of attempting to 
see what may realistically be achieved in the field of education given the existing situation - given 
the predominance of forms of liberalism in educational theory and practice (Hulmes 1989). This 
is inevitable for a theory of traditions as developed, which denies that it is possible to build from 
nothing, but always historicises knowledge and practice. However, in other respects, the 
differences form a traditioned liberalism are quite marked. Consider two examples of traditioned 
liberalism. Both Fitzinaurice (1993) and Galston (1991) recognise that grounding in some sort of 
tradition as a prerequisite for human flourishing. Thus Fitzmaurice argues that the confidence, 
self-esteem and judgement needed for general education progress rely on a grounding in tradition. 
Galston sees the civic virtues necessary to sustain liberal society as contingent on tradition. But, 
in each case, it is not part of their theory to consider how such traditions are themselves 
sustained. Furthennore, for Fitzmaurice, there is a tendency to see tradition as a necessary but 
ultimately disposable grounding for the development of liberal autonomy, in contrast to 
Maclnytre's notion of 'traditioned reason', for which tradition can never be left behind. For 
Galston, the neglect of the dynamics of tradition leads him to be undiscriminating about the kind 
of religion which supports the civic virtues which liberal society needs. In particular, the Lockean 
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deity which he most commonly appears to presuppose is subject to Milbank's criticism that in 
seeing 'man' as closest to God in the unrestricted exercise of dominium it opens to door to state 
domination. Thus civic virtue is not safe in liberal hands - to return to Sacks - what is needed is a 
model of community of communities who can enter into mutual criticism of one another (as in 
Maclntyre's university/ies). This is the very opposite of a pluralism of indifference, which, 
despite intentions to the contrary, is what so-called 'traditioned' liberalism becomes - because of 
its neglect of the substantive contents of the traditions which it invokes. 
This last point suggests a major area of potential research: the kinds of virtue-sustaining practices 
which are maintained and may even be promoted by liberal capitalist societies. It has been argued 
(following Stout 1988) that Maclntyre neglects practices in modem societies which sustain 
internal goods. There is much information available on attitudes and public opinion, but very 
little which considers the relation between social networks, practices, virtues and tradition. More 
work on the role of narrative in sustaining moral discourse would also be valuable. 
Another potentially rich area for investigation is Vertovec's (in Jackson and Nesbitt 1993) 
concept of "multiple cultural competence", and developed at 7.5: just how much plurality can be 
sustained within a telos oriented tradition? It is also hoped that the account of human rights given 
may stimulate research on the understanding and use of rights discourse, both amongst 
traditioned minorities and the majority in the West, as well as in Muslim countries (Dwyer 1991). 
A further, and final, area which the thesis suggests warrants further investigation is the feminist 
challenge both to liberalism and to traditional religion, especially, perhaps, Islam. In some ways, 
tradition-based ways of thinking and feminism have much in common in their mutual rejection of 
foundationalism and their turn to the concrete and the particular; yet feminist epistemologies tend 
to emphasise the Enlightenment concept of negative freedom in their models of emancipation, in 
contrast to traditions. Certainly, many crucial issues in the plural public arena arise at the 
intersection of feminist and cultural minority discourses, as the Women Against Fundamentalism 
and UKACIA clash at 5.4 indicates. Indeed, the author has already undertaken fieldwork on a 
case where discourses of gender, race, religion and culture interact. 10 
10 Concerning disputes at the Law Centre, Newcastle upon Tyne. My thanks to Brunel Research 
Initiative and Enterprise Funding and Brunel University College Dept. of Arts for Funding this. 
Note on Transliteration 
Diacritical marks are omitted from words in transliteration. 
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